%^^'- 






o.'^^'^-^P ''- 



.^^^^• 


















L-i ^O 






,-^5 -% '"it 

"■ "rl. ' ." 



=<^. O^^ 



,- -0' 












c " « O 






„,..■ ,^ 









,0 O^ 



.V-' .*'-/". 



,'^^%^^- 



o 



%."■•;,*?. 

%/-:. 


,,\V 


•^-r.. ' -- 












■V'. '"OO^ 




-./.: .<H -TV 






.^^'■ % 



■■■V< 






i-K 









S:^'^^^o^^l ^ ■ ^^s^^^-y^^- ^s-'^-y. ^ " -: 



.■x^ 



?.^ 









j.\'" '■''>^\^V 






*> * •' N <> ' ^" °J 



**^'' % J"' ^S'^:^' ■''{%. .xS' ' *^-'*^'' 






.<* -^f 












\' 



•Si. 









,0 c 



"(/^ ,\V' 



./i^- 












"■^V 









'' ^y'^,%% ^^ ,y;:;^^-%'" 









/»^^^>> <f^'::'.i'% /..'!r^% c?^.^:';.::'^ 






\0 O, , iX^'S?) 



o-^ -^^ ' 






.•/„,.. 



*.. ',\. 



>0 o^ 











,0 o^ 









%^^' 






V s" 



,C>^\0"', -'c.. 



..^\ ^rj§^/ .^X'^} 






^>^-^; 



c'=-'> 












>''-' v>^\-«,,/'';*"^°'>° 









\ 



^ \^ V - - , - 


















^. 'V..^ 




_^-,V y^ '•*. 'o.. 






%<^^'' ^J^^tJ.\'^ ^,^' 



*\a ■ 





^w;.^ 
. ^ -<^^^ 


;HI^^, - 


•^ 


V 


= ;:;' 


, •-" * 


./• 


'V 


\ ': 







..s*^ yi^ " .''"o. rp- .^^^v'^^"<^^ 




ADMIRAL VISCOXTIfT JELLICOE OF SCAPA, G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. 



THE GRAND FLEET 

1914-1916 

ITS CREATION, DEVELOPMENT AND WORK 



BY 
ADMIRAL VISCOUNT JELLICOE 

' OF SCAPA 
G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O. 



WITH ILLUSTRATIONS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS 




NEW ^S^ YORK 
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



^ 



^^ 



-■^^v^-^ 



COPTEIGHT, 1919, 
BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY 



PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



MUR 22 1919 



)CI,A5L2779 



f\^'. 



V 



-p \ 



TO MY COMRADES 
OF THE GRAND FLEET 



PREFACE 

In the following pages the work of the Grand Fleet, from 
the outbreak of war until the end of November, 1916, 
is described. 

The writing of this record of the work of the Grand 
Fleet, of which little has been heard by the nation 
hitherto, has helped to fill in days of leisure. The manu- 
script was finished by the autumn of 1918, but publication 
was deferred for obvious reasons. When the armistice 
had been signed and the German Navy had, for all prac- 
tical purposes, ceased to exist, I felt free to issue the book. 
The final revision has been done hastily owing to my early 
departure for the Dominions, and in the circumstances I 
hope I may rely on the indulgence of readers if any clerical 
errors have escaped me. In order to minimise the chances 
of such errors Mr. Archibald Hurd has kindly read the 
proofs, and I am much indebted to him. 

The narrative necessarily includes an account of the 
gradual organisation and development of the Grand Fleet, 
and its bases, by successive steps, after the hoisting of my 
flag on the outbreak of hostilities; and the manner in 
which the changing conditions of naval warfare were met 
is also dealt with. 

Admiral Mahan, amongst others, has truly said that 
whilst the principles of naval strategy are unchangeable, 
experience in war and changes in the weapons with which 
war is waged may profoundly affect the application of 
those principles. 



viii PREFACE 

The truth of this statement was shown in the Russo- 
Japanese war; in the short interval between 1904 and 1914 
further great advances took place in the technique of 
warfare; these produced a striking influence on strategy 
and tactics during the late war. 

The reasons which made it necessary, during the war, 
to hide from public view the work of the Grand Fleet 
no longer exist, and it will no doubt be of interest to the 
nation to learn something of its operations, especially as, 
for various justifiable reasons, few despatches were issued 
dealing with its activities. So far as the Battle Fleet 
was concerned, the Battle of Jutland was the one 
exception, and that despatch was written and published 
when it was necessary to conceal a good deal from the 
enemy. 

As is inevitable, much of the information in this 
volume is of a technical character and, though interesting 
to seamen, may prove less so to the general reader. Those 
who take this view may decide that Chapters IV to X, 
inclusive, require only to be glanced at. Confidential 
matter, which it is still undesirable to make public, has 
been excluded from the book. Some of this may see the 
light in later years. 

The main portion of the book is written in narrative 
form, but where it is thought that an explanation may 
be useful, as to the reasons which governed any particular 
movement or decision, such reason is given in order that 
opportunity may be afforded the reader of understanding 
the purpose in view and the manner in which it was hoped 
to achieve it. 

In some parts of the book reference is made to the 
Germans being superior to us in materiel. There were 
many directions, however, in which war experience 
showed the correctness of our views and the wisdom of 



PREFACE ix 

our pre-war policy. We did, in fact, obtain a margin of 
safety in the most essential type of vessel, the capital 
ship, and we did gain advantage from the heavier calibre 
of our guns. Naval policy is pursued in peace conditions 
under inevitable disadvantages in a democratic country, 
because there are many claims on the Exchequer. Re- 
viewing our pre-war programmes of ship construction and 
equipment, and bearing in mind the unconsciousness of 
the nation generally as to the imminence of war, it is 
matter for satisfaction that the Boards of Admiralty 
from the beginning of the century were able to achieve so 
much, and that when at last war became inevitable the 
nation had in control of its destinies at Whitehall a First 
Lord and a First Sea Lord who, accepting their responsi- 
bility, mobilised the Fleet before war was actually 
declared, thus securing for us inestimable advantages, as, 
I hope, I have demonstrated in my record of the Grand 
Fleet. The years of strenuous work and training carried 
out by the officers and men of the Fleet, which should 
never be forgotten, had made of it a magnificent fighting 
machine, and bore ample fruit during the war. 

The Germans, in creating their Fleet, followed 
generally the British lead. In this book reference is made 
to the general efficiency of the German Navy and of the 
good design and fine equipment of their ships. These 
points were never questioned by British naval officers, 
and the shameful surrender of the host of the German 
ships in 1918 did not alter the opinions previously formed. 
That surrender was the result of broken moral. 

More than a hundred years after the Battle of Trafal- 
gar, and after a century of controversy, the Admiralty 
considered it desirable to appoint a committee to decide 
whether that action was fought in accordance with the 
original intentions of the Commander-in-Chief, as em- 



X PREFACE 

bodied in his famous JMemorandum. It is hoped that 
the facts recorded in this book, and the comments 
accompanying them, constitute a clear statement of 
the making of the Grand Fleet and the manner in which 
it endeavoured, whilst under my command, to fulfil its 
mission. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER FAOE 

I The Opening op the War 1 

II General Naval Strategy in Home Waters 12 

III The Grand Fleet and Its Bases .... 34 

IV Declaration of War . 88 

V The Submarine and Mine Menace in the 

North Sea 105 

VI Incidents at Sea — November 1 to December 

31, 1914 155 

VII The Dogger Bank Action 187 

VIII German Mines and Submarines .... 221 

IX Controlling the North Sea 249 

X Attempts to Entice the Enemy to Action . 264 

XI The Naval Situation in May, 1916 ... 300 

XII The Battle of Jutland 304 

XIII The Battle of Jutland (continued) .... 341 

XIV The Battle of Jutland (continued) .... 370 

XV Reflections on the Battle of Jutland . . 390 

XVI The Lessons of Experience ; Lord Kitchener's 

Farewell 415 

XVn The Submarine Peril to Merchant Shipping; 

Recall to the Admiralty 445 

Appendix I 463 

Appendix II 490 



ILLUSTRATIONS 



Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, of Scapa, G. C. B., O. M., 
G. C. V. O. Frontispiece 

FACING PAGE r 

Destroyers Raising Steam on the First Occasion op 
A Submarine Being Reported Inside Scapa Flow 28 

The First Obstruction at Scapa Flow 28 

Smoke Screen Made by Destroyers 68 

A Dummy Battleship, March, 1915 68 

The Commander-in-Chief, Captain of the Fleet 
(Commodore Lionel Halsey), and the Flag Lieu- 
tenant (Lieut. -Commander Herbert Fitzherbert) 
on Board H.M.S. Iron Duke 96 i^ 

The Battle of Jutland as Depicted by a German 
Artist (colour) 336 i^^ 

H.M.S. Iron Duke and 3rd Division of the Battle 

Fleet Deploying at the Battle of Jutland . . 342 '■ 

H.M.S. Iron Duke Opening Fire at the Battle of 

Jutland 346 ^^ 

H.M.S. St/P£BB Opening Fireat the Battleof Jutland 366 ' 



PLANS AND DIAGRAMS 

PLANS 

FLAN PACING PAGE 

1. ScAPA Flow and the Orkneys 48 '' 

2. Area of Operations of 10th Cruiser Squadron . 74 1 

3. Typical Sweep, September 8th-11th, 1914 . . . 128 

4. Approximate Dispositions, October 3rd-11th, 1914, 

Whilst Canadian Convoy Was Crossing . . 138 ■ 

5. Movements op Fleet, January 23rd-25th, 1915 . 196 , 

6. Operations off Horn Reef, May 2nd-5th, 1916 . 290 

7. Operations of Battle Cruiser Fleet, 2 p. m. to 6.15 

p. m., May 31st, 1916 316 ^ 

8. Approximate Position of Ships of Grand Fleet, 

6.45 p. M., May 31st, 1916 350 

9. Approximate Position of Ships of Grand Fleet, 

7.15 p. M., May 31st, 1916 358- 



DIAGRAMS 

DIAGRAM 

1. Before and After Deployment of the Battle Fleet, 

May 31st, 1916. 

2. Showing an Imaginary Deployment on the Starboard 

Wing Column. 

3. Battle op Jutland, Movements of Battle Fleet and 

Battle Cruisers. 

4. Operations During the Night of May 31st-June 1st, 

and on June 1st, 1916. 



THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 



THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 



CHAPTER I 



THE OPENING OF THE WAR 



Early in 1914, whilst serving at the Admiralty as Second 
Sea Lord, I had been offered and had accepted the com- 
mand of the Home Fleets, which in the ordinary course 
would have become vacant in the following December on 
the expiration of Admiral Sir George Callaghan's term 
of command, and public announcement was made of the 
intended appointment. 

Sir George Callaghan was my senior by seven years, 
and he and I had served together in China fourteen years 
before, when I was Flag Captain to Admiral — afterwards 
Admiral of the Fleet — Sir Edward Seymour. He had 
since had what is probably a unique period of sea service, 
passing from one appointment to another without an 
interval of half pay. Soon after his promotion to flag 
rank he had become Rear- Admiral in the old Channel 
Fleet ; thence he had gone on to the 5th Cruiser Squadron 
in 1907; two years later he became second in command 
in the Mediterranean, and on the expiration of his term 
there, in 1910, he returned to take up the appointment 
of Vice-Admiral commanding the Second Division of the 
Home Fleets, succeeding to the position of Commander- 
in-Chief in 1910. The usual period for which the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet was supposed to fly 

1 



2 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

his flag was two years, but in 1913 the Admiralty, 
accurately interpreting the sentiment of the whole Service, 
extended Sir George Callaghan's appointment. And it 
was the approaching termination of this further period of 
command — to the regret of the Admiralty, for which I 
can speak from personal knowledge, and to the regret 
also of the officers and men of the Home Fleets — which 
led to my nomination in the spring of that year. 

In the latter part of July, when the situation in Europe 
had assumed a threatening aspect, Mr. Churchill, the First 
Lord, informed me that in the event of hostilities occur- 
ring involving this country, it was considered necessary 
that the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets should 
have the assistance of a second in command, and he added 
that I had been selected for the appointment, and it was 
desired that I should arrange with Sir George as to the 
ship in which I should fly my flag. 

Sir George Callaghan visited the Admiralty very 
shortly afterwards, and it was decided between us that 
the battleship Centurion should be my flagship. We 
discussed the slight reorganisation that this would involve 
in the Fleet, and I selected my staff, which comprised: 
Captain R. W. Bentinck as Chief of the Staff; Lieut. H. 
Fitzherbert as Flag Lieutenant; Lieut.- Commander E. 
Hardman Jones as Signal Officer; Lieut.-Commander 
R. L. Nicholson as Wireless Officer; Lieut.-Commander 
(N.) A. F. B. Carpenter as War Staff Officer, and Fleet 
Paymaster H. H. Share as Secretary. 

On July 28th, with no premonition of coming events, 
I was present at a dinner party given by Lord Morley at 
the United Services Club. The party was interesting, 
as it comprised Field-lNIarshal Lord Kitchener, Mr. 
Churchill, Lord Haldane, Lord Brj^ce, and others who 
figured later prominently in the War. 



THE OPENING OF THE WAR 3 

During the two following days conferences took 
place at the Admiralty as to the disposition of the Fleet, 
etc, and, in view of the threatening political situation, 
the work of demobilisation after the King's inspection 
at Spithead and the subsequent short fleet exercises were 
suspended, pending further developments. I met Lord 
Kitchener, who was about to return to Egypt, on one or 
two occasions at the Admiralty during these days. 

On July 30th I turned over the duties of Second 
Sea Lord, which I had discharged since December, 1912, 
to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Hamilton, K.C.B., and 
made my final preparations for joining the Fleet as second 
in command. 

I spent some hours at the Admiralty on the following 
day, and during a conversation with Mr. Churchill and 
the Marquis of Milford Haven, the then First Sea Lord, 
it was intimated to me that, in certain circumstances, I 
might be appointed Commander-in-Chief in succession to 
Sir George Callaghan. 

This intimation came upon me as a great surprise, 
and I protested against such an appointment being made 
on what might possibly be on the ver}?^ eve of war. 
Nothing definite was settled. I left, however, with the 
impression that the change was not one that had been 
finally decided upon, but that it might take place. I 
left London the same night by the mail train for Wick, 
the Commander-in-Chief having informed me that he 
would send a vessel to meet me there. 

The idea that the change might be made occupied 
my thoughts during the journey to the North. As I 
thought over the possibility of a transfer of command at 
such a moment, the stronger appeared the objections. 
During the ensuing forty-eight hours I sent several 
telegrams to both the First Lord and the First Sea 



4 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Lord on the subject. I dwelt strongly upon the danger 
of substituting, at such a juncture and at such short no- 
tice, an admiral who was not in touch with the Fleet, for 
a Commander-in-Chief with long experience of the Com- 
mand. I mentioned, also, the strong feeling of admira- 
tion and loyalty to the Commander-in-Chief that existed, 
and suggested as an alternative that I should act as his 
assistant on board the Fleet-Flagship. I had in mind 
that I might act somewhat in the capacity of his 
Chief of the Staff. In spite of the First Lord's reiterated 
opinion, my views remained unaltered, although it 
did not occur to me that some anxiety might be felt 
that Sir George Callaghan's health would not stand 
the strain of commanding the Fleet in the event of 
war. That, however, was a matter on which the Admiralty 
would be better informed than myself, and I had no hesi- 
tation in urging the opinions expressed in my successive 
telegrams. 

A thick fog prevailed at Wick, and the Boadicea, the 
ship in which I made the passage to Scapa Flow, was 
not able to leave until late in the forenoon of August 2nd, 
and arrived at Scapa Flow in the afternoon. 

When I reported myself to the Commander-in-Chief, 
the knowledge of the event which was apparently 
impending made the interview both embarrassing and 
painful, as I could see that he had no knowledge of the 
possibility of his leaving the Fleet, and obviously I could 
not tell him. 

We discussed various arrangements, including the 
question of the defence of Scapa Flow, for which tem- 
porary but naturally inadequate measures were being 
energetically taken with the limited resources at the dis- 
posal of the Fleet. 

At about 4 A.M. on August 4th, I received Admiralty 



THE OPENING OF THE WAR 5 

orders to open a secret envelope which had been handed 
to me in the train as I was leaving London, by an officer 
from the Admiralty. This envelope contained my 
appointment as "Commander-in-Chief of the Grand 
Fleet"- — a new designation which must be explained 
later. 

On this order I was obliged to act, and I proceeded 
on board the Iron Duke and found that the Commander- 
in-Chief had received orders to turn over the command 
to me. 

Sir George Callaghan had been my Commander-in- 
Chief during my command of the 2nd Battle Squadron. 
He was, in addition, a personal friend, and I, like all those 
with whom he had been in contact, had the most profound 
respect and admiration for him. The idea of taking over 
his command at the moment of his life naturally caused 
me feelings of the greatest pain, and, moreover, it was 
impossible to dismiss the fear that the Fleet might con- 
clude that I had been in some measure responsible for 
the change. This possibility had, of course, been present 
in my mind from the moment I left London, and it 
appeared to add to the objections to a change of com- 
mand at such a juncture, since any idea of this nature 
prevalent in the Fleet must affect the feeling of loyalty 
to me as the new Commander-in-Chief. 

It is unnecessary to dwell on the matter, but I cannot 
close this portion of my narrative without paying a warm 
tribute to the manner in which Sir George accepted the 
Admiralty decision, which obviously came as a great 
shock to him. He behaved, as always, as a most gallant 
officer and gentleman, and his one desire was to make 
the position easy for me, in entire disregard of his own 
feelings. 

It was decided that I should take over the Command 



6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

on the following day, but a telegram having been received 
from the Admiralty ordering the Fleet to proceed to sea 
at once, I returned to the Iron Duke, and Sir George 
Callaghan arranged to leave the Fleet in the Sappho 
before its departure at 8.30 in the morning. 

At that hour I took over the Command from Sir 
George Callaghan, who then struck his flag. 

The following ten or fourteen days were a period of 
great strain and anxiety. To assume so heavy a responsi- 
bility as the command of the Grand Fleet at such short 
notice on the eve of war was in itself a matter not to be 
taken lightly; it became necessary to gather together 
the strings of the whole organisation, to ascertain the 
dispositions already made and those immediately required, 
and the whole problem was largely complicated by the 
fact that the port on which the Fleet was based was open 
to attack both by destroyers and by submarines, the only 
obstacle to such attack being the navigational difficulties 
of the Pentland Firth. Though considerable, these were 
by no means insuperable. 

Added to this was my feeling of deep regret at super- 
seding a valued chief and friend at such a moment. The 
one thing that helped me through this period was the 
great and most loyal assistance rendered to me by the 
staff of Sir George Callaghan, who, notwithstanding their 
intense personal regret at his departure, gave me their 
very warm support, and concealed from me any trace of 
the feelings which they must have experienced at my 
presence amongst them under such exceptional and try- 
ing conditions. They behaved as naval officers always 
behave — in a true spii-it of comradeship. The same may 
be said of the flag officers and captains in the Fleet, and 
indeed of every officer and man. 

Sir George Callaghan left his whole staff with me, with 



THE OPENING OF THE WAR 7 

the exception of his flag lieutenant, who accompanied 
him to London. This staff included: Commodore A. F. 
Everett, C.B., Captain of the Fleet; Captain R. N. 
Lawson, Flag Captain; Commander Roger Backhouse, 
C.B., Flag Commander; Fleet Paymatser C. F. Pollard, 
C.B., Secretary; Commander the Hon. Matthew Best, 
War Staff Officer; Commander R. W. Woods, Signal 
Officer; Lieut.-Commander J. S. Salmond, Wireless 
Officer; Lieut.-Commander R. M. Bellairs, War Staff 
Officer; Lieut. W. D. Phipps, Signal Officer.* 

When it became certain that I was to take command 
of the Fleet, I asked the Admiralty to appoint Rear- 
Admiral Charles Madden as Chief of the Staff; and I 
was thus able to transfer Captain R. W. Bentinck to 
act as Chief of the Staff to Vice-Admiral Sir George 
Warrender, the next senior flag officer in the Fleet. 

The composition of the Grand Fleet was: 

Fleet-Flagship — H.M.S. Iron Duke. 
Attached Ships— H.M.S. Sappho, H.M.S. Oak. 

BATTLE FLEET 
1st Battle Squadron: 

Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B. (in command). 
Rear-Admiral H. Evan Thomas (2nd in command). 
Battleships Marlborough (Flag), St. Vincent (Rear Flag), Colossus, 
Hercules, Neptune, Vanguard, Collingwood, S'uperh, Bellona 
(attached Light Cruiser), Cyclops (repair ship) 

2nd Battle Squadron: 

Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, Bart., K.C.B. 
(in command). 

* Later, Commodore L. Halsey, C.M.G., became Captain of the Fleet, Captain 
F. C. Dieyer, C.B., Flag-Captain ; Commander C. M. Forbes, Flag-Commander, 
and Fleet-Pa}'master V. H. T. Weekes, Additional Secretary. 



8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart. (2nd in 
command). 
Battleships King George V. (Flag), Orion (Rear Flag), Ajax, Auda- 
cious, Centurion, Conqueror, Monarch, Thunderer, Boadicea 
(attached Light Cruiser), Assistance (repair ship), 

'ith Battle Squadron: 

Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, K.C.V.O. 
(in command). 

Battleships Dreadnought (Flag), Temeraire, Bellerophon, Blonde 
(attached Light Cruiser). 

3rd Battle Squadron: 

Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O. (in command). 
Rear- Admiral M. E. Browning (2nd in command). 
Battleships King Edward VII. (Flag), Hibernia (Rear Flag), 
Commonwealth, Zealandia, Dominion, Africa, Britannia, Hin- 
dustan, Blanche (attached Light Cruiser). 

\st Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

Vice-Admiral (acting) Sir David Beatty (in command). 
Battleships Lion (Flag), Princess Royal, Queen Mary, New Zea- 
land, 

2nd Cruiser S^quadron: 

Rear-Admiral the Hon. S. Gough-Calthorpe 
(in command). 
Cruisers Shannon (Flag), Achilles, Cochrane, Natal. 

3rd Cruiser Squadron: 

Rear-Admiral W. C. Fakenham, C.B. (in command). 
Cruisers Antrim (Flag), Argyll, Devonshire, Roxburgh. 

1st Light Cruiser Squadron: 

Commodore W. E. Goodenough (in command). 
Light Cruisers Southampton (Flag), Birmingham, Lowestoft, Not- 
tingham, 



THE OPENING OF THE WAR 



Destroyer Flotillas 

Second Flotilla: 

Captain J. R. P. Hawkesley (in command in Active). 
Destroyers Acorn, Alarm, Brisk, Cameleon, Comet, Fury, Goldfinch, 
Hope, Lame, Lyra, Martin, Minstrel, Nemesis, Nereide, 
Nymphe, Redpole, Rifleman, Ruby, Sheldrake, Staunch. 

Fourth Flotilla: 

Captain C. J. Wintour (in command in Swift). 
Destroyers Acasta, Achates. Ambuscade, Ardent, Christopher, Cocka- 
trice, Contest, Fortune, Garland, Hardy, Lynx, Midge, 0ml, 
Paragon, Porpoise, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Unity, 
Victor. 

Mine-Sweeping Gunboats: 

Commander L. G. Preston (in command). 
H.M. Ships Skipjack (S.O. Ship) (absent at first), Circe, Gossamer, 

Leda, Speedwell, Jason, Seagull. 
Shetland Patrol Force: Forward (Scout) and four destroyers of the 

River class. 

The above vessels formed the Fleet under the im- 
mediate command of the Commander-in-Chief at the 
outbreak of hostilities. In addition, there were in 
southern waters, and also under the command of the 
Commander-in-Chief, the following vessels : 

THE HARAVICH FORCE 

This force, although an integral portion of the Grand 
Fleet, was based on Harwich. It was intended that it 
should join the Grand Fleet at sea, if possible, in the 
event of a fleet action being imminent, and for this 
reason it was included in the organisation of the Fleet 
for battle; but the force did not, in actual fact, ever isp 



10 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

join the Fleet, nor did I expect that it would be able 
to do so. At the outbreak of war it was commanded 
by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt in H.M.C. Amethyst 
and comprised: 

1st Flotilla 

Commanded by Captain W. Blunt in Fearless with 
20 destroyers. 

Srd Flotilla 

Commanded by Captain C. H. Fox in Amphion with 
15 destroyers. 

Included also in the organisation of the Home Fleets, 
which Sir George Callaghan had commanded-in-chief, 
were the Second and Third Fleets : 

SECOND FLEET 

(under command of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., 

KC.M.G.). 

Fleet-Flagship Lord Nelson, Rear-Admirals Stuart-Nicholson and 

Bernard Currey (commanding Battle Squadrons). 

5th Battle Squadron: 

Prince of Wales (Flag), Agamemnon, Bulwark, Formidable, Im- 
placable, Irresistible, London, Queen, Venerable. 

6th Battle Squadron: 
Russell (Flag), Cornmallis, Albemarle, Duncan, Exmouth, Vengeance. 

5th Cruiser Squadron: 

Eear- Admiral A. P. Stoddart (in command). 
Carnarvon (Flag), Falmouth, Liverpool. 

6th Cruiser Squadron: 

Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant (in command). 
Drake, Good Hope, King Alfred, Levathan, 



THE OPENING OF THE WAR n 

(These last two Cruiser Squadrons were, however, 
broken up hnmediately, and the ships transferred to other 
duties. ) 

Minelayer Squadron, commanded by Captain M. H. Cobbe. 
H.M. Ships Naiad (S.O.'s ship), Andromache, Apollo, Intrepid, 
Iphigenia, Latona, Thetis. 

THIRD FLEET 

This Fleet comprised the 7th and 8th Battle 
Squadrons, consisting of our oldest battleships, and the 
7th, 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th Cruiser Squadrons, com- 
prising our oldest cruisers. 

But the only vessels of this Fleet which were ever 
associated with the Grand Fleet were the ships of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron, which, under the command of 
Rear- Admiral Dudley de Chair, joined the Grand Fleet 
shortly after the outbreak of war, the Squadron being 
employed mainly on blockading duties. It was com- 
posed as follows: 

Crescent (Flag), Edgar, Endymion, Gibraltar, Grafton, Harvhe, 
Royal Arthur, Theseus. 

All submarines, except those of the B and C classes 
which were detached for the protection of our coast and 
ports from Rosyth southwards, were worked, in accord- 
ance with Admiralty policy, from Harwich, and were not, 
therefore, under my command. The C class submarines 
were unfit for oversea work, and our operations in enemy 
waters were therefore confined to boats of the D and E 
classes, of which we possessed a total of 8 D's and 9 E's, 
as against the German total of 28 boats of the U class. 



CHAPTER ir 

GENERAL NAVAL STRATEGY IN HOME "WATERS 

It is hardly surprising if the work and purpose of the 
Navy had somewhat faded from public interest during 
the century that had elapsed since the Napoleonic Wars, 
the last occasion on which the inhabitants of this country 
had felt that their safety depended on maritime power. 
Indeed, it had fallen to the lot of a distinguished officer in 
a foreign navy, Captain Mahan, to awaken interest in this 
matter, and to point out the all-important influence which 
Sea Power had exerted, and would exert, on history. 

Associations such as the Navy League had been 
formed, having as their object the enlightenment of our 
countrj'men, and although a great work was done in this 
direction, the mere necessity for such work is an indication 
of the extent to which the nation had forgotten the lessons 
of the past. 

I therefore offer no apology for making some refer- 
ence to the use and j)urpose of the British Navy. 

The main objects for which our Navy exists may be 
shortly summed up under four heads: 

1. To ensure for British ships the unimpeded use 

of the sea, this being vital to the existence of 
an island nation, particularly one which is 
not self-supporting in regard to food. 

2. In the event of war, to bring steady economic 

pressure to bear on our adversary by deny- 

12 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 13 

ing to him the use of the sea, thus compell- 
ing him to accept peace, 

3. Similarly in the event of war to cover the 

passage and assist any army sent overseas, 
and to protect its communications and sup- 
plies. 

4. To prevent invasion of this country and its 

overseas Dominions by enemy forces. 

The above objects are achieved in the quickest and 
surest manner by destroying the enemj^'s armed naval 
forces, and this is therefore the first objective of our Fleet. 
The Fleet exists to achieve victory. 

But history has alwaj'^s shown that it is a very difficult 
matter to impose our will upon a weaker naval adversary, 
and that, instead of giving us the opportunity of destroy- 
ing his armed naval forces, he usually keeps the main 
body of those forces — the Battle Fleet — in positions of 
safety in fortified harbours, where they are a constant 
threat to the sea communications of the stronger naval 
Power, and force upon that Power a watching policy so 
that the enemy may be engaged, should he put to s^a, 
before he is able to gain any advantage. 

The watching policy in the great wars of the 
Napoleonic era was carried out by keeping our squadrons, 
through fair or foul weather, in the vicinity of those ports 
of the enemy in which his fleet lay. Occasionally our 
ships were driven off by stress of weather, but they 
regained their stations as soon as conditions permitted. 
During this war, however, the advent of the submarine 
and destroyer, and, to a lesser extent, the use of the 
mine rendered such dispositions impossible. 

No large ship could cruise constantly in the vicinity 
of enemy bases without the certainty that she would fall 
an early victim to the attacks of submarines. Destroyers 



14 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

could, it is true, afford some measure of protection, but 
destroyers have a very limited range of action, and could 
not keep the sea off the enemy's distant coast even in 
good weather for a sufficient length of time. Periodical 
relief of the destroyers was an impossibility, owing to the 
great numbers that would be required for this purpose. 

Moreover, even if the submarine danger could be over- 
come, the heavy ships would be so open to attack by 
enemy destroyers at night, if cruising anywhere near 
enemy bases, that they would certainly be injured, if not 
sunk, before many daj^s had passed. 

These facts had been recognised before the War and 
a watching policy from a distance decided upon, the watch' 
being instituted for the purpose of preventing enemy 
vessels from gaining the open sea, where they would con- 
stitute a danger to our sea communications. Now a watch 
maintained at a distance from the port under observation 
is necessarily only partial, except in circumstances where 
the enemy has to pass through narrow straits before gain- 
ing open water. 

The chances of intercepting enemy ships depend 
entirely on the number of watching vessels and the dis- 
tance that those on board them can see. At night this 
distance is very short — on a dark night not more than 
a quarter of a mile, and even in daylight, under the 
average conditions of visibility obtaining in the North Sea, 
it is not more than six to eight miles. 

The North Sea, though small in contrast with the 
Atlantic, is a big water area of about 120,000 square miles 
in extent. The width across it, between the Shetland 
Islands and Norway (the narrowest portion), is 160 miles, 
and an additional 40 miles (the Fair Island Channel) 
would need to be watched also if a patrol were established 
along this line. 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 15 

A consideration of all the circumstances had led to 
the adoption by the Admiralty of Scapa Flow in the 
Orkneys as the main Fleet Base, and the Admiralty had 
determined upon a naval strategy in Home Waters, in 
the event of war with Germany, based upon the idea that 
the Grand Fleet would control the North Sea, and that 
the Channel Fleet would watch the English Channel, thus, 
in combination, holding the enemy's main force. 

To effect this purpose, it was intended that the main 
Battle Fleet should occupy, as circumstances permitted, a 
strategic position in the North Sea where it would act in 
support of Cruiser Squadrons carrying out sweeps to the 
southward in search of enemy vessels, and should be 
favourably placed for bringing the High Sea Fleet to 
action should it put to sea. 

This policy of cruiser sweeps had been adopted as the 
result of experience in the various naval manoeuvres 
carried out in previous years in the North Sea. These 
had demonstrated quite clearly that the alternative 
policy of stretching cruiser patrol lines across the North 
Sea for the purpose of watching for the enemy was an 
impracticable one, it having been shown on many occa- 
sions that evasion of a single patrol line during the hours 
of darkness, or even daylight, under the conditions of 
visibility that usually prevail in the North Sea, is a very 
simple matter. Further, a line of cruisers occupying 
regular patrol positions is always in peril of successful 
submarine attack; the loss of the cruisers Hague, Cressy 
and AbouJdr showed this. It is also open to a concen- 
trated attack by surface vessels. 

The War Orders issued to the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Grand Fleet were based, therefore, on this general 
idea, and when the Grand Fleet proceeded to sea in com- 
pliance with Admiralty orders at 8.30 a.m. on August 



i6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the 4th, 1914, it left with the intention of carrying out 
this general policy. The Channel Fleet, under the com- 
mand of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, assembled in 
the Channel in accordance with the general strategic 
dispositions. 

The vessels engaged in this first move of the Grand 
Fleet comprised the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squad- 
rons, with their attached cruisers; the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron, with its Light Cruiser Squadron, strengthened 
by the addition of the Falmouth and Liverpool; the 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. These 
dispositions continued in force for some three weeks, 
when the strong influence of the submarine on naval 
strategy began to make itself apparent. 

The ideas held in pre- War days as to the capabilities 
of submarines were found, after a short experience of 
war, to need modification. In the first place, it became 
quickly apparent that the German submarines possessed 
a radius of action and sea-keeping qualities considerably 
greater than those of our own submarines. It had been, 
for instance, looked upon as a considerable achievement 
for our submarines to keep the sea for a period of five to 
seven days, and they had not operated at any great dis- 
tance from the coast. It is true that submarines had on 
occasion made long voyages such as to Australia, but 
they were then usually escorted, or even towed, and the 
number of days from port to port did not approach the 
length of time for which German submarines remained 
at sea. Further, it was known that the Germans pos- 
sessed a considerable superiority in the number of sub- 
marines which were capable of operating overseas, and 
the frequent sighting of enemy submarines as far north 
as the Orkney and Shetland Islands early in the War, 
combined with the fact that it appeared that the enemy 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 17 

had established a regular submarine patrol in the centre 
of the North Sea, made it evident that the German sub- 
marines would constitute a very serious menace to our 
heavy ships. 

The comparative strength in submarines in Home 
Waters at the outbreak of war was as follows: 

German — 

U Boats 28 of which U 1 to U 4 were hardly fit for oversea 
work, but were as good as our D class. 
British — 

(of which D 1 was unreliable and the remaining 
units of the D class were not equal to the U 
boats. 
E Class 9 

C Class 34 I Unfit for oversea work and used only for local de- 
B Class S I fence of the coast or in the Channel. 

The Germans also had at least 24 submarines under 
construction, whilst we were building 19, apart from two 
experimental vessels of which nothing resulted. 

Of these 19 submarines, several were of new type, in 
pursuance of a policy introduced by the Admiralty in 
1913-14 of widening the area of supply of these vessels. 
This policy had far-reaching and beneficial results on the 
subsequent output of this class of vessel, as it enabled us 
to increase our submarine flotillas more rapidly than would 
otherwise have been the case. 

A change in previous naval practice was considered 
necessary at an early period, because vessels moving at 
anything but high speed, particularly in the case of a 
number of ships in company, ran very considerable risks 
in waters where we might expect enemy submarines to be 
operating, unless screened by a strong force of destroyers. 
This conclusion affected the movements and operations 
of the Battle Fleet, since the number of destroyers we 



i8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

possessed was quite inadequate to form a screen for a 
Battle Fleet and a Battle Cruiser Squadron which con- 
stantly kept the sea. The number required, for such a 
screen to be effective, was at least 40 for the Battle 
Fleet alone as then constituted, and that number, 40, was 
all that we had stationed at the Northern Base. The fuel 
capacity of destroyers was only sufficient for them to 
remain at sea in company with a fleet for some three days 
and nights, whereas the Fleet itself could remain out for 
three or four times that period. Moreover, the destroyers 
could not be kept nearly so constantly at sea as the large 
ships owing to their requirements in the way of boiler- 
cleaning and the refit and adjustment of their more 
delicate machinery, and the necessity for giving not only 
the machinery, but the personnel, periods of rest. The 
heavy ships, then, had tAvo alternatives, either to remain 
at sea without a destroyer screen or to return to harbour 
with the destroyers. In the early days the first alternative 
was adopted, the risk being accepted, but minimised as 
far as possible, by keeping the ships in the northern part 
of the North Sea. 

A further danger soon made itself apparent. It 
became evident at an early period, as many naval 
officers had expected, in view of German language at the 
Hague Conference, that our enemy intended to throw 
overboard the doctrines of international law when he could 
gain any advantage by doing so. He accordingly pro- 
ceeded at once to lay mines in positions where he thought 
they would be advantageous to his operations, in utter dis- 
regard of the safety, not only of British, but also of neutral 
merchant ships. It was, therefore, thought very probable 
that he would elaborate this practice by laying mines in the 
North Sea in positions where he anticipated they might 
prove effective against the Grand Fleet, and that he would 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 19 

do this without issuing any warning to neutral countries. 
Consequently, if the main Battle Fleet were kept moving 
continuously in the central and southern waters of the 
North Sea, in which waters the enemy could easily lay 
mines with little danger of his operations being witnessed 
(as he could carry them out under cover of darkness), 
it was evident that considerable risks might be in- 
curred without our being aware of the fact. The policy 
of attrition of our Battle Fleet might thus be carried 
out with such success as to produce equality, or even 
inferiority, on the part of the British Fleet as compared 
with the German, in a comparatively short space of time. 
The only safeguard against such action which we could 
take would be to keep mine-sweepers constantly working 
ahead of the Battle Fleet. But the number of mine- 
sweepers that we possessed was wholly inadequate for 
such a task; and even if this had not been so, to carry out 
such an operation would have necessitated the speed of 
the Battle Fleet being reduced to some 10 knots, the 
maximum sweeping speed of mine-sweepers, and it would 
have been forced also to steer a steady course without 
zigzagging, conditions rendering the battleships exceed- 
ingly vulnerable to submarine attack. 

The first effect, therefore, of the submarine menace, 
combined with possible German action in regard to mine- 
laying, was to cause the Battle Fleet to confine its move- 
ments under ordinary conditions to the more northern 
waters of the North Sea, Avhere the risk might be taken 
of cruising without the presence of a screen of destroyers, 
and where it was improbable, ov/ing to the depth of water 
and the distance from enemy bases, that the Germans 
would be able to lay mines without discoverj\ 

The fact that this course of action would be forced 
upon us as the submarine and destroyer menace grew had 



20 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

often been present in my mind in pre- War days, when I 
had expressed the view that the beginning of a naval war 
would be a conflict betAveen the small craft, whilst the 
larger and more valuable vessels were held aloof. I have 
no doubt that this opinion was very generally held by 
officers of experience. 

The northward movement of the Battle Fleet was 
combined with the establishment of certain cruiser patrol 
areas in the North Sea. These areas, which were pur- 
posely made large, were watched on a regular, organised 
plan by our Cruiser Squadrons, moving at fairly high 
speed in such a manner as to reduce the submarine risk 
to the cruisers to a minimum, whist at the same time they 
kept as effective a watch as possible, first, to intercept 
German war vessels that might be covering a raid on our 
coasts or transports, or trying to reach the open sea to 
operate against trade, and, secondly, to ensure that all 
merchant ships entering or leaving the North Sea should 
be closely examined in order to enforce the blockade. 

This patrol policy was associated with periodical 
sweeps of cruisers, supported by the Battle Fleet, down 
into the southern waters of the North Sea, the object 
being to catch the enemy's fleet at sea, if possible, and 
in any case, owing to our movements being probably re- 
ported to the Germans by neutral merchant ships, to 
make them feel that they could never move a force to 
sea without the possibility of encountering our Fleet 
engaged in one of these southern sweeps, which we car- 
ried out at irregular intervals. A typical sweep is illus- 
trated in accompanying plans. On these occasions the 
Battle Fleet was kept strictly concentrated during the 
southern movement, and was screened as far as possible 
by destroyers against submarine attack; and at times 
mine-sweepers were directed to work ahead of the Battle 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 21 

Fleet. When this was not possible, owing to the small 
number of mine-sweepers available or the state of the 
weather, some of the older battleships of the 6th Battle 
Squadron, if they were in company, were stationed 
ahead of the main Battle Fleet in order that, should a 
minefield be encountered, these older ships would be the 
first to strike the mines, thus giving sufficient warning 
to enable me to manoeuvre the more valuable ships clear 
of the field. 

This general policy was continued until the attack on 
the Theseus and loss of the Hawke, belonging to the 
10th Cruiser Squadron, by submarine attack on 
October 15th, 1914, showed that even under the disposi- 
tions then adopted, our larger cruisers were being risked 
to too great an extent when working without destroyers 
in the central part of the North Sea. 

The next move, therefore, was the withdrawal of the 
cruiser patrols to a safer position farther to the northward 
and eastward of the Shetland Islands, this being com- 
bined with a watch by the smaller craft on the Fair Island 
Channel, and on the Pentland Firth approaches to the 
North Sea. Under these conditions the Battle Fleet 
was often kept either in a position westward of the 
Orkneys, where it was in support of the cruisers and at 
the same time formed a second blockade line, or it cruised 
to the north and east of the Shetland Islands, the cruiser 
patrols working farther south. 

In all the dispositions which were made for a watch on 
the northern entrance to the North Sea, the principle 
kept in mind was the necessity for such an organisation 
of the patrols as to have, in so far as numbers permitted, 
two lines, or two areas, watched. The two areas were 
at such a distance apart that vessels moving in or out 
of the North Sea were forced, so far as all human fore- 



22 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

sight could provide, to pass through the waters occupied 
by one of the two groups of ships during dayhght hours; 
the distances apart were regulated according to the length 
of the night at the different seasons of the year. 

As the Battle Fleet worked farther to the northward 
and westward, it became possible to make use of the 
heavy ships to assist in blockade work without running 
undue risks from submarines, and the blockade increased 
correspondingly in effectiveness. As time went on, how- 
ever, the provision by the Admiralty of a larger number 
of armed merchant cruisers enabled us to establish an 
effective blockade line by the use of these vessels alone, 
backed up by Cruiser Squadrons when such were available. 
The withdrawal of the Battle Fleet to more northern 
and western waters first took effect when the Fleet Base 
was shifted temporarily from Scapa to Lough Swilly. 
Wlien this occurred, it did not affect the policy of fre- 
quent cruiser sweeps into the southern portion of the 
North Sea, supported by the Battle Fleet, which were still 
continued. 

The dispositions that have been described took account 
naturally of two other very important factors. 

The first was the transport of our Expeditionary Force 
to France. It was highly probable that the enemy would 
endeavour to interfere with this movement, and in the 
early days of the War it would not have been a difficult 
matter for him to cause us some loss. His failure to make 
at least some attempt in this direction showed a lack of 
enterprise which surprised me, as I think it surprised most 
naval officers. 

The conditions for him were distinctly favourable. 
Our main Fleet was based, as he must have been aware, 
far away to the northward, and if he had timed an attack 
on the cross-Channel traffic for a period during which he 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 23 

reckoned that the Grand Fleet, or at least the destroyers, 
were returning to the base to fuel, he would have stood a 
good chance of making the attack and returning to his 
base before that Fleet could intervene. Consequently, he 
would only have had to deal with the comparatively light 
forces based in southern waters. On the other hand, 
if our Fleet arrived on the scene without destroyers, the 
Germans would have possessed no mean advantage. 

The enemy was provided with a large number of 
modern destroyers, and some of them would have been 
well expended over a Channel dash, which would in all 
probability have met with some success. During the 
transport of the Expeditionary Force the heavy ships of 
the Grand Fleet kept the sea as far as possible in order 
to cover the movement, but the destroyers were constantly 
returning to the base to fuel. 

The second factor which had considerable influence on 
Fleet dispositions was the possibility of an attempt at a 
raid or invasion by the enemy. Such a move was not 
very likely in the earliest days of the War, when the 
nights were comparatively short and the Expeditionary 
Force had not left the country. It is also probable that 
the enemy had few troops to spare for the purpose. But. 
the chances became greater as we denuded the country of 
men, and the conditions in other respects became more 
favourable. In October and November, 1914, I held and 
expressed the opinion that, if raids were attempted, 
landings would probably be effected in the rivers on the 
East Coast, the entrances to which were either unpro- 
tected or inadequately protected. A beach landing on 
our East Coast can only be carried out in fine weather, 
and the chances of encountering favourable conditions on 
arrival off the coast are not great, and I always doubted 
the attempt being made. In our rivers the opportunities 



24 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

are greater, and are not so dependent on fine weather, 
and I suggested to the Admiralty that a simple preventive 
in this case was to place merchant ships in position ready 
to be sunk across the channels (which are narrow and 
shallow), the ships being fitted with explosive charges 
below ready to blow out the bottoms in case of necessity. 
I mentioned the names of certain retired naval officers 
who, I felt certain, would make all the necessary prepara- 
tions in a very few days. I believe that my proposals 
were carried out. 

The danger of raids, however, and the consequent 
responsibility thrown upon the Admiralty for their pre- 
vention, during a period when we had very little military 
force in the country, led to a division of the Fleet by 
Admiralty direction, which, however necessary, had cer- 
tain disadvantages from a strategic point of view. 

The 3rd Battle Squadron, consisting of eight ships of 
the "King Edward VII." class, and the 3rd Cruiser 
Squadron of four ships of the "County" class, were or- 
dered to be based on Rosyth, together with destroyers 
for screening purposes. The eventuality that had then 
to be faced was that of the remainder of the Grand Fleet 
having to engage the High Sea Fleet, since concentra- 
tion with the 3rd Battle Squadron could probably not be 
effected without the risk of losing the opportunity of 
engaging. 

At this time the battle cruisers Princess Roycd, In- 
vincihle, and Inflexible were in the Atlantic operating 
against Von Spec's squadron; and the Australia, Indomi- 
table had not joined the Grand Fleet. The Tiger was not 
yet ready, so that at times our battle cruiser force con- 
sisted of only three ships, the Lion, Queen Mary, and 
Netio Zealand. 

Throughout the War the responsibility of the Fleet 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 25 

for the prevention of raids or invasion was a factor which 
had a considerable influence on naval strategy. 

If the Fleet, with destroyers, carried out a sweep in 
the North Sea, or if it was at sea for a cruise having 
exercises for its main object, there was bound to be 
present in the mind of the Commander-in-Chief the chance 
that he might be required suddenly to move south to en- 
gage the High Sea Fleet which had put to sea to cover a 
landing. If his destroyers were short of fuel at such a 
moment very serious consequences might ensue, and 
therefore all cruiser sweeps or other operations had to be 
curtailed to prevent such a situation arising. 

One other factor exercised a cramping effect upon our 
naval strategy throughout the War, namely, the bom- 
bardment of our undefended towns on the East Coast. 
Such bombardments were of no immediate military value 
to the enemy, but, in spite of the fact that the majority 
of the Press, and the public, realised that the Navy should 
not be led into false strategy because of these bombard- 
ments, it was difficult for the Fleet to ignore them, and 
I have no doubt that the Germans relied upon this fact. 

Whilst the Fleet was based at Scapa Flow, it was 
quite impossible to ensure that the enemy would be 
brought to action after such an operation, since to attain 
this end it would have been necessary for the Fleet, or 
a portion of it, to be constantly cruising in the southern 
portion of the North Sea. This was not practicable, even 
had it been desirable, because of the impossibility of keep- 
ing destroyers with the heavier ships, and in any case it 
was false strategy to divide the Battle Fleet, as such a 
course might well have resulted in disaster. 

The usual course adopted was to base the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet on Rosyth, and for that Fleet to cruise 
from that neighbourhood. The speed of the battle 



26 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

cruisers enabled them to get away from a decidedly 
suiierior enemy force of battleships if encountered, but 
there was always some risk in this case of a ship being 
disabled; the flag officer in command would then have 
been faced with the unpleasant alternative of abandoning 
her or of risking his whole force to cover her retreat. 

Had we been able to keep an effective look-out off the 
enemy ports, so as to obtain warning of their ships leav- 
ing, the difficulty would not have been so great, but our 
submarines in those days (the only class of vessel which 
could be used for such a purpose) were not fitted 
with wireless installations with which they could signal 
from the required positions, or indeed from positions any- 
where near the enemy's coast, and, in any case, it must be 
borne in mind that at night the exit of enemy vessels unob- 
served, even under the conditions of a close submarine 
look-out, is a comparatively easy matter. 

At this stage it is convenient to remark upon the con- 
dition of British naval bases. As is well kno^n, the 
Grand Fleet was moved to Scapa Flow during the latter 
days of July, 1914, and the defenceless condition of the 
Base, both against destroyer attack and submarine attack, 
was brought very strongly into prominence by the pres- 
ence of so valuable a Fleet at this Base. 

The anchorage known as Scapa Flow has three main 
entrances navigable by all ships, the Hoxa, the Switha, 
and Hoy Channels, and, in addition, has some more 
narrow, shallow and tortuous entrances on the eastern 
side, the main one being Holm Sound. The question of 
providing gun defences for this Base, which the Ad- 
miralty had decided a year or two before the War was 
to be the main Fleet Base, had been discussed on more 
than one occasion, after examination by a committee of 
officers on the spot; but, since finance governs defence, 



Strategy in home waters 27 

and the Admiralty from year to year had insufficient 
money for even more urgent needs, no action had been 
taken. Scapa Flow lies some 450 miles from the German 
naval bases, and was, therefore, open to an attack by 
enemj^'s destroj^er flotillas as well as, of course, by sub- 
marines. Its main, indeed its only, safety against such 
attacks by submarines lay in the navigational difficulties 
attendant upon entry into the harbour, combined, as re- 
gards destroyer attacks, with the possibility of an enemj^'s 
force being intercepted on its outward or homeward 
passage, or of its being successfully engaged in the 
vicinity of the base. The sailing directions laid great 
stress upon the difficulties of navigations in the approaches 
to this Base, due to the very strong and varying cur- 
rents, but the Germans were well acquainted Avith 
the Orkney and Shetland Islands. They had indeed 
made it a practice to send ships to visit these islands fairly 
frequently before the War, and they were, therefore, as 
well able to judge of the difficulties of entry into Scapa 
Flow as we were; and seeing that we used it as a main 
Fleet Base, they could deduce the fact, if they did not 
know it already, that the difficulties of entry were not 
insuperable. 

Sir George Callaghan, under these conditions, on the 
arrival of the Fleet at Scapa Flow at the end of July, 
took immediate steps, with the resources at his disposal 
in the Fleet, to improvise defences for the Base against 
destroyer attack. All that he could do was to land some 
12-pounder guns from the ships of the Fleet and mount 
them at the entrances. No searchlights could, however, 
be provided, so that the guns were not of much value at 
night. Arrangements were also made for placing light 
cruisers and destroyers at the various entrances to assist 
these defences. The further step, of course, was taken 



28 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

when the Fleet was present at the Base of placing patrols 
to the eastward of the Pentland Firth. It was not felt in 
the Fleet, however, that these measures gave much 
security even against destroyer attack on a dark night, and^ 
it gave no security whatever against submarine attack. 
Nothing but obstructions of some kind could give that 
security. The matter was frequently discussed. Although 
many brains had been at work, no satisfactory anti-sub- 
marine obstruction had been devised. Under the urgent 
pressure of war the solution was found. The conclusion 
generally held by experienced submarine officers was that, 
whilst the least important entrances, such as the Hoy, 
the Switha and the Holm Sound Channels, would be ex- 
tremely difficult for the passage of a submarine, entry by 
the Hoxa Sound Channel was quite practicable by a de- 
termined submarine officer. So much for the Base at 
Scapa Flow. 

At Cromarty the conditions were somewhat better. 
The only entrance to this Base is comparatively narrow, 
and was defended against the entry of destroj^ers and 
larger vessels by guns, which had been mounted by the 
Admiralty before war broke out. There was, however, 
no boom protection against the entry of destroyers, and 
the conditions in regard to submarine attack were the 
same as at Scapa Flow, there being no obstructions. 

At Rosyth the same conditions prevailed as at 
Cromarty, namely, the harbour was defended by guns 
only against attack by destroyers. In this case, the guns 
were manned by the military, and not by marines, as at 
Cromarty; again the harbour was quite open to sub- 
marine attack. 

Consequently, the anxiety of officers in command of 
Fleets or Squadrons at anchor in any of the Bases used 
by the Grand Fleet was immense. For my part, I was 




DESTROYERS RAISING STEAM OX THE FIRST OCC^VSION" OF A 
SUIIMAHIXE IIKJXC. REPORTED INSIDE SCAPA FLOW 



JUiJ^ 




•I'HE FIKST OBSTRUCTION" AT SCAPA FLOW 



30 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

their small fuel capacity, were only of use in southern 
waters and were appropriated to Dover. And we pos- 
sessed 25 destroyers of the "River" class, of a nominal 
speed of onl)-- 25 knots, as well as the old 30-knot de- 
stroyer; the latter class was only fit for patrol work in 
the vicinity of the coast. 

It may be said that similar reflections to those I have 
mentioned might be made by the Germans as regards our 
own movements, and that they were surprised that we 
did not attack their Fleet at anchor. The answer is 
obvious to those aware of the conditions. We were very 
short of destroyers for fleet work, and we were well aware 
of the thoroughness of the defences of the German naval 
bases. We knew that they not only possessed the most 
powerful and ample artillery defences, but we knew also 
that the Germans had a very efficient mining service, and 
we were justified in assuming that they had protected their 
naval bases by extensive minefields. We, on the other 
hand, were entirely unprovided with this particular form 
of defence. 

In view of the known quality of German artillery and 
mine defences and the thorough nature of their organisa- 
tion, my own view was that they also possessed, in all 
probability, anti-submarine defences. For these reasons, 
together with the important fact that the German rivers 
are so shallow that our submarines could not enter them 
in a submerged condition, it appeared to me that an attack 
on their ships in harbour would meet with no success, 
and that we could not afford to expend any of our exceed- 
ingly limited number of destroyers, or submarines, in 
making an attack which would, in all human probability, 
be foredoomed to failure. Later knowledge of the 
German defences proved the correctness of this view. 
I can only imagine that the Germans credited us, also. 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 31 

with possessing harbour defences and obstructions which 
in our case were non-existent, although we did our 
best in the Fleet to give the impression that we had ob- 
structed the entrances, for, pending the provision of proper 
obstructions, we improvised various contrivances. It 
may have seemed impossible to the German mind that we 
should place our Fleet, on which the Empire depended for 
its very existence, in a position where it was open to sub- 
marine or destroyer attack. 

This view, however, did not relieve the minds of those 
responsible for the safety of our Fleet from the gravest 
anxiety whenever the more valuable ships were in the un- 
defended harbours. 

A comparison of numbers between the Grand Fleet 
and the High Sea Fleet in the early part of the War shows 
the following figures. Only ships that had completed 
their training and were fit to fight in the line are included : 



BATTLESHIPS 
(B., British; G., German) 



Date 


Dread- 
noughts 


Pre- 
Dread- 
noughts 


Battle 
cruisers 


Light 
cruisers 


De- 
stroy- 
ers 


Air- 
ships 


Cruisers 


August 4th, 1914 

B 


20 
13 

20 
15 

21* 
16 

23 
17 

25 
17 


8 
16 

12 
16 

8 
16 

8 
16 

10 
16 


4 
3 

6 
3 

6 

4 

9 
4 

10 
4 


12 
15 

12 
14 

17 
12 

18 
14 

25 
15 


42 
88 

42 
88 

44 
88 

54 
88 

66 

88 


1 
3 
6 
6 
12 


9 


G 


2 


October 1st, 1914 

B 


10 


G 


2 


January 1st, 1915 

B 


14 


G 


1 


April 1st, 1915 

B 


17 


G. 


— 


October 1st, 1915 

B 


15 


G 


— 







* 21 completed, but two of these {Monarch and Conqueror) were seriously 
and one other battleship was refitting. 



32 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The above list gives the vessels nominally available. 

In comparisons of the strength at Germany's selected 
and our average moment, the following facts should be re- 
membered, and were necessarily taken into account by me 
at the time : 

(a) We usually had at least two battleships, one or two 
light cruisers, six destroyers, one or two cruisers, and per- 
haps one battle cruiser under refit, in addition to any other 
vessels that might be temporarily disabled. 

( h ) Germany would see to it that none of her ships was 
refitting when planning an operation, and she could rein- 
force her Fleet by several light cruisers and two or more 
flotillas of destroyers from the Baltic. 

(c) The pre-Dreadnoughts were not a very important 
factor on either side owing to inferiority of speed, and, in 
the case of our ships, the comparatively short range of 
their guns, due to the small amount of elevation of which 
their mountings admitted. 

{d) The German Zeppelins, as their numbers in- 
creased, were of great assistance to the enemy for scouting, 
each one being, in favourable weather, equal to at least two 
light cruisers for such a purpose. 

[e) Account is not taken in the British figures of the 
Harwich force, as this force could not be counted upon to 
effect concentration with the remainder of the Grand Fleet 
at the German selected moment. 

(/) The British cruisers, not being very modern, lacked 
the speed necessary for efficiency as scouts. They were 
very slightly faster than the battleships of the "Dread- 
nought" type, and, owing to their lack of speed, they 
were awkwardly placed if they came within range of an 
enemy Battle Squadron or Battle Cruiser Squadron. On 
the other hand, they were very superior in fighting 
qualities to the German light cruisers. 



STRATEGY IN HOME WATERS 33 

It will be seen from the above statements that the 
enemy had by far his best opportunity from the naval 
point of view in the earlj^ months of the War, as he was 
then much nearer equality of strength with the Grand 
Fleet than at any later period. A carefully laid trap, 
which included minefields and submarines, with the High 
Sea Fleet as a bait, might have been very effective at 
any period of the War in inflicting considerable losses on 
us. The Germans had their best opportunities between 
November, 1914, and February, 1915. After April, 1915, 
the situation got steadily worse for the enemy. 

The lesson of vital importance to be drawn from this 
review of relative naval strength, is that if this country 
in the future decides to rely for safety against raids or 
invasion on the Fleet alone, it is essential that we should 
possess a considerably greater margin of superiority over 
a possible enemy in all classes of vessels than we did in 
August, 1914. 



CHAPTER III 

THE GEAND FLEET AND ITS BASES 

The Grand Fleet may be said to have come into being 
only at the outbreak of the War, when it was so christened. 
As with the name, so with the organisation. 

The great majority of the really effective ships in the 
Grand Fleet were the outcome of the policy initiated by 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone when 
he took up the appointment of First Sea Lord in 1904 
in the Administration of the Earl of Selborne. One of 
Lord Fisher's first acts — and he carried through a num- 
ber of other changes which reacted favourably on the 
efficiency of the Fleet for war — was the introduction of 
the "all-big-gun" type of battleship, of which the Dread- 
nought, laid down at Portsmouth on October 2nd, 1905, 
was the earliest example. She was closely followed 
by the three "all-big-gun" battle-cruisers of the "In- 
vincible" class, which were of the same programme 
— 1905-6. Much criticism was levelled at the 
Dreadnought, but even more at the principle em- 
bodied in the battle-cruisers — ships with the speed of 
cruisers, but the same calibre armament as battle- 
ships. The War has fully justified Lord Fisher's 
conception. 

Our superiority in capital ships at the outbreak of 
war was due to the efforts of the Boards presided over by 
Lord Selborne and his successors from 1904 onwards, and 
Lord Fisher held the post of First Sea Lord for five and 

34 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 35 

a half years of that period. At the beginning of 1909, 
during Mr. McKenna's tenure of office as First Lord, 
great efforts were necessary to ensure the maintenance 
of a sufficient standard of superiority in capital ships over 
Germany, and to make good our deficiencies in destroy- 
ers. The nation has good reason for the most profound 
gratitude to Mr. IMcKenna for the very strong attitude 
he assumed at this highly critical period. Reference to 
the table on page 31 will show the position that would 
have arisen if the four additional "Dreadnoughts" had 
not been included in the 1909-10 building programme. 
In the later Administration, presided over by Mr. 
Churchill, continued efforts were necessary, and were 
made, and steps were also taken with a view to meet- 
ing the crying need for modern light cruisers; Lord 
Beresford had for some years been pointing out how 
essential it was to add largely to our programmes of light 
cruisers and destroyers. 

So much for construction in pre- War days when the 
Germans were carrying out their Navy Acts, one follow- 
ing the other in rapid succession. 

It is also of interest to note the part which Lord 
Fisher took in building up the Fleet organisation that 
existed in 1914. He introduced the system of manning 
the older ships, not in the first line, with nucleus crews 
composed of the principal officers and ratings. These 
ships were thus rendered capable of being put, in a very 
short time, into a condition in which they were fit to 
fight. This system superseded the old arrangement, by 
which ships not in full commission were not manned at 
all. Although it naturally led to a reduction in the total 
number of fully-manned ships, a disadvantage which was 
minimised by reducing squadrons abroad, it is probably 
accepted now that in the circumstances existing at the 



36 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

time the nucleus crew system is far preferable; it raised 
the general standard of the whole Navy in British waters, 
and facilitated the use of the Royal Fleet and Naval Re- 
serves on the outbreak of war. 



I. — The De-stelopment of the Geand Fleet 

In the organisation existing before the War, the 
Home Fleets comprised the First, Second and Third 
Fleets — in fact, practically all ships in home waters which 
it was intended to mobilise on the outbreak of war. 

The war organisation, as carried out, divided the Home 
Fleets into two parts. 

The First, the Grand Fleet, included the First Fleet, 
comprising the latest-built ships; the force stationed at 
Harwich; four ships of the 6th Battle Squadron; the 6th 
and 10th Cruiser Squadrons from the Second and Third 
Fleets respectively; and the mine-laying Squadron from 
the Second Fleet. 

The Second, or Channel Fleet, included the older 
battleships, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Battle Squadrons, 
the 5th and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, and a sweeping 
flotilla with torpedo boats. This force was commanded 
by Vice- Admiral Sir Cecil Burney until the end of 1914, 
when he joined the Grand Fleet. It was independent of 
the Grand Fleet. 

Of the ships of the Channel Fleet, the 5th and 6th 
Battle Squadrons and the 5th Cruiser Squadron were 
manned before mobilisation with nucleus crews, and were 
consequently partly trained; these ships assembled at 
Portland. The ships of the 7th and 8th Battle 
Squadrons and 7th Cruiser Squadron were not manned 
until mobilisation, and the crews consequently required 
training. This training was carried out near Plymouth, 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 37 

and the battleships joined Sir Cecil Burney's command 
on September 3rd, 1914. 

The ships of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were employed 
as a look-out force in the Straits of Dover during the time 
that the Channel Battle Fleet was patrolling to guard the 
passage of the Expeditionary Force. They were subse- 
quently ordered by the Admiralty to another service, and 
three of them, the Hogue, Cressy and Ahoukir, were sunk 
whilst patrolling the Broad Fourteens off the Dutch coast. 

These, then, were the conditions when War opened. 
It was only natural that war experience should show 
very quickly the many directions in which we had to recast, 
or elaborate, our pre-War ideas, or to introduce new ar- 
rangements. 

Peace manoeuvres, however useful, can never be a 
substitute for war experience. They are many factors 
which render peace manoeuvres uni-eal. In the first place, 
the available ships have to be divided so as to form the 
opposing fleet, "an enemy"; secondly, a matter of far 
greater moment, the manoeuvres occupy much too short 
a period, and many of the difficulties affecting both 
materiel and personnel are not experienced; thirdly, the 
conditions of war cannot be reproduced without serious 
inconvenience, and even danger, to merchant ships ; finally, 
in our own manoeuvres there was a tendency in the rules 
to give the torpedo less than its proper value as a fight- 
ing weapon. 

But, more than all, it was the conditions under which 
war broke out that made it necessary for us in the Grand 
Fleet to build up what was almost a new organisation. 

(a) The submarine had just become a most formidable 
weapon; its development during the War was extraordi- 
narily rapid. 

(&) The airship as a scout was in its infancy at the 



38 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

start, but it also developed with great rapidit}^, as did the 
heavier-than-air machines. 

(c) The mine, neglected by us, had been highly de- 
veloped by the enemy, both defensively and offensively. 

(d) The effective range both of the gun and of the 
torpedo was quickly shown to be much greater than had 
been considered possible before the War.* 

(e) Wireless telegraphy developed with great rapidity, 
and was put to many uses not dreamt of in pre-War days. 

On the other hand, we were very fortunate in having 
the Fleet concentrated at the outbreak of war. People 
had often pictured war with Germany coming as a bolt 
from the blue, and even naval officers feared that when 
the occasion did arise, it would be found, as had previously 
been the case, that fear of precipitating a conflict might 
lead the Government to delaj' concentration with the re- 
sult that our squadrons would be separated when war was 
actually declared. Fortunately, the Admiralty in the last 
days of July, 1914, placed us at once in a strong strategic 
position. For this action the nation should be grateful 
to the First Lord and First Sea Lord. 

It was curious that, in spite of all the lessons of history, 
there was general expectation that a great Fleet action 
would at once be fought. No doubt this arose, partly, 
from the boastings of German naval officers in pre-War 
days, and partly from a knowledge of the great sacrifices 
the enemy would incur unless he could dispute effectively 
our command of the sea. Most people found it difficult 
to imagine that the High Sea Fleet (built at vast 
expense, and rightly considered by the enemy to be an 
efficient weapon of war) would adopt from the outset a 

* In pre-War days our Battle Practice had been carried out at a maximum 
range of about 9,500 yardc, and only on one occasion, when the Colossus fired 
at a target ai 14,000 yards oif Portland in 1912, had thib range been exceeded. 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 39 

purely passive role, with the inevitable result that Ger- 
man trade would be swept from the seas. But there 
vv^ere two factors tending to make the High Command 
adopt this course. First, there was the fear that action 
with the Grand Fleet would so weaken the High Sea 
Fleet as to cause the command of the Baltic to pass into 
Allied hands, with a consequent landing of Russian 
troops on German soil as the result. This fear had been 
present in the German mind ever since the days of Fred- 
erick the Great, when Russia threatened Berlin during 
the Seven Years' War. The second point, no doubt, 
was that the German High Command realised that, if 
Germany adopted a defensive rjole with her Fleet, it 
created, by far, the most difficult situation for us. Repug- 
nant as this might be to high-spirited German naval offi- 
cers, it was unquestionably the worst policy for us, for, 
whilst the German High Sea Fleet remained "in being" 
as a fighting force, we could not afford to undertake 
operations tending to weaken our Grand Fleet, particu- 
larly in the earlier period of the War when our margin 
of superiority at Germany's "selected moment" was not 
great. The main disadvantage to the Germans, apart from 
their loss of trade, lay in the inevitable gradual weaken- 
ing of the morale of the personnel of the Navy, and it is 
highly probable that this loss of morale was in the end 
responsible for the series of mutinies which broke out in 
the High Sea Fleet during 1917 and 1918, culminating 
in the final catastrophe in November, 1918. In my view, 
the passive role was carried much too far. 

II. — The Staff Organisation 

To pass to the development of the organisation. 
Almost the first question was that of Staff and Staff 
work. In the days before the War, the Staff of the Com- 



40 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

mander-in-Chief of the Home Fleets consisted of the fol- 
lowing officers: 

(a) A Personal Staff, comprising a Flag-Commander, 
Flag-Lieutenant, and Secretary. The Flag-Captain was 
also, in a sense, on the Personal Staff. 

(&) A General Staff, comprising a Captain of the 
Fleet with his Secretary, a Wireless officer, a Signal offi- 
cer, and the clerical staff of the Secretary. 

In addition, the organisation provided for the appoint- 
ment of two War Staff officers, on mobilisation for war. 

This was the Staff which, together with an additional 
Signal officer, I found in the Iron Duke, on assuming com- 
mand of the Grand Fleet. 

It had always been my intention, on relieving Sir 
George Callaghan in December, 1914 (as was originally 
arranged before the War broke out, as I have explained), 
to add to the above, a Captain, for the operational side 
of the Staff, leaving the Flag-Captain responsible only 
for the Command of the Fleet-flagship, this being, in my 
opinion, sufficient work and responsibility to occupy his 
whole time; and I had prepared an organisation of the 
Staff of the Fleet-flagship in accordance with which the 
work should be divided into two distinct branches, the 
operations and the materiel side, each with a secretariat. 
I had communicated my views to the officers selected for 
the Staff. This, in my judgment, was the correct line for 
any Naval Staff organisation, and it was later introduced 
by me into the Admiralty Naval Staff. 

When informed, just prior to the declaration of War, 
that I might be required to take over the command of the 
Fleet, I decided to ask, as the first step, for the services 
of Rear- Admiral Charles E. Madden as Chief of the Staff. 

I had brought with me from London on my own Staff, 
as Second in Command of the Grand Fleet, a Captain 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 41 

(Captain Bentinck), with the title of Captain on the 
Staff, a Secretary with assistants, a Flag-Lieutenant, a 
Signal officer, a Wireless officer, a War Staff officer, and 
a Signal Boatswain. These, with the exception of Cap- 
tain Bentinck (who joined Vice- Admiral Sir George War- 
render's Staff), I took to the Iron Duke, and my Staff 
then comprised: 

A Rear •Admiral as Chief of the Staff. 

A Commodore as Captain of the Fleet. 

Two Secretaries, with the necessary clerical staff. 

A Flag-Lieutenant. 

Three Signal officers. 

Three Wireless officers (very soon reduced to two). 

Three War Staff officers. 

Two Signal Boatswains. 

A Fleet Coaling officer also joined the Staff. 

The main difficulty in providing a Flag officer afloat 
with a suitable staff is that of accomm oblation, and this 
difficulty was somewhat serious when I doubled the staff 
on board the Iron Duke. However, it was successfully 
overcome. The Staff was organised into two branches — 
Operations and Materiel — the former directly under the 
Chief of the Staff, the latter immediately under the Cap- 
tain of the Fleet. On proceeding to sea, however, the 
work of the Captain of the Fleet became, of necessity, 
very largely reduced, and he joined the operational side, 
arrangements being made by which either he or the Chief 
of the Staff was always on the bridge in my absence, as 
we soon found under the new conditions, consequent on 
the advent of the submarine as an important factor in 
naval warfare, that it was essential that an officer should 
be constantly on the bridge who could take immediate 
action in moving the Fleet, or any portion of it, as might 
be required. 



42 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Even so, the presence of the Commander-in-Chief 
was so frequently required, at a moment's notice, owing 
to the swiftness with which a modern fleet moves, that I 
never left my sea cabin, which was under the bridge, 
to go to the after part of the ship when the Fleet was 
at sea. 

The duties of my Staff afloat were separated, as 
already stated, under two headings. This division, as is 
clear from the above remarks, affected their duties in 
harbour more than when at sea. In the latter case the 
two branches combined, and the whole staff became "opera- 
tional." 

The Staff work under these conditions was carried out 
in the war-room, situated under protection, below the con- 
ning tower. Here the movements of our own ships were 
recorded, as well as those of the enemy until we were 
nearing contact. All intelligence was sent from the 
bridge to this centre by the Signal officers, and the situa- 
tion at anj^ moment could be seen by a glance at the charts 
kept by the War Staff officer on duty. 

When we were nearing enemy vessels or enemy waters, 
the work was shifted from the war-room to the Ad- 
miral's shelter on the bridge, so that the situation could 
be seen by me more readily; and finally, when, as on 
May 31st and August 19th, 1916, the two fleets were 
nearing touch with one another, the "plot" of the move- 
ments as reported was continually under my obser- 
vation. 

At ordinary times, in harbour, the Staff officers en- 
gaged on the operational side were following the move- 
ments of such enemy vessels (chiefly, of course, sub- 
marines) as were known to be at sea, as well as those 
of our own vessels. (In the latter case frequent orders to 
ships were necessary to ensure that they did not rneet 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 43 

each other at night — when risk of colhsion would be in- 
curred owing to ships not carrying lights, or in thick 
weather.) They put into execution the orders given by 
myself or the Chief of the Staff, and were engaged 
in elaborating plans of future movements and drawing 
up the necessary orders for such movements as I had in 
contemplation. They were also engaged in arranging all 
gunnery, torpedo and other practices and exercises, and 
in the constant work of the production, revision and issue 
of orders for the organisation and tactical working of the 
Fleet. 

On the materiel side, the Staff work comprised that of 
storing, provisioning and fuelling the Fleet, all questions 
of instruction, training, personnel, discipline, mails, refits 
and repairs, etc. 

In action each member of the Staff had his own 
particular duty allotted to him. The secretaries took 
notes and recorded proceedings; certain officers had as 
their sole duty that of watching and reporting to me every 
movement of enemy vessels; one officer was detailed to 
attend solely to torpedo attacks made by the enemy, 
keeping me informed of their progress and of their pos- 
sibilities; another dealt with all questions relating to con- 
centration or distribution of fire, bringing to my notice 
any signals required to give effect to our preconceived 
arrangements ; each signal officer had his own special duty, 
one being responsible that all signals for tactical move- 
ments made visually were also made by "short distance" 
wireless telegraphy. One wireless officer worked in the 
main office and one in the auxiliary office. The Staff 
was so organised as to leave the Commander-in-Chief 
free to take a comprehensive survey of the whole posi- 
tion, whilst ensuring that notliing that should be done was 
left undone. It must, however, be realised that the rapid- 



44 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ity of movement of fleets is so great that, at critical 
moments, the Commander-in-Chief of a fleet, or the Flag 
Officer Com.manding a Squadron, must of necessity make 
instant decisions; there is no time for consultation or for 
advice. 

III. — Preparation of Cruising Orders 

One of the earliest steps taken in organising the Grand 
Fleet after the declaration of War was to lay down defi- 
nitely the various cruising orders for the Battle Fleet 
and its "look-out" screen of battle-cruisers, cruisers and 
light cruisers. There had been much discussion for some 
years before the War as to the best disposition of cruisers 
ahead of a Battle Fleet. None of the arrangements that 
had been under discussion was adopted as a whole, but 
war exjjerience led to a series of diagrams being drawn 
up giving the cruising stations of all the various classes 
of cruisers and other light craft under the different con- 
ditions that might exist. These included diagrams show- 
ing the cruiser disposition with the fleet moving towards 
enemy waters, under conditions of ordinary visibility, 
by day, or in low visibility by day, both with the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet in company and without it; a similar dia- 
gram when moving away from enemy water by day (this 
being to meet the possible case of an attempted attack 
by destroyers as the fleet steered away from enemy 
waters) ; diagrams were got out for steering towards or 
away from enemy waters at night; and, finally, dia- 
grams were prepared, both for day and night, for the 
dispositions of the cruisers and other light forces after an 
action. 

Several different cruising diagrams for the Battle 
Fleet itself, both by day and at night, were similarly 
drawn up. Some of these were specially designed to give 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 45 

such safety from submarine attack as was possible to the 
main body of the Fleet, in the not unhkely event of 
destroyers being absent, from bad weather, shortage of 
fuel, or other causes. The dispositions for use at night 
provided for the use of destroyer attack, and were de- 
signed to give safety from collision, due to squadrons 
inadvertently closing each other in the darkness, when 
showing no lights; this was a very possible event during 
the course of a long night when a very slight error in 
steering, or a slight difference in compasses, will rapidly 
bring two squadrons together that started the night five 
miles apart. It was necessary to keep squadrons separ- 
ated, as a long line of ships greatly facilitated successful 
submarine attack, whilst a slight dispersal of squadrons 
gave greater freedom of movement in the case of de- 
stroyer attack. At the same time it was necessary to 
provide for concentrating the Fleet quickly at daylight. 

The question of submarine screens was taken up 
at the commencement of war. This matter had 
naturally been considered before the War, but was in 
its earliest stages, and, although an efficient disposition 
of a screen of destroyers is a comparatively simple matter 
when there is no lack of destroyers, the case is different 
when a fleet is very short of the requisite number, as was 
our experience, and one destroyer had often to be dis- 
posed to endeavour to do the work of two. 

Diagrams of submarine screens were, therefore, 
drawn up to meet the different conditions resulting from 
the presence of varying nimibers of destroyers, or a de- 
creased number of ships requiring to be screened, and 
also providing for the ships being in various formations. 
In November, 1916, the number of these diagrams was 
seventeen. 

Early in the War the danger of successful submarine 



46 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

attack on warships at sea, whether in company or pro- 
ceeding singly, had impressed on us the necessity of 
taking every precaution for safety, and the practice of the 
fleet steering zigzag courses was devised and generally 
adopted in accordance with my directions. In the case 
of a fleet or squadron, the usual practice was to carry out 
the alterations of course by turning the ships together; 
occasionally the turn was made "in succession," but this 
was exceptional. In small squadrons, the turns were occa- 
sionally made at fixed time intervals without signal. 

Zigzagging had a very beneficial effect on the manner 
in which officers of watches kept station in a fleet, since 
there is no better practice than keeping station on a line of 
bearing, a far more difficult matter to the novice than 
keeping station astern of another ship. I attribute the 
excellent manner in which the ships were handled in 1915 
and 1916 very largely to this early experience. Much 
theoretical investigation was instituted to determine the 
method of zigzagging, both in a fleet and in a single ship, 
which gave the greatest protection against submarine at- 
tack, and actual experiments took place Avith our own 
submarines with a view to forming correct conclusions; 
the flag oflficers of the fleet rendered me much assistance 
in this as in all other matters. 

The experience of the Grand Fleet was utilised in the 
instructions subsequently issued to merchant ships, and 
the value of zigzagging in reducing the danger of sub- 
marine attack was clearly shown during the year 1917 by 
the comparative immunity of merchant ships that com- 
plied with the orders as compared with those that did not 
do so. Occasionally, of course, zigzagging brought a ship 
into danger, but this was exceptional as compared with 
the general immunity given. 

When the convoying of merchant ships through 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 47 

the submarine zone was instituted in 1917, after I had 
returned to the Admiralty, the Grand Fleet experience 
was again of value in the preparation of instructions. 

The supremely important question of how best to 
handle in action the large and increasing Fleet en- 
gaged my attention from the commencement. In 
drawing up the various instructions for the conduct of 
the Fleet, both when cruising and in action, I availed 
myself of the advice and assistance of the experienced 
flag officers commanding the various Squadrons. Much 
discussion took place on these matters, and many of the 
dispositions adopted formed the subject of actual ex- 
periment at sea before being incorporated in the 
orders. 

The successful and rapid deployment of the Battle 
Fleet from its cruising formation was a matter of the 
greatest importance, and constant practice in carrj^ing cut 
this manoeuvre under every varying condition was given 
to the Fleet when at sea. Various arrangements were 
introduced having as their object the simplification and 
shortening of the manoeuvre, with a view to bringing 
the heaviest possible fire to bear on the enemy's fleet as 
quickly as possible. Orders were drawn up to meet 
cases of deployment in thick weather, when the enemy 
might be sighted at short range, and immediate inde- 
pendent action by a divisional Flag Officer would be 
necessary. 

In the early part of the War the rapid deployment of 
the Fleet for action was complicated by the presence of 
the 3rd Battle Squadron of pre-Dreadnoughts — the ves- 
sels of the "King Edward VII." class — as the speed 
of the ships of this squadron was some three knots less 
than that of the rest of the Battle Fleet. I endeavoured 
to solve this problem by practical experience. Much 



48 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

depended on the tactics likely to be adopted by the 
enemy's Battle Fleet. The main difficulty lay in the 
fact that if the 3rd Battle Squadron was placed on one 
flank of the Battle Fleet when in cruising order and de- 
ployment towards that flank became necessary in con- 
formity with an enemy movement, thus placing the slow 
3rd Battle Squadron in the van, the fleet speed of the 
whole Battle Line was necessarily reduced to some 14 
knots, in order to have the necessary reserve of speed in 
hand. If, on the other hand, the 3rd Battle Squadron 
was placed in the centre of the Fleet, the Fleet speed 
was again reduced to that attainable by this squadron. 
It was desirable to devise a cruising order for the Battle 
Fleet which would admit of the 3rd Battle Squadron be- 
ing in the rear after deployment, in whichever direction 
deployment took place. There was still the objection, 
which had to be accepted, that a turn of 16 points forced 
upon us by the enemy would place this squadron in the 
van. 

The cruising order eventually adopted placed the pre- 
Dreadnought Squadron in rear of the Dreadnought 
Squadrons, with a view to the slow squadron turning in 
the opposite direction to the remainder on deployment, 
and eventually taking station in rear of the Dreadnought 
Fleet. This involved accepting some delay in getting the 
3rd Battle Squadron into effective action. 

The question was not one of importance subsequent 
to April, 1915, from which date our superiority in battle- 
ships of the Dreadnought type was sufficient to give me 
confidence that the High Sea Fleet, engaged under suit- 
able conditions, could be crushed in action without the 
aid of the 3rd Battle Squadron; but during the winter 
of 1914-15, when our superiority in Dreadnoughts was 
frequently very slight, and the enemy possessed two pre- 






Pla^N^l 



|i 



L'-Mi-uMMiiha-lwa^ 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 49 

Dreadnought Battle Squadrons, our 3rd Battle Squadron 
was a necessary addition to the Grand Fleet. 

The Battle Orders indicated the position to be 
occupied by our battle-cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers 
and destroyers on deployment, as well as that of the 
fast 5th Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the 
"Queen Elizabeth" class, when that squadron joined the 
Fleet. The first Battle Orders drawn up and issued 
shortly after war commenced were modelled on a Battle 
memorandum which I had prepared when in command, 
first, of the Atlantic Fleet, and, later, of the 2nd Battle 
Squadron. But the changing situation soon made altera- 
tions and additions necessary, and the Orders were under 
constant revision. 

The tactics to be pursued by the different units of 
the Fleet in action under all conceivable conditions were 
provided for as far as possible. 

Stress was laid from the beginning on the fact that 
the Commander-in-Chief of a large fleet could not after 
deployment control the movements of all the squadrons 
comprising that fleet under the conditions of modern 
action when funnel and cordite smoke, and the great 
length of the line, would hamper his knowledge of events, 
and increase the difficulty of communication. The neces- 
sity for wide decentralisation of command, after the de- 
ployment of the fleet for action, was emphasised. 

As the Fleet grew in size, increasing stress was laid 
on this point. Flag officers commanding squadrons were, 
of course, kept fully acquainted with the general ideas 
under which the Fleet would act, so that they might be 
able to interpret my wishes when acting independently. 
Stress was laid on the necessity for keeping a close watch 
on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, so that 
squadrons could conform to his movements. The general 



50 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

lines on which I intended to engage were defined. These 
included the range at which it was intended to open the 
engagement, the range below which it was not intended to 
close under ordinary conditions, on account of the risks 
to be apprehended from torpedo fire, and the exceptions to 
this rule which might become necessary. Emphasis was 
laid on the supreme necessity for a free use of our own 
torpedoes when opportunity occurred. 

After the experience of the engagement on January 
24th, 1915, between the battle-cruisers, and especially as 
our superiority increased and the High Sea Fleet gave no 
sign of a desire to engage, the conviction became stronger 
than in any action between the two fleets, the enemy would 
fight a retiring battle. This is the most difficult form of 
tactics to counter in these days of submarines, mines 
and torpedoes, since a retiring fleet is in a position of 
great tactical advantage in the employment of these 
weapons. The Tactical Board was in constant use for 
a consideration of this problem, both by myself and the 
other flag officers. 

In the earliest stages of the War, when the German 
submarine strength M^as not great, one of the main prob- 
lems to be considered in regard to a fleet action was the 
employment of our destroyers and light cruisers to 
attack the enemy's Battle Fleet with torpedoes and to 
counter his similar attacks, which, owing to his great su- 
periority in destroyers, was a matter of supreme im- 
portance. The knowledge, too, that his light cruisers and 
destroyers, as well possibly as some of his heavier ships, 
were fitted for mine-laying (which was not the case with 
us) made it necessary to take into account the probability 
that he would use this form of attack at the commence- 
ment of a general action, or during the stages leading 
up to it. Later, when his submarines increased in num- 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 51 

ber, the method of countering the use of such vessels by 
the enemy, in the preliminary stages of a fleet action, 
had also to be considered, particularly as it was not 
until 1916 that the Grand Fleet was provided with any 
submarines of this type, and not until 1917 that sub- 
marines which could maintain the Fleet-speed at sea be- 
came part of the organisation. 

The comparative immunity of the van from torpedo at- 
tack by the enemy, if the fleets were approximately abeam 
of one another, and the risks run by the centre and rear 
were pointed out, as were the different conditions pro- 
duced in the case of a retiring enemy, or one which had 
a position of torpedo advantage. 

The influence of the torpedo on tactics became greater 
as the War progressed, owing to the advance made in 
the technique of these weapons. Before the opening of 
hostilities, for instance, torpedoes had a maximum range of 
about 10,000 yards. We made many improvements 
in our torpedoes as the War progressed, including 
a great increase in range, and we had every reason to 
believe that the Germans were making similar progress, 
and that the range of their topedoes was as much in ex- 
cess of the pre-War range as was that of our own 
weapons. 

The threat of successful torpedo attack even from 
battleships in the line was, therefore, an important factor 
to be taken into account, with the ships of the opposing 
fleets formed in single line at the close intervals which are 
necessary for successful co-operation and the concentra- 
tion of power aff'orded by a shortened line. Investigation 
into possible alternative formations for fighting a fleet 
action was constantly proceeding, but the single line, or 
a modification of it, was, under most conditions, the best 
that could be devised. 



52, THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

It was pointed out that, although our Fleet would be 
manoeuvred for advantage in gunnery position, it might 
be necessary to engage under unfavourable gunnerj^ con- 
ditions in order to prevent the enemy reaching his own 
waters. 

Several new manoeuvres were introduced and practised 
by the Fleet with a view to countering possible tac- 
tics on the part of the enemy. These included a 
"turn away" or a "turn towards" to counter a serious 
attack by torpedoes; a quick method of reversing the 
course of the Fleet without impairing its organisa- 
tion to meet enemy tactics necessitating such a move; 
rapid methods of re-forming single line ; etc. Other new 
tactical methods were introduced as time progressed 
to meet the changing conditions of modern war- 
fare. 

Detailed orders were drawn up in regard to the con- 
duct of the Fleet after an action, so far as it was possible 
to foresee the conditions that might arise. The object 
was to arrange to continue the attack bj^ light craft, 
whilst safeguarding the heavy ships against counter- 
attack by light forces. 

In the orders which were issued for the guidance of 
the destroyers both before, during, and after an action, en- 
deavour was made to provide for all these contingen- 
cies. The stations of the flotillas, including the Harwich 
flotillas, if they were present, were laid down, and each 
had its particular duties assigned to it. General direc- 
tions were given for the employment of the destroyers, 
wide latitude being reserved to the officers commanding 
flotillas. 

The treatment of disabled ships was legislated for. 

The duties of each class of vessel, battle-cruiser, 
cruiser and light cruiser when in cruising order, or in 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 53 

action, or after an action, were defined, particular em- 
phasis being laid on the necessity for ships in the van, 
when in action, gaining a position of torpedo advan- 
tage in regard to the enemy's Battle Fleet, whilst at the 
same time engaging enemy vessels of a similar class and 
preventing torpedo attacks on our own Battle Fleet from 
developing. 

Thus it was laid down as the leading principle in the 
General Cruiser Instructions, that after gaining touch 
with the enemy the first essential was to maintain that 
touch. Instructions were also given that in the event of 
the enemy's advanced forces becoming engaged with our 
Battle-Cruiser Fleet, the cruisers in our advanced line were 
to push on and gain touch with the enemy's Battle Fleet. 
It will be seen later that this situation arose during the 
Jutland battle. 

The Instructions for battle-cruisers laid down the prin- 
ciple that in action their primary function was the de- 
struction of the similar enemy vessels if present, and, after 
their destruction or in their absence, to attack the van 
of the enemy's Battle Fleet. Prior to action their duty 
was defined as giving information as to the enemy's Battle 
Fleet, whilst denying similar information to the enemy. 
The Vice- Admiral commanding the Battle- Cruiser 
Fleet was given a free hand to carry out these general 
instructions. 

The Instructions for the 5th Battle Squadron (the 
ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class) were drawn up to 
provide for the battle-cruisers being either absent or 
present. In the former event, this squadron took the 
place, and the duties, of the battle-cruisers; with our 
battle-cruisers present and in the van, the 5th Battle 
Squadron was ordered to take station ahead of the re- 
mainder of the Battle Fleet in the case of a deployment 



54 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

towards Heligoland, and in rear of the Battle Fleet in the 
case of dejjloyment axvay from Heligoland. The object of 
this latter disposition was to place the High Sea Fleet 
at a disadvantage should it execute a 16-point turn after 
deployment. In order to enable the 5th Battle Squadron 
to carry out its functions in action, it was stationed be- 
tween the Cruiser Line and the main Battle Fleet when 
in cruising order. 

The Instructions to the light cruisers defined their 
duties in action as being to attack the enemy's light cruisers 
and torpedo craft, to support our destroyers, and to at- 
tack the enemy's battle line with torpedoes. For this 
purpose most of the light cruiser squadrons were required 
to be in the van on deployment. 

The Instructions for destroj^ers laid emphasis on the 
fact that they should carry out an early attack on the 
enemy's Battle Fleet, commencing their attacks in clear 
weather, as soon as the Battle Fleet were engaged. Un- 
der conditions of low visibility, they were instructed to 
attack without waiting for the Battle Fleets to be en- 
gaged. It was pointed out that destroyers closing the 
enemy's Battle Fleet for the purpose of an attack were 
also in the best position for preventing successful attacks 
on our own fleets. 

As soon as submarine flotillas were attached to the 
Grand Fleet, in 1916, instructions for their conduct be- 
fore, during, and after action were drawn up. Instruc- 
tions for two other classes of vessel, namely, mine-layers 
and sea-plane carriers, had been issued earlier, vessels of 
the mine-laying type, but of a slow speed, having 
been attached to the Fleet from the commencement of 
War, and sea-plane carriers, possessing, however, but slow 
speed and inferior arrangements, having joined during 
1915. 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 55 

IV. — The Training of the Fleet 

Inseparable from the question of the management of 
the Fleet before and during action was that of the Avorking 
together of its units at sea by day and at night. This 
matter was, of course, one to which great attention had 
been devoted by Sir George Callaghan, who, when he 
handed over the Fleet to me, gave me a fighting machine 
trained to a very high pitch of perfection by an officer 
who was a past master in fleet training. 

But it was inevitable that war conditions should make 
even greater demands on the skill of the personnel than 
had previouslj^ been necessary, and in no direction was 
this more necessary than at night, the number of ships 
in company being far greater than had previously been 
usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling 
added to the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, 
fleets cruising on dark, stormy nights without showing any 
lights, did so for comparatively short periods, during 
which the more experienced officers could, to a certain 
extent, remain on deck. 

Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed 
more than a very dim light at the stern, and frequently 
not even that, adding greatly to difficulties of fleet cruis- 
ing. Consequently provision had to be made for ensuring 
safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and con- 
siderable foresight and great skill on the part of officers 
was necessary 

- Single ships and squadrons that might by any possi- 
bility pass close to one another during hours of dark- 
ness were warned beforehand of the danger, and arrange- 
ments made so that they should be aware of each other's 
positions. Destroyers, especialljr, were given directions 
so as to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which 



56 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

otherwise might open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all 
sorts were similarlj^ warned so far as this was possible, 
but in their case the conditions, owing to difficulties of 
communication, were frequently much more embarras- 
sing. 

Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night 
had to be such as to reduce to a minimum the necessity 
for signals, whilst giving freedom of action in an emer- 
gency. What applied to conditions of darkness applied 
equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for en- 
suring safety in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, 
could not as a rule be employed, since the blasts might 
give warning to the enemy and place the Fleet open 
to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the 
other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in 
close company with the larger ships for screening purposes 
against submarines led, in the case of sudden fog, to a 
difficult situation, as, before the Fleet could safely carry 
out any manoeuvre, it was essential to get the destroyers, 
clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by 
the large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued 
to meet all these conditions, and the best testimony to 
the training of the Fleet prior to the War was the remark- 
able freedom from accident during the early months after 
the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly 
commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by 
no means handy vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisa- 
tion, was also a source of great gratification to me, and 
must have been most satisfactory to the officers and men 
concerned. 

The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particu- 
larly in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its 
units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by 
wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 57 

presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate atten- 
tion on the question of the efficiency of our signal ar- 
rangements. Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to 
be stopped, because by means of directional wireless sta- 
tions the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could 
be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt 
that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and 
in some cases even the name of the ship so signalling. 
This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made 
progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet 
being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if 
much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally 
concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of 
our squadrons using the same means of communication. 
That was an inevitable inference. 

The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in 
the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully com- 
piled and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of sig- 
nalling that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet 
had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the 
Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions 
that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders 
somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the 
object was achieved. 

Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea 
in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in 
and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet 
Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the 
enemj^, and good organisation gradually reduced the time 
occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet 
manoeuvring when much to the southward of the lati- 
tude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was 
also carried out by visual signalling. 

Owing to the danger of disclosing the position of the 



58 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Fleet to enemy submarines or destroyers, it was not pos- 
sible to use visual signalling at night, except with carefully 
shaded lamps which were only visible at a distance of 
about a quarter of a mile, and then only by the ship 
addressed, and this problem thus became complicated at 
night, in fogs or in very thick weather. Occasional resort 
had then to be made to wireless, but by signalling before 
dark all expected movements during the night, and by 
arranging the course of the Fleet so that few alterations 
were necessary, we succeeded in keeping almost absolute 
wireless silence. It had to be used, however, when im- 
portant information from the Admiralty and elsewhere 
was to be transmitted to the Fleet-Flagship, or to senior 
officers of squadrons, or to single ships when at sea en- 
gaged in operations, etc., and early in the War we had 
to devise a method by which this could be done without 
calling up the ships in question by wireless, thus neces- 
sitating a reply from them, and thus possibly acquainting 
the enemy of their position. 

After a time a satisfactory and ingenious system of 
communicating the required information without causing 
the ship herself to divulge her position was devised by 
the Fleet Wireless officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. L. 
Nicholson. This plan worked excellently and gradually 
was greatljr extended during the later stages of the War. 

It must not be thought that, because wireless sig- 
nalling at sea was restricted, it was not intended to make 
full use of it when necessary and when silence was no 
longer required, such as when the fleets were within 
sight of one another. On the contrary, a great advance 
was made during the War in the use of wireless tele- 
graphy for manoeuvring the Battle Fleet, as well as in 
every other direction. So proficient did the ships be- 
come under the organisation introduced by Lieutenant- 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 59 

Commander Nicholson, assisted as he was by the very 
efficient wireless officers and wireless personnel, that in 
1916 I could handle the Battle Fleet by wireless with as 
much ease and rapidity as by visual signals. At the begin- 
ning of the War ten minutes to a quarter of an hour would 
elapse before I could be sure that all ships had received 
a manoeuvring wireless signal addressed to the whole 
Battle Fleet. In 1916 the time rarely exceeded two to 
three minutes. This great improvement was due to new 
methods introduced, as well as to incessant practice in 
harbour. 

Our advance in the use of wireless telegraphy was 
very considerable indeed, and I owed a great debt of 
gratitude to Lieutenant-Commander Nicholson, the other 
wireless officers of the Fleet-Flagship, and the wireless 
officers and personnel of the whole Fleet. The progress 
was the more remarkable since, owing to extreme short- 
age of wireless personnel for the expanding Fleet and 
the large number of auxiliary vessels commissioned, we 
were forced to discharge many of the best operators in 
the Fleet as the War progressed and to replace them by 
boys trained in the Wireless School established by the 
Fleet at Scapa Flow. 

A point which war experience brought into con- 
siderable prominence was the difficulty of distinguishing, 
with sufficient rapidity, enemy vessels from our owti 
ships both before, and, more particularly during, action. 
The difficulty applied to all classes of vessels, but was 
greatest in the case of torpedo craft and submarines. 
Steps were taken to deal with it, and satisfactory arrange- 
ments made for certain distinguishing marks visible at 
long distances to be worn during daylight by our own 
surface vessels. The question of identification at night 
was more difficult, and although we effected improve- 



6o THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ment in this respect also, the results were not so satis- 
factory. 

Of the original experimental work carried out by the 
Fleet at Scapa Flow none was more important than that 
connected with the safety of ships from mines. Early 
in the War it had become obvious that there was danger 
of a serious weakening of the Grand Fleet by successful 
mine attack, and no safeguard existed beyond the work 
of the mine-sweepers; these vessels could not work far 
afield, and in bad weather could not work even close to 
their bases, whereas the Fleet might be required to pro- 
ceed to sea when mine-sweeping was impracticable. 

A solution of this difficulty was required. Com- 
mander Cecil V. Usborne, of the Colossus^ in these 
circumstances proposed to me the trial of an apparatus 
which he suggested should be towed from the bows of 
ships; it was intended to fend off any mine encountered, 
provided the ship did not strike it absolutely "end on." 
I ordered immediate trials ; all the necessary materiel was 
provided with Fleet labour and appliances, and starting 
with trials in a picket boat, they were continued until a 
series of experiments commenced in large ships, battle- 
ships and cruisers. I placed Rear- Admirals A. L. Duff 
and A. C. Leveson in charge of the experiments and 
great progress was made, although absolute success was 
not obtained. 

Lieutenant Dennis Burney, the son of Admiral Sir 
Cecil Burney, visited the base at this juncture, and, 
knowing his inventive turn of mind, I discussed the 
matter with him at considerable length. Lieutenant 
Burney soon afterwards put forward proposals for 
effecting the required object. His idea was to utilise 
apparatus which he had devised earlier for other purposes. 
His scheme was of a more elaborate nature than that 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 6i 

devised by Commander Usborne, and necessitated the 
manufacture of apjiliances by outside manufacturers. I 
urged the Admiralty to take up the question at once; 
this was done, and the experiments, started at Ports- 
mouth, were transferred to Scapa Flow as soon as pre- 
liminary success had been obtained. 

The two devices were then tried over a considerable 
period at Scapa Flow, still under the immediate direction 
of Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson, who threw them- 
selves wholeheartedly into the task, Rear-Admiral 
E, F. A. Gaunt taking up this work in their occasional 
absence. After many disappointments the Burney 
system was proved to be successful, and I at once re- 
quested that manufacture on a large scale should be 
proceeded with. The device was of an elaborate char- 
acter, and many persons at first were sceptical as to its 
A^alue, owing partly to early difficulties in manipulation. 
But Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson rendered the 
greatest assistance in overcoming objections, and grad- 
ually it came to be seen in the Fleet that we had 
become possessed of a most valuable safeguard. By 
the time I relinquished the Command a very large num- 
ber of battleships, battle-cruisers, and cruisers, and some 
light cruisers had been fitted, and the gear was working 
well. Owing to Lieutenant Burney's efforts, improve- 
ment was constantly being effected, with the result that 
during 1917 the fitting was universal. During that year 
it was instrumental in saving several warships from dam- 
age by mines, and in 1918 the number of ships saved was 
also considerable. 

The initial idea was that of Commander Usborne, 
and both he and Lieutenant Burney displayed much 
energy in working out their respective devices. But it 
was through Lieutenant Burney's ingenuity that final 



62 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

success was achieved. Rear-Admirals Duff and Leveson 
eventually brought the appliance to perfection, with the 
result that it was generally adopted. A modified arrange- 
ment of the same nature was fitted to merchant ships 
during 1917 and 1918, and proved of very great value. 

As was inevitable, my thoughts turned at an early 
stage of my Command to the necessity for constant 
improvement in the fighting efficiency of the Grand 
Fleet. My knowledge of the German Navy, which was 
considerable, left me under no delusions as to its 
character. I had made it my business to keep mj^self 
very fully acquainted with German progress. I had 
first been brought into close touch with the modern 
German Navy during service in China from 1899 to 
1902, which included the Boxer campaign, when I 
saw a great deal of its officers and men. I had then 
formed a high estimate of its efficiency, and subsequent 
touch on many occasions with the German Fleet had 
convinced me that in materiel the Germans were ahead 
of us, and that the personnel, though lacking the 
initiative and resource and seamanlike character of the 
British, was highly disciplined, and well educated and 
trained. I knew also that the German Fleet was in no 
way short of officers ; this was the case with us owing to the 
constant political pressure in the years before the War, 
and I expected that this shortage of officers would be a 
great handicap to us as the War progressed. The branch 
of the German Navy from which I expected very good 
work was the destroyer service. I had seen German de- 
stroyers manoeuvring. 

Finally I knew, perhaps better than most of our 
officers, how efficient was the gunnery and torpedo work 
of the High Sea Fleet, and how rapid had been its ad- 
vance in the year or two before the War. A great in- 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 63 

crease had been made in the allowance of ammunition for 
practice. Before the War this was much higher than our 
own, and there was no doubt in my mind that the German 
allowance would be well expended. Indeed, we had ob- 
tained information which placed this beyond question. 

I was well acquainted personally with many of the 
flag officers and captains in the German Navy and had 
some idea of their views on naval warfare. Amongst 
those whom I knew best were Admiral von Ingenohl, 
the then Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, 
Vice-Admiral von Lans, commanding a Battle Squad- 
ron, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief of tlie Naval Staff, who 
later succeeded Admiral von Ingenohl, Grand-Admiral 
von Tirpitz, Admiral von Holtzendorff, a former Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet, who succeeded 
Admiral von Pohl as chief of the Naval Staff, and Ad- 
miral von Usedom, who did conspicuous work in the shore 
batteries during the Dardanelles operations. JNIy knowl- 
edge of these officers led me to expect good work in the 
High Command, and I also expected that they would be 
well supported. 

It is interesting to record that I took part in a Con- 
ference of Allied naval officers in a pagoda at the end 
of the Great Wall of China in company with Admiral 
von Holtzendorff (the then German Flag Captain in 
China) after the capture of the Shan-hai-Kwan forts, 
in 1900, and that Admiral von Usedom succeeded me 
as Chief of the Staff to Admiral — afterwards Admiral 
of the Fleet — Sir Edward Seymour, when I was wounded 
during the international expedition for the relief of the 
Peking Legations. I had met both these officers on sev- 
eral subsequent occasions, as well as Admiral von Lans, 
who was in command of the litis at the capture of the 
Taku forts by the Allies in the Boxer campaign. 



64 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

My knowledge of the German Navy was a strong rea- 
son, had no others existed, for making me desirous of 
doing all that was possible to increase our own gunnery 
and torpedo efficiency. 

The Germans possessed an excellent practice ground 
in Kiel Bay, with every appliance for carrying out gun- 
nery exercises, and I felt sure that they had rendered it 
safe from any hostile attack, and that the German Fleet 
would be able to maintain and improve its efficiency as 
time progressed. 

We were not in so fortunate a position. There had 
been no recent opportunity for carrying out gunnery and 
torpedo exercises and practices ; Scapa Flow had not been 
used as a base for such work in peace time, except for 
destroyers, and consequently no facilities existed there, 
although the proximity of Cromarty, which liad been a 
Fleet practice base, neutralised this disadvantage to a 
certain extent at a later period. But there was no pro- 
tected area outside the harbour where practices could be 
carried out in safety, and the harbour itself was not at 
first secure against submarine attack. Much use, how- 
ever, was made of the Moray Firth outside Cromarty 
later when submarine obstructions had been provided, 
and the Germans had obligingly laid a mine-field which 
protected the practice area from seaward. At the 
commencement of the War, then, it was necessary to 
depend on fleet resources for the provision of targets for 
gunnery practices, and the practices themselves were car- 
ried out under conditions which laid the ships open to 
submarine attack. This was most unsatisfactory, and the 
work suffered considerably as the result. The opportunity 
provided by constant sea work in the first months of the 
War was, however, utilised to carry out such gunnery 
practices as the conditions admitted. 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 65 

At first the custom was for the Fleet to use small 
targets which the ships carried with them. These were 
unsuitable; their' small size rendered them frequently 
invisible at even moderate ranges in any sea, and I felt 
that the Fleet could not make progress under such con- 
ditions. 

Practice at rocks or small islands was next resorted 
to, but no really suitable rocks existed, and, in any 
case, practice at them eventually involved too much risk 
of submarine attack, as the German submarines began 
to find their way to the westward of Scotland. Towards 
the end of 1915 it became possible, owing to the increase 
in the number of destroyers attached to the Fleet, and to 
the provision of submarine obstructions at Cromarty, to 
carry out gunnery practices at long ranges at targets in 
the Moray Firth, and real improvement dated from that 
period. 

Later still, battle practice targets were brought to 
Scapa Flow, and the long-range firing was carried 
out in the Pentland Firth, a still more convenient 
place. 

Meanwhile Scapa Flow itself had been developed for 
all the preliminary gunnery practices which could be 
carried out with guns up to 6-inch in calibre, and also 
for night firing and for torpedo work. The fine stretch 
of water was secure from submarine attack after the 
obstructions had been provided, and ships could practise 
by day and night without danger of attack. The Flow 
was simply invaluable for this purpose. Ships were 
firing, running torpedoes, practising fire control exer- 
cises, carrying out experiments and exercising in dealing 
with attacks by destroyers, day after day, from daylight 
until dark. 

After dark, night firing was frequently carried out,/ 



66 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

and occasionally a division of battleships was exercised 
in steaming in company, without lights, in order to give 
the officers of watches practice. When the constant sea 
work of the earlier months of the War gave place to oc- 
casional cruises, the seagoing and fighting efficiency of 
the Fleet was maintained at a remarkably high standard 
as a result of the work in Scapa Flow. 

During the period 1914-16 a marked advance was 
undoubtedly made in gunnery efficiency. At an early 
period of the War a memorandum was issued pointing 
out the necessity for increased attention to drill and 
organisation. Absolute perfection was insisted upon, 
and it was obtained, by the strenuous efforts of officers 
and men. I knew that we had to deal with an en- 
emy who would be as perfect as constant drill could 
ensure. 

A great extension of the system of Director Firing, 
by which one officer or man could lay and fire all the guns, 
was made. The situation in this respect before the War 
was that a few ships had been fitted for the system, which 
had been devised by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. But a 
very large nmnber of officers were sceptical as to its value 
compared with the alternative system ; there was consider- 
able opposition to it, and the great majority of the ships 
were not fitted. In some cases the system was not fa- 
voured even in the ships provided with it. 

It had fallen to my lot in 1912 to carry out com- 
petitive trials of the Director System and the alterna- 
tive system already in use, and the results of these trials 
had fully confirmed me in my previous opinion of the 
great value of the Director System. I was able to press 
these views on my return to the Admiralty at the end 
of 1912 as Second Sea Lord, and it was then decided to 
provide all the later ships with the arrangement. Little 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 67 

progress had, however, been made when the War broke 
out, only eight battleships having been fitted. 

Early in 1915 arrangements were made, with the as- 
sistance of Sir Percy Scott and the warm support of 
Lord Fisher, then First Sea Lord, by which the battle- 
ships and battle-cruisers were supplied with this system, 
without being put out of action or sent to a dockyard 
for the purpose. The necessary instruments were manu- 
factured at various contractors' shops, and the very labori- 
ous task of fitting them, and the heavy electric cables, 
on board the ships was carried out by electricians sent 
to the various bases. The complicated work naturally 
took a considerable time, and many vexatious delays oc- 
curred; but gradually all ships were fitted, Sir Percy 
Scott rendering invaluable assistance at headquar- 
ters. 

As a first step, the system was fitted to the heavy 
guns mounted in turrets, and by the date of the Battle 
of Jutland there were few ships that were not supplied 
with the system, although six of those last fitted had not 
had much experience with it. 

The conditions under which that action was fought 
converted any waverers at once to a firm belief in the 
Director System, and there was never afterwards any 
doubt expressed as to its great value. 

Further efforts were made later to accelerate the work, 
and the system was extended to smaller vessels. This 
had been the intention even before the action, but there 
were then still many who were unconvinced. However, 
during the remainder of 1916 and 1917 the work was 
pressed forward, and the system became universal for all 
guns and in all classes of ships. 

The improvement in what may be termed the applica- 
tion of existing methods of fire control may now be men- 



68 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

tioned. Throughout the War we had gradually, as the 
result of practice, increased greatly the effective range 
at which ships could engage, and stress had been laid 
on the necessity for bringing the fire rapidly on to the 
target in order to obtain early hits. Improvement was 
perhaps most rapid in the five or six months following 
the Jutland action. In this action the Fire Control In- 
strimients, as adopted in the Service, which were the out- 
come of the work of naval officers, were found to meet 
the gurmery requirements most successfully. The only 
important improvement that was made was the provi- 
sion of additional means for keeping the observation of 
Fire Instruments trained on the correct enemy ship. Vari- 
ous committees were formed immediately after the battle 
in order that full advantage might be taken at once of 
our experience. The result was the introduction of new 
rules for correcting gunfire; these, in addition to greatly 
increasing the volume of fire from a ship, also rendered 
it difficult for the enemy vessels to evade punishment 
by dodging tactics. 

In order to cope more successfully with the latter de- 
velopment, more experiments were ordered, having as 
their object the determination of the inclination of the 
enemy vessel to the line of bearing from us, and various 
methods of obtaining this inclination were recommended 
to the Fleet. The most promising at the time that I 
relinquished command of the Fleet was that proposed 
by Lieutenant J. W. Rivett-Carnac, R.N., the range-find- 
ing expert of the Grand Fleet, who had investigated this 
inclination problem for some years. A great increase 
in the rapidity with which the fall of shot were "spotted 
on" to a target resulted from all this work. It is not 
too much to say that the interval between opening fire 
and the moment at which the salvoes began to "strad- 




SIMOKF. SCREKX MADE BY DESTROYERS 




DUMMY BATTLESHIP, MABCH, 1915 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 69 

die" the target was certainly halved, and the rapidity of 
fire when the enemy was "straddled" was very greatly 
increased. The new firing rules, by standardising the 
system of correcting fire, produced a marked increase 
in the efficiency of the methods by which the fire of two 
ships was concentrated on to one target and gen- 
erally paved the way for the solution of many gunnery 
problems which the Fleet had previously been unable 
to solve completely. 

The use of smoke screens was closely investigated as 
a result of our experience of the German use of this de- 
vice. Prolonged experiments were carried out at Scapa 
Flow to ascertain the possibilities and the best method 
of using smoke screens, and they were also used during 
battle tactics and during range-finder exercises. The 
trials included the use of smoke shell as well as funnel 
and artificial smoke. 

In another direction efforts were made to increase 
efficiency. The Jutland battle convinced us that our ar- 
mour-piercing shell was inferior in its penetrative power 
to that used by the Germans, and immediately 
after the action I represented this with a view to im- 
mediate investigation. A Committee sat to consider the 
matter. In 1917, as First Sea Lord, I appointed a second 
Committee. 

With one of the old type of armour-piercing shells of 
a particular calibre as used at Jutland the shell would, 
with oblique impact at battle range, break up whilst hol- 
ing a certain thickness of plate, and the shell could not, 
therefore, reach the vitals of the enemy's ships. A shell 
of the new type, as produced by the 1917 Committee, of 
the same calibre would at the same oblique impact and 
range pass whole through a plate of double the thickness 
before exploding and could therefore with delay action 



70 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

fuse penetrate to the magazines of a capital ship. Had 
our ships possessed the new type of armour-piercing shell 
at Jutland, many of the enemy's vessels, instead of being 
only damaged, would probably not have been able to 
reach port. The manufacture of these new type shells 
for the Fleet was well advanced before the end of 1917. 

The value of the torpedo as a fighting weapon in 
action, from ships, from destroj^ers, and from submarines, 
was also greatly increased. The torpedo practices at 
Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, were of 
the greatest possible use. 

The real cause underlying the improvement was the 
great keenness displayed by officers and men. Their one 
idea was to strive for the highest efficiency, and 
there was never apparent the least sign of weariness or 
staleness in repeating time after time exercises and prac- 
tices with which they were so familiar. No tribute 
that I can pay to the personnel of the Grand Fleet in 
this connection could be sufficiently high. I know that 
under my successor the improvement in fighting efficiency 
continued. 

Owing to the collapse of the moral of the personnel 
of the German Navy, culminating in the surrender for 
internment of the majority of their capital ships, the 
Grand Fleet was given no opportunity of testing in ac- 
tion the methods adopted as a result of our experience 
during the first two years of war, and perfected by two 
years' further training. Had the German fleet come out 
to battle a terrible punishment awaited it! 

Mention has been made of the development of aircraft 
during the War. The possibilities resulting from the use 
of the air for reconnaissance work, for assisting in the di- 
rection of gunfire, and, finally, for offensive operations, 
were fully recognised in the Grand Fleet; but for a con- 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 71 

siderable period the lack of suitable machines hindered 
development. The first decisive step taken was the fit- 
ting out of the Campania, a passenger ship of the Cunard 
Line, as a sea-plane carrier to be attached to the Battle 
Fleet. Prior to that, the Harwich Force and, later, the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet had been provided with smaller ves- 
sels, the Vindex and Engadine, carrying a few sea-planes. 
They had been used in operations in the Heligoland 
Bight, but without much success, owing to the difficulty 
experienced in getting sea-planes to rise from the water 
except in the finest weather. 

With the arrival of the Campania at Scapa, we were 
able to investigate the difficulties attending the use of air- 
craft from ships as then fitted and to indicate the direc- 
tion in which improvement was desirable and possible. It 
was apparent that little improvement could be expected 
so long as we were dependent on the machines rising from 
the water. The first step, therefore, was to improve the 
arrangements for flying off from the deck of the 
Campania. The ship returned to Liverpool at the end 
of 1915 in order that the necessary alterations 
might be effected; these were not completed until 
the late spring of 1916; during the alterations, the 
Campania was also, at my request, fitted to carry a kite 
balloon. 

The advantages to be obtained from the use of kite 
balloons had been demonstrated during the Dardanelles 
operations, and the 3Ienelaus, kite balloon ship, was sent 
to the Grand Fleet. But it was soon obvious that we 
could not make profitable use of kite balloons in a fleet 
action unless they were ^owa from the ships themselves, 
and experiments were carried out, under the direction of 
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, commanding the 
4th Battle Squadron, having as their object the best 



72 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

method of fitting and using kite balloons from warships. 
Man}' difficulties were experienced, the principal one 
being that of providing wire of sufficient strength to stand 
the tension of the balloon during strong winds. The Kite 
Balloon Section at Roehampton gradually solved the 
difficulties, and by the end of 1916 the majority of the 
flagships leading divisions of the Fleet were provided 
with kite balloons, and were experiencing their utility. 
From this beginning, great developments took place in 
providing vessels of all classes, including light cruisers, 
destroj^ers, P boats, and trawlers, with kite balloons; the 
balloon was used in the case of the smaller ves- 
sels for anti-submarine reconnaissance work, whilst in the 
heavy ships it was used for observation and correction 
of fire. 

Meanwhile, the development of the air-craft carrier 
had proceeded, but not with the same rapidity. It was 
evident to me in 1916 that for anti-Zeppelin work we 
should look towards the aeroplane flying from the deck, 
rather than to the sea-plane, although it also could rise 
from the deck; but I gathered the time was hardly ripe 
for the step, owing to the landing difficulty, and the first 
efforts of the Royal Naval Air Service lay in the direction 
of providing a type of sea-plane that would fly well off 
the deck and climb quickly. These efforts were fairly 
successful, but the development of the heavier-than-air 
craft machine for use with the Fleet did not begin until 
the aeroplane was adopted for the work; and this took 
place in 1917, when progress became rapid, and continued 
until the end of the War. 

There remains the question of the air-ship, which was 
also being developed during the period 1914-16, but as 
this matter was not within the province of the Fleet, it 
is unnecessary to touch upon it here, 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 73 

V. — The Blockade 

The story of the development of the Grand Fleet 
would be incomplete without reference to the Blockade, 
and, in particular, to the work of the 10th Cruiser Squad- 
ron. In the early days of the War, the 10th Cruiser Squad- 
ron consisted of the ships of the "Edgar" class — ^vessels 
at least twenty years old; and during August, 
1914, the Admiralty commissioned three armed merchant 
ships, the Matihia, Alsatian and Oceanic, to strengthen 
the squadron for blockade work; the latter ship was lost 
by shipwreck in September of that year. 

The Blockade in those early daj^s was carried out by 
the 10th Cruiser Squadi'on and by the other cruiser squad- 
rons attached to the Grand Fleet. During No- 
vember, 1914, the ships of the "Edgar" class were with- 
drawn owing to their unseaworthy condition, and the 
ships' companies utilised to commission a number of ad- 
ditional armed merchant cruisers. By the end of De- 
cember, 1914, the squadron consisted of eighteen ships, 
being raised later to a strength of twenty-four ships. A 
very large proportion of the officers and men of the re- 
constituted 10th Cruiser Squadron belonged to the Mer- 
cantile Marine. 

The advent of so large a squadron of these vessels 
called for a considerable organisation for their main- 
tenance; they were based on Livei'pool for all the heavy 
work of upkeep, whilst a secondary advanced base at 
Swarbachs Minn, on the west coast of the Shetland 
Islands, was gradually developed, and obstructed against 
submarine attack. The work of organisation was carried 
out by Rear-Admiral de Chair, who commanded the 
squadron, ably seconded by Rear-Admiral H. H. Stile- 
pian, the Senior Naval Officer at Liverpool, to whoin 



74 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

we were much indebted for hearty co-operation and effi- 
cient organisation at the base. 

The work of the squadron consisted in intercepting 
and boarding all vessels bound into or out of the northern 
entrance to the North Sea, and this work could obviously 
not be carried out in the face of the German submarines 
without heavy risk to the ships. The danger was 
greatest during the operation of boarding, as the examin- 
ing vessel was obliged to stop to lower the boarding-boat. 
As the number of German submarines increased, the 
squadron was necessarily withdrawn to positions further 
removed from the enemy submarine bases, and the Block- 
ade line, after the spring of 1915, ran generally from 
the Orkneys and Shetlands past the Faroe Islands to 
Iceland, and when freedom from ice rendered passage 
round the north of Iceland possible, ships operated in that 
neighbourhood. 

A careful organisation of the movements of the ships 
was necessary to cover such an immense area of the sea, 
and to provide that all ships should, as far as possible, be 
intercepted. Even in the case of ships of such large coal 
endurance as the armed merchant steamers, it was not 
possible to keep much more than one-half the nimiber in 
commission on an average on the patrol line at the same 
time. The remainder were either in port refitting and 
refueling, or were en route to and from the bases. The 
distance from the middle of the patrol line to Liverpool 
was some 600 miles, so that two days were occupied in 
the passage each way. 

When going to or from Liverpool the ships had to run 
the gauntlet of enemy submarines, which were passing 
down the west coast of the Hebrides and Ireland, and 
as no destroyers were available with which to screen them 
against attack, the risk was considerable. They had also 



Plan. N? 2. 




GRAND FLEET AND BASES 75 

to face the constant danger of mine-fields. Several ships 
of the squadron fell victims to submarines or mines with 
a resultant heavy loss of life. 

Whilst the ships were on patrol, the work of the board- 
ing parties was very arduous. The preliminary ex- 
amination could not be carried out without boarding, 
and the manner in which the boats of the squadron were 
handled in the very heavy weather, almost constant in 
northern latitudes, was a fine tribute to the seamanship 
of the officers and men. In this boarding work the fisher- 
men of the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, hardy 
and experienced seamen, rendered most conspicuous 
service. 

The efficiency of the Blockade increased gradually 
from its inception, as is well known, and after a time the 
percentage of vessels that evaded the ships of the 10th 
Cruiser Squadron became so low as to be almost neg- 
ligible. The procedure adopted was to send all ships, 
preliminary examination of which at sea aroused any 
suspicion, into Kirkwall or Lerwick harbours, where reg- 
ular examination services were instituted. The ships were 
taken in under the supervision of an armed guard, sent 
on board from the boarding-vessel, and these guards un- 
derwent many unpleasant experiences. Several lost their 
lives in ships which were torpedoed bj^ German subma- 
rines, and in many cases, particularly in badly found sail- 
ing ships, they underwent great hardships. The guards 
were also the means of saving more than one such ship 
from shipwreck, by working her themselves when the crew 
refused to do so any longer, and in all cases great tact 
and discretion on the part of the officer in charge, usually 
a junior officer of the Roj^al Naval Reserve, were neces- 
sary in his dealings with the neutral captains. The whole 
question of the efficiency of the Blockade — as shown hy 



76 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the returns furnished to me from Headquarters — ^was con- 
stantly under review by my Staff and myself. 

The fate of the detained ship was decided in London 
on receipt of the report of examination. As was perhaps 
natural, the sentence on many ships' cargoes pronounced 
in London was not accepted without question from the 
Fleet, and a good deal of correspondence passed with 
reference to individual ships. We, in the Fleet, were nat- 
urally very critical of any suspicion of laxity in passing, 
into neutral countries bordering* on Germany, articles 
which we suspected might find their way into Germany, 
and constant criticisms were forwarded by me, first to the 
Admiralty, and, later, to the Ministry of Blockade, when 
that Ministry was established. The difficulties with which 
the Foreign Office was faced in regard to neutral sus- 
ceptibilities were naturally not so apparent in the Fleet 
as to the authorities in London, and though many of our 
criticisms were perhaps somewhat unjustifiable, and some 
possibly incorrect, it is certain that in the main they were 
of use. Indeed, they were welcomed in London as giv- 
ing the naval point of view. The decisive effect of the 
Blockade did not become apparent until the end, when 
the final crash came, and it was seen how supreme an 
influence on the result of the War this powerful weapon 
had exercised. Even those who during the War had 
been asking what the Navy was doing, recognised at the 
last how victory had been achieved, largely, as the result 
of the silent pressure of Sea Power. 

VI. — The Grand Fleet Bases 

Mention has been made elsewhere of the unprotected 
state of the Grand Fleet bases against submarine attack 
in the early part of the War. The matter was one of 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 77 

supreme impoTtance, and formed the subject of very- 
urgent representations to the Admiralty. Many brains 
were at work on the problem at the Admiralty, at the 
bases, and in the Fleet itself. 

The first step was that taken under the direction of 
Captain Donald S. Mum-o, the King's Harbour Master 
at Cromarty, who devised a system of submarine 
obstruction which later formed the pattern for the deep- 
water obstructions at most of our naval bases. Owing 
to his energy and driving power, the entrance to 
Cromarty was rendered fairly secure by October 26th, 
1914. Whilst he was working out a defence for 
Cromarty another officer, Lieutenant Bircham, R.N.V.R., 
under the command of Admiral Sir Robert Lowry, 
the Commander-in-Chief of the coast of Scotlandj 
suggested a method for providing an obstruction for 
the Rosyth base. This was fitted in place by 
the end of October, 1914, and was also entirely suc- 
cessful. 

As soon as the Cromarty scheme was in train, I re- 
quested that obstructions on similar lines should be 
fitted to the three main entrances to Scapa Flow, the 
Hoxa entrance (by far the most likely to be attempted) 
being taken in hand first. Exasperating delays in the 
supply of the necessary material were experienced, 
and the first line of obstructions in the Hoxa entrance 
was not completed until December 29th, 1914, the first 
line in Switha Sound by January 12th, 1915, and that 
in Hoy Sound by February 19th, 1915. Meanwhile offi- 
cers and men of the Fleet had improvised obstructions, 
first at Lough Swilly and Loch na Keal, and later at 
Scapa Flow, which, while not giving thorough security 
against a determined attempt at entry, had a psychologi- 
cal value. These obstructions, which were kept in exist- 



78 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ence even after the completion of the more efficient meth- 
ods of dealing with the problem, involved much labour. 

Towards the end of 1915, or early in 1916, the disad- 
vantages attendant on basing the Fleet so far north as 
Scapa Flow, were discussed between Sir Henry Jackson 
-(then First Sea Lord) and myself. We both felt that, 
with the Fleet at the northern base, the difficulties of 
intercepting the High Sea Fleet during coast raids, and 
of dealing with landing raids covered by the High Sea 
Fleet, were so considerable as to make it eminently de- 
sirable to base the whole Fleet farther south, if this were 
feasible. A discussion took place at Rosyth, and as the 
result I suggested a scheme of submarine obstructions 
across the Firth of Forth, which would admit not only 
of berthing the whole Grand Fleet in that anchorage, but 
would also allow of gunnery and torpedo practices being 
carried out with a considerable degree of safety in the 
Forth, so that the Fleet, if based there, could keep up its 
fighting efficiency. Many senior officers in the Grand 
Fleet were not in favour of the idea, for two reasons: 
first, that the Fleet could be mined in by the enemy 
with much greater ease when in the Forth than when at 
Scapa; and, secondly, that practices could not be so effi- 
ciently carried out in the Forth. There was much weight 
in both these objections, although the difficulties of carry- 
ing out practices in the Forth were exaggerated; but the 
strategic advantage, in my opinion, outweighed them, and 
the scheme was proceeded with as proposed. 

That part of the scheme which admitted of the safe 
carrjnng out of practices was completed by December, 
1916, and the whole of the new obstructions were in place 
by July, 1917, nearly a year later, it is true, than the 
anticipated date. The result certainly justified the con- 
clusion arrived at. When the conditions made it at 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 79 

all probable that the High Sea Fleet might put to 
sea for an operation in southern waters, the Grand 
Fleet assembled in the Firth of Forth, and the undoubted 
disadvantages of the southern base were neutralised by- 
skilful dispositions on the part of the flag officers respon- 
sible. 

The protection of the Grand Fleet bases against sub- 
marine attack was only one of the many factors necessary 
for their development. In pre- War days, although it 
had been decided that the use of northern bases would 
be necessary in the event of a war with Germany, the 
bases had not been prepared to meet the new situation. It 
is, perhaps, desirable to remove any misunderstanding as 
to the causes of this failure. 

(a) The decision had not long been taken, and 

(b) The necessary financial provision was lacking. 
Under the first of these headings the base at Scapa 

Flow was aflpected, and, under the second, that at Rosyth, 
where for some time progress in the development of the 
base had been arrested. 

The Admiralty had taken steps to make some prepara- 
tions at Cromarty, in so far as the provision of gun 
defences against attack by surface vessels was concerned, 
but nothing had been done for the upkeep of a fleet be- 
yond a decision to transfer to Cromarty, during war, one 
of the floating docks at southern yards. 

In fact, the situation was that, whilst we had shifted 
our Fleet to the north, all the conveniences for the main- 
tenance of that fleet were still in the Channel ports. The 
first step was the transference of the large floating dock 
from Portsmouth to Invergordon, in the Cromarty Firth, 
together with a staff of dockyard workmen, who were 
housed in a merchant ship captured from the Germans. 
Workshops were fitted up on shore under the energetiG 



80 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

superintendence of Rear- Admiral Edmund R. Pears and 
his able staff of dockyard officers. It can be said with 
great emphasis that this floating dock was simply invalu- 
able to the Grand Fleet. 

Invergordon gradually developed into a great repair- 
ing base. A second and smaller floating dock was pur- 
chased early in 1916 at my request and placed there, and 
by the middle of that year the base had attained large 
proportions ; work of all kinds was carried out with rapid- 
ity and success, including the repairs of battleships 
after the Jutland battle, and the great extension in 
armoured-deck protection fitted to ships after the same 
action. 

Ordinary refits of battleships had been carried out at 
Invergordon since the autumn of 1914. At Scapa Flow 
the same possibilities as a repairing base did not exist, 
although a floating dock for destroyers, for which many 
requests had been made, was eventually obtained and 
placed there. 

But the base at Scapa Flow had extended out of all 
loiowledge in other directions. In August, 1914, the 
base organisation consisted only of the seagoing Fleet re- 
pair ships Cyclops and Assistance. At an early stage the 
Cyclops was connected to a shore telegraph cable off the 
village of Scapa, and she became at the same time a 
floating post office and a base for the auxiliary vessels (a 
few drifters) which were first requisitioned. Rear- Ad- 
miral Francis S. Miller was appointed to her as the Senior 
Naval Officer at the base. The manner in which the great 
demands on her accommodation were met was a standing 
wonder to me. In the early part of the War, officers on 
Admiral Miller's staff and others were obliged to make 
their sleeping berths, as best they could, on the deck or 
on top of their writing-tables, and it was surprising that 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 8i 

the overcrowding in all directions did not affect health. 
But the work went on very successfully in the most in- 
convenient circumstances. 

Towards the end of 1914 it became necessary, owing 
to the weather conditions, to move the base organisations 
from the north to the south-west side of Scapa Flow. 
The anchorage at Long Hope was selected, whilst the 
Fleet itself lay off the north side of the Island of Flotta, 
and the numerous larger auxiliaries, colliers, oilers, store 
ships, and the ammunition ships lay between Long Hope 
and Hoy Sound. Prior to this, the importance of the 
organisation in the Orkneys and Shetlands had increased 
to such an extent that I had asked for the appointment 
of a Senior Flag Officer in general command 
of the whole district, and of the defences in par- 
ticular. 

So much of my time was being occupied in deciding 
and pressing forward the work of organisation of the base 
and its obstructions and defences, in dealing with the 
numerous questions relating to the patrol of the coast by 
coast watchers, in arranging for the disposal of merchant 
ships sent in for re-examination, and for guarding such 
vessels, in considering questions affecting the occupation 
of land for the erection of defences, in the requisition- 
ing of trawlers and drifters, etc., that it was becoming 
difficult to deal with the fast accumulating Fleet work 
proper. Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley Colville, who sug- 
gested that he should waive his seniority in order to serve 
as my junior officer, was appointed Vice-Admiral Com- 
manding the Orkneys and Shetlands. This left Rear- Ad- 
miral Miller free to devote himself to the increasingly 
heavy work of base organisation proper, relieved me of 
a mass of work outside the Fleet, and was of the greatest 
possible benefit in every way. Under Sir Stanley Col- 



82 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ville's most able direction, the completion of the organi- 
sation for the general defences of the Islands, the work 
of patrol craft and mine-sweepers, and the provision of 
submarine obstructions was effected, and the work pushed 
forward. Captain Stanley Dean Pitt, R.N., an officer of 
very wide experience, was appointed to superintend the 
work of laying the submarine obstructions, and under 
his able direction, in the face of the greatest difficulties 
due to bad weather and strong tides, the entrances to 
Scapa Flow were either blocked by sunken ships or ob- 
structed by nets, mines, and other devices. 

The gun defences at Scapa, which at the beginning 
of the War consisted of 12-pounder and 3-pounder guns 
landed from the Fleet, were gradually reinforced by four- 
inch and six-inch guns obtained from abroad, the whole 
being manned by Royal Marine pensioners under Lieut.- 
Colonel Gerald N. A. Harris, R.M.A. The garrison was 
housed in huts, erected temporarily for the pur- 
pose, and although with the handiness which charac- 
terises a Royal Marine in all circumstances, the 
officers and men eventually made themselves comfortable 
even under such weather conditions as are experienced at 
Scapa Flow, they endured a very considerable amount of 
hardship in the early days with their accustomed cheer- 
fulness. 

And here I cannot fail to mention the endurance and 
staying qualities of the crews of the tra,wlers that sup- 
ported the submarine obstructions, particularly those at 
Scapa Flow. These trawlers were moored in positions in 
which they were exposed to the whole fury of northerly 
and southerly gales; in many cases they were within a 
few yards of a rocky coast, heavy seas breaking over them 
and bringing on board tons of water. The skippers knew 
that they had to stick it out for the sake of the safety of 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 83 

the Fleet and the maintenance of the obstruction, and 
under these conditions they did their duty in a manner 
which calls for the highest praise. 

Meanwhile the development of the base proper pro- 
ceeded apace. One of the earlier arrivals was the old 
cruiser Impeneuse, which was used as a post office, depot, 
and general overflow ship to the Cyclops. The number of 
trawlers and drifters, which had their home at 
Scapa Flow and which were engaged on patrol or mine- 
sweeping work, attendance on the Fleet, garrison, or on 
the mass of Fleet auxiliaries, increased with great rapidity 
during the winter of 1914-15; on September 1st, 1914, 
the nimiber was nil, and it reached a total of some four 
yachts, eighty-five trawlers, and twenty-seven drifters by 
the summer of 1915. These vessels all looked to the 
Cyclops, Assistance and Imperieuse for refit, pay, food, 
and for every conceivable want. Gradually the number of 
base ships was increased, culminating in the arrival of 
the old battleship Victorious about March 6, 1916, as the 
"home" of some 500 dockyard workmen working in the 
Fleet, fitting the Director System, increasing the protec- 
tion to decks and magazines, carrying out minor 
repairs, retubing condensers, and many other urgent 
tasks. 

IVIention has been made of the large number of colliers, 
oilers, store ships, ammunition ships, etc., that were used 
by the Fleet. At one time this caused some criticism, 
based principally on the time spent by the colliers at the 
Fleet Base. It may be as well to explain the 
necessity for this. There were no facilities at the base 
for the storage of coal, either in lighters or on shore. 
Consequently, the whole of the coal required at the base 
was necessarily kept on board the colliers. The actual 
number of colliers which I deemed it necessary to keep 



84 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

at the base during the first two years of war was 
determined by the necessity for coaling the Fleet and 
getting it to sea again with the utmost possible rapidity. 
We could not contemplate such a situation as the Fleet 
arriving short of fuel, and being delayed in completing 
owing to shortage of colliers, with the possibility of in- 
formation being received simultaneously that the High 
Sea Fleet was at sea and covering a landing raid on our 
coast! Rapidity of fuelling was of vital importance to 
the Empire. 

Therefore, in stating my requirements of colliers, I 
gave the number necessary to enable almost the whole 
Fleet to be fuelled simultaneously; in other words, 
the number of colliers was dependent on the number of 
coal-burning ships in the Fleet. Some slight reduction 
was found possible, to allow for the probable case of some 
ships requiring less coal than others, thus admitting of 
two such ships using one collier in succession; but, 
broadly speaking, the requirements were as stated. 
When the cargo of colliers fell below a certain minimum, . 
they return to Cardiff to refill to economise ton- 
nage. 

At Rosyth the situation was eased by the transport of 
coal by rail to Grangemouth and its transshipment to 
colliers there. As we needed colliers as coal-storing ships, 
so also we required ammunition ships to carry a propor- 
tion of the reserve ammunition for the Fleet. There 
were no facilities at Scapa or Cromarty for storage on 
shore. The number of ships required for this service was, 
however, much smaller. 

Floating storage of all sorts possesses one great ad- 
vantage over shore storage; should strategic conditions 
necessitate a change of base, the coal, ammunition and 
other auxiliaries can move with the Fleet. The 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 85 

same argument applies in a lesser degree to floating 
docks. 

A consideration of all these facts connected with the 
development of fleet bases will show that this question 
necessarily required a good deal of attention on the part 
of my Staff and myself, and was incidental to the de- 
velopment of the 'Grand Fleet. 

VII. — The Personnel and its Welfare 

Another factor in the development of the Fleet, by 
no means the least important, was that of the moral and 
spirit of the personnel. It is, of course, impossible to 
exaggerate the importance of this question as an element 
in the efficiency of the Fleet. In the early months of 
war, when the Fleet was continually at sea, the few hours 
spent in harbour were fully occupied in coaling and stor- 
ing the ships ; but these conditions could not be continued 
indefinitely. As the months passed with no sign of en- 
emy vessels at sea and time in harbour increased as com- 
pared to that spent at sea, it became necessary to find 
some diversion for the minds of the officers and men. 

The first step taken at Scapa Flow was carried out 
under the superintendence of Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis 
Bayly, then commanding the 1st Battle Squadron. 
Always alive to the necessity for providing occupation, 
recreation, and exercise for officers and men, he started 
considerable works on Flotta Island, works of such a 
divergent nature as batteries for the defence of the sub- 
marine obstructions then in progress, football grounds 
for the men, a golf course for the officers, and landing 
piers on the beach. These schemes grew and were eventu- 
ally divided out amongst the various squadrons. A rifle 
and pistol range were also constructed, and several piers 



86 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

built. The whole of the work was carried out, I may 
add, by means of Fleet labour. Later a "Canteen" ship, 
the s.s. Gliourko, was fitted up by the Junior Army and 
Navy Stores, and this vessel played an important part 
in the harbour life of the Grand Fleet, She carried stores 
and provisions of all sorts, available for use by all ships, 
but particularly of the smaller vessels which could not 
send their mess stewards far afield in search of a change 
of diet. She was provided with a stage, and theatrical 
and cinema entertainments took place on board fre- 
quently. She was also fitted with a boxing ring, and 
squadron boxing competitions were held on board with 
great frequency. Finally, she was utilised for lectures 
of all sorts, and for the Church services of Roman Catho- 
lics and Nonconformists. 

The system of lectures was encouraged to the utmost. 
Officers lectured on board their ships to the ships' com- 
panies on every subject, the War included, and much 
good resulted. 

Education was freely developed. The Admiralty 
provided, at my request, schoolmasters in large numbers, 
and classes for the boys and voluntary classes for the men 
in the evenings in harbour were very well attended. 

And, finally, exercise of all sorts was encouraged to 
the utmost extent possible. This took the form princi- 
pally of football, rowing regattas, athletic sports and box- 
ing. The keenness displayed in all these sports was a 
certain indication that the personnel was showing no sign 
of staleness. 

The Englishman's love of sport helps him to tide over 
periods of tedium and weariness, which are most calcu- 
lated to undermine discipline. Occupation and interest 
are the surest antidotes to discontent and unrest, and 
never during the first two and a half years did I see signs 



GRAND FLEET AND BASES 87 

of either. On the contrary, the men, I believe, were thor- 
oughly happy and contented, treated the War as being 
in the day's work, and looked forward eagerly to the day 
on which their enemy would give them the opportunity 
for which they were waiting, and for which they kept 
themselves thoroughly efficient and fit. 

In those days the officers got to know the men even 
better than they had done before, and the spirit of com- 
radeship between all ranks became correspondingly closer. 
Certainly no Commander-in-Chief could ever have desired 
to see in the force under his orders a finer spirit than 
that which animated the officers and men of the Grand 
Fleet. 



CHAPTER IV 



DECLARATION OF WAR 



At 8.1. . A.M. on August 4th, 1914, the Grand Fleet pro- 
ceeded to sea in compliance with Admiralty orders. The 
ships accompanying the Fleet-Flagship Iron Duke were 
the vessels of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 
the light cruisers Southampton, Birmingham, Boadicea, 
Blonde and the destroyers of the 4th Flotilla ; the cruisers 
Shannon, Natal and Roxburgh, and the light cruisers 
Nottingham, Falmouth and Liverpool, which were at 
Rosyth with the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla, were directed to 
meet the Fleet at a rendezvous in Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 
1.30 E. The light cruisers Bellona and Blanche were left 
behind to coal. 

A report received from the Admiralty that three Ger- 
man transports had passed the Great Belt on the even- 
ing of August 1st had led to the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 
with the cruisers Cochrane and Achilles, and the 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, being ordered to sea on the 
evening of August 3d to cruise to the southward of the 
Fair Island Channel during the night. 

The orders under which the Fleet acted were to sweep 
east as far as Long. 2 E. and, then, for the cruisers 
to carry out a wide sweep to the southward and south- 
westward. These orders were in conformity with the 
general strategical ideas embodied in the War Orders for 
the Grand Fleet, which, as already indicated, aimed at 
establishing a blockade; at preventing the enemy forces 
from getting into the Atlantic to interfere with the operj!,- 



DECLARATION OF WAR 89 

tions of our cruisers engaged in protecting our own trade 
as well as stopping trade on the part of the enemy; and 
at asserting control of the North Sea and denying it to 
the enemy. Pursuant to these orders, the 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were directed 
to sweep the area between Lat. 60 and 61 N., working 
eastward from the Shetland Islands to Long. 2 E., arriv- 
ing there at 4 p.m.^ thence to sweep to the S.E. until 
5 A.M. on August 5th, when they were on a line drawn 
S.W. from Hangesund Light in Lat. 59.25 N. with the 
eastern ship 20 miles from the coast. The Antrim and 
Argyll, being short of fuel, were detached during the 
evening of August 4th to coal at Scapa. 

The sweep was prolonged to the westward by the 
cruisers and light cruisers from Rosyth; the 2nd Flotilla 
was detached to Rosyth to fuel. This first sweep was 
begun in northern waters because the North Sea is 
narrower at this point, and also because it afforded oppor- 
tunity of intercepting vessels which might have left 
German ports two days previously in anticipation of 
hostilities. The cruiser sweep was supported by the 
Battle Fleet, which steamed as far as Long. 2 E., turning 
at 3 A.M. on August 5th to the westward. 

The 3rd Battle Squadron which had been compelled 
to leave Scapa 80 per cent, short of fuel owing to the 
paucity of colliers, was detached to that base at 8.30 p.m. 
on the 4th, to complete with coal. 

During the night information was received by wireless 
telegraphy that war had been declared against Germany 
at midnight, 4th-5th August, and the following gracious 
message was received from His Majesty the King and was 
conmiunicated to the Fleet : 

"At this grave moment in our National History, I 



90 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

send to you and through you to the officers and men of 
the Fleet of which you have assumed command, the 
assurance of my confidence that under your direction they 
will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, 
and prove once again the sure Shield of Britain and of her 
Empire in the hour of trial." 

During daylight on the 5th, the Battle Fleet cruised 
to the northward of Lat. 57.30 N., in accordance with 
Admiralty telegraphic orders; the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron was sent back to Scapa to coal, as well as four 
light cruisers and the Lowestoft, and the 4th Flotilla was 
sent to Invergorden for a similar purpose. In the after- 
noon, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the cruiser Devon- 
sMre, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, were 
detached to sweep to the eastward, and the Battle Fleet 
turned to the southward at 3 a.m. on the 6th to meet the 
3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron in Lat. 
59 N., Long. 1.0 E. 

During August 6th the following reports were re- 
ceived : 

(a) Two German cruisers were reported passing 
Trondhjem going north. (This came from the Admiralty.) 

(&) Four torpedo-boats had been seen off the north- 
west end of the Shetlands going north. ( This was a local 
report.) 

(c) The German liner Kronprinzessin Cecilie was 
stated to have passed through the Stronsay Firth, Ork- 
neys, bound east, during the night of the 5th-6th. (Local 
report. ) 

The destroyer Oak was despatched to search the 
vicinity of the Stronsay and Westray Firths, but obtained 
no confirmation of the report. 

(d) It was reported that the Germans had established 



DECLARATION OF WAR 91 

a base in Lat. 62 N. on the Norwegian coast (the exact 
position unknown). 

A search of the coast by cruisers revealed nothing in 
confirmation of the last report, but a British trawler 
reported that a large number of German merchant ships 
had assembled in the West Fiord and in the harbours of 
the Lofoten Islands on the coast of Noi-way. Reports 
as to the Germans having established a base on the Nor- 
wegian coast were very persistent during the early days 
of the War. These reports were probably to some extent 
due to the ideas prevailing before the War as to 'German 
intentions in this respect, thesd views being naturally 
coloured b}' the frequent visits of the German High Sea 
Fleet in peace time to Norwegian M^aters, particularly 
to the vicinity of Trondhjem. 

In 1911, when I conamanded the Atlantic Fleet, ar- 
rangements had been made for me to visit Norwegian 
ports at the same time as the High Sea Fleet, in order 
to bring about a meeting between the two navies, with, 
it was hoped, beneficial results. But the Agadir crisis 
intervened, and the visit was postponed. The meeting 
took place in 1914, when a portion of the 2nd Battle 
Squadron, under the conmiand of Vice- Admiral Sir 
George Warrender, visited Kiel during the regatta week, 
very shortly before the outbreak of war. 

During daylight of August 6th the Dreadnought 
Battle Fleet cruised between Lat. 59 N. and 60 N. and 
Long. 1 E. and 1 W.; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the 
1st Light Cruiser Squadron swept to the eastward between 
Lat. 58 N. and 60 N., thence to the northward along 
the Norwegian coast, and to the Shetlands and Scapa 
Flow, the 3rd Battle Squadron being detached to the 
N.E. to cover them. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 
rejoined the Battle Fleet at sea after refuelling; the 



92 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

2nd Flotilla left Rosyth at daylight and swept to the 
north-eastward ; and the 4th Flotilla left Invergordon with 
orders to search the vicinity of the Pentland Firth for sub- 
marines prior to the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the 7th. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Scapa at 
6 A.M. on the 7th to fuel; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron arrived at 10 a.m.^ and 
during the day the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with the 2nd 
Flotilla, carried out a thorough search of the Norwegian 
coast, being covered by the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 
and 3rd Battle Squadron. No sign of a Gei-man base 
could be discovered, and the force was ordered back to 
Scapa to fuel. 

The fuelling of the Fleet was considerably delayed, 
owing to the inadequate number of colliers, many of those 
present being also unsuitable for the work of rapid coal- 
ing. The lack of lubricating oil for the 3rd Battle 
Squadron also caused trouble, but these early difficulties, 
although a source of considerable anxiety at the com- 
mencement of hostilities, were overcome later. 

The greatest anxietjr constantly confronting me was 
the defenceless nature of the base at Scapa, which was 
open to submarine and destroyer attacks. Whilst the 
Fleet was fuelling the only protection that could be 
afforded was to anchor light cruisers and destroyers off 
the various entrances and to patrol outside the main 
entrance; but these measures were no real defence 
against submarines, and the position was such that it was 
deemed most inadvisable to keep the Fleet in harbour 
longer than was absolutely necessary for fuelling pur- 
poses. Accordingly, at 6.30 p.m. on the same day, the 
Battle Fleet again proceeded to sea, being screened 
through the Pentland Firth to the westward until dark 
by the 4ith Flotilla, and course being then shaped to pass 



DECLARATION OF WAR 93 

round the Orkneys into the North Sea. In order to 
jirovide some protection against destroyer attack, a re- 
quest was forwarded to the Admiralty asking that two 
of the older battleships might be sent up to defend the 
main entrances. This measure was approved and a reply 
was received that the Hannibal and Magnificent were 
being despatched. 

The Russell, Albemarle and Exmouth, of the 6th 
Battle Squadron, belonging originally to the Channel 
Fleet, arrived at Scapa to join the Grand Fleet on the 
night of the 7th-8th. 

At 9.30 P.M. on the 8th the battleships Orion, Monarch 
and Ajax were detached to carry out target practice, and 
the remainder of the Fleet proceeded to the south-east- 
ward from Fair Island, carrying out Fire Control Exer- 
cises; but, on receipt of a report from the Monarch, that 
a torpedo had been fired at her by a submarine, the prac- 
tice was stopped and the ships rejoined, one-half of the 
2nd Flotilla being directed to search for the submarine. 
At 6.30 P.M. the officer of the watch on board the Iron 
Duke sighted a pei-iscope and altered course to ram; the 
same periscope was shortly afterwards reported by the 
Dreadnought, but was not seen again. 

At 4 A.M. on the 9th, the Fleet was in Lat. 58.31 N., 
Long. 1.9 E. 

Shortly afterwards the Orion reported a strong smell 
of oil, and bubbles were seen on the surface, and the 
Birmingham, commanded by Captain A. M. Duff, of 
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, which had been screen- 
ing ahead of the Fleet with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, 
claimed to have rammed and sunk the German submarine 
U 15, which she had sighted on the surface. This initial 
success was hailed with great satisfaction in the Fleet. 
Subsequent information showed that the Birmingham 



94 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

had been handled with great promptitude. During day- 
hght of August 9th, the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron were cruising in company, the noon po- 
sition being Lat. 58.41 N., Long. 0.15 W., and as the pres- 
ence of submarines was suspected, the Fleet was con- 
stantly zigzagging, the ships altering course by "Blue 
Pendant" turns, that is, turning together by signal. 

At midnight, 9th-10th, the position of the Iron Duke 
was Lat. 57.51 N., Long. 1.2 E. 

On the 9th a telegram was dispatched to the Admiralty 
requesting that the movements of the Commodore (T) 
and Commodore (S) might be directed from the Ad- 
miralty, whilst the Commander-in-Chief with the Fleet 
remained in northern waters, as it was not possible to be 
sufficiently conversant with the conditions in the south for 
the Commander-in-Chief to control these movements. 
This plan was adopted and continued throughout the War. 

On August 10th, the movements of the Fleet were as 
follows : 

At 5 A.M. the Iron Duhe parted company from the 
Fleet and proceeded to Scapa in order that the Com- 
mander-in-Chief might communicate by land wire with 
the Admiralty and make further arrangements for the 
work at the fleet bases. The Iron Duke, with the 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron, and the Falmouth, Liverpool and 
Hellona, arrived at Scapa at 2.30 p.m., the 2nd Flotilla 
forming a submarine screen through the Pentland Firth. 

The remainder of the Battle Fleet proceeded north 
under the command of Sir George Warrender to a posi- 
tion to the westward of the Shetlands, in accordance with 
telegraphic directions received from the Admiralty, where 
it was considered that the submarine danger in the 
North Sea was considerable at this time. The 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron was detached to sweep a wide area to 



DECLARATION OF WAR 95 

northward and westward in advance of the Battle Fleet, 
which was screened by the 4th Flotilla as far north as 
Lat. 60 N. ; this flotilla was then detached for opera- 
tions on the Norwegian coast in conjunction with the 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. 
The latter force ,was directed to search for a suspected 
German submarine base in the vicinity of Stavangcr Fiord. 
The Flag officer in command was directed to carry out the 
operation of endeavouring to locate this base — if it 
existed — with due regard to the susceptibilities of the 
Norwegians. Commodore W. E. Goodenough, com- 
manding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, visited Stav- 
anger in the Southampton and was assured by the 
Norwegian authorities that no base had been formed in 
that vicinity by the enemy. 

The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Falmouth left 
Scapa at 10 p.m. on the 10th to co-operate with the 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron, the Hannibal and Magnificent having 
arrived at Scapa at 4 p.m. These two battleships were 
stationed to defend the Hoxa and Hoy entrances to Scapa 
Flow against attack by destroyers. 

Rear- Admiral Miller, who arrived in the Hannibal, 
was placed in administrative charge of the base and of the 
local defences, and arrangements were made for the local 
Territorial Force and other inhabitants of the Orkneys 
and Shetlands to patrol the coast and watch the harbours. 
Telephonic communication round the coast was estab- 
lished bj^ degrees. 

Reports were received of aeroplanes having been seen 
over the Orkneys on the evening of the 10th, and the 
Centurion reported having sighted an airship north of the 
Shetlands on the same evening. Little credence was at- 
tached to these reports, which in the early days of the War 
were very frequently received. 



96 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

August lltJi. — The Iron Duke left Scapa and re- 
joined the Battle Fleet at 5 p.m. in Lat. 60.8 N., Long. 
3.28 W. The Battle Fleet was then exercised in forming 
line of battle, and also carried out sub-calibre gun prac- 
tice. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron joined after com- 
pleting its northern sweep and was detached to Scapa 
to fuel at 8 p.m. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron, and 4th Flotilla, having completed 
their examination of the Norwegian coast, returned, some 
to Scapa and some to Cromarty, to fuel. The 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron returned to a position N.E. by E., 30 
miles from Kinnaird Head. The Drake, flying the Flag 
of Rear- Admiral W. L. 'Grant, which had joined the 
Grand Fleet, was dispatched to search the coast of the 
Faroe Islands for possible enemy bases. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the old 
cruisers of the "Edgar" class, had by this time been 
established on a northern patrol area between the Shet- 
lands and the Norwegian coast, under the command of 
Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair. 

On this day orders were given to establish Loch Ewe, 
on the north-west coast of Scotland, as a secondary coaling 
base for the Fleet, and Rear-Admiral Richard P. F. 
Purefoy was appointed to take charge of the base. 

A week of war had now elapsed without any move 
whatever being made on the part of the High Sea Fleet; 
the only German naval activities had been mine-laying in 
southern waters during the first two days of the War, 
together with some submarine activity in the North Sea. 
The British Fleet during the week had been largely occu- 
pied in boarding all merchant vessels sighted, and in insti- 
tuting as strict a blockade as was possible. 

August 12th. — The Battle Fleet to the westward of the 
Orkneys (noon position Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 4.12 W.) 




THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET (COMMODORE LIONEL HALSEY), 
AND THE FLAG LIEUTENANT (lIEUT. -COMMANDER HERBERT FITZHERBERT) , 
ON BOARD H. M. S. "iron DUKe" 



DECLARATION OF WAR 97 

was exercised during the forenoon and afternoon at 
battle tactics and carried out gunnery practices between 4 
and 8 p.m.; it proceeded then to Scapa Flow to fuel, 
arriving at daylight on the 15th, with the exception of the 
3rd Battle Squadron, which went to Loch Ewe to coal, 
and to test the suitability of this base and its capability 
for defence against submarine attack. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been 
fuelling at Scapa, left before dark on the 12th to cruise 
west of the Orkneys with orders to economise fuel in 
view of a projected operation to the southward. 

The 2nd Cruiser Squadron and the Falmouth swept 
100 miles to the south-eastward from Kinnaird Head 
during the day, and then returned to Cromarty to fuel. 

The Bellona and Liverpool swept to the south-east- 
ward of the Pentland Firth during the day and night of 
the 12th, together with one-half of the 2nd Flotilla as 
a guard against destroyer attack on the Fleet whilst coal- 
ing. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron remained on the northern 
patrol. A report was received from Rear-Admiral Grant, 
in the Drake, that the position in the Faroe Islands was 
quite satisfactory, neutrality being observed. The Drake 
remained on patrol to the north-eastward of the Faroe 
Islands, and two ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were 
sent to assist her in her work of blockade. 

Rear-Admiral E. R. Pears was on this date appointed 
in charge of the Fleet Base at Cromarty. 

The Admiralty informed me that a neutral steamer 
from Hamburg had arrived in England and reported that 
there were fourteen enemy battleships at Cuxhaven on 
the 9th inst., together with several mine-layers; that 
there were 30 destroyers between Cuxhaven and Heligo- 
land, and that a large mine-field had been laid outside the 



98 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

entrance to the Jade river. This was the first definite 
news of the enemy's main fleet. 

August ISth. — The Dreadnought Battle Fleet was 
coaling at Scapa during the day, and the 3rd Battle 
Squadron coaling and storing at Loch Ewe. My object 
in providing this alternative base was to expedite entry 
into the bases for fuelling, and also to be prepared with 
a second base in the event of Scapa Flow becoming 
untenable by submarine attack. 

The Albemarle relieved the Liverpool and Bellcna on 
patrol to the eastward of the Orkneys in the evening, these 
two ships returning to Scapa to fuel. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was at sea west of 
the Orkneys; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty coal- 
ing; the 3rd Cruiser Squadron at sea sweeping to the 
south-eastward from the Aberdeenshire coast; and the 1st 
Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa coaling. The Falmouth 
was now attached to this squadron. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron and the Drake were on 
the northern and Faroe patrols. During the day the 
Commander-in-Chief held a conference with the Flag 
officers of the Fleet and explained the operations con- 
templated on the 15th and 16th inst. At 7.30 p.m. the 
Dreadnought Battle Fleet proceeded to sea to the west- 
ward, except two ships which had not finished coaling, 
the operation having been again delayed owing to an 
insufficient number of colliers being provided. They fol- 
lowed later. 

The Ajax reported a turret defective, and was sent 
back to effect repairs with the aid of the Cyclops. 

August 14!th. — During the forenoon the Dreadnought 
Battle Fleet and battle cruisers were carrj'ing out target 
practice. Noon position of the Iron Duhe, Lat. 59.11 N., 
Long. 4.27 W. 



DECLARATION OF WAR 99 

At 2 P.M. all Battle Squadrons, including the 3rd 
Battle Squadron from Rosyth and the 6th Battle Squad- 
ron, rejoined the Flag, and battle exercises, including de- 
l)loyments, were carried out till 7 p.m. 

At midnight the whole Fleet passed through the Fair 
Island Channel on its way to carry out a sweep in the 
North Sea. 

During the night of the 14th-15th all squadrons were 
moving towards a concentration rendezvous in the North 
Sea, that for the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons being 
Lat. 58.52 N., Long. 0.0, and for the 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron Lat. 59.0 N., Long. 0.15 E., at 3 a.m. on the 
15th; the rendezvous for the 2nd and 4th Flotillas was 
Lat. 59. 7 N., Long. 0.40 W., at 4 a.m. the 15th; for the 
mine-sweepers Lat. 58.40 N., Long. 8.45 E., at 6. p.m. 
the 15th; four ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron from 
the northern patrol joined the Fleet at 6 a.m. on the 15th. 

Towards the end of July, 1914, information from a 
usually reliable source had been received at the Admiralty 
indicating that the Germans intended carrying out a very 
extensive mine-lajang policy in British waters in the event 
of war between the two countries. The actual positions of 
many mine-fields were given by our informant, and it was 
apparent, provided the information were correct, that 
the enemy intended to lay mines regardless of their effect 
on mercantile traffic, whether British, Allied, or neutral. 

The proceedings of the mine-layer Koningen Louise 
in the first days of war tended to confirm this view, and 
consequently it was thought to be quite probable that 
mine-fields of an extensive character might be laid in the 
North Sea, in positions where they might be expected 
to be effective against any movement of our Fleet, par- 
ticularly any southward movement. 

The small margin of superiority which we possessed 



100 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

over the German fleet, as compared with the immense 
difference in our naval responsibihties, made it very nec- 
essary that precautions should be taken to safeguard the 
most valuable of our ships from such a menace when op- 
erating in waters that might be mined. 

It was for this reason that the six mine-sweepers 
accompanied the Battle Fleet during this sweep, for, al- 
though the speed of the Fleet was necessarily reduced by 
their presence in order to admit of sweeping operations, 
and the danger from submarine attack thereby increased, 
and although the sweeping operations could only be car- 
ried out in an exploratory fashion, there was the chance 
that the danger incurred by taking the whole Fleet over 
possible mine-fields might be much reduced. 

Later, when it became impossible to take the sweepers 
to sea as their presence was more necessary in the vicinity 
of the bases, the practice was introduced of placing one of 
the older battleships of the 6th Battle Squadron ahead of 
each squadron of the Dreadnought Fleet in order that 
these less valuable ships might first discover the mines 
instead of the Dreadnought battleships. The officers and 
men of the 6th Battle Squadron named their Squadron 
the "Mine Bumping Squadron" on this account. 

August 15th. — At noon the Iron Duke's position was 
Lat. 58.16 N., Long. 1.45 E., the whole Fleet being in 
company in cruising order and steering to the eastward, 
preparatory to turning south. The plan of operations 
included a sweep of the southern part of the North Sea by 
cruiser forces comprising some of the older cruisers, to- 
gether with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich; two 
of our submarines had been ordered to be off the Ems 
and two off the Jade by 6 a.m. on the 16th. 

During the day three sea-planes and two aeroplanes 
arrived at Scapa for reconnaissance work from the base. 



DECLARATION OF WAR loi 

August 16th. — At 4 a.m. the h'on Duke Was in Lat. 
56.43 N., Long. 4.5 E. At 8 a.m., no report having been 
received of the sighting of any German vessels, the 
Commander-in-Chief directed the cruisers to continue the 
sweep until 9.30 a.m. At this time the Fleet-flagship 
Iron Duke's position was Lat. 55.56 N., Long. 4.40 E., 
the battle cruisers being some 40 to 50 miles ahead of 
the Battle Fleet. The only enemy vessel seen was one 
submarine by the New Zealand at 10.35 a.m. in Lat. 
55.45 N., Long. 5.26 E. 

The weather was very fine with high visibility, and at 
9.30 A.M., the cruisers being then well to the southward 
of the latitude of the Horn Reef, the whole Fleet turned 
to the northward, the Battle Fleet on a north by west 
course, at a speed of 12 knots, zigzagging. 

Rear- Admiral Christian, of the 7th Cruiser Squadron, 
reported that the sweep of the southern force had been 
unproductive. 

The cruisers were now disposed on a wide front for 
a northerly sweep, spreading from the Norwegian coast, 
for a distance of 150 miles, to the westward, with the 
Battle Fleet in the centre. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron 
swept to Lister, on the Norwegian coast, and then along 
that coast as far as Lat. 60 N., thence towards Kinnaird 
Head, with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron prolonging 
and supporting. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron extended the 
front to the westward, supported by the 3rd Battle 
Squadron. 

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron remained in rear of 
the Battle Fleet until dusk, and then was stationed 12 
miles ahead. The 10th Cruiser Squadron, spread 10 miles 
apart, covered the area between the Battle Fleet and the 
2nd Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd and 4th Flotillas re- 
mained with the Battle Fleet, acting as a submarine 



102 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

screen by day, and keeping in rear of the Fleet at night. 

The mine-sweepers, which had swept ahead of the 
Battle Fleet when on the southerly course, acted as a 
submarine screen during the passage to the northward. 
During the night of the 16th-17th the 3rd Cruiser Squad- 
ron was detached to Cromarty to coal, the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron to Scapa to coal, and to resume the northern 
patrol, and the 6th Battle Squadron, the 2nd Flotilla 
mine-sweepers and 3rd Battle Squadron proceeded to 
Scapa to fuel. 

August 17th.— At 7.15 a.m. the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet altered course to pass through the Fair Island 
Channel, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron rejoined, 
The 4th Flotilla, which had been disposed astern during 
the night, resumed station as a submarine screen at day- 
light. The Battle Fleet zigzagged as usual throughout 
daylight. 

At noon the Iron Duke's position was Lat. 58.59 
N., Long. 1.35 E. At midnight, Lat. 59.27 N., Long. 
2.25 W., and at 8 a.m. the 18th, Lat. 58.44 N., Long. 

4.47 W. 

The 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the northerly sweep 
sighted only neutral vessels and proceeded to work in an 
area designated as No. 5 (eastward from Kinnaird Head) . 
Noon position, Lat. 58.42 N., Long. 3.0 E. 

This area, No. 5, was designed to cover the approach 
to the Pentland Firth, both for blockade purposes and as 
an outpost position for the Fleet at Scapa. 

At this time, the northern and central parts of the 
North Sea were divided into certain numbered areas in 
which cruisers could be directed by wireless to work with- 
out the necessity of making a long signal. 

The various areas were approximately placed as 
follows : 



DECLARATION OF WAR 103 

Area No. 1. — Covering the route round the north end of tlie Shetland 

Islands from the southward and eastward. 
" No. 2. — Covering the Fair Island Channel to south-eastward, 

working down to the line Kinnaird Head — Udsire. 
" No. 3. South-eastward from the N.E. end of the Orkneys to 

Lat. of Kinnaird Head^ with a width of about 50 miles 

from the line Noss Head — Kinnaird Head. 
" No. 4. — South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head 

— Udsire Lighthouse between 70 and 140 miles from 

Kinnaird Head. 
" No. 5. — South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head 
— Udsire Lighthouse, between Area 4 and Norwegian 

territorial waters. 
" No. 6. — South-eastward 120 miles from the line Kinnaird Head 

— Udsire Lighthouse, between 20 and 70 miles from 

Kinnaird Head. 
" No. 7- — Between Lat. 55.20 N. and 57.50 N. and between 50 and 

150 miles from the English coast. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, having coaled, left to 
resume the northern patrol; the Drake, and the two ships 
acting with her, were ordered to return to Scapa to coal, 
and directions were given for the other two ships to rejoin 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron subsequently. During the 
day the Orion developed serious condenser defects, neces- 
sitating retubing her condensers. A telegram was sent 
to the Admiralty requesting that new condenser tubes 
might be sent at once to Loch Ewe, together with dock- 
yard workmen to assist with the retubing. Meanwhile 
arrangements were made for giving fleet assistance to the 
Orion, and for all suitable spare condenser tubes from 
the fleet to be sent to her on arrival. 

The situation as regards the coal supply to the Fleet 
had by this time become very serious, and was causing 
me much anxiety; in reply to strong representations to 
the Admiralty, a telegram was received explaining the 
position and the eff'orts being made to rectify matters. 



104 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The Admiralty also informed me of the great impor- 
tance that was attached to the efficiency of the northern 
patrol, and stated that four armed merchant ships were 
being sent to reinforce the 10th Cruiser Squadron. 

The constant sea work had by this time shown the 
inadequacy of the engine-room imj)lements of all ships 
for war conditions, and, in consequence of representa- 
tions to this effect, 1,000 R.N.R. firemen were sent to 
Scapa for distribution amongst the various ships. The 
benefit derived from this measure was very considerable. 

Two Fleet messenger vessels, the Cambria and Anglia, 
arrived at Scapa on the 17th. These ships were used for 
communication between the bases, for carrying mails and 
despatches, and for boarding duties. 

August ISth. — The Dreadnought Battle Fleet 
arrived at Loch Ewe to fuel early in the afternoon; it was 
accompanied by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron which was 
without the Falmouth and Liverpool. The attached 
cruisers were anchored in suitable positions for defending 
the entrance against submarine attack, so far as they were 
capable of doing it, and the armed steamboats of the fleet 
patrolled the entrance. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been detached 
to Scapa at daylight to fuel. A coaling base for the 10th 
Cruiser Squadron had been by this time established at 
Lerwick in order to shorten the distance for the ships 
when proceeding to fuel. The Alsatian, an armed mer- 
chant ship, joined the 10th Cruiser Squadron. 

The Assistance arrived at Loch Ewe as base repair 
ship, and was connected to the shore telegraph system. 

Aeroplanes were reported off Foula Island, south-west 
of the Shetlands, during the night of the 18th-19th. En- 
quiry showed this rumour to be false. 

The Admiralty informed me on this date that Rear- 



DECLARATION OF WAR 105 

Admiral Arthur Christian, with his Flag in the Sapphire, 
had been placed in command of all forces in the southern 
portion of the North Sea, namely. Cruiser force C, the 
destroyer and submarine flotillas. As already explained, 
these forces were acting under direct Admiralty orders and 
were independent of me, unless ordered to join my Flag. 

This organisation was dropped later on, after the loss 
of the Cressy, Ahoukir and Hogue, Cruiser force C being 
abolished, and the command of the destroyer and sub- 
marine forces reverting to their own senior officers. 

August 19th, 21st, 22nd.— The Battle Fleet and 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron remained in harbour during the 
19th, coaling, storing, cleaning boilers, and taking in addi- 
tional ammunition up to a maximum storage. With the 
exception of the Orion, these ships left on the 20th at 6.30 
P.M. for an area to the westward of the Orkneys and 
Shetlands, with orders to carry out target practice on the 
21st. The battle cruiser New Zealand was ordered to the 
Humber to join the Invincible. 

As Commodore Keyes reported on this date that our 
submarines in the Heligoland Bight were being followed 
and watched by German trawlers fitted with wireless, I 
informed the Admiralty that I proposed to treat such 
vessels as men of war. This was approved. The 2nd and 
3rd Cruiser Squadrons were directed to work in Patrol 
Area 1 alternately, and to carry out target practice in the 
Cromarty Firth, en route to the patrol area. 

The practice of the Battle Fleet on the 21st was inter- 
fered with by fog and the Fleet did not form up until late 
at night, and passed through the Fair Island Channel into 
the North Sea during the early morning of the 22nd. 
The Battle Fleet was joined off Fair Island by the 1st 
Light Cruiser Squadron, was exercised in battle tactics 
during the day, and in the afternoon Avas joined by the 



io6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

2nd Flotilla as a submarine screen in Lat. 59.50 N., Long. 
1.30 E. The position of the Iron Duke at midnight, 
22nd-23rd, was Lat. 59.34 N., Long. 1.58 E., steering to 
southward. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, which had been 
detained at Scapa b}^ fog during the 21st, carried out 
target practice to the westward of the Orkneys on the 
22nd, and then proceeded to a position in Lat. 59.15 N., 
Long. 1 E., in readiness to support cruisers of the 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Cruiser Squadron, now 
comprising the Drake and King Alfred, which were 
ordered to work between Scotland and Norway in areas 
to the southward of the position named. 

There were no reports of enemy ships being sighted 
except one submarine in Lat. 55.4 N., Long. 1.35 E., 
on August 20th. The Admiralty informed me on this 
date that the Portsmouth floating-dock had left for 
Cromarty northabout, in pursuance of the policy decided 
on before the War. It was, therefore, suggested that one 
of the boy artificers' floating workshops should be sent 
north to work in conjunction with the dock. Steps were 
taken to carry out this suggestion, but the ship was lost 
on passage in bad weather near Portland. 

August 23rd. — The Battle Fleet remained cruising in 
the North Sea in support of the Cruiser Squadrons, the 
weather being misty, with rain. The 3rd Battle Squadron 
was detached to Scapa to coal, to arrive at daylight, the 
24th; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron, Avere sweeping to the southward as far south as 
Lat. 56 N.; the Alsatian was sent with the 6th Cruiser 
Squadron to look out off Jaederens Point, on the southern 
coast of Norway, to ascertain if German merchant ships, 
trying to make their own ports, were leaving territorial 



DECLARATION OF WAR 107 

waters at this point, and, if so, to capture them. One- 
half of the 2nd Flotilla was screening the Battle Fleet, 
the second half searching for a submarine reported east 
of the Orkneys. A submarine was sighted by the Ruby 
of the 2nd Flotilla with the Battle Fleet at 5 p.m., and 
course altered to avoid her. 

The destroj^ers Rifleman and Comet collided in a fog, 
the latter being considerably damaged. 

The Sappho was sent to search North Rona Island, a 
statement having been received indicating that it might 
possibly have been used by the enemy as a base for air- 
craft. She reported, after examination, that the island 
was, as expected, unsuitable for such a purpose. 

The Ajax reported having burnt out a boiler, and the 
Admiralty was asked to instruct the contractors to send 
to Scapa men and tubes for retubing it. 

The King Edrsard VII. reported cracks in the inner 
A tubes of two of her 12-inch guns. 

August 24ith. — The Battle Fleet cruised between the 
Orkneys and the Norwegian coast, and carried out battle 
tactics during the forenoon, the weather becoming too 
thick in the afternoon. 

The 1st Battle Squadi-on was detached to Scapa to 
fuel, as well as the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the latter 
being relieved bj'^ the 3rd Cruiser Squadron. The re- 
mainder of the cruisers continued their sweeping opera- 
tions as on the 23rd. 

August 25th. — The 3rd Battle Squadron left Scapa to 
relieve the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in immediate sup- 
port of the cruisers at 6 a.m., and while en route to its 
position captured an Austrian steamer, the Attila. The 
remainder of the Battle Fleet left its cruising ground, 
arriving at Scapa at 7.30 a.m. on the 26th, with the 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron to fuel. The Agincourt, a new 



io8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

battleship which was bought from Turkey when still in 
an unfinished state, was met off Noss Head and entered 
with the Fleet. 

At 5.30 P.M. a submarine was sighted from the bridge 
of the Iron Duke, and the Fleet manoeuvred clear of the 
position. One-half of the 4th Flotilla, which had screened 
the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea, joined the Commander- 
in-Chief at 5 P.M., and was ordered to search for this 
submarine, but without result. The Drake, of the 6th 
Cruiser Squadron, left the Norwegian coast for Scapa at 
4 A.M., the 25th, owing to condenser trouble. 

The Dominion reported two of her 12-inch guns 
cracked. The King Edward VII. left Scapa for Devon- 
port to change her two guns, which had also cracked. 
Vice- Admiral Bradford shifting his flag to the battleship 
Dominion, 

The weather was thick during the night of the 25th- 
26th, but the fog lifted sufficiently for the Battle Fleet 
to enter Scapa. 

August 2()th. — The li'on Duke, the 2nd and 4th Battle 
Squadrons, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and 2nd Flotilla, 
were at Scapa fuelling. 

The 1st Battle Squadron, with one-half of the 4th 
Flotilla, left to join the 3rd Battle Squadron at sea, their 
departure having been delayed for some hours bj'^ thick fog. 

The 2nd Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 5 p.m. for 
Rosyth to coal. 

The 6th Cruiser Squadron left patrol at 8 p.m. to coal, 
the King Alfred at Scapa, and the Alsatian at Liverpool; 
the arrangements in the large merchant-ships were such 
as to render coaling from colliers a difficult and slow 
progress. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron, except the Mantua, left 
the northern patrol to coal at Scapa. 



DECLARATION OF WAR 109 

During the day the Admiralty informed me of some 
operations which the southern forces were intended to 
carry out in the Heligoland Bight on the 28th, and di- 
rected that the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron should join in 
the operations. I made urgent representations as to the 
necessity of supporting the force with battle cruisers, and 
informed the Admiralty that I was sending the 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron to take jsart. I requested that the 
Vice-Admiral, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the Com- 
modore, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, might be informed 
direct by the Admiralty of the positions which the other 
ships would occupy, and that the senior officers of the 
southern force taking part should also be informed of 
the presence of the battle cruisers and 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron. 

On this date 1,000 additional seamen ratings arrived 
to join the Fleet, experience having shown that the num- 
ber of deck complements, as well as the engine-room 
complements, required increasing, principallj^ owing to 
the heavy guns of the secondary armament being so con- 
stantly manned at sea — by day against submarine attack, 
and by night against destroyer attack. 

August 27th. — On this date I wired to the Admiralty 
proposing the erection of two wireless stations in the 
Orkneys for local communication, and a directional sta- 
tion to assist in locating the positions of 'German ships 
using wireless. The remainder of the Battle Fleet pro- 
ceeded to sea at 6 p.m. to join the 1st and 3rd Battle 
Squadrons at 7 a.m. on the 28th to the south-eastward of 
the Orkneys in Lat. 58.20 N., Long. 0.20 W. The 2nd 
Flotilla accompanied the Fleet as a submarine screen. 

On this date a patrol of the eastern approaches to the 
Pentland Firth was inaugurated by the Mine-laying 
Squadron which was not required at the time for mine- 



no THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

laying operations, with the object of ensuring a closer 
Match on the mercantile traffic through the Pentland 
Firth, and the Oceanic, an armed merchant cruiser, which 
had joined the Fleet, was detached to carry out a patrol to 
the westward of the Fair Island Channel in order to con- 
trol the traffic at this point. 

Information was received from the Admiralty of the 
existence of mined areas off Harwich, Flamborough Head 
and Tynemouth. The positions of the two latter mine- 
fields appeared to corroborate the information obtained 
prior to the outbreak of war. 

A collision occurred at 9.30 p.m. between the Bellero- 
phon and the s.s St, Clair, which was passing tlu'ough 
the Fleet. The St. Clair was damaged, but the damage 
to the Belleroplion was not serious. 

August 28th. — The weather was misty with a visibility 
of 4 to 6 miles until the evening, when it cleared slightlj% 
The Battle Fleet during the day proceeded to the south- 
ward, the noon position being Lat, 58.19 N., Long. 0.21 
E., with cruisers in advance. 

The Fleet was exercised during the day at battle tac- 
tics. The sweep of light forces into the Heligoland Bight 
which took place at dawn was successful in bringing enemy 
light forces to action. The official despatches relating to 
this operation are given in an Appendix. The events may 
be shortly described here. At 6.53 a.m. Commodore 
Tj^rwhitt, commanding the Harwich force, which had 
swept into the Heligoland Bight during the night to cut 
off enemy vessels, sighted a destroyer and chased her. 
From 7.20 to 8 a.m. the Arethusa and the 3rd Flotilla' 
were in action with destroyers and torpedo-boats making 
for Heligoland, sinking one destroyer. At 7.57 the 
Arethusa, Commodore Tyrwhitt's flagship, which had 
been in commission only a few days, sighted two enemy 



DECLARATION OF WAR ni 

light cruisers, and engaged them, assisted a httle later 
by the light cruiser Fearless. At 8.25 a.m. a hit from the 
Arellnisa wrecked the fore bridge of one of the enemy- 
ships, and they both steamed at once for Heligoland, 
which was then sighted, and our ships turned to the west- 
ward. The Arethusa had been considerably damaged 
during the action and had suffered several casualties. 

At 10.55 A.M. another German light cruiser was 
sighted by the Arethusa, and on being attacked by the 
Fearless and destroyers turned away; she reappeared at 
11.5 and engaged the Arethusa and Fearless and was 
attacked by these ships and by destroyers and again turned 
away. Meanwhile Commodore Tyrwhitt had informed 
Sir David Beatty of the position, and that officer pro- 
ceeded at full speed to his support. The light cruiser 
Mains had been attacking the somewhat disabled Arethusa 
and the Fearless at about 11.30 a.m. and had suffered very 
severely in the action, being practically disabled. The 
arrival of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, under Com- 
modore Goodenough, on the scene at about noon secured 
her destruction. 

Between 12.37 p.m and 1.45 p.m. the 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron en- 
gaged two other German light cruisers, one of which was 
sunk; the second was last seen burning furiously and in 
a sinking condition. 

Even thus early in the War the difference between 
the behaviour of British and German seamen was notice- 
able. On the British side, in addition to other assistance 
rendered to the survivors of the Mainz (which had been 
sunk), Commander Keyes, in the destroyer Firedrake, 
proceeded alongside and rescued 220 of her crew, many of 
them being wounded. A German light cruiser opened 
fire on the British destroyers engaged in picking up sur- 



112 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

vivors from the German destroyer Vl87 when that ves- 
sel was sunk by our craft, thus making it necessary for 
the destroyers to leave behind the boats carrying out the 
rescue work. The British submarine E4 afterwards took 
our officers and men out of these boats and left some un- 
wounded Germans to take the other boats, which con- 
tained German wounded, to Hehgoland. 

In the afternoon of August 28th the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron was directed to work in Area No. 6, leaving 
the armed merchant cruisers farther to the northward. The 
object was to give a better chance of intercepting enemy 
vessels or neutral ships carrying contraband of war by 
establishing two patrols on the probable exit or entrance 
courses, one of which would in all probability be crossed 
of necessity during daylight hours, even if the second were 
passed through at night. 

August 29th. — This was a bright, fine day, with high 
visibility. The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at 
sea with three divisions of the 2nd Flotilla, cruising and 
carrying out battle tactics and other exercises. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa to 
fuel at 7 P.M., in company with the 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron, the Liverpool being detached to Rosyth to land 
the "German prisoners captured in the Heligoland Bight 
on the 28th. 

The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was cruising in Ai-ea No. 5, 
which the 3rd Cruiser Squadron left during the day for 
Cromarty to fuel. 

The 6th Cruiser Squadron and 10th Cruiser Squadron 
were in Area No. 6; the mine-layers were in Area No. 3. 

During the day the Oak arrived from Scapa with tele- 
grams and despatches for me and returned with similar 
correspondence for the Admiralty. The Oak was usually 
employed on this duty while the Iron Duke was at sea 



DECLARATION OF WAR 113 

during the earlier months of the War, my infrequent 
visits to a base rendering this essential. 

Some risk from submarine attack was naturally in- 
volved during the time that the Iron Duke, or any other 
heavy shij), was stopped to communicate. The risk was 
recognised, and, as the number of enemy submarines in- 
creased, it became undesirable to incur it, and the prac- 
tice of stopping ships at sea for any such purpose was 
abandoned; the longer time spent in harbour tended to 
reduce the necessity for the practice to some extent, but 
during the early part of the War this was the only means 
of conveying despatches to the Fleet when it was con- 
stantly at sea. 

The reported increase in enemy mine-laying off our 
eastern coasts caused me to suggest to the Admiralty at 
this time the desirability of the patrol flotillas working 
somewhat farther seaward, and to ask for an increase as 
soon as possible in the number of fast light craft to work 
off the northern fleet bases. A request for 20 drifters to 
work in the approaches to the Pentland Firth was also 
forwarded. 

The Fleet messenger Cambria was brought out to work 
with the Battle Fleet for the purpose of boarding merchant 
ships owing to the shortage of light cruisers for this work. 

August 30th. — In the afternoon the Dreadnought 
Battle Fleet shaped course for Scapa, and arrived at 7- 
A.M. on the 31st to fuel, the 3rd Battle Squadron being 
ordered out to the eastward of the Orkneys to support the 
2nd Cruiser Squadron, which was searching the eastern 
portion of Area 5. 

The patrol of the 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons was 
continued as usual, the 6th Cruiser Squadron leaving the 
Area at 3 a.m. on the 31st to fuel at Scapa. 

During the day the Assistance returned to Scapa from 



114 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Loch Ewe as base ship, and the Illustrious arrivef] there 
as defence ship for the entrance. I had decided her posi- 
tion during my previous visit. 

As a result of inquiries of the Admiralty, I vi'as in- 
formed that trawlers were being taken up and armed for 
patrol duties as rapidly as possible, and that arrangements 
for the defences of Scapa, which had formed the subject 
of correspondence between the Admiraltj^ and myself, had 
been approved, including the laying of certain mine-fields 
at the entrances. 

August 31st. — A sweep towards the Scottish coast 
of all vessels at sea, or ready for sea, was carried out in 
consequence of information having been received pointing 
to the possibility of mine-laying by the enemy in the 
vicinity of the Pentland Firth or Moray Firth during the 
night of August 31st-September 1st; the sweep was 
arranged to intercept the enemy mine-layers on their 
return trip. But it was unproductive, no mine-laying 
having taken place. The squadrons engaged in the sweep 
were the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Battle Squad- 
ron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 10th Cruiser Squadron. 

In consequence of urgent representations as to the 
insufficiency of .303 rifle ammunition for the Army, all 
ships disembarked 50 per cent, of their ammunition of 
this calibre at the end of August for conveyance to 
Woolwich. 

Later, still more of the rifle ammunition and all but 
a very small number of rifles, as well as many machine- 
guns, were landed from the Fleet for use by the Ai-my. 

A meeting of all the captains of Dreadnought battle- 
ships was held on board the Iron Duke on August 31st in 
order to discuss with them the subject of tactics in action. 



CHAPTER V 

THE SUBMARINE AND MINE MENACE IN THE NORTH SEA 

On September 1st the Dreadnought Battle Fleet with 
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 6th Cruiser Squadron 
and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were at Scapa Flow, clean- 
ing boilers, storing, and taking in ammunition, etc. The 
Fleet was at the usual anchorage off Scapa Pier, on the 
north side of the Flow; the ships which wei-e fitted with 
torpedo nets had them out, as was customary, unless col- 
liers or store-ships were alongside. 

The Falmouth, of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was 
anchored to the westward of Holm Sound, and the re- 
mainder of this squadron formed the outer or southward 
line of ships, all at two hours' notice for steam. The 
weather during the day was dull and misty, with rain at 
times. 

At 6 P.M. the Falmouth reported the periscope of a 
submarine in sight inside the harbour, and immediately 
opened fire, four rounds being fired by this ship; she 
reported having probably hit the submarine. Directly 
afterwards the Vanguard, one of the outer line of battle- 
ships, also opened fire on an object reported as a peri- 
scope, as did one of the E class destroyers, which was pa- 
trolling between the Fleet and the Hoxa entrance. 

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was directed to weigh 
immediately steam was ready, which was at 8.30 p.m., and 
to endeavour to locate the submarine and keep her under. 

The 2nd Flotilla, lying at Longhope, at short notice, 

115 



ii6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

was also instructed to weigh at once and search for the 
submarine. The whole of the ships present were ordered 
to raise steam with all despatch, and to prepare for tor- 
pedo attack, and the small craft, such as drifters, steam- 
boats, motor-boats, yachts, etc., which had steam ready 
and which could be collected, were at once organised in 
detachments to steam up and down the lines at high speed 
and outside the Fleet, with the object of confusing the 
submarine and endeavouring to ram her, if sighted. Col- 
liers and store-ships which had steam ready were directed 
to weigh and to go alongside the battleships that were 
not fitted with torpedo nets, in order to act as a form of 
protection against torpedoes fired at these valuable ves- 
sels. All ships in the outer lines were directed to burn 
searchlights to locate and confuse the submarine. 

At about 6.30 p.m. the Drake reported a submarine 
in sight from that ship, thus confirming the earlier reports. 

The Fleet was directed to weigh by divisions as soon 
as steam was ready and to proceed to sea. By 9 p.m. the 
weather was exceedingly thick inside the harbour and con- 
siderable difficulty was experienced in getting the Fleet 
out, as at this time there were no navigational facilities 
of any sort for leaving the harbour at night or in thick 
weather; but by 11 p.m. all the ships had left the harbour 
without accident, and, although there was a dense fog 
outside, the Fleet cleared the Pentland Firth successfully. 

The Assistance was ordered to Loch Ewe, and left 
after the Fleet, reporting having sighted a submarine in 
the entrance whilst going out. The 2nd Flotilla was left 
behind to locate and, if possible, destroy the submarine, 
and the 4!th Flotilla was stationed outside the Hoxa and 
Hoy entrances during the night, and directed to meet 
the Fleet at 7 a.m. on the 2nd. The only ship, as distinct 
from destroyers, remaining in the harbour was the 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 117 

Cyclops, lying off Scapa with the telegraph and telephone 
cables on board, and directions were given to Rear- Ad- 
miral Miller to endeavour to locate, by means of the mine- 
sweeping gunboats, the submarine reported sunk by the 
Falmouth. 

No trace of a submarine was discovered, and sub- 
sequent investigation showed that the alarm may have 
been false, the evidence not being conclusive either way. 
The incident, however, made it clear that protection 
against submarine attack was an absolute necessity, as 
the Fleet could not remain at a base that was as open 
to this form of attack as Scapa Flow. The only possible 
action, in the event of an alarm being given of the 
presence of a submarine, was to take the Fleet to sea, 
and, in addition to the dangers arising at that time from 
a hurried departure in thick weather, a feeling of in- 
security was created, which would be bad for moral, and 
the ships were deprived of opportunities for cleaning 
boilers, refitting machinery, etc., which experience was 
showing was essential if the steaming efficiency of the 
Fleet was to be maintained. 

The matter was at once represented to the Admiralty 
and proposals were made for blocking all the entrances 
to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa and Hoy entrances, by 
sinking old merchant ships in the channels. Pending 
the supply of reliable defences for the main entrance. 
Rear- Admiral Miller was directed to requisition a large 
number of net-drifters. The plan was to lay drift 
nets in the entrance to be watched by the drifters, the 
nets having indicator buoys attached to them and floating 
on the surface, so that the presence of a submarine might 
be indicated by the buoy moving with the net. 

The navigational difficulties of the narrower entrances 
were, meanwhile, the only obstacles to the passage of 



ii8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

submarines through them, but it was realised that these 
were considerable. The opinion was formed, however, 
that the Hoxa entrance presented no insurmountable 
difficulty of this nature to a determined submarine 
commander. 

By this date the local defence flotilla of destroyers 
consisted of vessels of the E class. A request was made 
for basing a hunting flotilla of 16 trawlers on Kirkwall, 
these vessels being intended to guard the approaches to" 
the Pentland Firth and to act as submarine hunters 
generally. It was also suggested that a monetary 
reward should be offered to the personnel of any trawler 
through whose agency a submarine was captured or de- 
stroyed. 

The mine-sweeping force at Scapa had been 
strengthened bj^ the addition of a flotilla of trawlers, and 
the mine-sweeping gunboats and trawlers were continu- 
ouslj'' employed in keeping certain fixed channels of 
approach to the Pentland Firth swept and clear of mines. 
These vessels were, therefore, not available for anti-sub- 
marine work, except to the detriment of their mine-sweep- 
ing duties. 

On September 1st the available cruiser squadrons were 
employed in Area No. 6, supported by the 3d Battle 
Squadron and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

From September 1st to September 5th the Battle 
Fleet remained at sea, cruising in the area between the 
north-east coast of Scotland and the coast of Norway, in 
support of the cruiser squadrons working to the south- 
ward, and opportunity was taken to continue the exercises 
of the Fleet in battle tactics, together with occasional 
gunnery practice. The Orion, of the 2nd Battle Squadron, 
was still absent from the Fleet, retubing condensers; the 
King Edward VII. rejoined on the 2nd, after exchanging 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 119 

defective guns; and the Dominion was then detached to 
Devonport to exchange her damaged 12-inch guns. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron had been strength- 
ened by the arrival of the Inflexible from the Mediter- 
ranean, and was employed during this period in support 
of the cruiser sweeps, the Squadron joining the Battle 
Fleet on the 3rd for battle exercises. 

During the period under review reports from time to 
time of the sighting of enemy submarines appeared to 
indicate that they were working on a line Ekersund- 
Pentland Firth, the line which they were apparently 
occupying during the first few days of the War, when 
U 15 was sunk by the Birmingham. 

Information received on September 3d suggested that 
enemy cruisers might have passed, or might be intending 
to pass, into the North Sea via the Skagerrak. The 
2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron, supported by the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and accompanied by the 2nd Flotilla, were, 
therefore, directed to sweep to the entrance to the 
Skagerrak, arriving there by noon of September 4th, 
starting from a position in Lat. 58 N., Long. 2.36 E., 
at 4 A. M. that da}\ From the Skagerrak the 2nd and 3rd 
Cruiser Squadrons were to make a detour to the south- 
westward with the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the latter 
proceeding then to Rosyth and the Cruiser Squadrons 
to Cromarty; and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 
with the 2nd Flotilla, was directed to sweep on a wide 
front towards the Pentland Firth on the Ekersund- 
Pentland line in search of enemy submarines, which it 
was hoped might be caught on the surface at night. 
Thence the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron was to proceed 
to Scapa to fuel, and the 2nd Flotilla to the westward of 
the Orkneys to search for submarines, returning to 



120 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Longhope at 9 p. M. on September 6th. The 4th Flotilla, 
which had been with the Battle Fleet, was directed at 
the same time to sweep the western portion of the Eker- 
sund-Pentland line for submarines, and then to return 
to Longhope. 

These orders were carried out, but no enemy vessels 
of any sort were sighted, except that at 6.30 a.m. on the 
5th the Thetis, mine-layer, working south-eastward 
of the Orkneys, reported a suspicious vessel, thought 
to be a German cruiser. The 2nd and 6th Cruiser 
Squadrons and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron closed in on 
the position, but the ship was eventually identified as one 
of our own vessels. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet arrived at Loch Ewe 
at 4 P.M. on the 5th to coal, two mine-sweeping gunboats 
having been previously detached to that base to search 
the entrance for mines. 

During the early daj^s of September frequent reports 
were received of enemy mines having been discovered on 
the east coast, and several vessels were sunk, as a conse- 
quence, including the gunboat Speedy. It appeared that 
the enemy was laying the mines from merchant vessels 
flying neutral or even, possibly, British colours, as well 
as from regular mine-laying ships. The large number 
of vessels trading on the east coast and of fishing craft 
at sea, both British and neutral, greatly increased the 
difficulty of preventing these operations. The task of 
boarding and examining even a considerable percentage 
of these vessels involved a heavy strain. Our cruiser 
sweeps were showing this daily. The Admiralty's atten- 
tion was drawn to the matter, and the question was raised 
of establishing some restrictions, particularly as regards 
the areas in which fishing should be permitted. 

Tile extinction of a large proportion of our coast lights 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 121 

was also proposed, the burning of which enabled the 
enemy to fix his position accurately when engaged in 
mine-laying operations. This policy of the extinction of 
lights, thus started, gradually became general, and 
eventually only the most important lights were exhibited 
at night, and the large majority of these were only shown 
when requests were made by men-of-war who required 
them for entering port, the time of their exhibition being 
thus reduced to a minimum. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch Ewe 
until 6 A.M. on September 7th, and then proceeded to 
sea. The Orion was left behind to complete work on her 
condensers and rejoined the Fleet at sea on September 
9th, having been absent for twenty-one days. 

The Agincourt, the new battleship which since com- 
missioning had been engaged in gunnery and torpedo 
practices either at Scapa or to the westward of the 
Orkneys, joined the 4th Battle Squadron at sea on Sep- 
tember 7th in order to give her officers experience in 
working with the Fleet. There had been great difficulty 
in carrying out her practices because she had not been 
supplied with "sub-calibre" guns, and this deficiency 
could not be made good for some months; this caused 
much delay in raising her battle efficiency. However, 
she was manned with officers and a ship's company of 
a very high standard and, in spite of all disadvantages, 
the early gunnery practices carried out by her in com- 
pany with the Fleet showed that she would eventually 
prove to be a most valuable addition to the Fleet. 

Representations had been made by me to the Ad- 
miralty that the presence of a senior Flag officer in 
general command of the Orkneys and Shetlands, who 
would be responsible for the defences of these islands and 
the Fleet bases, was very necessary, the work of actual 



122 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

administration of the base at Scapa Flow being sufficient 
fully to occupy the time of Rear- Admiral Miller. 

Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Stanley Colville accepted 
the post, and as it was very desirable that the officer 
holding this position should be junior to the Commander- 
in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, he paid me the compliment 
of expressing his desire to be placed junior on the list to 
myself, a reversal of our proper respective seniorities. 

He was, accordingly, appointed, and came to Loch 
Fwe on September 6th, to confer with me before taking 
up his appointment. He accompanied me to sea in the 
Iron Duke on the 7th in order to talk matters over, was 
embarked on board the Oak to the westward of the 
Orkneys, and took up his command on arrival. The 
result was immediately most beneficial. He was able to 
devote his whole time to the questions of defence and 
organisation and relieved me of all these matters which 
had, as was inevitable under the previous arrangement, 
occupied so much of my time in harbour and so much 
of my thoughts at sea. 

On September 6th the Portsmouth floating dock ar- 
rived safely at Cromarty. 

During September 7th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet 
proceeded northward from Loch Ewe en route to the 
North Sea, and passed through the Fair Island Channel 
at 10 P.M., being joined at 4 a.m. by the 3rd Battle 
Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth 
after dark on this date and proceeded to the north-east- 
ward, being joined at 4 a.m. on the 8th by the Sappho 
and four destroyers of the 4th Flotilla. These smaller 
vessels were intended to carry out boarding duties in order 
to avoid the danger to the large ships from submarine 
attack, consequent on stopping for this purpose. The 
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron swept to the south-eastward 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 123 

of Area 6 during daylight on the 8th, and during the 
night of the 8th and dayHght of the 9th was on a patrol 
area approximately between Lat. 55 N., Long. 2 E., and 
Lat. 56.20 N., Long. 2.40 E., with the object of inter- 
cepting possible enemy mine-layers. The Battle Fleet 
carried out gunnery practices and exercised battle tactics 
during the 8th eastward bf the Orkneys, and at dark pro- 
ceeded to the southward to support an extensive sweep 
into the Heligoland Bight which it had been decided to 
carry out on September 10th. The dispositions for this 
sweep were generally as follows: 

The 1st and 3d Flotillas from Harwich, supported 
by the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron to the northward, and the 7th Cruiser Squadron 
to the westward, swej)t out the Heligoland Bight from 
east to west, commencing from a position some ten to 
twelve miles from Heligoland, which position was to be 
reached one hour before dawn. The Battle Fleet, with 
the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, spread 20 miles 
ahead, was in position Lat. 55.9 N., Long. 4.24 E. 
at 8 A.M. on September 10th, steering S.S.E. at 12 
knots speed of advance. 

The Battle Fleet, with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser 
Squadrons to the southward, cruised to the north-west- 
ward of Heligoland until 11 a.m. on the 10th, by which 
time it was clear that the sweep had been unproductive. 
No German vessel of any sort was sighted, except one 
seaplane reported by the 7th Cruiser Squadron. The 2nd 
Flotilla was stationed with the Battle Fleet as a submarine 
screen, and to assist the attached cruisers in boarding 
duties during the day, and the 4th Flotilla, which had been 
working with the 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, princi- 
pally for boarding duties, was also directed to join the 
Battle Fleet on the morning of the 10th, but by reason 



124 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

of the thick weather did not do so until 2 p.m. Owing 
to the large number of trawlers that were met with, 
nearly all of which were flying neutral colours, the board- 
ing duties were very onerous. Considerable suspicion 
attached to these trawlers because frequently Telefunken 
wireless signals were noticed to be very strong after the 
Fleet had passed these vessels; but close examination 
failed to reveal anything suspicious in those that were 
boarded, no wireless apparatus being discovered in any 
of them. 

The conditions on September 10th were very unfavour- 
able for the sweep into the Bight. Thick weather pre- 
vailed both before and after daylight, and the visibility 
varied from between two and five miles. The mist pre- 
vented the junction of the 4th Flotilla with the Battle 
Fleet for eight hours, a circumstance which would have 
had awkward consequences had the High Sea Fleet been 
encountered with its full complement of 80 to 100 de- 
stroyers, as might have been the case in such close prox- 
imity to German ports. 

It was noted at the time that the conditions were very 
unfavourable for a Fleet action owing to the low visibihty 
combined with the glare produced by the occasional sun- 
shine and absence of wind. A passage in the notes made 
on this occasion referred to such conditions as follows : 

"The weather conditions ... were very unfavour- 
able for a general action owing to the low visibility and 
the glare caused by brilliant sunlight and absence of 
wind. . . . The conditions make it impossible for 
the Commander-in-Chief in the centre of the Fleet to 
know what is going on in the van and rear . . . besides 
being entirely favourable to tactics largely based on the 
employment of torpedo craft or mine-layers. 

"In addition there are great difficulties in concen- 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 125 

trating detached ships and flotillas and in forming the 
Fleet prior to battle, also in the recognition of ships and 
destroyers." 

This passage is of interest because of its bearing on 
the Jutland battle some two years later when somewhat 
similar conditions prevailed. 

The difficulty of recognition mentioned made so much 
impression on mj^ mind that special daylight recognition 
devices which could be seen at a considerable distance were 
subsequently devised and used by our own light cruisers 
and destroyers when in the presence of the enemy. 

When it became evident that there were no enemy 
vessels to engage, I organised a sweep to the northward 
on a large scale, with a view to intercepting any enemy 
ships that might be at sea and of closely examining all 
merchant ships and fishing vessels which were met with. 

The starting-point of the sweep was Lat. 55.30 N., 
Long. 4.0 E., the dispositions being: 

The Invincible (which had now joined the Battle Cruisers) 
and the Inflexible, to sweep towards Dundee. 

3rd Cruiser Squadron towards Aberdeen at 12 knots speed of 
advance. 

1st Light Cruiser Squadron towards Pentland Firth at li 
knots speed of advance. 

2nd Cruiser Squadron towards Fair Island at 10 knots speed 
of advance. 

All ships spread as widely as visibility admitted. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (which now once more in- 
cluded the New Zealand) to be in general support. 

The Battle Fleet with divisions spread four miles apart to ex- 
tend the sweep to the eastward. 

These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 2. 

At 3 A.M. on the 11th the sweep was directed to turn 
to N. 16 E., and, later, the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was 
stationed in a new area, No. 7, between Lat. 55.20 NL 



126 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

and 57.30 N., between 50 and 150 miles from the coast. 
The 3rd Cruiser Squadron was sent to Cromarty to coal; 
the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron rejoined the Battle Fleet, and the Invincible 
and Inflexible were sent to Scapa to coal, as well as the 
8rd Battle Squadron, a half flotilla of destroyers screening 
these vessels into the base. 

During the 11th and 12th the Battle Fleet and 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron carried out battle tactics and 
gunnery exercises, and the Battle Fleet then proceeded to 
Loch Ewe, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st 
Light Cruiser Squadron to Scapa to fuel. 

During the passage south and north numerous reports 
of floating mines were received. The majority proved to 
be fishermen's bladders which at this time were being 
frequently reported by merchant ships as floating mines. 

The Admiralty now informed me that a patrol of the 
3rd meridian of East Long, between the parallels of 
55.30 N. and 53.30 N. had been established by the 1st 
and 3rd Flotilla, the patrol consisting of eight destroyers 
and one light cruiser, supported by two cruisers of the 
"Bacchante" class, the object being to catch enemy 
mine-layers. I was also informed that a patrol of the 
"Broad Fourteens," off the Dutch coast, was being 
maintained to guard the Eastern Channel and Thames 
approaches. 

On September 11th the Hibernia reported a 12-inch 
gun cracked, the fifth since the outbreak of war! 

On the same day salvage operations on the armed 
merchant-cruiser Oceanic^ which had gone ashore in 
a fog on Foula Island on September 8th, were 
abandoned owing to heavy weather. The vessel broke 
up eventually. 

Rear- Admiral E. R. Pears reported that the Ports- 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 127 

mouth floating dock would be ready for work on Sep- 
tember 21st, a very smart piece of mooring work 
having been carried out by Captain Munro, R.N., the 
King's Harbour Master. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Loch 
Ewe coaling, storing and cleaning boilers, etc., from 
5 P.M. on September 13th until 6 p.m. on September 17th, 
and the 1st Battle Ci'uiser Squadron, except the In- 
flexible and Invincible, remained at Scapa until Sep- 
tember 18th. Meanwhile the usual cruiser sweeps in the 
North Sea in Areas 3, 6 and 7 were carried out by the 2nd, 
3rd, 6th and 10th Cruiser Squadrons and the Mine-layer 
Squadron, supported by the Invincible, Inflexible and 
3rd Battle Squadron, which left Scapa on the morning 
of September 14th for the purpose. The armed merchant- 
cruisers Alsatian and Mantua were patrolling eastward of 
the Shetlands. 

Advantage was taken of the stay at Loch Ewe to 
make general arrangements with the Admiralty for the 
defence of that base, and on September 17th the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, with the Chief of War Staff, 
the Director of Intelligence Division, Commodores (S) 
and (T) arrived at Loch Ewe to confer with me. The 
bombardment and capture of Heligoland was also dis- 
cussed. The proposals had been previously forwarded to 
me by Mr. Churchill, and had been carefully examined by 
myself, Reai'-Admiral Charles Madden, the Chief of 
Staff, and by the Flag officers commanding the Battle 
Squadrons. The opinions of these officers against the 
operation were unanimous. It had not been suggested 
that the Grand Fleet should be used for the operation, 
except as a supporting force; the older battleships were 
intended for this purpose. But the arguments against 
the operation were overwhelmingly strong. It was 



128 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

pointed out that ships were no match for heavy fortifica- 
tions such as were known to exist on Hehgoland; that 
direct fire from high- velocity guns with a low trajectory 
would be ineffective against well-placed, heavily protected 
and well-concealed land guns; that, even if a storm- 
ing party were able to land and to capture the 
island, it would be quite impossible to hold it, situated 
as it was close to German naval bases, for if we could take 
it in a fortified condition, it would be far easier for the 
Germans to recapture it with the fortifications demol- 
ished; that it would be under continuous attack by sea 
and air, and that any attempt to hold it, if captured, 
would involve keeping the Grand Fleet constantly in 
southern waters, which, owing to the number of small 
craft then available, was an impossibility. Aircraft 
spotting, which would be a necessary adjunct, was at that 
time in its infancy, and we had no vessels specially suited 
for bombardments at long range, such as the monitors 
which, later on, carried out such useful work on the 
Belgian coast. After a conference, at which the Flag 
ofiicers were present, I thought that the idea would be 
abandoned. 

This was not the case, however, and the matter was 
taken up later at the Admiralty with Vice- Admiral Sir 
Cecil Burney, commanding the Channel Fleet. His view 
coincided with those expressed by the Flag officers at the 
Loch Ewe conference, although he was of course prepared 
to carry out any orders that might be given him. The 
idea was not finally abandoned for some time. The 
opinions of Sir Cecil Burney and myself were identical, 
as indeed were those of every Flag officer with whom I 
discussed the matter, with one single exception, a junior 
Flag officer. 

Another subject touched on during Mr. Churchill's 



SWEEP OF SEPTS^To ir." 1914. 




B.F. - BoltkFktt. 

O.CS. " BatHe Cruistr Sauadran. 

AUreWations J ^-^- " ^''"'"'- ^cj'jadron. 

usee/. j L.C.S.- tig/}/ Cru/ser Sjuat/ran. 

Floti - Disfrorer FMHIa. 

M.S. - Mini Sweeper. 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 129 

visit was that of operations in the Baltic, but as no large 
operations of this nature could be attempted without the 
assistance of Allied battleships, in order to maintain 
supremacy in the North Sea during such operations, no 
steps were taken. 

By this date a regular programme of dockings and 
refits for all ships was recognised as necessary, and 
battleships were now being detached one at a time for 
this purpose. For some months after the commencement 
of the War, it was not possible to allow ships more than 
four days for docking and for the execution of the most 
urgent work, except in cases of accident or very serious 
defects, as our margin of superiority was none too large, 
and we were already experiencing a good deal of trouble 
with condenser tubes, necessitating ships being laid up 
for the work of retubing; but the work achieved in the 
four days was a very fine tribute to the dockyard organisa- 
tion and to the industry of the dockyard men. 

The Battle Fleet left Loch Ewe on the evening of 
September 17th, the Erin, a new battleship bought, in- 
complete, from Turkey, being in company for the first 
time in order to accustom her officers to working the ship 
with the Fleet. Target practice was carried out to the 
westward of the Orkneys during the forenoon of the 
18th, but was interfered with by bad weather — a frequent 
experience. The Battle Fleet then proceeded into the 
North Sea, via the Fair Island Channel, the position at 
midnight, 18th, being Lat. 59.23 N., Long. 1.13 W., and 
course south. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa 
with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron on the evening of 
the 19th, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty at 
the same time, all for the southward for a sweep into 
the Heligoland Bight, supported by the Battle Fleet, in 
search of the enemy and with a view to carrying out a 



130 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

thorough examination of trawlers suspected of acting as 
look-out vessels for the enemy. 

While on passage south during the 19th the Battle 
Fleet was exercised at battle tactics. At midnight on 
the 19th the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 58.3 N., 
Long. 2.24; E., and at 8 a.m. on the 20th, in Lat. 57.8 N.,^ 
Long. 3.20 E., having met the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. 
The 2nd Flotilla had been under orders to leave Scapa 
in time to meet the Battle Fleet at 8 a.m. on the 21st, 
but, owing to bad weather, the orders were cancelled 
and the flotilla returned to Scapa, as did the 4th Flotilla, 
which was to have accompanied the battle cruisers. 
During daylight of the 20th the Battle Fleet cruised to- 
wards the Norwegian coast to the northward of Lat. 
57 N., in support of the battle cruisers engaged in ex- 
amining trawlers in the vicinity of the Little Fisher 
Bank; it turned to the southward at 4 p.m. to rendezvous, 
at 5 A.M, on the 21st, in Lat. 56 N., Long. 3.30 E., with 
the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been coaling at 
Scapa and had left on the 20th to join the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

At 7 A.M. on the 21st the Battle Fleet was in position 
Lat. 55.45 IST., Long. 3.30 E., and the Vice- Admiral of 
the battle cruisers having reported at 6.20 a.m. from a 
position in Lat. 55.16 IST., Long. 4.52 E., that the weather 
was too bad to admit of the search of trawlers being 
carried out satisfactorily, the operation was abandoned 
and the Fleet turned to the northward, as it was con- 
sidered that an incomplete examination would do more 
harm than good. 

During this period the 3rd Cruiser Squadron was 
working in Area 7, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in 
Area 6, as usual; the Alsatian and Mantua, with the 
DraJte^ of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were sweeping down 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 131 

the Norwegian coast and then returned to resume their 
patrol east of the Shetlands, where they were joined by 
the armed merchant ship Teutonic. 

The 2nd and 4th Flotillas left Scapa on the 20th and 
joined the Battle Fleet and the Battle Cruiser Squadron 
respectively on the 21st. 

All wireless telegraphy signalling at sea was stopped 
between 4 p.m. on the 20th and 4 p.m. on the 21st, in 
order that the enemy should not become aware of the 
movements of the Fleet, as such knowledge might pre- 
vent the High Sea Fleet from putting to sea and possibly 
deprive us of our opportunity of catching it. 

During the passage of the Fleet to the northward, an 
extensive sweep was carried out during daylight of the 
21st. The Battle Fleet covered a front of 40 miles, and 
battle cruisers and cruisers prolonged the front to the 
eastward and westward. 

On the evening of the 21st I was informed by 
wireless telegraphy from the Admiralty of a report 
that a German force of two light cruisers, vdth 
destroyers and submarines in company, had been 
sighted from Esbjerg on the 20th, proceeding to the 
northward. The whole Fleet was turned to the southward 
at midnight on the 21st, and spread at dawn to cover a 
front of 104 miles from the Norwegian coast westward, 
sweeping to the northward, to endeavour to intercept the 
enemy vessels if they had continued a course to the north- 
ward. The sweep to the northward was continued until 
10 A.M. The Iron Duke was in position Lat. 59 N., 
Long. 2.35 E., when the line was directed to wheel 
towards the Orkneys and Shetlands on a course N. 51 W. 
During the 22nd, visibility was very good, but no enemy 
vessels were sighted, and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet 
and battle cruisers passed to the westward of the Orkneys 



132 THE GRAND FLEET 1914-1916, 

during the night, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle 
Squadron being detached to support the cruisers searching 
in the North Sea areas. 

At 7.45 A.M. on the 22nd wireless telegraphy signals 
from the Cressy were intercepted indicating that the 
Aboukir and Hogue had been sunk by submarines in 
Lat. 52.18 N., Long. 3.41 E. These vessels were 
patrolling the "Broad Fourteens," off the Dutch Coast, 
under Admiraltj^ orders. No further details were re- 
ceived, beyond a wireless signal from Commodore ( S ) , at 
11.30 A.M., that he was proceeding in the Fearless with 
seventeen destroyers to Terschelling to endeavour to inter- 
cept the enemy submarines on their way back. The 
Commander-in-Chief, thereupon, ordered the 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron (from the southern position of Area 7) to pro- 
ceed at once to support the Commodore ( S ) . By direc- 
tions, however, given by the Admiralty these orders were 
cancelled, and the forces returned. 

At 10.30 P.M. I ordered the armed merchant-cruisers 
to proceed at once to a position off Trondhjem, as a report 
had been received that the German liner Brandenburg, 
lying at that port, was likely to sail. Constant reports 
to this effect were received for several days, and the 
Brandenburg was heard using her wireless telegi'aphy on 
September 25th. The patrol was maintained until Sep- 
tember 28th, when contradictory reports were to hand — 
one that she had been seen at sea on the 27th, and the 
other that she was being interned by the Norwegian 
Government. The latter report proved to be correct. 
The patrol was then moved to a position off the Utvoer 
Lighthouse, Lat. 61.3 N., Long. 4.30 E., to intercept 
the German destroyer Prinz Friedrich Wilhelm, said to 
be leaving a Norwegian port. 

During the 23rd the Dreadnought Battle Fleet and 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 133 

battle cruisers attempted to carry out gunnery practices, 
but thick weather interfered. The force returned to 
Scapa to fuel, arriving on the 24th; the 3rd Battle 
Squadron arrived for the same purpose on the 25th. 

On the 23rd and 24th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron pro- 
ceeded from Area 7 to sweep up the Norwegian coast, 
thence going to Cromarty to coal. The squadron arrived 
there on the evening of the 25th. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa 
until the evening of the 25th, when it proceeded out to 
the westward of the Orkneys; on the 26th bad weather 
again prevented target practice, a heavy westerly gale 
being experienced. This moderated on the morning of 
the 27th, when the Battle Fleet was to the eastward of 
the Shetlands, but increased again to a very strong gale 
during that day, with a wind force of 70 miles per hour 
and a very heavy confused sea. 

A considerable amount of damage was done to wire- 
less masts, topmasts, etc., and several ships had boats 
damaged or washed away. The ships of the "Iron 
Duke" class took in large quantities of water through 
their 6-inch gun ports, due to these guns being mounted 
at such a low level. The gale continued during the 28th, 
veering to the northward, and moderated on the 29th, on 
which date the Battle Fleet, which had moved to the 
southward during the 28th, returned to Scapa, being met 
and screened by destroyers which had not been able to 
join the Fleet at sea owing to the bad weather. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 
morning of the 26th, and proceeded to the Norwegian 
coast, sweeping down as far as the Naze in search of 
enemy ships, particularly the s.s. Prinz Friedrich Wil- 
liehn, reported to be about to leave Bergen. It was also 
to support the Drake, Nottingham, Falmouth, and two 



134 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

destroyers, which had been sent to the vicinity of the 
Naze to meet Submarines El and E5. The latter vessels 
had been reconnoitring in the Skagerrak and Kattegat for 
enemy vessels. The two submarines and the destroyers 
experienced very heavy weather on their return across the 
North Sea, and some anxiety was felt for their safety. 

The 3rd Cruiser Squadron proceeded to Area 2 on the 
26th, and on the 29th was sent to watch off the entrances 
to Bergen in Norway for the German s.s. Prinz 
Friedrich Wilhelm. The squadron returned to Cromarty 
on October 1st. On the 28th the Princess Royal left the 
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (proceeding to Scapa to 
fuel, en route) to meet, and protect, a convoy of Canadian 
troops about to leave the Dominion for the United 
Kingdom. The Invincible and Inflexible, which had 
been cruising north of the Faroe Islands, joined the 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron at sea on the 29th. For the pur- 
pose of supporting the cruisers in the North Sea area, the 
3rd Battle Squadron and 6th Battle Squadron sailed from 
Scapa on the arrival of the Dreadnought Battle Fleet. 
Additional precautions against attack by submarines 
were taken during the stay of the Fleet at Scapa on this 
occasion, as reports indicated the presence of a consider- 
ably increased number in the North Sea. These precau- 
tions included more numerous patrols by destroyers of the 
2nd and 4th Flotillas outside the entrances to Scapa, and 
necessarily involved a greatly increased strain on the de- 
stroyers. 

Further precautions against submarine attack were 
also found necessary in the Firth of Forth, and the arrival 
of light cruisers at Leith for refit were temporarily sus- 
pended by Admiralty orders owing to the presence of 
submarines in the vicinity. Two torpedoes were fired at 
the destroyer Stag, and another at a torpedo boat off May 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 135 

Island on the 25th. The destroyer Cheerful was also 
fired at on the 26th. 

The month of October, 1914, opened with the 
Dreadnought Battle Fleet at Scapa, with the exception 
of the Ajcuc, which was en route to Devonport to refit, 
and the Audacious, which was on passage from Devon- 
port after refit. The 3rd and 6th Battle Squadrons were 
at sea supj)orting the cruisers, except the Exmouth, of 
the 6th Battle Squadron, which was at Devonport 
refitting. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, the Invin- 
cible, and the Inflexible, were at Scapa; the Princess 
Royal was cleaning boilers and preparing for her trip to 
Halifax. 

Of the cruisers, the Devonshire, of the 3rd Cruiser 
Squadron, was refitting at Cromarty; the Theseus, of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron, was returning from the White 
Sea, where she had been to fetch some Russian officers; 
the Mantiia and Alsatian, armed merchant-cruisers, were 
at Liverpool, coaling and making good defects. 

Of the destroyer flotillas, the Active and five de- 
stroyers of the 2nd Flotilla, and two of the 4th Flotilla, 
were absent refitting. 

On October 1st regulations were brought into force 
under which a large number of coastal navigational lights 
were extinguished, as also were regulations closing the 
east coast ports to neutral fishing craft ; other regulations 
were issued to control the movements of fishing vessels 
in certain areas. On October 10th further orders, under 
which additional coastal navigation lights were extin- 
guished (principally in the North of Scotland), became 
effective. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa 
untU 5 P.M. on October 2nd, and then proceeded into the 
North Sea. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron sailed at 



136 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

daylight, October 3rd, and the newly constituted 2nd 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, consisting of the Invincible and 
Inflexible, with the Sappho and three mine-layers, left at 
2 P.M. on October 3rd. 

On October 3rd all the ships of the Grand Fleet took 
up pre-arranged positions designed to secure a close watch 
over the northern portion of the North Sea, partly with 
a view to an interception of all traffic, and partly to 
ensure that no enemy vessel broke out of the Nolth Sea 
during the ensuing week. The main object was the pro- 
tection of an important convoy of Canadian troops, which 
was crossing from Halifax, and which the battle cruiser 
Princess Royal and the battleship 3Iajestic had been 
sent to meet and to protect. The Princess Royal 
arrived at the rendezvous at 8 p.m. on October 7th, 
and waited for the convoy, which was two and a half 
days late. 

The Grand Fleet was disposed for this purpose during 
the period Oct. 3rd-llth approximately as follows: 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron was watching the Fair Island 
Channel from the western side. 

The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with armed merchant-cruis- 
ers, the Sappho and three mine-layers, was stationed to the north- 
ward and eastward of the Shetland Islands. 

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron patrolled the northern portion 
of Area No. 4. 

The 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons patrolled Area No. 5. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron also patrolled Area No. 5. 

The mine-sweepers patrolled to the eastward of the Fair Island 
Channel. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with its divisions widely spread, 
worked to the northward of Area No. 5, and the Srd Battle 
Squadron to the northward of Area No. 4, whilst the 6th Battle 
Squadron was utilised to watch the waters between the Dread- 
nought Battle Fleet and Norwegian territorial waters. 

The destroyers were stationed, some to guard the eastern ap- 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 137 

preaches of the Pentland Firth, some to work off the Norwegian 
coast, and the remaining available vessels to work with the Battle 
Fleet for screening and boarding purposes. They returned to 
the bases (Lerwick or Scapa) as necessary for refuelling, and 
for shelter when the weather necessitated this. 

These dispositions are shown in Chart No. 3. 

The Princess Royal met the Canadian convoy in Lat. 
49.45 N., Long. 27.5 W., at 8 P.M. on October 10th. 
On the 11th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet passed to the 
westward of the Orkneys, remaining there until daylight 
on the 12th, and then returning to Scapa, the 2nd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, with the Teutonic, being withdrawn 
from the patrol north of the Shetlands to a patrol line 
north-west from Sule Skerry lighthouse, Lat. 59.6 N., 
Long. 4.24 W., during the night of the 11th and remain- 
ing there until daylight on the 13th, when they left for 
Scapa. During October 12th all other vessels engaged 
in this operation returned to their bases for fuel, except 
the 3rd Battle Squadi'on (the ships of which had coaled 
two at a time during the operation) and the cruiser squad- 
rons, which had been relieved as necessary to fuel. 

Whilst the Fleet was engaged on this service the 
following incidents occurred. On October 2nd the 
Alsatian took six concealed Germans off a Danish 
steamer. At 5 a.m. on October 7th a submarine was 
reported inside Loch Ewe, being sighted by a collier and 
by the Assistance; she was fired at by the latter ship, in 
misty weather. On receipt of the report I ordered all 
vessels to leave Loch Ewe at once, and sent a division 
of destroyers there from Scapa to search for the sub- 
marine. Later investigation indicated that the report 
was well founded. 

On October 9th the Alsatian sighted an enemy sub- 
marine in Lat. 61.42 N., Long. 0.50 W.; on the same 



138 THE GRAND FLEET, ' 1914-1916 

day at 3 p.m. the Antrim, flagship of the 3rd Cruiser 
Squadron, when in Lat. 59 N., Long. 4.40 E., was missed 
by two torpedoes fired at her by a submarine which the 
Antrim just failed to ram after the attack; numerous 
reports of enemy aircraft having been sighted on the East 
and West coasts of Scotland were also received. 

On October 10th the Liverpool and one-half of the 4th 
Flotilla were sent to the Norwegian coast to examine the 
islands in the vicinity of Udsire light, Lat. 59.19 N., 
Long. 4.50 E., to ascertain that they were not being used 
as German submarine bases, in view of the attack on the 
Antrim in that vicinity on the 9th. The 3rd Cruiser 
Squadron supported. Nothing was seen that lent colour 
to this idea. 

Ships of the Battle Fleet were detached to the north- 
ward, two or three at a time, during the operations, to 
carry out gunnery practices by day and by night. Thick 
fogs were prevalent during the whole period, and ships 
detached from the Fleet experienced very considerable 
diiBculty in rejoining. The foggy weather nearly 
resulted in a serious collision between a battleship of the 
6th Battle Squadron and one of the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet, the two ships passing within a few feet of each other 
on opposite courses. 

On the return of the Battle Fleet to Scapa on the 
morning of October 12th, Admiral Sir Stanley Colville 
reported that a partial submarine obstruction was in place 
across the Hoxa entrance. The presence of even a 
partial obstruction reduced the danger of submarine 
attack on the Fleet whilst coaling, a matter which had 
given me much anxiety since the beginning of hostilities. 

On arrival in harbour it was found that the condenser 
tubes of the Iron Duke were in a bad condition, although 
the ship was quite new, and that the condensers would 



APPROXIMATE 
DISPOSITIONS OCT-3".\oir- I9I4. 
WHILST CANADIAN CONVOY WAS CROSSING. 




MENACE IN NORTH SEA 139 

need either complete, or partial, retubing. The discovery 
was very disconcerting when taken in conjunction with 
the case of the Orion, the condensers of which ship had 
been retubed during September; it naturally led to sus- 
picion being directed to the condenser tubes generally 
of other ships, from which reports of cases of tubes occa- 
sionally giving out were being received. 

The whole question was taken up with the Admiralty, 
requests being made that all available spare tubes should 
be sent at once to the Northern bases, together with some 
dockyard fitters who could assist the artificers of the 
Fleet in the work of retubing. Representations were also 
made as to the urgent necessity of increasing the 
stock of reserve tubes in case the defects became 
general in the Fleet owing to the ships being so constantly 
under steam at sea. The task of replacing the defective 
tubes in the Ifon Duke's condensers was begun at once, 
with the help of the artificers of the Fleet, and the 
Centurion was detailed as the spare Fleet-Flagship in 
case of emergency. But at this time the Iron Duke was 
not kept specially in harbour for retubing work, this being 
carried out as opportunity occurred, although under con- 
siderable difficulties, since the labour of suddenly pre- 
paring for sea, with a condenser undergoing retubing, was 
very appreciable. The mamier in which this heavy work 
was taken in hand and rapidly completed in several ships, 
largely by Fleet labour, demonstrated the extreme 
efficiency and very fine spirit of the engine-room depart- 
ments of the ships of the Grand Fleet. 

From the 12th to the 16th October the 1st and 4th 
Battle Squadrons remained at Scapa, and at 6 p.m. on the 
16th they left to carry out target practice to the westward 
of the Orkneys. The 2nd Battle Squadron left Scapa 
on the evening of the 13th to support the cruisers in the 



140 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

North Sea; it joined the 3rd Battle Squadron already 
there, the ships of which were being detached to Scapa 
two at a time to fuel and to overhaul their machinery. 
It was found necessary to give these ships, with recipro- 
cating engines, five days off duty periodically in order to 
carry out necessary adjustments. 

The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadi'on, with the 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron and two divisions of destroyers, left 
Scapa at 5.30 p.m. on the 12th, to carry out a sweep of 
the southern part of the North Sea. This force swept on 
the 13th on a broad front down to the Dogger Bank, 
thence to the Norwegian coast, and to the northward 
on the 14th in conjunction with the 2nd Cruiser Squadron 
(which was then prolonging the sweeping line), without 
sighting any enemy vessels. The battle cruisers and light 
cruisers took up a position on the 15th to support the 
cruiser squadrons on patrol, the destroyers proceeding 
to Lerwick to fuel. 

The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron remained at Scapa. 
The 2nd Cruiser Squadron was working the N.E. corner 
of Area 6, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron at this period 
was working the south-western portion of Area No. 6. 
At 1.15 P.M. on October 15th the Theseus reported that 
a torpedo, which had missed, had been fired at her in 
Lat. 57.50 N., Long. 0.33 E. 

On receipt of this report orders were given that the 
ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, on patrol, were to be 
withdrawn to the northern corner of the area, and later, 
at 8 P.M._, orders were sent that they were to join the 
2nd Battle Squadron still farther north, and to be used 
by the battleships (which were spread for the purpose of 
intercepting trade or enemy's ships) for boarding pur- 
poses. Meanwhile the senior officer of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron ships operating in Area 6 (H.M.S. Edgar) re- 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 141 

ported that he could get no reply to wireless signals from 
the Hawke. The Swift, with a division of destroyers, 
was ordered to proceed from Scapa at high speed to the 
last reported position of the Hawke in Lat. 57.47 N., 
Long. 0.12 E., to search for the ship. Two other 
divisions of destroyers were sent, later on, to assist the 
Swift. It is to be noted that a submarine had been 
reported off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast at 8.30 
A.M. on the 14th, but this report did not reach the Iron 
Duke until the afternoon of the loth. 

The Swift reported on the 16th having picked up a 
raft M'ith an officer and 20 men, survivors of the Hawke, 
which had been sunk by a submarine in Lat. 57.40 N., 
Long. 0.13 W., on the 15th. Shortly after sighting the 
raft, the Swift was attacked by the same or another sub- 
marine (it was thought by more than one) whilst engaged 
in her work of rescue, and torpedoes were fired at her. 
Captain Wintour subsequently stated that he was only 
able to effect the rescue by manoeuvi-ing at high speed in 
the midst of the wreckage, etc., using the destroyers with 
him to screen his movements. His experience was an 
unpleasant one, as he naturally desired to remain on 
the spot until he had ascertained with certainty that he 
had picked up all the survivors, and this he proceeded to 
do with praiseworthy persistence, bringing them to 
Scapa. On the 16th reports were also received that 
the destroyers Alarm and Nymphe had been attacked by 
submarines to the eastward of the Pentland Firth, and 
that the Nymphe had rammed the submarine that had 
attacked her. Later examination of the NympJie's 
bottom by divers showed that her starboard propeller was 
damaged. 

At 4.18 P.M. on the same day, the 16th, it was 
reported from one of the shore batteries that a submarine 



142 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

was close into the Switha entrance to Scapa Flow. The 
ships inside were immediately ordered to raise steam with 
all despatch, and the usual precautions were taken of 
patrolling the harbour with everj^ available small craft, 
including destroyers, tugs, trawlers, drifters and picket- 
boats; and colliers and store-ships were as usual sent 
alongside the battleships, which were not fitted with 
torpedo nets, as a precaution. 

The scene in the harbour on such occasions was a busy 
one. Small craft of every nature were patrolling at 
the sight of a periscope; all guns were manned; torpedo 
nets, where fitted, were placed in position; and every 
effort was made to ensure that the Fleet was as adequately 
guarded by the available patrol craft as circumstances 
admitted. All large ships except the repair ships Cyclops 
and Assistance left harbour during the night, the Iron 
Duke joining the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons west of 
the Orkneys. 

At noon on the 17th Sir Stanley Colville, who had 
been requested to organise a careful search for the re- 
ported submarine, signalled that a submarine was believed 
to be inside Scapa Flow and had been hunted, but not 
actually located. Reports had been received that officers 
and men on board several of the destroyers, and the gun- 
boat Leda, had seen the periscope of the submarine, and 
that a torpedo had actually been fired at one of the hunt- 
ing vessels. It was, however, ascertained subsequently 
that this torpedo was one which had been accidentally 
discharged by one of our own destroyers. 

The accuracy or otherwise of these reports has never 
yet been determined with certainty, but many of the 
officers engaged in the search were convinced at the time 
that a submarine was actually inside, and that they had 
seen her. Indeed, a good many rounds were fired during 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 143 

the day at objects which were thought at the time to be 
a periscope. 

The reports signalled to me convinced me that, until 
the matter was cleared up with certainty, and until some 
more absolute security against submarine attack on the 
Fleet at anchor could be provided, it was courting disaster 
to base battleships or battle cruisers at Scapa Flow. We 
had seen in the loss of the Hatvke that enemy submarines 
could quite well operate in northern waters, and it was 
thought to be only a matter of time before they would 
attempt an attack on the Fleet in Scapa Flow, if indeed 
the attempt had not alreadj^ been made. 

I decided, therefore, that it was necessary to seek for 
a temporary base which could be used with safety whilst 
the submarine obstructions at Scapa were being per- 
fected. The incident that had already occurred at Loch 
Ewe cast doubt on the safety of that base, since it was 
unprovided with any obstructions at all and the depth of 
water made it impossible to improvise them with Fleet 
resources. 

Accordingly I looked for other and more easily ob- 
structed ports, and eventually decided on Lough Swilly 
for the main part of the Fleet, and Loch-na-Keal in the 
Island of Mull for the ships for which berthing-space 
could not be found at Lough Swilly. Both ports possessed 
comparatively narrow entrances, and at Lough Swilly 
the water was so shallow as to make it difficult for a sub- 
marine to enter submerged. It was also a "defended port" 
and therefore possessed an organisation which would be 
useful for regulating the entry of ships. 

The extensive dispositions necessitated by the tem- 
porary change of base were at once ordered. Colliers, 
store-ships, and auxiliaries of one kind and another, which 
were either en route to, or at, Scapa Flow, were diverted 



144 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

to the new bases; the 2nd Battle Squadron and 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron were ordered to Loch-na-Keal to fuel 
and to improvise anti-submarine obstructions at the 
entrance ; and the Illustrious was ordered there from Loch 
Ewe to act as guard ship; the 1st and 4th Battle Squad- 
rons and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron were detached to 
cruise to the north-westward of the Hebrides for blockad- 
ing purposes, and to carry out practices; and the 1st 
Light Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser Squadron and 3rd 
and 6th Battle Squadrons were sent to Lough Swilly to 
coal. The cruiser blockade and look-out line was with- 
drawn farther to the northward owing to the danger from 
submarines incurred in operating in the central or 
southern portions of the North Sea on a regular patrol, 
and the impossibility of providing destroyers as a screen 
for the ships. The new line was to the northward of the 
Shetland Islands, and the 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons 
and armed merchant-cruisers carried out the patrol. There 
were, therefore, two lines of blockade, one formed by the 
heavy ships north-westvv^ard of the Hebrides, the second 
to the northward of the Shetland Islands. The organisa- 
tion was such that it was probable that vessels attempting 
to evade the blockade would pass one of the two lines 
during daylight hours. In making these new dispositions 
it was still intended to keep the North Sea itself under 
observation by frequent cruiser sweeps. 

Numerous reports of submarines in the Minch at this 
time led to the Active and two divisions of destroyers 
being sent there to search for them, and the remainder of 
the 2nd and 4th Flotillas were divided between blockade 
duty in the Pentland Firth, work at Scapa Flow, and in 
the vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands, and with the 
ships at Loch-na-Keal and Lough Swilly. 

On October 21st the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 145 

arrived a Cromarty to coal. Owing to the receipt of in- 
formation from the Admiralty early that day, that it was 
reported that some German cruisers, destroyers and sub- 
marines had left Danzig on October 17th for the North 
Sea, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron were ordered to leave their bases that 
morning, proceed into the North Sea, and sweep down 
on a broad front to the Skagerrak, screened by the 4th 
Flotilla of destroyers. The latter had to be sent back to 
their base on October 22nd owing to heavy weather. The 
remainder of the force swept up to the Skaw without 
sighting any enemy vessels, then north along the Nor- 
wegian coast, and proceeded, the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron to Cromarty and the 1st Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron to Scapa. 

On October 21st a submarine was reported just out- 
side Cromarty by an armed trawler, and another report 
was received of one having been sighted by the destroyer 
Lynx. The submarine obstruction at Cromarty, designed 
by Captain Mum*o, had now been completed, and the base 
was considered secure. It would, however, only accom- 
modate a small portion of the Fleet. 

The dispositions given above were maintained until 
October 22nd, when the Iron Duke, 1st and 4th Battle 
Squadrons, the Active and two divisions of destroyers 
of the 2nd Flotilla, arrived at Lough Swilly. The 3rd and 
6th Battle Squadrons and 2nd Cruiser Squadron took 
their place to the north-westward of the Hebrides as an 
outer blockade line and support for the cruiser squad- 
rons. The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and four 
destroyers were detached to the southern part of the 
North Sea on the 23rd to support the Commodore (T) in 
carrying out aerial operations in the Heligoland Bight. 
The operations failed owing to the difficulty the sea-planes 



146 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

experienced in rising off the water, and the 2nd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron returned to Cromarty. 

On arrival of the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons at 
Lough S willy, steps were immediately taken to lay an 
anti-submarine obstruction at the entrance, and this was 
very smartly completed with the limited resources of the 
squadrons by 4 p.m. on the 23rd, and for the first time 
since the declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure 
base. Wire hawsers provided by the ships of the Fleet 
were suspended at varying depths between six colliers 
which were anchored across the entrance, with target rafts 
as intermediate supports. 

It was a fairly effective obstruction, and armed steam- 
boats from the fleet patrolled near it with destroyers as 
a support. 

The relief to those responsible for the safety of the 
Fleet was immense, and attention was at once turned to 
the well-being of the personnel, which had been pressed 
very hard, and to improving the efficiency of the ships in 
gunnery and torpedo work. Battle practice targets were 
ordered over from Lamlash, in the Island of Arran, a 
pre- War practice base, with the intention of carrying out 
practice in the waters north-west of Ireland. The work 
of retubing the condensers of the Iron Duke was once 
more taken in hand, and ships were given the opportunity 
off overhauling and adjusting machinery, steam being 
put back to longer notice than had previously been 
possible. The anti-submarine defence was continually 
strengthened and improved during the stay of the Fleet, 
and the colliers supporting it were gradually replaced by 
trawlers and drifters. 

In order to give the men some much-needed diversion 
and exercise a pulling regatta was organised and held on 
October 26th, and the men were landed for route marches 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 147 

as frequently as possible during the stay of the ships at 
Lough Swilly. 

On the 26th a submarine was reported inside 
Cromarty harbour, but Sir David Beatty, who was there 
with the battle cruisers, stated, after investigation, that 
he did not consider the report was true. 

Discussions took place with the Admiralty during the 
stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly on the subject of 
trawlers for the patrol of the Minches and vicinity, and 
the requirements were given as thirty-six trawlers for this 
service, which was considered next in importanoe to the 
provision of an adequate patrol force of this nature for 
the waters in the vicinity of the bases at Scapa Flow 
and Cromarty. 

The stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly was rendered 
memorable by the unfortunate loss of the Audacious, 
then one of our most modern battleships. 

Orders had been given to the 2nd Battle Squadron to 
carry out target practice against the two battle practice 
targets obtained from Lamlash, and the squadron left 
Loch-na-Keal on the evening of October 26th for a 
rendezvous in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 8.30 W., at daylight 
on the 27th, where the targets which had left Lough 
Swill)?^ in tow of two tugs, the Plover and Flying Condor, 
escorted by the light cruiser Liverpool, were to be met. 

The squadron was in Lat. 55.34 N., Long. 8.30 W. 
at 9 A.M. on the 27th, preparing for the practice, when 
at that hour the Audacious struck a mine whilst turning. 
The explosion resulted in the flooding of the port 
engine-room and partly flooding the centre engine-room. 
It was not clear at the time whether the ship had been 
mined or torpedoed. The Monarch having reported sight- 
ing a submarine at 11 a.m., a precautionary signal was 



148 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

made to Sii' George Warrender to keep the squadron 
clear of the Audacious. 

IMeanwhile all available destroyers, tugs, trawlers and 
other small craft were sent from Lough Swilly and Loch- 
na-Keal to assist the Audacious and to prevent the sub- 
marine (if one were present) from doing further damage; 
and the armed boarding steamer Cambria escorted the 
collier Thomliill (provided with towing hawsers) to the 
scene. The hospital-ship Soudan was ordered out to give 
help to survivors in case the Audacious sank or to the 
injured, and the Liverpool was directed to stand by her, 
but to keep moving at high speed. The battleship 
Eocmouth was put at "short notice" ready to tow the 
Audacious in if necessary. Vice- Admiral Sir Lewis 
Bayly, commanding the 1st Battle Squadron, came on 
board the Iron Duke to suggest that he should proceed to 
the scene to render any assistance, an offer of which I 
very gladly availed myself, as Sir George Warrender, in 
the 2nd Battle Squadron, could not close the ship whilst 
the danger of submarine attack existed. 

Shortly after the Audacious struck the mine, the 
s.s. Olympic, on passage from the United States to Liver- 
pool, closed the ship on learning of the disaster, and 
Captain Haddock, C.B., R.N.E-., who was in command, 
at once volunteered to help in any way possible. Captain 
Dampier, of the Audacious, asked that his ship might be 
taken in tow and brought into Lough Swilly, and Captain, 
Haddock, disregarding the danger of submarine attack or 
of being mined, took immediate steps to carry out this 
request. Unfoi-tvmately a considerable sea was running, 
which increased during the day. In spite of the most mag- 
nificent and seamanlike handling of the Olympic by 
Captain Haddock, and later in the day excellent work on 
the part of the master of the Thomhill, the hawsers 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 149 

constantly parted, owing to the state of the sea and the 
weight of the Audacious^ the stern of that ship being 
almost awash by the afternoon. The two ships were 
worked in a manner which Sir Lewis Bayly reported as 
beyond praise. The attempts to tow the injured ship had 
to be abandoned before dark, and Sir Lewis Bayly, 
Captain Dampier and the few officers and men who had 
remained on board to work the hawsers, etc., were taken 
off the Audacious by 7.15 p.m. The remainder of the 
ship's company had been removed without accident, in 
spite of the heavy sea, in the course of the day by de- 
stroyers, trawlers, and other small craft, and in the boats 
of the Atidacious. 

The work of the destroyers on this occasion was, as 
usual, of the greatest value, and the exceedingly seaman- 
like handling of the Fury by Lieutenant-Commander 
Sumner, who, in the teeth of the greatest difficulties, took 
heavy wire towing hawsers between the Audacious and 
the towing ships on several occasions, elicited from 
Sir Lewis Bayly expressions of warm admiration. 
Arrangements were made for the Liverpool to stand by 
the Audacious during the night, but at 9 p.m. she sud- 
denly blew up with great violence and sank. The cause 
of this explosion was never ascertained with certainty. 
At the time the ship blew up the Liverpool was not far 
distant, and a good deal of debris fell on the deck of that 
ship, killing one petty officer. This was the only casualty 
due to the loss of the Audacious. 

Meanwhile, at 1.8 p.m.^ information reached me from 
Kingstown that the s.s. Manchester Commerce had been 
sunk on the night of the 26th by a mine in the vicinity of 
the disaster to the Audacious, and at 4.40 p.m. a report 
came from Malin Head that a four-masted sailing vessel, 



150 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the Caldajf, had also struck a mine in the neighbourhood 
on the previous night. 

These unfortunately belated reports disposed at once 
of any idea that submarines had attacked the Audacious, 
and at 5 p.m. the Exmouth sailed from Lough Swilly to 
attempt to tow her in. Steps had already been taken to 
warn outward and homeward bound vessels of the exist- 
ence of the mine-field and to divert all trafiic clear of it; 
and all mine-sweeping gunboats were ordered to Lough 
Swilly to locate the exact limits of the mine-field and to 
sweep a clear passage along the north coast of Ireland, 

On the arrival of the s.s. Olympic at Lough Swilly, 
orders were given that no communication between the 
ship and the shore was to take place. I wired to the 
Admiralty suggesting that the loss of the Audacious 
should be kept secret for as long as possible, so that the 
enemy should not learn of it, as the fact would afford 
him encouragement at a time when the military situation 
was extremely critical for the Allies, and also because, as 
a general policy, it was desirable to conceal from the 
enemy any serious losses of which he could otherwise have 
no immediate knowledge. 

This procedure was approved for the time, because of 
the military situation, and the Olympic was kept at Lough 
Swilly for several days. This was necessary as she had 
on board a considerable number of United States passen- 
gers, and it was known that they had taken photographs 
of the Audacious in a sinking condition. 

Amongst these passengers was Mr. Schwab, of the 
Bethlehem Steel Company, and it was made known to me 
after a day or two that he had come over on very import- 
ant business connected with War Office contracts, and 
wished to proceed to London. After an interview with 
him, this was agreed to, and I asked him to call on Lord 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 151 

Fisher of the Admiralty in connection with the construc- 
tion of some submarines which I ascertained from him 
that his firm was in a position to build very rapidly and 
which would be of the greatest value to us. He did this, 
and with the most satisfactory results, as ten submarines 
were consti'ucted — as he promised — in the extraordinarily 
short space of five months. These vessels were most use- 
ful to us later. 

The 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons were at Lough 
Swilly during the remainder of October; the 2nd Battle 
Squadron proceeded to Lamlash on the 29th to coal, and 
to Lough Swilly on November 1st; the 3rd Battle Squad- 
ron went to Scapa on the 27th; and the 6th Battle Squad- 
ron to Lough Swilly. 

On October 27th a trawler reported very suspicious 
movements on the part of a large steamer to the westward 
of the island of Sule Skerry (west of the Orkneys). It 
appeared possible that the ship might be a German mine- 
layer, and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Scapa was 
sent to a position 120 miles from Fair Island on the Fair 
Island — Heligoland line, to intercept her on returning, 
with orders that, at daylight on the 29th, she should 
spread widely and sweep towards Fair Island, then 
sweeping over to the Norwegian coast near Jaederen's 
Point, spreading at daylight on the 30th and sweeping 
up a line approximately N. 15 W. from Heligoland, 
before returning to Scapa. Destroyers of the 4th 
Flotilla were also sent out from Scapa on the 28th in 
search of the suspected vessel, and the 3rd and 10th 
Cruiser Squadrons were disposed so as to cut her off if 
she passed to the north of the Shetlands. The ship was 
not sighted, and no mines had been laid. 

The Grand Fleet was considerably weakened at this 
time apart from the loss of the Audacious. The A jaw had 



152 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

developed condenser defects; the Iron Duke had sunuar 
troubles; the Orion had to be sent to Greenock for 
examination of the turbine supports, which appeared to 
be defective; the Conqueror was at Devonport refitting, 
and the New Zealand was in dock at Cromarty. The 
Erin and Agincourt, having been newly commissioned, 
could not yet be regarded as efficient, so that the Dread- 
nought Fleet only consisted of 17 effective battleships 
and 5 battle cruisers; the German Dreadnought Fleet 
at the time comprised 15 battleships and 4 battle cruisers, 
with the Blucher in addition. The margin of superiority 
was, therefore, unpleasantly small in view of the fact 
that the High Sea Fleet possessed 88 destroyers and the 
Grand Fleet only 42. 

During the stay of the Fleet at Lough Swilly numer- 
ous reports of the presence of submarines on the west 
coast of Scotland were received, a large number of the 
reports coming from the coast watchers. Destroyers were 
sent on many occasions to search the localities from which 
the reports emanated, and the various harbours that 
could be used by submarines as a base were frequently 
examined. At this period it was considered possible 
that enemy submarines, acting so far from their home 
ports as the west coast of Scotland, would be working 
from a short or from a floating base. It was not thought 
— from experience with our own submarines — ^that they 
would be self-supporting at this distance, and the best 
method of limiting their activities, if not destroying the 
submarines, was to find their base. Later experience, 
and a closer loiowledge of German submarines, however, 
showed that they were independent of such bases. 

It is very doubtful whether any enemy submarines 
passed to the westward of Scotland during October. We, 
at any rate, found no certain evidence that they were 



MENACE IN NORTH SEA 153 

present, in spite of the very numerous reports of their 
being sighted. Similarly, reports were constantly being 
received of air-craft (both Zeppelins and aeroplanes) 
being seen in the north of Scotland ; many of the rumours 
were of the most circumstantial nature, some comdng 
even from warships. It is quite certain that these reports 
were founded on optical illusions, and it may be said that 
little credence was attached to them at the time. 

But the currency of many rumours in those early days 
of the War, sometimes supported by statements of the 
most plausible character, were not only embarrassing, but 
frequently involved a great deal of unproductive cruising, 
for it was impossible to ignore anything which would 
enable us to find out the enemy's movements or intentions. 

At the end of October, news came of the unfortunate 
wreck of the hospital ship Rohilla off Whitby, with con- 
siderable loss of life. 

About this time the German land forces occupied 
the Belgian coast. The effect of this occupation on naval 
strategy was considered in the Grand Fleet, and Sir Lewis 
Bayly and I discussed the blocking of Zeebrugge by sink- 
ing ships across the channel. Sir Lewis Bayly considered 
the scheme feasible, and wrote to me on the subject. I 
then suggested to the Admiralty that such an operation 
should be carried out. It was not considered practicable 
by the Admiralty at the time. It is perhaps of interest 
to note that the subject was discussed as early as 1914. 

Some two years later I caused the question to be re- 
considered after taking up the appointment of First Sea 
Lord at the Admiralty (it had been under consideration 
between 1914 and 1917). More than one plan was dis- 
cussed between Admiral Bacon (commanding the Dover 
patrol) and myself; one idea, which I favoured, was to 
utilise ships of the "Apollo" class, cutting down their 



154 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

upper works to render them less visible during ap- 
proach. Meanwhile, other schemes for driving the enemy 
from the Belgian coast were in operation, so the question of 
blocking was deferred. In September, 1917, when it be- 
came clear that the object in view would not be effected 
by military operations during that year, I gave directions 
to the Plans Division of the Naval Staff, of which Rear- 
Admiral Roger Keyes had recently become the head, that 
plans for blocking Zeebrugge were to be prepared; later, 
after considering an independent proposal by Sir Regi- 
nald Bacon for attacking the mole by landing parties 
from monitors run alongside it, I decided that the opera- 
tion was to be combined with the landing on the Zee- 
brugge mole. The main objective for the landing was 
the destruction of enemy destroyers known to be lying 
alongside the mole, and I considered that this landing 
would also be very useful in creating a diversion to facili- 
tate the approach of the block ships. The scheme was 
eventually approved by me in November, 1917, and the 
training of the storming party and selection of the block 
ships were taken in hand. 



CHAPTER VI 

INCIDENTS AT SEA — NOVEMBER 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1914 

On November 1st I left Lough Svpilly to confer at the 
Admiralty with the First Lord and the First Sea Lord, 
Lord Fisher, who had relieved the Marquis of Milford 
Haven in this post. During this conference, held on 
November 2nd, the requirements of trawlers, drifters, 
etc., for the patrol of the vicinity of the various fleet 
bases, the Minches, and the waters surrounding the 
Orkneys and Shetlands were discussed at length and 
decisions reached. The defence of the bases was also con- 
sidered. I stated that the requirements of patrol vessels 
for the Orkney and Shetland areas were a total of 72, 
and for the Minches of 36. 

The future general na\al policy was also discussed, 
one of the main questions being that of the 3rd and 
6th Battle Squadrons joining the Channel Fleet, It 
was determined that this step should be taken and the 
necessary orders were given. I agreed to it with some 
reluctance, as there was obviously no prospect of the 3rd 
Battle Squadron being able to join the Dreadnought 
Fleet before a Fleet action if stationed in southern waters, 
and a dispersion of the Fleet, which resulted in the main 
Battle Fleet having but a slender preponderance of 
strength over the High Sea Fleet, was a measure which 
was open to considerable objection. The increasing 
necessity for refitting our ships, which involved sending 
them as far away as Portsmouth or Devonport, combined 
with the failures in condenser tubes that were occurring, 

155 



156 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

led to two, or three, or even more battleships being ab- 
sent at a time, on passage, laid up, or refitting. At the 
German selected moment, our main Battle Fleet might 
well at this period have been' reduced to 18 ships (aU 
Dreadnoughts), whilst the High Sea Fleet was just 
rising to a strength of 16 Dreadnoughts and 16 pre- 
Dreadnoughts. 

Later, however, after the raid on East Coast towns, 
the 3rd Battle Squadron was again detached from the 
Channel Fleet and based on Rosyth, with the 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron; the two squadrons arrived there on 
November 20th after passing west of Ireland and coaling 
at Scapa. The 6th Battle Squadron remained in southern 
waters. The object which it was desired to attain by this 
last distribution, which was ordered from the Admiralty, 
was to have a naval force based farther south than Scapa, 
to be more immediately available in the case of an at- 
tempt by the enemy to land a hostile force on our east 
coast. 

I returned to Lough Swilly at noon, November 3rd, 
and found the Fleet under orders from the Admiralty to 
proceed to Scapa at once. These orders were cancelled 
after my arrival, and the movements of the Battle Fleet 
left to my discretion. I proceeded to sea with the 1st, 
2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons at 3.45 p.m. and, passing 
south of Tory Island, made for the vicinity of the Bills 
Rocks on the coast of Galway, for target practice, which 
was carried out on the 4th, the Fleet then proceeding to 
the northward. 

The Battle Fleet was screened out of Lough Swilly 
by the 2nd Flotilla, which then left for Scapa. This 
flotilla had been employed during the stay at Lough Swilly 
in providing patrols off the entrance and in hunting for 
submarines, reports of which were very frequent. 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 157 

Prior to leaving Lough Swilly, news arrived from the 
Admiralty that the light cruiser Undmcnted, of the 
Harwich force, was being chased by several German 
vessels in southern waters, and that hostile battle cruisers 
had been sighted off Gorleston. These occurrences had, 
presumably, led to the ordering of the Fleet to Scapa. 
As it was thought that the operations of the German 
battle cruisers might be part of a general movement, 
orders were sent to the 3rd Battle Squadron to join the 
Commander-in-Chief at Scapa, the 1st and 2nd Battle 
Cruiser Squadrons being' directed to proceed with all 
disj^atch toAvards Heligoland, with the 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron; the 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons were or- 
dered to Scapt to coal, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron 
to the Shetlands for the same purpose, ready for even- 
tualities. These orders were cancelled when it became 
apparent that the German movement was local, and that 
our ships would be too late to intercept the enemy. On 
this occasion, the German cruiser Yorck, when returning 
to port, struck a German mine and sank. 

The base at Loch-na-Keal was abandoned when the 
Fleet left Lough Swilly, and the obstructions removed 
by the battleship Illustrious. 

On November 3rd the Admiralty issued a general no- 
tice proclaming the North Sea as an area in which hostile 
operations were being carried out, and pointing out the 
danger incurred hj neutral vessels which entered the North 
Sea without first ascertaining the steps necessary for 
safety. 

On November 5th the Invincible and Inflexible left 
Cromarty for Devonport by Admiralty orders, prior to 
X:)roceeding to search for Admiral von Spec's squadron 
in the South Atlantic. This order, the necessity for 
which was apparent, and the subsequent results of which 



158 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

were undoubted!}^ of high value, had, however, the effect 
of still further weakening the Grand Fleet, 

The Iron Duke, with the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle 
Squadrons cruised between the Hebrides, Faroe Islands 
and Shetlands after November 4ith, and carried out gun- 
nery practices and battle exercises as opportunity oc- 
curred. The 1st Battle Squadron was sent to Scapa to 
coal on the 7th, the 2nd Battle Squadron on the 8th, and 
the Iron Duke and 4th Battle Squadron arrived there on 
the 9th. 

The 2nd, 3rd and 10th Cruiser Squadrons were en- 
gaged on blockade work during this period. 

On November 6th, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 
with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and one-half of the 
4th Flotilla, was sent from Cromarty to carry out a sweep 
of the North Sea, passing through the following positions, 
namely : 

1. Lat. 56.0 N. 2. Lat. 57.50 N. 3. Lat. 60.10 N. 

Long. 1.30 E. Long. 5.0 E. Long. 3.15 E. 

4. Lat. 61.20 N. 5. Lat. 61.0 N. 6. Lat. 58.50 N. 

Long. 3.0 E. Long. 1.0 E. Long. 0.0 - 

thence the Battle Cruiser Squadron and destroyers were 
to go to Cromarty and the light cruisers to Scapa. 

The new battle cruiser Tiger, which had been work- 
ing up gunnery and torpedo practices at Bantry Bay in 
the south of Ireland, arrived at Scapa on November 6th to 
continue her practices and to join the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron. It was felt that she would prove a very wel- 
come reinforcement when efficient, since the departure 
of the Invincible and Inflexible had left us in a question- 
able position with regard to battle cruisers as compared 
with the Germans. 

After the Battle Fleet left Lough Swilly, and in 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 159 

consequence of information sent to me by Admiral Col- 
ville as to the slow progress being made with the submarine 
obstructions, orders were given to the various ships to 
prepare sections of rope net submarine detectors for use 
in the entrances to Scapa Flow, and these were rapidly- 
placed in position by the Fleet in Hoxa, Switha and Hoy 
Sounds -when the ships arrived at Scapa, armed trawlers 
being detailed to watch each section. It was very dis- 
appointing to find on returning to the base that so little 
headway had been made with the supply of material for 
the permanent submarine wire net obstruction, and that 
the Fleet was still, therefore, open to submarine attack. 
The increase in the number of patrol trawlers, however, 
for service in the vicinity of the base gave some protection 
to the entrances, and relieved the hard-pressed destroyers 
to a welcome extent. 

At this time the watching and blockading cruisers 
were disposed in areas between the Shetland Islands, 
Faroe Islands, and Iceland and to the north-westward of 
the Hebrides, but the whole of the cruisers were begin- 
ning to show signs of overwork. 

The Rear- Admiral commanding the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron reported that all his ships, which were very old, 
were showing increasing signs of needing thorough repair 
at a dockyard, and arrangements were put in hand for 
sending them, three at a time, to the Clyde. In addition, 
the Antrim, of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, reported con- 
denser defects; the Drake, of the 6th Cruiser Squad- 
ron, was at Scapa making good defects, which were con- 
stantly developing, and the Kiyig Alfred and Leviathan, 
of the same squadron, were refitting at dockyard ports. 
In spite of these incidents, however, large numbers of 
steamers were being intercepted daily by cruisers, bat- 
tleships and destroyers, and sent into Kirkwall for exami- 



i6o THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

nation. About this time the increase in the number of 
patrol craft at Scapa made it necessary to add consider- 
ably to the administrative organisation at that base, and 
requests were sent to the Admiralty to provide depot ships 
for the local defence destroyers, the patrol trawlers, and 
the other small craft, as well as adequate administrative 
staffs. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet remained at Scapa 
until November 17th with steam ready at from two to 
three hours' notice, and on that date the 2nd Battle 
Squadron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron, and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with a half 
flotilla as a screen, left their bases to take up positions for 
preventing a suspected attempt on the part of the enemy 
to send some ships into the Atlantic. The 2nd Battle 
Squadron worked to the westward, and the remaining 
vessels to the eastward of the Shetland Islands. The 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron 
returned to Scapa on the 20th and the 2nd Battle Squad- 
ron and 2nd Cruiser Squadron on the 21st. 

A heavy gale was experienced in the northern part of 
the North Sea and in the waters surrounding the Orkneys 
and Shetlands from November 11th to November 13th, 
and all work in the harbour had to be suspended, ships 
lying with steam up, whilst at sea most of the cruisers 
were obliged to lay to. At Scapa all the sea-plane sheds 
were wrecked by the gale, and the sea-planes damaged. 

During this stay of the Battle Fleet at Scapa the 
routine was introduced of carrying out gunnery and tor- 
pedo practices inside the harbour, two or three ships being 
under way at a time for the purpose. This routine was 
subsequently carried out whenever the Fleet, or any por- 
tion of it, was at Scapa and the greatest possible benefit 
was derived from it. It was found possible to carry out 



INCIDENTS AT SEA i6i 

practice from all guns, up to and including 6-inch, inside 
the harbour by day and night, besides the ordinary sub- 
calibre firing and torpedo practices by ships, and by de- 
stroyers attacliing ships, or divisions of ships. 

On November 11th, the battle cruiser Princess Royal 
sailed for Halifax, by Admiralty orders, for the purpose 
of strengthening the North American Squadron in opera- 
tions against Admiral von Spee's squadron, should it 
appear in northern waters, I protested, as Commander- 
in-Chief, against sending so powerful a ship as the Princess 
Royal, armed with 13.5-inch guns, since her absence left 
our Battle Cruiser Squadron inferior in strength to the 
German battle cruiser force. I suggested that the New 
Zealand, carrying 12-inch guns, was, owing to her eco- 
nomical coal consumption, more suited to the work re- 
quired and strong enough for the purpose. However, the 
Princess Royal sailed and remained absent from the North 
Sea until the beginning of January, 1915. 

At this period, reports of enemy submarines being 
sighted, more particularly by shore observers in the 
Hebrides, Orkneys and Shetlands, were very numerous, 
and destroyers and patrol craft were frequently being sent 
to search suspected bases or sheltered bays in which sub- 
marines might be taking refuge. All such searches were, 
however, fruitless, although in many cases the reports 
were very circumstantial and convincing. 

On November 18th the mine-sweeping gunboats, 
whilst searching the Fair Island Channel, sighted a 
submarine on the surface and chased her at a speed of 18 
knots, but could not overhaul her. The submarine sub- 
sequently dived. This incident was the first practical 
proof of the high surface speed possessed by German 
submarines. 

Destroyers were sent out immediately from Scapa to 



i62 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

assist in the search, with orders to use their searchlights 
after dark in order to force the submarine to keep under 
water and so exhaust her batteries. The search, however, 
proved abortive, although continued for 24 hours. The 
use of searchlights for this purpose, begun on this occa- 
sion, became common later on. 

A submarine was sighted by the 2nd Battle Squad- 
ron at 9 A.M. on the 19th, well to the westward of the 
Orkneys, and this may have been the vessel chased by 
the mine-sweepers. 

During the gale on November 12th, the ships of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron — the old "Edgar" class of cruisers 
— which were on patrol between the Shetlands and Faroe 
Islands had suffered much damage, many of them show- 
ing signs of leaking and straining; boats and ventilators 
were washed away; and water in large quantities found 
its waj^ below. It became evident that these old ships were 
not sufficiently seaworthy to withstand the winter gales 
of northern latitudes without first undergoing a thorough 
repair, and arrangements were made to send them, three 
at a time, to the Clyde for survey and refit. The survey 
of the first three, however, revealed that some months' 
work would be required to make them efficient for winter 
blockade duty, and it was then decided by the Admiralty 
to pay off the whole squadron, and to utilise the crews to 
commission armed merchant ships, which would be far 
more suitable, as they could keep the sea for much longer 
periods. 

The ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been 
using Swarbachs Minn, a harbour in the Shetland Islands, 
as an occasional coaling base. This was evacuated on 
November 20th in consequence of the receipt of a report 
that a submarine attack on the harbours in the Shetland 
Islands was probable, all of these harbours being, at that 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 163 

time, defenceless against such attack. On leaving the 
base, the shijjs of the 10th Ci-uiser Squadron, not already 
at a refitting port, were ordered to dockyard ports to pay 
oflP. 

On November 20th, during practice, a lyddite common 
shell detonated in one of the 9.2-inch guns of the Achilles, 
and the muzzle of the gun was blown off, eleven of the 
gun's crew being injured. This occurrence cast doubt on 
the safety of the whole of the lyddite shell afloat, and 
restrictions on their use were issued, but were eventually 
removed, after the withdrawal of all suspected shell of 
this nature. 

At dusk on November 22nd the Grand Fleet left its 
bases for the purpose of carrying out a sweep of the 
North Sea, and to support an aerial operation in the 
Heligoland Bight. The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, were included in this 
movement, and met the remainder of the Fleet at sea at 
9.30 A.M. on November 23rd in Lat, 57.40 N., Long. 
2.30 E. 

The 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 
2nd Cruiser Squadron, 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 6th Cruiser 
Squadron, and 2nd and 4th Flotillas, took part in the 
operation, the Fleet proceeding south in cruising order, 
with destroj^ers screening the Battle Fleet and 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron against submarine attack by day. The 
channel eastward of the Pentland Firth was, as usual, 
searched by the mine-sweeping gunboats prior to the de- 
parture of the Fleet. 

The Commodore (T) from Harwich, with three Light 
Cruisers and eight destroyers, was directed to co-operate 
in the aerial operations. During daylight on the 23rd 
opportunitj" was taken to carry out two tactical exercises. 



i64 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The Iron Duke's position at midnight was Lat. 56.55 N., 
Long. 4.11 E. Ships were ordered to be at action stations 
by dawn on the 24th, and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 
with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and a division of 
destroyers, was detached in the afternoon of the 23rd with 
directions to be in Lat. 55.10 N., Long. 6.20 E. by 5.30 
A.M. on the 24th. 

The Drake reported her port engine disabled at 1 
P.M. on the 23rd, and had consequently to be sent back 
to Scapa. 

During the night the Admiralty informed me that the 
aerial operations had been abandoned, as it was thought 
that the enemy had a force present in the Bight, which 
would be too strong for our detached vessels. I then 
directed the Commodore (T) to meet the 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron at its daylight position in Lat. 54.50 N., Long. 
7.6 E., and thence to proceed towards Heligoland and 
endeavour to djaw any enemy forces that might be en- 
countered towards our Fleet. The 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron were directed 
also to proceed to the 2nd Cruiser Squadron to give any 
necessary support. 

The weather on the 24th was fine and bright with 
high visibility. The Commodore (T) reconnoitred Heli- 
goland and reported at 10.40 a.m. that there was smoke 
behind the island, and ships steaming to the southward; 
and that he had sighted a submarine. The Rear- Admiral 
of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron reported at 11 a.m. that he 
had only sighted destroyers, and that he could not draw 
the enemy towards him, and so Avas returning to the 
northward with Commodore ( T ) . The Vice- Admiral of 
the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, who was supporting, 
turned to the northward shortly afterwards, his noon posi- 
tion being Lat. 54.47 N., Long. 6.35 E. The 2nd Cruiser 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 165 

Squadron was attacked at 12.35 p.m. by an aeroplane, 
which dropped five bombs near the Liverpool, which was 
in company. 

The Battle Fleet cruised in support, the 10 a.m. posi- 
tion of the Iron Duke being Lat. 55.23 N., Long. 5.30 
E. At 2 P.M. the Battle Fleet turned to the north-west- 
ward, sighting the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron astern at 
3.30 P.M. The battle cruisers and light cruisers were 
stationed 15 miles to the eastward of the Battle Fleet 
during the night, and the necessary dispositions were taken 
to provide against a destroyer attack during the night. 

On November 25th two more tactical exercises were 
carried out. During the afternoon the wind increased, 
and thick weather set in, and by daylight on the 26th a 
heavy southerly gale was blowing, so the attached cruisers 
were sent to the bases for shelter. The 1st Battle Squad- 
ron, 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron, and the destroyers, had been detached 
at midnight on the 25th for Scapa, Rosyth and Inver- 
gordon respectively. The original intention was to take 
the remainder of the Fleet farther north for target prac- 
tice, but it was abandoned owing to the bad weather, 
and the Iron Duke, the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons 
and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa on the 
27th. 

During the absence of the Fleet, the German sub- 
marine U 18 was rammed at 12.20 p.m. November 24ith 
by mine-sweeping trawler No. 96, one m.ile off the Hoxa 
entrance to Scapa. U 18 was damaged in the collision, 
dived, hit the bottom and received further damage. All 
the available patrol craft were ordered to the spot most 
promptly by the Vice- Admiral commanding the Orkneys 
and Shetlands and hunted her. She finally came to the 



i66 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

surface and surrendered off Muckle Skerry in the Pent- 
land Firth. The submarine sank as the crew came on 
deck, the sea cocks, probably, having been previously 
opened. The commanding officer of the submarine, who 
had apparently intended to try to enter Scapa Flow, 
expressed great surprise to Admiral Colville at the ab- 
sence of the Fleet. It seemed possible that he had been 
deterred from his attempt by the sight of the buoys across 
the entrance, probably suspecting the presence of an ob- 
struction which, however, was not there. The sinking 
of the submarine caused the greatest gratification to the 
local defence forces at Scapa and acted as an incentive 
to further efforts. It was also, probably, a deterrent 
to further attacks on the Fleet at Scapa, as the circum- 
stances in which U 18 was sunk were kept most secret in 
order that the enemy might be led to think that her destruc- 
tion was due to nets or mines. Indeed, it is very likely that 
this incident and the secrecy observed had important results 
in preventing the loss of ships of the Grand Fleet when 
at anchor in Scapa Flow. 

Great submarine activity occurred at this time in the 
vicinity of the Orkneys and Shetlands. The Dryad 
sighted a submarine on the 24th in Lat. 58.35 N., Long. 
1.45 W. ; a second was sighted by an armed trawler off 
Copinsay on the same day; and a third was sighted from 
the shore, proceeding to the eastward through the Pent- 
land Firth. On the 25th U 16 was sighted by a collier 
and trawler in Lat. 58.46 N., Long. 2.15 W., and later 
by the mine-sweeping gunboat Skipjack not far from this 
position. 

On the return of the Fleet arrangements were made 
for constructing, with Fleet resources, net obstructions 
across the Hoy entrance to Scapa Flow, and, in view of 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 167 

the attempt of U 18, all patrols were stiffened to the ut- 
most extent possible. 

During November 27th and 28th the strong gale con- 
tinued, interfering considerably with the work on the 
submarine obstructions. Several reports of the sighting 
of submarines in harbours in the north of Scotland, the 
Orkneys and Shetlands were received during the last days 
of November, and destroyers and patrol craft were kept 
very busy in searching the various bays and harbours. 
In many cases chai-ges were exploded on the bottom in 
baj'^s in which it was considered that a submarine might 
be lying, in the hope of forcing her to the surface. No 
known result, however, was obtained. 

The Fleet remained in the various bases until the end 
of the month, the ships in Scapa Flow carrying out gun- 
nery and torpedo practices and working at the obstruc- 
tions. The King George V., which had just returned 
from refit at a dockyard, developed condenser defects 
necessitating partial retubing; she was the fourth battle- 
ship in which this defect had occurred since the War 
started, a period of only four months, and it will be real- 
ised that such wholesale breakdowns caused me uneasiness. 

During November the work of sinking block-ships in 
all the entrance channels to Scapa Flow, except the Hoxa 
and Hoy entrances, was carried out. Unfortunately the 
block-ships had been sent up in a light condition without 
cement ballast which, I was informed, could not be sup- 
plied, and they began in many cases to break up or to 
shift their position during the winter gales. This fact, 
combined with the great difficulty experienced in sinking 
them in the exact positions required owing to the strong 
tides prevailing (up to at least eight knots in strength), 
and the very short periods of slack water, rendered the 
work of blocking only partially effective, 



i68 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

At the end of November the effective state of the 
Grand Fleet was as follows: 

Fleet-Flagship: the Iron Duhe, 

1st Battle Squadron: 

7 ships, the Neptune being away refitting. 

9,nd Battle Squadron: 

7 ships, of which one, the King George V., was disabled, re- 
tubing condensers. 

Srd Battle Squadron (Pre-Dreadnoughts) : 

7 ships, one ship refitting at twelve hours' notice for steam, 
and the 8th ship returning from a dockyard refit. 

4it}i Battle Squadron: 

5 ships (complete). 

Isi Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (the Princess Royal having been detached ta North 
America). 

2nd Cruiser Squadron: 

5 ships. The Shannon was refitting. 
3rd Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 
6th Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 
Isi Light Cruiser Squadron: 

5 ships. The Liverpool was refitting. 
9,nd Flotilla: 

15 destroyers (5 refitting). 
Uh Flotilla: 

15 destroyers (5 refitting). 
10th Cruiser Squadron: 

Nil (paid off). 
Armed Merchant-Cruisers : 

2 (2 were coaling at Liverpool). 
Mine-STveeping Gunboats : 

5 (3 were refitting). 

The two new battleships, the Emperor of India and 
Benbow, the former flying the flag of Rear- Admiral A. 
L, Duff, C.B., had arrived at Berehaven in the south of 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 169 

Ireland on December 1st to "work up" after commis' 
sioning. On the same date the Leviathan arrived at 
Cromarty to act as flagship of the 1st Cruiser Squadron 
under the orders of Rear- Admiral Sir A. G. W. Moore. 
His flag was transferred to her from the A'^eoj Zealand on 
December 2nd. 

On the night of December 2nd a very violent gale 
sprang up at Scapa Flow, during which several ships 
dragged their anchors, in spite of two anchors being down 
and steam up; the gale lasted until the morning of the 
4th. All communication between ships in Scapa Flow, 
even by drifter, was suspended, and the light cruisers at 
sea on patrol were forced to lie to. An officer and one 
man were washed overboard from a picket-boat shelter- 
ing under the stern of a store-ship and drowned. 

On December 3rd Rear-Admiral Dudley de Chair, 
lately in command of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, hoisted 
his flag in the armed merchant ship Alsatian to command 
the merchant cruisers attached to the Grand Fleet, which 
were now constituted as the new 10th Cruiser Squadron. 

At 1.45 P.M. on December 3rd the destroyer Garry, 
Commander W. W. Wilson, of the local defence force, 
reported that she was engaging a submarine at the Holm 
Sound entrance to Scapa Flow. This submarine was 
possibly sheltering there from the bad weather. De- 
stroyers and trawlers were at once sent out to assist, 
and the submarine was last reported diving to seaward. 
Several rounds from her 12-pounder gun were fired by 
the Garry at the submarine's corming tower, but appar- 
ently without effect, and an attempt to ram her also 
failed owing to the heavy sea and very strong tides. The 
submarine and the Garry fired torpedoes at one another, 
the submarine's torpedo passing under the stern of the 
Garry, All ships were directed to raise steam for leaving 



170 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

harbour on receipt of the first report from the Garry, 
from which it was not clear whether the submarine had 
passed through Hohii Sound into the harbour, but this 
order was cancelled when it was ascertained that she was 
outside. 

On December 4th all the mine-sweeping gunboats 
attached to the Grand Fleet were sent to Sheerness by 
Admiralty direction for the purpose of carrying out 
sweeping operations off the coast of Belgium; trawlers 
were then the only sweeping vessels left with the Grand 
Fleet. 

On December 5th another heavy gale was experienced, 
lasting until the following morning, and all small craft at 
sea were forced to shelter. 

In consequence of representations made to the Ad- 
miralty of the inadequacy of the mine-sweeping force at 
this time attached to the Grand Fleet, owing to the 
withdrawal of the gunboats, steps were taken to fit out 
eight small steamers for the purpose, and I was informed 
that they would arrive on various dates during the month 
of December. These vessels did not prove very satis- 
factory as mine-sweepers in northern waters, and were 
withdrawn later for use in the Mediterranean. 

During the sta}^ of the Fleet in Scapa Flow work on 
the improvised submarine obstructions was continued by 
naval parties with all possible speed, and, meanwhile, 
work on the permanent obstructions was in hand, though 
progressing but slowly, owing to the difficulty experienced 
in fitting out the trawlers at Inverness with the necessary 
winches and providing the required moorings. 

On December 6th bad weather was again experienced. 
Orders were issued on this date for a sweep down the 
North Sea, but were cancelled on receipt of information 
from the Admiralty that the recent bad weather had 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 171 

caused a very large number of mines to break adrift in 
the southern portion of the North Sea. On the same day 
the Hght cruiser Sapplio and three armed boarding 
steamers were sent to Loch Ewe and based there with 
orders to work north-west of the Hebrides for the inter- 
ception of trade; the force of armed boarding steamers 
was increased later. These vessels were mostly Irish mail 
packets. Rather extensive alterations were necessary, 
after they had been sent up, before they were fit for their 
duties. 

During the early part of December the ships of the 
2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron were mainly engaged in Areas 3, 4 and 6; the 
3rd Cruiser Squadron was at Rosyth and working to the 
eastward from that base. 

On December 7th Rear-Admiral Sir A. G. W. 
INIoore, K.C.B., assumed command of the newly con- 
stituted 1st Cruiser Squadron, and the Leviathan and 
Duke of Edinburgh arrived at Scapa on that date; the 
Wariior and Black Prince, with the above ships, com- 
prised the squadron. On December 7th, two merchant 
ships, the s.s. Michigan and City of Oxford, disguised as 
men-of-war, arrived at Scapa. These vessels, with 
several others, had been fitted out at Belfast by Admiralty 
orders with dummy turrets and guns, and altered with a 
view to representing certain British battleships and battle 
cruisers. The whole of these were formed into a squadron 
under the command of Commodore Haddock, C.B., 
R.N.R., of Olympic fame, and termed the Special Ser- 
vice Squadron. The disguise of the ships was carried out 
very cleverly, though presumably at considerable expense. 
They would have been of value had it been possible to 
select vessels of a suitable speed, but the highest speed 
attainable by any vessel in the squadron was not more 



172 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

than nine to ten knots, whilst the speed of the squad- 
ron as a whole did not exceed seven knots. The ships 
could not under these conditions accompany the Fleet 
to sea, and it was very difficult to find a use for them 
in home waters. Commodore Haddock was, later, de- 
tached with the squadron to Loch Ewe, where the ships 
were worked up to carry out fleet movements. This he 
did most successfully, so that, had the ships possessed 
the requisite speed, use might have been made of them 
as a squadron for various decoy purposes. But, under 
the conditions existing, this was impossible, and eventu- 
ally the squadron was disbanded with the exception of 
one vessel; the experiment was tried of sending her to 
sea disguised as a disabled man-of-war with a consider- 
able heel to one side, and with patrol craft accompanying 
her as if for protection, in the hope that a submarine 
might be induced to attack her and so afford the patrols 
an opportunity of sinking the submarine. 

This scheme, however, met with no success. All the 
vessels were restored to their original conditions for trad- 
ing pur]30ses, with the exception of some which were sent 
to the Mediterranean and to North America, where it was 
reported that they were of some use. 

On December 8th another gale was experienced. The 
Thunderer, which had developed condenser defects, left 
for Devonport on the 8th for refit and for retubing con- 
densers; yet another case of this defect! 

On December 9th the 1st Battle Squadron proceeded 
to sea to cruise to the north-westward of the Shetland 
Islands and to carry out gunnery practices as convenient. 
In consequence of bad weather the Vice- Admiral sent the 
attached cruiser Bellona back to Scapa for shelter. 

On December 10th the new battleships Benbow and 
Emperor of India arrived from Berehaven to strengthen 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 173 

the 4th Battle Squadron, and proved very welcome addi- 
tions to the Fleet. They, as well as all other new ships 
joining, necessarily spent several weeks in practices before 
becoming efficient to join the Fleet at sea, or to take part 
in action. Owing to the hurried completion of these two 
ships, a great deal of fitting work was also required before 
they were in a proper condition, and this delayed their 
practices considerably. On the 11th another gale was 
experienced which lasted until the 14th. The weather 
during this period was very bad, and ships at sea (in- 
cluding the 1st Battle Squadron which returned to Scapa 
on the 12th) met with very bad weather. Destroyers on 
patrol were unable to maintain their stations and were 
forced to run for shelter, and one of them, the Cochatiice, 
suff^ered some damage. 

On the 12th the work of retubing the port condenser 
of the King George V. was completed; the starboard con- 
denser was not taken in hand owing to the small margin 
of superiority of the Battle Fleet over the High Sea Fleet 
at this time. 

During this stay of the Battle Fleet some very neces- 
sar)^ work in the ships of the "Iron Duke" class was 
partially carried out. These shii^s were the first modern 
battleships fitted with 6-inch guns for their secondary 
armament, and the gunports were very low. Early in the 
War it was found necessary to unship the ports altogether, 
as the sea washed them away constantly. Water then 
had free access to the inside of the ship through the open- 
ing between the revolving shield and the ship's side, and, 
except in fine weather, water entered freely. In bad 
weather the water, as deep as three to four inches, was 
continually washing about the living decks and finding its 
way below through the open hatches, to the great discom- 
fort of the ship's company, who were continually wet, and 



174 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

to the detriment of efficiency. Arrangements were de- 
vised on board the Iron Duke to overcome this trouble, 
and steps taken to have all the necessary fittings made 
at various contractors' yards. A partial bulkhead v^as 
fitted in rear of the guns to confine the vi^ater which en- 
tered the ship, and watertight indiarubber joints pro- 
vided between the gun shields and the ship's side. The 
result was satisfactory, and similar changes were made 
in the ships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class and in the 
Tiger. The two after 6-inch guns, which were on the 
main deck level, were removed altogether at the first 
opportunity, and the ship's side and armour completed in 
the after embrasure in all these ships, as it was apparent 
that these guns could never be worked at sea, being only 
a few feet above the water line. The guns themselves 
were mounted in new unarmoured casemates on the 
superstructure deck level. The work connected with the 
forward 6-inch guns was entirely carried out at Scapa, 
with the ships at short notice for steam, and in some 
cases the workmen remained in the ships and continued 
the work at sea. 

On December 12th serious defects in the boilers of 
the Liverj^ool became apparent and the speed of the ship 
was limited to 17 knots. This defect, which first showed 
itself in this ship, gradually affected the boilers of the 
same type in all ships so fitted, as they experienced a cer- 
tain degree of wear, and from this time onwards there was 
usually one, and occasionally two, light cruisers paid off 
for the purpose of carrying out the necessary repairs 
which occupied a period of two or three months. This 
reduction in the number of efficient light cruisers was 
serious, at a time when our numbers compared badly with 
those possessed by the enemy. 

On December 14th directions were given to the 2nd 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 175 

Battle Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at 
Scapa, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at Cromarty and 
all the available destroyers which were at that base, 
and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, to proceed 
to sea to meet at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.20 N., Long. 
0.10 W., at 2.30 P.M. on December 15th, the force then 
to proceed to the southward with a view to sweeping 
the western portion of the North Sea. The 2nd Battle 
Squadron — without the Thimderer, which was refitting, 
and, therefore, comprising only six ships — left Scapa early 
on the 15th, but in passing through the Pentland Firth 
the attached cruisers Blanche and Boadicea were seriously 
damaged by the heavy sea running as the result of the late 
exceptional gales, and were forced to return. The 
Boadicea had her bridge washed away and lost several 
men swept overboard and drowned. This ship was sent 
to the Clyde for repairs ; the damage to the Blanche being 
less was made good at Scapa. The number of destroyers 
accompanying the force was, unfortunately, very inade- 
quate, the 2nd Battle Squadron being unprovided with 
any vessels of this class, as the weather conditions in the 
Pentland Firth made it out of the question for destroyers 
to go to sea from Scapa. It was decided not to post- 
pone the sweep on this account. I ordered all available 
destroyers out from Cromarty in the hope that the weather 
conditions in the Moray Firth might be better than at 
Scapa; only seven were available, however, and I there- 
fore asked the Admiralty to direct the Commodore (T), 
with the 1st and 3rd Flotillas from Harwich, to meet the 
northern force at a southern rendezvous at dajdight on 
December 16th. This proposal was not carried out, how- 
ever, the Harwich force, which was at sea, remaining a 
considerable distance to the southward. 

Whilst the force was on passage to the southward, the 



176 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

destroyers Lynx, Ambuscade, Unity, Hardy, Shark, 
Acasta and Spitfire — which had left Cromarty with the 
battle cruisers and on reaching the rendezvous were sta- 
tioned 10 miles ahead of the 2nd Battle Squadron — 
sighted and became engaged before daylight on Decem- 
ber 16th with a strong force of enemy destroyers, and, 
later, with one enemy cruiser arid three light cruisers. 
The destroyers appeared to be screening ahead of the other 
vessels and both destroyers and cruisers were engaged by 
our small destroyer force. It was difficult to ascertain 
the result of the engagement so far as the German vessels 
were concerned, although the Hardy claimed to have hit 
a light cruiser at close range; the Hardy's steering-gear 
was disabled by enemy fire, two men killed and one officer 
and 14 men wounded. The Ambuscade and Lynx were 
also holed, the Lynx having one man wounded. The 
Hardy finally withdrew under escort of the Lynx. The 
engagement caused our own destroyers to become scat- 
tered and separated from the Battle Squadron, and in 
the course of the day they proceeded to various east coast 
ports to repair and refuel, the Hardy being escorted to 
the Humber by the Spitfire. No report of this engage- 
ment reached me at the time. My first information of 
the presence of enemy forces in the vicinity of our coast 
was obtained by intercepting at 8.55 a.m. a wireless mes- 
sage from the Admiralty to Vice-Admiral commanding 
the 2nd Battle Squadron, timed 8.35 a.m., stating that 
Scarborough was being shelled. The Grand Fleet was at 
once ordered to raise steam, and left at 12.15 p.m., steer- 
ing for a position Lat. 57 N., Long. 2.30 E. The weather 
had now moderated sufficiently to allow of destroyers ac- 
companying the Fleet. 

Meanwhile Sir George Warrender, who was in com- 
mand of the 2nd Battle Squadron and was the senior 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 177 

officer of the forces at sea, on receipt of the Admiralty 
telegram had turned to the northward to endeavour to 
intercept the enemy forces on their return passage. 
Wireless signals were intercepted in the Iron Duke indi- 
cating that the scout Patrol was being engaged by two 
enemy battle cruisers and that battleships or battle 
cruisers were off Scarborough and light cruisers off 
Hartlepool. I knew that a gap between two mine-fields 
laid by the enemy off our coast existed between Lat. 
54.20 X. and 54.40 N. and concluded that any enemy 
forces operating off our coasts would pass through this 
gap. At 10 A.M., therefore, after intercepting the various 
messages mentioned above, I reminded the Vice-Admiral 
of the 2nd Battle Squadron and the Vice-Admiral of the 
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron by wireless that this gap 
existed, and that the enemy would probably emerge there, 
and Sir George Warrender at 10.26 a.m. directed Sir 
David Beatty to pass through the gap towards our coast. 
The Admiralty at 10.30 signalled, however, to the Vice- 
Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron that the enemy was 
probably returning towards Heligoland, and that he 
should keep outside the mine-fields and steer to cut off 
the enemy. Sir George Warrender then directed Sir 
David Beatty to obey this latter order. 

I had ordered the 3rd Battle Squadron to sea from 
Rosyth immediately on receipt of the first news of the 
enemy, and Vice-Admiral Bradford, whose squadron was 
at short notice for steam, left at 10 a.m. with directions 
from me to proceed to lat. 55.50 N., Long. 1.10 W., 
my object being for this force to intercept the enemy 
should he pass out to the northward of the German mine- 
fields instead of through the gap between them. 

Sir George Warrender, with the 2nd Battle Squadron, 
the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being in company, was informed 



178 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

of these dispositions by me. At 11.40 a.m. he signalled 
that at 12.30 p.m. he would be in Lat. 54.24 N., Long. 
2.0 E. Sir David Beatty, with the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, was to the 
north-westward of the Battle Squadron, and the Commo- 
dore (T) some 60 miles to the southward, having been 
ordered by the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squadron, 
at 10.28 A.M., to steer for a position in Lat. 54.20 N., 
Long. 1.30 E. The weather throughout the whole morn- 
ing had been very misty, with a visibility of about five 
miles, and sufficient sea to cause a great deal of spray 
when, ships were steaming at high speed. 

At 11.30 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, in the 
Southampton (1st Light Cruiser Squadron), sighted an 
enemy light cruiser and destroyers steering to the south- 
ward, gave chase with the Birmingham and engaged them ; 
owing to the spray washing over the ship, and to the mist, 
no result was visible. Three other enemy light cruisers, 
or cruisers, were sighted to the south-westward shortly 
before 11.50 a.m., at about which time touch with these 
vessels was lost. 

At 12.16 P.M., German cruisers and destroyers were 
sighted in Lat. 54.23 N., Long. 2.14 E. by the 2nd 
Battle Squadron distant about five miles on a bearing 
north by west, steering to the eastward, having evidently 
come out through the gap in the mine-fields as was an- 
ticipated; the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron at this time 
was some 15 miles north of the Battle Squadron. It 
seems probable that the German force passed either 
between our 2nd Battle Squadron and the 1st Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, or ahead of the former and astern of 
the latter. On sighting our Battle Squadron, which turned 
to close, the enemy steered to the northward and disap- 
peared shortly afterwards in the mist, steaming at high 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 179 

speed, and without being engaged by the 2nd Battle 
Squadron. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron did not sight 
any enemy forces. 

The escape of the enemy's force was most disappoint- 
ing, seing that our own squadrons were in a very favour- 
able position for intercepting the raiders. Low visibility 
was the main reason for their escape, but the absence 
from the Battle Squadron (through the bad weather in 
the Pentland Firth) of its attached cruisers and of a 
sufficient force of destroyers was a contributory cause, as 
well as the fact of our light cruisers having lost touch with 
the enemy at 11.50 

At 3 P.M. the Vice-Admiral of the 2nd Battle Squad- 
ron informed me of the main features of the position, and 
stated that he was in Lat. 54.43 N., Long. 1.55 E., steering 
to the northward, with the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, adding 
that he had ordered the battle cruisers and light cruisers 
to rejoin him. 

At about 2 p.vM. the Admiralty informed me that it 
was thought, from the information given by our direc- 
tional stations, that other ships of the High Sea Fleet 
were probably at sea, and at 6.30 p.m. I gave all our forces 
a rendezvous at which to meet at 6 a.m. on the 17th. 

The force from Scapa, consisting of the 1st and 4th 
Battle Squadrons, with the 2nd Flotilla, and the 1st, 2nd 
and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, met at this time the force 
under Sir George Warrender, the 3rd Battle Squadron 
under Vice- Admiral E. E. Bradford, and the Commodore 
( T ) with three light cruisers, and proceeded to the south- 
ward. During the afternoon of the 17th the Admiralty 
was able to ascertain (by directional wireless telegraphy) 
and to inform me that the ships of the High Sea Fleet, 
previously reported, were now in harbour. 

Opportunity was then taken of the whole Fleet being 



i8o THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

in company with the Commodore (T) to carry out a battle 
exercise. At dusk the Commodore (T) was detached to 
Harwich, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser 
Squadron to Rosyth, the 2nd Battle Squadron and 2nd 
Flotilla to Scapa, and the Marlborough to Rosyth, for the 
purpose of allowing Sir Lewis Bayly and Sir Cecil Burney 
to exchange commands in accordance with orders received 
from the Admiralty by wireless telegraphy when at sea. 

The light cruiser Bellona and the flotilla leader Broke 
collided during the battle exercises, and were seriously 
damaged, being sent to Rosyth under the escort of the 
Devonshire. 

During the 17th wireless messages intercepted in the 
Iron. Duke showed that the enemy raiding force had laid 
a large number of mines off the Yorkshire coast and that 
some British and neutral merchant ships had been sunk 
as a result. 

During December 18th the 1st and 4th Battle Squad- 
rons, the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron remained at sea to the eastward of the 
Orkneys, and in the evening the battleships shaped course 
for Scapa, arriving on the 19th, the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron reaching 
Cromarty on the same day. The 1st and 2nd Cruiser 
Squadrons also proceeded to Cromarty, and the 6th 
Cruiser Squadron remained out on patrol. 

During the 18th a submarine was reported inside 
Scapa Flow, and the 2nd Battle Squadron raised steam; 
but investigation showed that the report was not well 
founded. 

The strength of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now 
risen to 18 ships, and directions were given by me to 
the Rear-Admiral commanding to establish patrols as 
follows : 



INCIDENTS AT SEA i8i 

Patrol A. — Nortli of the Faroes and to westward of Long. 
5.30 W. 

Patrol B. — Nortli of the Shetlands and to westward of Long. 
1.0 W. 

Patrol C. — South of the Faroes and to westward of a line 
joining Sydero and Sule Skerry lighthouses. 

Patrol D. — West of the Hebrides and a line N.%W. from 
St. Kilda. 



The Sappho and the seven armed boarding-steamers, 
now available, were based on Loch Ewe, and completed 
the blockade line between Patrol D and the Hebrides. 
They were, however, shifted later on to Scapa, where 
they were employed on patrol and boarding duties in 
the approaches to the Pentland Firth, or at sea with 
cruiser squadrons. 

On December 20th a report was received that the 
submarine obstruction in Hoxa Sound had been found to 
be pierced; this led to steam being raised by all ships at 
Scapa, and the usual search by small craft was ordered; 
boats were also sent to explode charges on the bottom in 
the vicinity of the damaged portion of the submarine 
obstruction, where it was thought a submarine might 
have been entangled. Another alarm took place later, 
due to some trawlers inside Scapa Flow mistaking the 
concussion due to the explosion of these charges for tor- 
pedoes and firing warning signals in consequence. The 
precautions were kept in force until after daylight on the 
21st. On that date Vice- Admiral Sir Cecil Burney 
arrived at Scapa in the Marlborough and assumed com- 
mand of the 1st Battle Squadi'on, Sir Lewis Bayly taking 
over the command of the Channel Fleet. 

On the 21st the 1st Battle Squadron and 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron left Cromarty for Rosyth in obedience 
to directions from the Admiralty that the battle cruisers 



i82 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

and light cruisers were to be based on the latter port. 
This change was one result of the Scarborough raid. 

The mine-sweeping gunboats rejoined the Grand Fleet 
on this date. 

On December 23rd the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, 
with the Iron Duke, proceeded to sea to the westward of 
the Orkneys, and carried out target practice at the Sulis- 
Ker Rock, north of the Hebrides, on the 24th, passed 
through the Pentland Firth at 6 p.m. on that date, and 
proceeded into the North Sea for a sweep into southern 
waters. 

During daylight of the 25th the 1st Battle Squadron, 
the 2nd Flotilla and the 6th Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, 
the 3rd Battle Squadron, the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the 
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron from Rosyth, and the 1st and 2nd Cruiser 
Squadrons and 4th Flotilla from Cromartj"^ met the Iron 
Duke, and the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons at given 
rendezvous between Lat. 56.45 N., Long. 1.30., and Lat. 
56.14 N., Long. 3.20 E. 

Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney was under treatment 
on board a hospital ship and too unwell to take his 
squadron to sea. Admiral Sir Stanley Colville was, 
therefore, directed to hoist his flag on board the Marl- 
borough and to assume temporary command of the 1st 
Battle Squadron. 

The whole Fleet was together by 1.20 p.m. on the 
25th, steering south-south-east at 15 knots. At 1.40 
P.M. the Birmingham and Southampton, of the 1st Light 
Cruiser Squadron, both sighted submarines about 15 miles 
to the south-westward of the Battle Fleet. 

The Battle Fleet was then gradually turned from the 
south-south-eastward course to north-north-eastward until 
3 P.M., being then in position Lat. 56.22 N., Long. 3.43 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 183 

E. Course was altered to north-north-west at 3.15 p.m. 
and speed reduced. At 9.15 p.m. the Fleet again turned 
to the southwai'd, speed having to be reduced owing to 
the sea becoming too heavy for the destroyers. By 
midnight a south-westerly gale was blowing. 

At 8 A.M. on December 26th the Battle Fleet was in 
Lat. 55.58 N., Long. 2.16 E., with the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron 40 miles 
to the southward; a speed of 11 knots was the most that 
the destroyers could keep up without risk of serious dam- 
age, and, as the weather was getting rapidly worse, they 
were detached at 8.10 a.m to their bases. 

By 10 A.M. a whole gale was blowing from the south- 
eastward. The sweep was abandoned and course altered 
to the northward. At 11 a.m. the Rosyth and Cromarty 
squadrons were ordered to proceed to their bases, the 
Indomitable, which had joined the Fleet at 8 a.m. from 
the Mediterranean, being ordered to Rosyth, there to join 
the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. The destroyers and 
light cruisers suffered somewhat from the gale, the 2nd 
Flotilla unfortunately losing three men, and from the 
light cruiser Carolme one man was washed overboard. 

Bad weather continued during the passage north with 
a very rough sea, and on nearing the Pentland Firth the 
Dreadnought Battle Fleet found the conditions to be 
exceptionally severe, with a following wind which caused 
the funnel smoke to obscure objects ahead of the ships. 
The ships were directed to enter Scapa Flow in the fol- 
lowing order: 2nd Battle Squadron, 1st Battle Squadron, 
4th Battle Squadron; the 2nd Battle Squadron was timed 
to enter at 6 a.m. — some time, of course, before daylight, 
which, at this period of the year at Scapa Flow, is about 
8.30 A.M. 

As the rear subdivision of the 2nd Battle Squadron 



i84 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

approached the entrance, the ships as usual having no 
Hghts showing, the Monarch altered course and stopped 
to avoid a patrol trawler which she suddenly sighted close 
under her bows. The Conqueror, astern of her, was 
unable to avoid the Monarch and the two ships collided; 
the stern of the Monarch and the starboard bow of the 
Conqueror were very seriously damaged, rendering both 
ships unseaworthy. They were brought into the harbour 
and safely berthed. 

Meanwhile, the 1st Battle Squadron, following astern 
of the 2nd Battle Squadron, entered safely. The Iron 
Duke was leading the 4!th Battle Squadron, and, on inter- 
cepting the wireless messages indicating that something 
was wrong, I stood through the Pentland Firth to the 
westward with the 4th Battle Squadron until the situa- 
tion had become clearer. The dawn was very late and a 
furious gale was blowing, with a very heavy sea and strong 
tide in the Firth. These conditions made the handhng 
of the battleships very difficult when they turned through 
16 points to return to the eastward. 

The Iron Duke and 4th Battle Squadron entered at 
10 A.M. The whole Fleet remained with two anchors 
down and steam up on account of the weather until 1 
P.M., when the wind and sea moderated, and by the morn- 
ing of the 28th normal conditions were resiimed. As a 
result of the gale, it was necessary to send the destroyers 
Hope, Redpole and Ruby to dockyards for repairs. 

On the 28th a new Light Cruiser Squadron, termed 
the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was formed, consisting 
of the Falmouth (Flag of Rear- Admiral Trevelyan 
Napier), Gloucester, Yarmouth and Dartmouth. 

Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney now resumed com- 
mand of the 1st Battle Squadron. 

Enemy submarines were active at the entrance to the 



INCIDENTS AT SEA 185 

Firth of Forth at this time; a torpedo was fired at T.B. 
No. 33 and another :vt T.B, No. 31 on the 25th, and two 
submarines were sighted during the 28th off the entrance 
to the Tay. 

Temporary repairs to the Monarch and Conqueror 
were begun as soon as the weather permitted, and the 
former ship was able to leave Scapa for Devonport for 
thorough repair on December 29th. It was found neces- 
sary to obtain salvage plant and assistance in the case of 
the Conqueror, which had sustained very extensive under- 
water injury over a considerable length, and Captain 
Young, of the Liverpool Salvage Association, for whose 
services I applied at once, was sent up with the salvage 
ship Battler, arriving on December 31st. The Conqueror 
was taken into Switha Sound and the repair ship 
Assistance secured alongside her, and excellent tem- 
porary repairs were effected by the 18th January, by 
the staff of the Assistance, Captain Betty, R.N., and by 
the salvage artificers under Captain Young. 

The second condenser of the King George V. was 
taken in hand for retubing at this time. 

At the end of 1914 the condition of the Fleet was: 

Fleet-Flagship: Iron Duke. 
1st Battle Squadron: 

8 ships (complete). 
2nd Battle Squadron: 

4 ships (the Conqueror and Monarch being disabled and the 
King George V. retubing her second condenser). 

3rd Battle Squadron: 

7 ships (Commonwealth refitting). 

ith Battle Squadron: 

7 ships (complete) but two new ships, the Benbow and Em- 
peror of India, not yet efficient. 

1st Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

5 ships {Princess Royal was away). 



i86 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron : 

3 ships (Black Prince refitting). 
2nd Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 
3rd Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 
6th Cruiser Squadron: 

2 ships (complete). 
1st Light Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 
Znd Light Cruiser Squadron: 

2 ships (2 not joined). 
10th Cruiser Squadron: 

14 ships (4 coaling and refitting). 
2nd Flotilla: 

16 destroyers (4 refitting). 
4ith Flotilla: 

17 destroyers (3 refitting). 



CHAPTER VII 



THE DOGGEE BANK ACTION 



Developments in the intelligence system at the 
Admiralty, initiated at the outbreak of war by Rear- 
Admiral Henry F. Oliver, the Director of the Intelli- 
gence 'Division, and an improvement in the efficiency 
of our directional wireless stations and of wireless tele- 
graphy generally, led to our being able to obtain more 
reliable knowledge of the movements of enemy vessels. 
The result was that it had become unnecessary towards 
the end of 1914 to keep the Fleet so constantljj^ at sea 
in anticipation of enemy movements. It was very de- 
sirable to spare the ships to some extent since it was in- 
creasingly evident that the War would be prolonged, and 
we had already had several warnings that the strain of 
constant sea work was telling on the efficiency of the 
machinery. Two very disquieting examples of this were 
the failure of condenser tubes on a large scale, particularly 
in the battleships, and the trouble developing in the boilers 
of a very considerable number of light cruisers. 

The problem of training personnel was also beginning 
to prove serious. In order to commission the large 
number of new ships which had been laid down since Lord 
Fisher, full of energy and ideas, had taken up the office 
of First Sea Lord (the number, of all sorts, building and 
projected, being more than 600), it became evident that 
it would be necessary to remove trained men from the 
Grand Fleet and to replace them with boys or untrained 

187 



1 88 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

landsmen. Under these conditions the individual 
efficiency of the ships in gunnery and torpedo work, as 
well as in such matters as signalling (visual and wireless) 
and the other factors which are essential in a fighting 
ship, could only be maintained if we could spend suffi- 
cient time in harbour, during which regular instruction 
could be given ; this instruction to be followed by frequent 
practices under way, in conditions where the ships would 
not be liable to attack by enemy submarines, and need 
not, therefore, be screened by the overworked destroyers. 
The organisation for carrying out this work at Scapa Flow 
was, therefore, greatly elaborated. 

Steps were taken to start a school for training young 
wireless operators at Scapa, first on board each ship, and, 
later, in a specially fitted merchant ship. The want of 
wireless operators had been most seriously felt since the 
War began. In addition to the needs of new warships 
of all classes in this respect, the requirements for merchant 
ships, trawlers and other patrol craft were immense and 
could not be met. In this branch of instruction Lieut.- 
Commander R. L. Nicholson, the Fleet wireless officer 
on my staff, carried out invaluable work in organising 
and starting the school. The training of young ratings in 
visual signal duties was also taken in hand vigorously 
under Commander A. E. Wood and the signal officers of 
the Fleet. The Grand Fleet became, in effect, a gi-eat 
school for turning out trained personnel for the Navy as 
a whole, whilst still keeping watch over the High Sea 
Fleet, and controlling the North Sea and its northern exit, 
thus carrying out its role as the centre and pivot of the 
whole naval side of the War. 

Early in 1915 the subject of the instruction and educa- 
tion of the midshipmen also exercised my attention. On 
mobilisation all the cadets had been removed from 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 189 

Dartmouth and sent to sea, with their training, of course, 
very incomplete. During the first months of the War, 
when the ships were either at sea or, if in harbour, were 
coahng, it was impossible to give these young officers 
any regular instruction, and, whilst they were learning 
much that would be invaluable to them in the future, 
it was evidently highly desirable that their systematic 
education should be continued as far as was possible during 
a war. 

Steps were accordingly taken in this direction. The 
first essential was to obtain naval instructors for the ships 
carrying midshipmen. The policy of the Admiralty, for 
some years before the War, had been to reduce gradually 
the number of naval instructors afloat, the idea being that 
the training at the Colleges and on board the training 
cruisers rendered the presence of instructors at sea 
unnecessary. I never held this view personally, but, in 
any case, it was clear that, as the cadets had gone to sea 
with less than half their course completed, further in- 
struction at sea was necessary. The specialist officers 
afloat could not undertake this work under war conditions 
and strong representations were, therefore, made to the 
Admiralty on the subject. Eventually a number of 
gentlemen were entered specially for this instructional 
work and, after a short course of training in navigation 
at Greenwich, were sent to the Fleet, where their work 
proved to be of great value to the rising generation of 
officers. 

The blockade was becoming daily more effective, 
although the blockading cruisers worked at so great a 
distance from the German coast. The only interference 
ever attempted by the enemy was by submarine attack 
or by mines, and during the year 1915 no great success 
was achieved by them in this respect when the conditions 



190 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

are considered. The regular blockading squadron, the 
10th Cruiser Squadron, was assisted in its work by the 
sweeps of our cruisers and light cruisers, accompanied 
occasionally by the Battle Fleet. In addition to the 
discharge of these duties, the Battle Fleet engaged in 
periodical cruises, during which battle exercises were 
carried out for the purpose of maintaining efficiency in 
the handling of the ships and squadrons and of giving the 
fresh officers, who were frequently joining the Fleet, to 
replace others required for the new ships, experience in 
the work of the Grand Fleet under the novel war 
conditions. 

Pursuant to this general policy, the Dreadnought 
Battle Fleet remained in harbour until January 10th, and 
then left for a cruise to the westward of the Orkneys and 
Shetlands. Gunnery practices were carried out by day 
and at night, as well as battle exercises, and the Fleet 
returned to Scapa dui-ing the day and the night of the 
13th. The 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth on the 12th 
for a cruise in the North Sea, and on the night of the 13th- 
14th passed to the westward of the Orlineys for gunnery 
practice, returning to Rosyth on the 15th. 

Other events of interest during the first fortnight of 
January were the return of the Princess Royal from 
North American waters on the 1st; a short cruise in the 
centre of the North Sea by the 1st Battle Cruiser 
Squadron and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron between 
the 3rd and the 5th, and by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron 
between the 6th and the 8th; a cruise by the 1st Cruiser 
Squadron to the westward of the Orkneys between the 4th 
and 6th, and by the 6th Cruiser Squadron between the 
6th and the 9th, and the 10th and 14th. On January 4th 
the King George V. completed the work of retubing her 
condenser. 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 191 

On the 9th all ships at Scapa raised steam ready for 
leaving, in. consequence of a report of a submarine being 
sighted in Hoy Sound, and available destroyers and 
trawlers were sent to patrol in the vicinity of the Hoy 
anti-submai'ine Fleet obstructions until the Battle Fleet 
left harbour on the 10th. 

Gales were experienced at Scapa on the 1st, 13th, 16th 
and 19th of January. 

On January 15th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
was reconstituted, under Vice-Admiral Sir A. G. W. 
Moore, K.C.B., whose flag was transferred from the 
Leviathan, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, to the New 
Zealand; the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron then comprised 
the New Zealand, Indomitable and Invincible (the last 
not having yet arrived). Rear- Admiral Sir Robert 
Arbuthnot, Bart., took command of the 1st Cruiser 
Squadron in place of Sir Gordon Moore, flying his flag 
in the Defence, which took the place of the Leviathan; 
the latter vessel was transferred to the 6th Cruiser 
Squadron. Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, C.B., relieved 
Sir Robert Arbuthnot as Rear- Admiral in the 2nd Battle 
Squadron, flying his flag in the Orion. 

On the 17th the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser 
Squadrons and 1st Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth 
for a cruise in the centre and southern portions of the 
North Sea, and on the 19th, at dawn, arrived in position 
Lat. 55 N., Long. 5.30 E. to support Commodore Tyr- 
whitt in carrying out a reconnaissance in Heligoland 
Bight. Nothing was sighted beyond an airship and a sea- 
plane, and the force was ordered to return to its bases 
and arrived during the night of the 20th-21st. 

On the 18th the Admiral commanding at Queenstown 
reported that a German mine had been washed ashore 
at Portrush, as well as bodies and wreckage, apparently 



192 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

belonging to the Viknor, an armed merchant cruiser of 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron. Anxiety had been felt as 
to the safety of the Viknor for two or three days owing 
to no reply to wireless signals being received from her, 
and the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had been 
directed to search for her. The report from Portrush 
pointed to the probability that she had struck a mine off 
the north coast of Ireland, either in the Audacious mine- 
field or a field further to the southward, and had been lost 
with all hands in the very heavy weather prevailing at the 
time in this vicinity. All traffic round the north of 
Ireland was stopped until sweepers were able to examine 
the whole area. 

At this time a large number of German mines were 
being constantly reported both in the North Sea and on 
the west coasts of Scotland and Ireland, having evidently 
broken adrift from their moorings in the heavy weather 
which had been generally prevalent. These mines, which 
were not safe when adrift, as provided for under The 
Hague Convention, were a source of some danger to 
ships, particularly at night. On the 18th the battleship 
Superb, having developed defects in one of her turbines, 
was sent to Portsmouth. She was absent from the Fleet 
until March 11th. 

On January 19th, the orders for the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron (blockading squadron) were somewhat modified 
by me; the new centre lines of patrol positions being: 

Patrol A. — A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 62.20 N., 
Long. 10.0 W. 

Patrol B. — A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 61.10 N., 
Long. 1.15 E. 

Patrol C. — A line 80 miles long, 360° from Lat. 59.40 N., 
Long. 9.0 W. 

Patrol D. — Eastern line of patrol to be 80 miles in the di- 
rection 335° from St. Kilda. 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 193 

The ships were ordered to patrol on east and west 
courses on each side of the centre line at a speed of at 
least 13 knots by day, zigzagging. 

At the same time four ships were directed to carry 
out a special patrol of the Norwegian coast between the 
parallels of 62 N. and 62,20 N. This patrol was main- 
tained until the 22nd. As indicating the gi-owing work 
of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the 
efficiency of the blockade, the Rear-Admiral of the 10th 
Cruiser Squadron reported on January 18th that 80 ships 
had been intercepted by his squadron since December 
26th, 52 of which were eastward-bound. The strength 
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron had now risen to 21 ships, 
exclusive of the Viknor, the loss of which ship with her 
fine ship's company was deeply regretted. 

A patrol to the eastward of the Pentland Firth was 
at this period being worked by the Sappho and five armed 
boarding-steamers, which were supported at night by one 
or two cruisers or light cruisers as necessary. 

The Monarch returned from being repaired at Devon- 
port on the 20th. Temporary repairs to the Conqueror 
had been completed about January 18th, but the ship was 
detained pending more favourable weather conditions; 
on the 21st she left for a southern dockyard, escorted 
by four destroj'^ers. On clearing the Pentland Firth, 
however, she found that the sea was too heavy for the 
passage to be made with safety in her damaged condition, 
and the ship returned to Scapa, where further work was 
taken in hand and it was decided that it would be neces- 
sary to dock her in the floating-dock at Invergordon to 
effect more permanent repairs for the passage south than 
could be carried out by divers at Scapa. She reached 
Invergordon on January 24th. 

On January 23rd the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser 



194 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Squadrons and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth 
left for a sweep in the southern portion of the North Sea, 
in conjunction with the Harwich force. The remainder 
of the Grand Fleet acted in support. The 1st and 2nd 
Battle Cruiser Squadrons (except the Queen Mary, which 
was absent refitting) and the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron 
were directed to a rendezvous, where the Commodore (T), 
with available destroyers and light cruisers, was ordered 
to meet them. 

The 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron 
were ordered to the vicinity of the battle cruisers' 
rendezvous. 

The Iron Duke, the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squad- 
rons, the 1st, 2nd and 6th Cruiser Squadrons, and the 
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, available destroyers of 2nd 
and 4th Flotilla (a total of 28 destroyers) left Scapa 
during the evening of the 23rd and proceeded towards the 
same rendezvous. 

At 7.20 A.M. the Aurora, of the Harwich force, 
reported that she was in action with enemy vessels; at 
7.30 A.M. Sir David Beatty reported enemy battle cruisers 
and cruisers in sight in Lat. 54.53 N., Long. 3.32 E., 
steering east. At 7.55 a.m. Commodore Goodenough, 
commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported 
his position as Lat. 55.10 N., Long. 3.32 E., and enemy 
vessels in sight, consisting of battle cruisers, light cruisers 
and destroyers, steering between south-east and south. 
On receipt of these reports the Battle Fleet increased to 
19 knots speed, and steered to support the battle cruisers, 
and the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 
which were further to the southward, were ordered to 
steer for Heligoland at full speed, to act in immediate 
support. The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was also sent 
on ahead at full speed to join the other forces. 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 195 

The proceedings of the force under Sir David Beatty 
are best described in his report given in an Appendix. 

During the early part of the engagement Sir David 
Beatty kept nie informed of his position and proceedings, 
but at 11.30 A.M. a report was received from Sir Gordon 
]Moore that he was heavily engaged with the enemy battle 
cruisers in Lat. 54.21 N., Long. 5.4 E. The fact that 
this report was made by this officer caused me some un- 
easiness at first, as it implied that the Lion could not 
signal, but as the Rear-Admiral made no mention of 
any casualty to the Lion, I concluded the cause was some 
breakdown in her wireless arrangements and that all was 
well. 

At 11.50 A.M. Commodore Goodenough, commanding 
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, reported the enemj^ 
steering south-east at 25 knots, and at noon that he had 
lost touch with them; at 12.5 p.m. Rear Admiral Sir 
Gordon Moore reported that he was retiring north-west, 
and, later, north-north-west, that the Bliicher Avas out of 
action, and that the remaining enemy battle cruisers were 
out of sight; he added that the Lion had hauled out of 
action. He gave his position as Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 
5.22 E. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet's position at noon was 
Lat. 56.29 N., Long. 3.22 E., with the cruisers 15 
miles ahead and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron ahead 
of the cruisers. At 1.15 Rear-Admiral Moore reported 
in repl}^ to my enquiry that Sir David Beatty was on 
board th*e Princess Royal, that the Lion was damaged and 
detached; Sir David Beatty then reported that the Lion's 
speed was reduced to 12 knots, that the Bliicher had 
been sunk, and two other enemy battle cruisers seriously 
damaged, and that he was covering the retirement of the 
Lio7ij which was steaming with her starboard engine only. 



196 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The hit which disabled the Lion was a piece of luck 
for the enemy. 

At 2 P.M. Vice-Admiral Bradford, commanding the 
3rd Battle Squadron, reported that he was turning to the 
northward, having all the battle cruisers in sight. The 
3rd Battle Squadron was sighted from the I?-on Duke at 
3.30 P.M., and stationed on the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile directed the 
Indomitable at 3.38 p.m. to take the Lion in tow, and 
this operation was effected by 5 p.m. At 4 p.m. the Iron 
Duke's position was Lat. 55.15 N., Long. 4.7 E., and 
at 4.30 P.M. the battle cruisers were in sight from the 
Iron Duke. The Battle Fleet then turned to the north- 
ward, keeping in company with the battle cruisers until 
dark. 

At 7 P.M. the Lion's starboard engine became dis- 
abled and the speed was still further reduced. 

At dusk the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons and 
all destroyers of the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with the Battle 
Fleet, except those vessels which were short of fuel, had 
been detached to assist the remaining destroyers in screen- 
ing the Lion and her escort against destroyer and sub- 
marine attack. The heavy ships, battleships and battle 
cruisers, stood to the northward to be clear of torpedo 
attack. The night passed without incident, the 1st and 
2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons joining the battle cruisers 
during the darkness. Wireless messages were sent on the 
24th to the Senior Naval Officer, Tyne, to send out tugs 
to meet the Lion, and this was done. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet and the battle cruisers 
remained cruising in the North Sea during daylight on 
the 25th, except the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd 
Cruiser Squadron, which were detached to Rosyth at 
8 A.M. 



MOVEMENTS r«0M JANT 23''.\o 25^" 1915. 




S. - BatHz Squadron, 
mr^^fons jaC.5.- Baftfe Cruiszr S<^u<2dron. 
L.C.S.- Lighi Cruiszr S<fuadror>. 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 197 

During these operations many floating mines were 
sighted and sunk. 

The battle cruisers proceeded to Rosyth at dusk, and 
the Battle Fleet to Scapa, except the Iron Duke and 
Centurion, which were sent to Cromarty, the Iron Duke 
to dock and refit and the Centurion to act as "stand by" 
Fleet-Flagshij) during the refit. The Lion arrived at 
Rosyth at 6.35 a.m. on the 26th in a dense fog and was 
taken up harbour for temporary repairs, the Assistance 
being sent from Scapa to Rosyth to help in the work. 
The main injury to the Lion was caused by two hits under 
water, which pierced the feed tank and displaced an 
armour plate; the permanent repairs were completed on 
the Tyne, the work being carried out by the aid of coffer 
dams, there being no dock there capable of taking the 
ship. Her casualties consisted of 11 men wounded. The 
only other battle cruiser that received injury was the 
Tiger, in which ship Engineer Captain Taylor, a most 
valuable officer, and five men were killed, 11 being 
wounded ; the material damage to the ship was slight. 

The enemy, as the result of this action, suffered the 
total loss of the Blilcher; and two battle cruisers, the 
Derfflinger and Seydlitz, sustained severe injuries, a 
serious fire or explosion occurring in one of the after 
turrets of one ship, which put that, or possibly both after 
turrets, out of action and caused a large number of 
casualties amongst the crew. It was ascertained at a 
later date from German prisoners that the condition of 
one, if not of both ships on return to harbour was very 
serious; the casualties, as well as the material injury, were 
heavy. It was stated subsequently that the Derfflinger 
had 60 killed and 250 wounded, and the Seydlitz about 
100 killed. 

One of our destroyers, the Meteor, was damaged 



198 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

in the action, but was towed back to port and 
repaired. 

On the 26th the 6th Cruiser Squadron was reconsti- 
tuted and composed of the Drake, Leviathan and 
Cumberland, and a 7th Cruiser Squadron was formed 
under the command of Rear- Admiral A. W. Waymouth, 
consisting of the Minotaur (flagship), Hampshire and 
Donegal. The 1st and 6th Cruiser Squadrons were sent 
to Scapa, and the 2nd and 7th to Cromarty. 

The Britannia, of the 3rd Battle Squadron, grounded 
in the Firth of Forth in the fog on her way back to 
Rosyth, was ashore for 36 hovirs, and suffered consider- 
able damage, necessitating repairs at a dockj^ard. 

On the 27th January the 1st Cruiser Squadron and a 
division of destroyers sailed to cruise in the centre portion 
of the North Sea and returned on the 30th, being re- 
lieved by the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. On January 28th 
the battle cruisers Princess Royal and Queen Mary, with 
the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, left Rosj^th to support 
operations being carried out in the Heligoland Bight by 
Commodore Tyrwhitt and Commodore Keyes on January 
30th and 31st. Owing to fog the operations could not' 
be carried out, and the force returned to its bases on the 
30th. 

A report of a submarine inside Cromarty Harbour on 
the 29th caused ships to raise steam preparatory to 
leaving, and all small craft to search for the submarine, 
but on investigation it was considered that the report was 
unreliable. 

On January 30th enemy submarines appeared in the 
Irish Sea, one of them opening fire on Walney Island, 
where the works of Messrs. Vickers, Limited, are situated. 
At about this date, owing to marked enemy submarine 
activity in the Irish Sea, the shins of the 10th Cruiser 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 199 

Squadron were directed to coal temporarily at Loch 
Ewe instead of at Liverpool, and two divisions of Grand 
Fleet destroyers were detached to the Irish Sea to assist 
in hunting the submarines. 

During January the number of drifting German mines 
in the North Sea was very considerable. Many were 
sighted and sunk by the Fleet when at sea; the 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron alone, when on patrol on the 30th and 
31st Januaiy sinking 12 mines. 

At the end of January the condition of the Grand 
Fleet was as follows: 

BATTLE FLEET 

Iron Duke, Fleet-Flagship, refitting. 

1st Battle Squadron: 

7 ships (Superb was away). 
2nd Battle Squadron: 

6 ships (Conqueror was unserviceable). 
ith Battle Squadron: 

7 ships (complete). 
Srd Battle Squadron: 

6 ships (Commonwealth and Britannia refitting). 
Ist Battle Cruiser Sqtiadron: 

2 ships (Lion was effecting temporary repairs ; the Tiger re- 
fitting). 

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

1 ship (Indomitable refitting after a fire, due to defective elec- 
tric circuits). 

\st Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 

9,nd Cruiser Squadron: 

3 ships (Natal refitting). 
Srd Cruiser Squadron: 

3 ships (Roxburgh refitting). 
Qth Cruiser Squadron : 

3 ships (complete). 



200 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

7ih Cruiser Squadron: 

3 ships (complete). 
1st Light Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships (complete). 
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron: 

4 ships {Liverpool refitting). 
2nd Flotilla: 

11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea). 
4:th Flotilla: 

11 destroyers (5 refitting, 4 detached in the Irish Sea). 

The shortage of destroyers at this period was exceed- 
ingly marked. 

During February the Battle Fleet remained in har- 
bour. jVo enemy movements took place or were expected 
as several changes were being made in the High Sea 
Fleet commands; the principal of these was the relief of 
Admiral von Inghenol by Admiral von Pohl as Com- 
mander-in-Chief. It was anticipated that the new 
Flag officers would exercise their squadrons in order 
to become familiar with them before attempting any 
operations. 

The opportunity was taken of refitting the Iron 
Duke, and the ship remained at Invergordon, in the 
Cromarty Firth, until February 23rd. It was becoming 
desirable to give the officers and men of the Battle Fleet 
some change from Scapa Flow, where there were no 
opportunities for landing for exercise or recreation, and 
arrangements were made by which battle, as well as 
cruiser squadrons should visit Invergordon periodically 
for this purpose. The 2nd Battle Squadron accordingly 
arrived at this base on February 24th. 

During the first half of February, 1915, eight de- 
stroyers were absent from the Grand Fleet flotillas, 
working in the Irish Channel against submarines, leaving 
only a total of 20 to 22 available for the Fleet; an insuf- 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 201 

ficient number for screening purposes. This deficiency 
made it desirable to keep the Battle Fleet in harbour, 
except in an emergency. 

The enemy's submarine activity became much more 
marked during February. Early in the month the Ger- 
man Admiralty proclaimed that after February 18th all 
the waters round the British Isles would be declared 
unsafe for merchant-ships of all nationalities, and inti- 
mated that Allied merchant-ships would be destroyed in 
these waters and that neutral merchant-ships ran similar 
risks. Enemy submarines began to operate in increasing 
numbers in the English Channel, to the westward of the 
English Channel, in the Irish Sea and oflP the west coast 
of Ireland, as well as on the east coast of England, and the 
losses of merchant-ships from submarine attack became 
serious. The destroyers of the Grand Fleet that remained 
at the northern bases were kept fully employed in search- 
ing for and hunting reported submarines. 

In addition to the maintenance of the blockade by the 
10th Cruiser Squadron, cruiser and light cruiser squad- 
rons carried out various patrol and search operations 
during the month. The 3rd Cruiser Squadron cruised in 
the centre portion of the North Sea from February 1st 
to 3rd; the 2nd Cruiser Squadron cruised off the Shet- 
land Islands from the llth-13th, then swept down 
the Norwegian coast and returned to Cromarty on the 
15th; the new 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron carried out 
a sweep in the southern portion of the North Sea be- 
tween the 16th and 20th with destroyers in company; 
the new 8rd Light Cruiser Squadron cruised to the west- 
ward of the Shetlands for exercise between the 15th and 
18th, then passed into the North Sea and swept to the 
southward, returning to Scapa on the 20th; the 1st 
Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on the 17th for the vicinity 



202 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

of the Norwegian coast, swept down towards the Naze and 
then returned to patrol north of the Shetlands until the 
21st, when the squadron arrived at Scapa; the four light 
cruisers attached to the Battle Fleet, Bellona, Blanche, 
Boadicea, and Blonde, with four destroyers, left Scapa on 
the 18th for a hne N. 37 E. 60 miles long from Lat. 57.30 
N., Long. 0.30 W., with directions to sweep towards the 
Naze by day and patrol the line at night; they remained 
on this duty until the 21st. The 7th Cruiser Squadron 
cruised to the westward of the Fair Island Channel from 
the 19th to the 22nd, and available destroyers of the 2nd 
and 4th Flotillas were patrolling to the eastward of the 
Fair Island Channel and the Moray Firth respectively 
during the same period. 

The 3rd Cruiser Squadron, with four destroyers, left 
Rosyth on the 23rd to cover the Fleet mine-sweepers 
whilst searching for mines along a projected Fleet track 
in the North Sea, but, the sea being too heavy for mine- 
sweeping, the squadron carried out a patrol instead until 
the 25th, when the mine-sweeping operations took place, 
lasting until the 27th, when the squadron returned to 
Rosyth. 

This searching mine-sweep was carried out because of 
the increasing probability of the enemy laying mines 
intended to catch our heavy ships when proceeding to- 
wards the southern portion of the North Sea, and the 
consequent necessity for a periodical examination of a 
route which the Fleet could traverse with some safety. 
This policy was maintained throughout the pel-iod of 
my command, alternative routes being periodically 
examined; although it was obviously impossible to carry 
out this examination frequently, it did afford some chance 
of a mine-field being discovered before serious losses were 
sustained by the Fleet. 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 203 

During the month of February a reorganisation of 
the battle cruiser and light cruiser squadrons was carried 
out by Admiralty orders, and a "Battle Cruiser Fleet" 
instituted under the command of Sir David Beatty, with 
the title Vice- Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet. 

The organisation was as follows : 

Lion, Fleet-Flagship. 

1st Baiile Cruiser Squadron: 

Princess Royal (Flag of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock), Queen 
Mary, Tiger. 

2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

Australia (Flag of Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham), Netv 
Zealand, Indefatigable. 

3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

Invincible (to be Flag), Inflexible^ Indomitable. 

1st Light Cruiser Squadron: 

Galatea (Broad pennant of Commodore E. S. Alexander- 
Sinclair), Cordelia, Caroline, Inconstant. 

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron: 

Southampton (Broad pennant of Commodore W. E. Good- 
enough), Nottingham, Birmingham, Lowestoft. 

Srd Light Cruiser Squadron: 

Falmouth (Flag of Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier), Yar- 
mouth, Gloucester, Liverpool. 

The Battle Cruiser Fleet remained an integral portion 
of the Grand Fleet. In some respects the term "Fleet" 
was an unfortunate selection, as it implied, incorrectly, 
an independent organisation. On my taking office 
as First Sea Lord at the end of 1916, the title was altered 
to the more appropriate one of Battle Cruiser Force. 

The Aust7'alia joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet at 
Rosyth on February 17th, and the Invincible, having 
concluded the very successful operations in the South 

' The Inflexible had not yet joined by the end of February. 



204 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Atlantic under Sir Doveton Sturdee, which cuhninated 
in the destruction of Admiral von Spec's Squadron of 
cruisers and light cruisers, arrived at Scapa for gunnery 
practices during the latter part of February, and joined 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet at Rosyth early in March; 
the Indefatigable also arrived on the 24th from the Medi- 
terranean. 

The Tiger arrived in the Tyne on February 1st for 
refit, and left again on the 8th. The Lion reached 
the Tyne for repairs on February 9th, remaining there 
for the remainder of the month. The strength of the 
destroyer force working with the Grand Fleet was 
increased on February 19th by the addition of the light 
cruiser Fearless and two divisions of destroyers from the 
1st Flotilla. These vessels had been relieved at Harwich 
by new destroyers of the "M" class. This addition 
brought the destroyer force actually with the Grand Fleet 
up to a total of 48, and further additions were now 
gradually made from the 1st Flotilla at Harwich as new 
destroyers were completed to relieve them. 

His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet on 
February 27th by visiting the ships based on Rosyth. 

In the course of February the destroyers of the 
"River" or "E" class, based at Scapa for local defence, 
were replaced, by Admiralty directions, by destroyers of 
the "C" class (old 30-knot type). This change, although 
dictated by the general naval situation, limited consider- 
ably the range of activity of the local defence vessels, 
owing to the poorer sea-going qualities of the destroyers 
of the "C" class. 

During the month the destroyer Erne was wrecked 
off Rattray Head on the Aberdeen coast, and became a 
total loss ; the Goldfinch went ashore in a fog in the north 
of the Orkneys and was also lost; the Sparrowhawk also 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 205 

went ashore, but was got off, though considerably 
damaged. The armed merchant-cruiser Clan McNaugh- 
ton, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was lost with all hands 
during the month, the supposition being that she 
foundered in one of the numerous heavy gales. Although 
a prolonged search was carried out, only a certain amount 
of wreckage was found. The loss of this ship and her 
efficient ship's company brought once more into promi- 
nence the excellent work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and 
the risks to which the ships were subjected. 

The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were daily 
increasing, and the number of ships passing the blockade 
line unexamined was becoming very small. During one 
week in February sixty-seven vessels were intercepted 
and eighteen of them sent in with prize crews on board. 

During February the old battleships Hannibal and 
Magnificent were relieved as guard-ships by the old 
cruisers Crescent and Royal Arthur. 

Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee succeeded Vice- 
Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble in the command of the 
•1th Battle Squadron during the month; Admiral 
Gamble's period of command had expired. Sir Doveton 
Sturdee, who had served as Chief of the Naval Staff early 
in the War, came to the Fleet fresh from his Falkland 
Islands victory. 

The weather at the northern bases during February 
was less boisterous than usual. There was a good deal of 
misty and foggy weather in the early part of the month, 
and a considerable amount of snow towards the end. 

During March the principal movements of the Fleet 
were as follows: 

From the 4th to the 10th, the 6th Cruiser Squadron 
was, with the Orotava of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, 
cruising off the Norwegian Coast. 



2o6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

From the 7th to the 10th the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet was cruising in the northern portion of the North 
Sea, accompanied bj' the 1st, 2nd, and 7th Cruiser 
Squadrons and the 4th Flotilla; and the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet was also cruising during the same period in the 
central part of the North Sea. The opportunity was 
taken of carrying out various battle exercises. The 2nd 
Battle Squadron and 7th Cruiser Squadron did not return 
with the remainder of the Battle Fleet on the 10th, but 
remained at sea until the 11th. The 4th Flotilla was 
forced to shelter at Lerwick from the 7th to the 9th owing 
to bad weather. From March 10th to the 13th the 3rd 
Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were cruising 
in the centre portion of the North Sea. 

From the 16th to the 19th the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet again cruised in the northern and central parts of 
the North Sea, accompanied by the 1st, 2nd, and 7th 
Cruiser Squadrons, the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, and 
the 2nd Flotilla. The 2nd Flotilla, however, could not 
remain at sea on the 17th owing to bad weather and was 
sent back to Scapa. A collision occurred between the 
Nemesis and Nym2}he, which necessitated the docking of 
both vessels for repairs. The flotilla was ordered out 
again from Scapa early on the 18th, but only seven 
destroyers were available, and they reached the Fleet at 
2 P.M. on that date. 

The Battle Fleet and cruisers carried out a strategical 
exercise in the early morning of the 18th, and then 
steered for the bases, a projected second exercise being 
abandoned as the Fleet was bj^ this time in an area which 
was not considered safe from submarine attack; the 
visibility was also very high, and it was suspected that 
at least one enemy submarine might be in the neighbour- 
hood. 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 207 

At noon the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 58.21 N., Long. 
1.12 E., zigzagging at a speed of 15 knots, and the 4th 
Battle Squadron had just been detached to proceed to 
Cromarty, when at 12.18 p.m. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil 
Burney commanding the 1st Battle Squadron signalled 
that a submarine's periscope had been sighted from the 
Marlborough, the leading ship of the port wing column, 
and that a torpedo fired by the submarine had passed just 
astern of the Neptune, the rear ship of the column. The 
Fleet was at once turned away from the submarine 12 
points to starboard (ships turning together) and speed 
was increased to 17 knots. 

At 12.30 P.M. the 4th Battle Squadron was crossing 
under the stern of the remainder of the Battle Fleet and 
signals were being made to Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton 
Sturdee to steer clear of the position in which the sub- 
marine was sighted, but before any movement was 
effected the officer of the watch, Lieutenant-Commander 
Piercy, of the Dreadnought of that Squadron, sighted a 
periscope close to, one point on the port bow, the sub- 
marine apparently steering a southerly course and 
zigzagging. Captain Alderson, commanding the Dread- 
nought, at once altered course direct for the submarine, 
increased speed, followed, and rammed her. The bow 
of the submarine came out of the water and her number, 
U 29, was plainly visible. She sank immediately. The 
Blanche, which passed close to the spot, reported a large 
quantity of wi-eckage, one article of clothing and much oil 
and bubbles on the surface, but no survivors. 

It seems probable that the captain of the submarine, 
after firing at the 1st Battle Squadron, was confused by 
the movements of the 4th Battle Squadron crossing astern 
of the remainder of the zigzagging Fleet, at high speed, 
and in trying to get clear failed to observe the Dread- 



2o8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

nought until too late. The Dreadnought was admirably 
handled. 

On arrival of the Fleet in harbour I wired to the 
Admiralty urging that the fate of U 29 should be kept 
secret. The secrecy regarding the loss of this submarine 
cormnanded by Commander Weddingen, was much 
resented in Germany, and many accusations of treacher- 
ous conduct levelled at the British, probably in the hope 
that we might give information as to her fate. The policy 
of secrecy was certainly correct, as it left the enemy 
entirely ignorant of our methods, and possibly had some 
effect of the moral of the submarine crews. 

The Fleet steered to the eastward until well clear of 
the area in case other submarines were present, and then 
shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 19th. 

On March 29th the Grand Fleet left its bases with the 
intention of carrying out a sweep of the North Sea, but 
the plan was abandoned and the Fleet returned to its 
bases on the following day. 

The principal movements of destroyers during March, 
additional to the regular patrols and fleet movements, 
were as follows: 

From March 2nd to March 5th search was made by 
a half flotilla for a number of oil drums reported as 
moored in certain areas in the North Sea. The report 
indicated that the enemy might be refuelling subma- 
rines in this manner; the search disposed of the supposi- 
tion. 

From March 8th to March 10th the Commander-in- 
Chief Coast of Scotland, Sir Robert Lov^ry, in conjunc- 
tion with Vice-Admiral Bradford, who was the Senior 
Flag Officer of Grand Fleet ships at Rosyth, and was, 
therefore, responsible for all movements of these ships 
from the Rosyth base, organised a search on a large 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 209 

scale for a submarine reported to be operating off the 
Aberdeenshire coast. The vessels employed in this opera- 
tion comprised trawler patrols and destroyers of the 1st 
Flotilla, and they were rewarded on March 10th by 
forcing the submarine — Ul2 — to the surface, when 
II.M.S. Ariel, very skilfully handled, succeeded in ram- 
ming and sinking her. Ten of her crew of twenty-eight 
were rescued. The Aiiel was considerably damaged, and 
was docked at Leith for repairs. 

On March 20th and 21st a division of destroyers hunted 
a submarine in the Moray Firth without success. 

On March 12th the Faulknor and six destroyers 
were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate 
against submarines in the Irish Sea. 

In the course of the month the small steamers, 
specialty fitted as mine-sweepers for the Grand Fleet, were 
withdrawn for service abroad. The increasing number of 
mines in the North Sea and the paucity of mine-sweepers 
led me to decide on JNIarch 22nd to fit eight destroyers each 
from the 2nd and 4th Flotillas with light mine-sweeps, and 
the work was taken in hand. These vessels were intended 
to augment the regular force of mine-sweepers in an 
emergency, as it was felt that a movement of the High 
Sea Fleet for an important naval operation would in all 
probability be preceded by extensive mine-laying outside 
the Fleet bases, and a much stronger sweeping force than 
we possessed was required to enable a passage for the 
Fleet to be rapidly cleared. 

The Conqueror rejoined the Fleet on ]\Iarch 6th 
after effecting repairs which had been carried out by 
Messrs. Cammell Laird at Liverpool with most com- 
mendable rapidity. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron experienced a further loss 



210 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

during March, the Bayano being sunk by a submarine off 
Corsewall Point, Galloway, on March 11th, with con- 
siderable loss of life. 

In the course of this month Rear-Admiral W. L. 
Grant succeeded Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham in 
command of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, the latter succeed- 
ing Rear- Admiral Sir Gordon JMoore in command of the 
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron; Vice- Admiral Patey 
transferred his flag from the Australia to the Leviathan 
to proceed to the West Indies as Commander-in-Chief, 
and the 6th Cruiser Squadron was broken up, the ships 
being transferred to service abroad. 

The enemy submarines were very active against mer- 
chant shipping during March, and our losses were con- 
siderable, both from this cause and from mines. 

During IVIarch the weather at the northern bases was 
not very boisterous, but a great deal of mist and fog was 
prevalent during the first fortnight, and during the last 
fortnight snow fell on at least seven days. An average 
of fiftj'-six ships per week was intercepted by the ships of 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month. 

During April, 1915, intended Fleet movements were 
prevented on several occasions by bad weather, and the 
10th Cruiser Squadron and other ships at sea experienced 
exceptional gales; the principal movements carried out 
were as follows : 

From the 5th to the 8th the 3rd Battle Squadron, 
3rd Cruiser Squadron and five destroyers of the 1st 
Flotilla cruised in the North Sea (central portion), and 
from the 5th to the 9th the Battle Cruiser Fleet with 
eight destroyers of the 1st Flotilla cruised in the northern 
portion of the North Sea. 

On April 8th the Lancaster, of the 7th Cruiser Squad- 
ron, and the Caribbean, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 211 

were detached to watch the Norwegian coast between 
Lat. 62 and 64 N. 

On April 11th the whole Grand Fleet proceeded to 
sea; the Battle Fleet met the Battle Cruiser Fleet 
and 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth, and cruised in the 
centre portion of the North Sea during the 12th and 
13th, returning to the various bases on the 14th to fuel. 
The opportunity was taken of carrying out battle 
exercises. 

Whilst the Dreadnought Battle Fleet was passing 
down east of the Orkneys at 2.30 p.m., and was 
being met by the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, which had come 
out to screen the ships in, the Neptune reported having 
sighted a submarine's periscope, but as the Fleet was 
steaming at 18 knots and the destroyers were taking up 
screening stations it was not considered that successful 
attack was probable, and the Fleet held its course for 
Scapa. 

Submarines were also sighted during the day by the 
Antrim in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 1.2 E., and by the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.40 E., 
but no successful attack resulted. 

The Grand Fleet proceeded to sea again for a sweep 
in southern waters on the 17th, and at 8 a.m. on the 
18th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with the 1st, 2nd, 
and 7th Cruiser Squadrons looking out ahead and the 2nd 
and 4th Flotillas screening, was in Lat. 57.25 N., Long. 
1.4 E., steering at 18 knots' speed for a position in 
Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 3.30 E., where it was intended to 
meet the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron 
from Rosyth. 

The junction took place at 4 p.m.^ the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet, which had been ordered to a position a little far- 
ther south, arriving there at this time. No enemy vessels 



212 THE GKAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

having been sighted, the whole Fleet was turned to the 
northward shortly Ijcfore dusk, when in the vicinity of 
the Little Fisher Bank, to the westward of Northern Den- 
mark. During the night the 3rd Battle Squadron and 
3rd Cruiser Squadron were detached to return to Rosyth, 
and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas to Scapa; the Vice- Admiral, 
Battle Cruiser Fleet, was directed to cruise independently 
on the 19th; and the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with 
the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, proceeded to the 
eastward of the Shetlands; target practice was carried 
out dxu'ing daylight of the 19th and the night of the 19th- 
20th, and the Battle Fleet returned to its bases at Scapa 
and Cromarty during the night of the 20th-21st and 
fuelled. During the cruise the Achilles, of the 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron, reported sighting a submarine at 2.40 
P.M. on the 18th. 

On the 19th the Alhemaiie and Bussell, of the 6th 
Battle Squadron, which had rejoined the 3rd Battle 
Squadron from the Channel ports, were detached from 
Rosyth to Scapa for practices. 

The Grand Fleet again proceeded to sea on the night 
of the 21st for another sweep towards the Danish coast, 
and at 8 a.m. on the 22nd the forces from Scapa and 
Cromarty, comprising the 1st, 2nd and 4th Battle Squad- 
rons, Russell and Albemarle, 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser 
Squadrons, and the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, were in position 
Lat. 58.4 N., Long. 0.27 E. 

At 4.30 P.M. the 3rd Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser 
Squadron joined the Commander-in-Chief, and the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet took station ahead of the cruiser screen. 
At dusk no enemy ships had been sighted and the Fleet 
turned to the northward again, the Iron Duke's position 
being Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 4.53 E. 

The 3rd Battle Squadron, ,3rd Cruiser Squadron and 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 213 

the Battle Cruiser Fleet were detached to return to Rosyth 
during the night, and the remainder of the Fleet arrived 
at the Scapa and Cromarty bases on the 23rd. 

During these two southerly sweeps the Fleet sighted 
a large number of neutral steamers and trawlers which 
were closely examined, but nothing suspicious was found, 
although the interception of German Avireless messages, 
when the Fleet was in the vicinity of the trawlers, raised 
suspicions that they were acting as look-out vessels; this 
suspicion was strengthened by carrier pigeons being 
sighted from various ships. 

One Norwegian steamer which was found to be carry- 
ing magnetic ore to Rotterdam was sent to the Firth of 
Forth. 

Movements of interest of individual ships during 
April included the arrival of the Lion at Rosyth on the 7th 
after completion of all repairs, the arrival of the new 
Battleship Warspite, of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, 
at Scapa on the 13th, and the commissioning on the 26th 
of four more mercantile vessels to join the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron. 

The Invincible was sent to the Tyne to change some 
of her 12-inch guns, which had become worn during the 
Falkland Island engagement. 

On April 10th Rear- Admiral Tottenham succeeder' 
Rear- Admiral Waymouth in command of the 7th Cruiser 
Squadron, the latter officer's health having unfortunately 
broken down. 

On April 7th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron were rearranged somewhat in view of the 
lengthening of the days: 

Patrol Area A was north of the Faroes, the centre line being occa- 
sionally shifted. 



214 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Patrol Area C had as its centre a line from Cape Sydero in the 
Faroe Islands to Lat. 58.30 N., Long. 8.0 W. 

" " E was north of Iceland. 

" " F was south of Iceland. 

" " G had as its centre the meridian of S° E. Long, be- 

tween Lat. 62 N. and 631/2 N. A cruiser was 
sent to strengthen the patrol in this area. 

During the month the average number of vessels 
intercepted weekly by the ships of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron was 68, of which an average number of 23 was 
sent in weekly for examination. 

Enemy submarines were very active in April, and 
destroyers were sent out frequently from the Fleet 
bases to endeavour to destroy craft reported in the 
vicinity — particularly in the neighbourhood of the Fair 
Island Channel-^but no success was achieved, except 
in the case of the Ariel and U 12. The look-out and 
navigational arrangements for the Pentland Firth were 
improved during April by the establishment of telephonic 
communications between Scapa and the Island of Swona. 
Arrangements were also gradually perfected for obtain- 
ing the exhibition of all navigational lights and fog signals 
in the Pentland Firth on demand by our ships at all 
times. The weather at Scapa during April was bad. 

Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 
9th and 10th. There was a great deal of mist and fog 
during the latter part of the month as well as a moderate 
amount of snow. 

The enemy laid a large mine-field in the middle of 
the southern portion of the North Sea during April, thus 
pursuing the policy which it was expected he would 
adopt, regardless of the interests of neutrals. Fortu- 
nately, information as to its existence was obtained in 
time to prevent any of our ships from falling victims 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 215 

to the mines. But the mine-field was undoubtedly well 
placed strategically so as to interfere with the freedom of 
movement of our Fleet in southern waters if it were 
endeavouring to bring the High Sea Fleet to action, since 
it necessitated our ships making a wide detour to the 
eastward or westward to reach the waters to the south- 
ward of the mine-field; it was doubtless laid with this 
object in view. 

In ]May the Grand Fleet flotillas were much occupied 
in endeavouring to locate and destroy enemy submarines, 
and the movements of the heavy ships were curtailed 
during the month owing to the absence of destroyers for 
the purpose of acting as a submarine screen. 

The principal work of the destroyers in this connec- 
tion — oflicers and men showing a fine spirit in carrjang 
out what were frequently fruitless searches — was as 
follows : 

May Ist-Srd. — The 2nd Flotilla was engaged in operations 
against enemy submarines reported, first, in the Fair Island 
Channel and, then, to the eastward and south-eastward of the 
Pentland Firth. The flotilla did not succeed in gaining touch 
with the submarines. 

May 5th-7th. — One half of the 1st Flotilla was searching for 
a submarine oiF the Aberdeenshire coast, without result. 

May 7th. — One division of the 2nd Flotilla was acting against 
a submarine reported in the Fair Island Channel, and then 
proceeded to work down the shipping route west of the Heb- 
rides and Ireland in the hope of catching a submarine attack- 
ing trade. 

May 8th. — Half the 4th Flotilla was searching for subma- 
rines off the east coast of the Orkneys. 

May lOth-llth. — A division of the 4th Flotilla was search- 
ing for a submarine reported to be off North Ronaldshay; later, 
this division was reinforced by all available destroyers from 
Scapa, with orders that the force was to continue the search 
during the night, burning searchlights to assist the work and 



2i6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

cause the submarine to submerge, thus exhausting her battery 
power. 

May 13/fc.— Six destroyers were searching for a submarine 
reported west of Thurso. 

May 15th. — A division of the 1st Flotilla left Rosyth to 
operate against a submarine oif Aberdeen. 

May 16th. — A division of the 4th Flotilla was searching for 
a submarine reported approaching the Fair Island Channel. 

May IQth-^Oth. — A division of the 4th Flotilla was acting 
against a submarine reported west of the Orkneys. 

The principal Fleet movements during the month 
were : 

3Iay 2nd to May 5th. — Two forces, each consisting 
of two light cruisers and eight destroyers, were engaged 
in carrying out a thorough examination of aU vessels, 
especially fishing craft, found in the areas usually tra- 
versed by the Fleet during southerly sweeps in order to 
ascertain whether any were acting as German look-out 
ships under neutral colours. A considerable number of 
vessels were examined, especially trawlers, and some were 
sent in for more detailed examination at the bases, but 
nothing incriminating was discovered. 

Between JNIay 5th and 10th the 3rd Battle Squadron 
and 3rd Cruiser Squadron cruised in the northern portion 
of the North Sea, being screened out from Rosyth by a 
half flotilla. On the return towards Rosj^th in Lat. 56,49 
N., Long. 0.39 E., and before being met by the screen- 
ing destroyers, the 3rd Battle Squadron, two torpedoes 
were fired by a submarine; they were aimed apparently 
at the Dominion, but both missed. The squadron was in 
division in line ahead, steaming at 15 knots, and was zig- 
zagging at the time. 

On May 6th the mine-layer Orvieto and eight de- 
stroyers left Scapa to carry out a mine-laying operation 
in the Heligoland Bight. The force ran into a dense fog, 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 217 

and a collision occurred between the destroyers Comet 
and Nemesis, the latter being seriously damaged. The 
force was directed to return and left Scapa again on the 
8th, carrying out the operation successfully during the 
night of the lOth-llth; it returned on the 12th. 

The light cruisers Phaeton and Royalist left Scapa on 
]May 12th for a position north of the Shetlands, in order 
to intercept a neutral steamer reported to have left 
Bremerhaven on May 11th with wireless installations on 
board. The C Patrol of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was 
also moved to a position to intercei^t this vessel, and the 
light cruiser Sajjpho and armed boarding steamer Amster- 
dam were placed on the western side of the Fair Island 
Channel. The force returned on the 14th, the report 
proving to be incorrect. 

The whole Grand Fleet carried out a sweep of the 
central part of the North Sea between May 17th and 
19th, the forces from Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth meet- 
ing at a rendezvous in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 0.0 at 7 a.m. 
on the 8th, and sweeping to the south-eastward at a speed 
of 16 knots until the afternoon, with the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet some thirty to fifty miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. 
The Fleet returned to its bases on the 19th, not having 
sighted any hostile vessels. Battle tactics were exercised 
during the passage north. 

On May 21st the Fleet mine-sweepers, which had been 
sent to Aberdeen beforehand in readiness, left with an 
escort of two light cruisers to examine the mine-field 
reported to have been laid in the centre of the southern 
portion of the North Sea. Two of the sweepers collided 
in a fog on leaving Aberdeen, and another went ashore; 
the remainder proceeded and located the north-east corner 
of the mine-field on the 22nd and 23rd ; they returned to 
Aberdeen on the 24th, after examining en route a position 



2i8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

in which it was reported that paraffin barrels were moored. 
These were destroyed. It was thought that they might be 
intended for German submarines. 

Whilst the Fleet sweepers located the north-east 
corner of the mine-field, paddle sweepers, under the escort 
of two light cruisers from Harwich, located the south-west 
corner. The search was subsequently continued under the 
same conditions, and the limits of the mine-field, which 
covered a large area south of Lat. 56 N. and east 
of Long. 2.30 E., were determined. The enemy made 
no attempt to interfere with the sweeping operations, if 
indeed he was aware of them. 

On the 21st the patrol, comprising the Sappho and 
armed boarding steamers, hitherto maintained in an area 
east and south-east of the Pentland Firth, was moved tem- 
porarily to the west of the Firth on account of submarine 
activity. Destroyers from the Grand Fleet replaced the 
original patrol at night, the interception of mercantile 
traffic being carried out by the armed boarding steamers 
to the westward. The destroyer Eifleman grounded in a 
fog on the 22nd, necessitating docking for repairs. 

A new form of anti-submarine operation was begun 
on May 23rd by the Commander-in-Chief Coast of Scot- 
land (Admiral Sir R. Lowry). This consisted of two 
C-class submarines operating with an armed trawler, 
the idea being that the trawler should invite attack by a 
submarine, thus giving our submarines an opportunity of 
sinking the enemj'^ by torpedo attack. 

On ]May 24th the Admiralty telegraphed that Italy 
had entered the War on the side of the Allies. 

On the next day I proceeded in the Iron Duke to 
Rosyth to confer with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who 
had succeeded Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord. The con- 
ference took place on the 26th and was of an important 



DOGGER BANK ACTION 219 

nature. The general naval policy, so far as it concerned 
the Grand Fleet, was discussed, and arrangements made 
as to the procedure to be followed in future. Sir Henry 
Jackson asked that Commodore Everett might join him 
at the Admiralty as Naval Assistant, and, with the consent 
of Commodore Everett, this was arranged. His place as 
Captain of the Fleet was filled by Captain Lionel Halsey, 
C.M.G., of the New Zealand. It was with great regret 
that I parted with Commodore Everett; his long ex- 
perience in the Fleet under Sir George Callaghan and his 
intimate loiowledge of fleet work and unfailing tact had 
been of the greatest possible assistance. The Iron Duke 
returned to Scapa on the morning of the 28th. On the 
26th Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, C.B., had 
hoisted his flag in the Invincible as Rear-Admiral com- 
manding the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron. The battle- 
ship Queen Elizabeth arrived at Scapa from the Dardan- 
elles on the same day. 

From May 29th to 31st the Grand Fleet carried out 
another sweep in the North Sea, the direction on this occa- 
sion being towards the Dogger Bank. The forces from 
Scapa and Cromarty concentrated in Lat. 57.35 N., 
Long. 0.0 at 7.15 A.M. on the 30th, and steered to the 
southward at 17 knots' speed. The Rosyth force steered 
for a point farther south and was in sight from the cruiser 
line at 9.30 a.m., being ordered to keep ahead of the Fleet. 
The sweep was continued until the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet was in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank. No enemy 
vessel was sighted. 

The Fleet then turned to the northward and, owing 
to a northerly swell, speed had to be reduced on account 
of the destroyers. During the night the Rosyth force was 
detached to its base. Speed was increased as the weather 
improved, and the Scapa and Cromarty forces arrived on 



220' THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the morning of May 31st. The Iron Duke left Scapa for 
Cromarty during the afternoon of May 31st, and arrived 
that evening. 

During the month the procedure of moving squadrons 
between Scapa and Cromarty was continued. At this 
period a second line of submarine obstructions, which was 
designed to prevent the entry of destroyers, as well as 
submarines, into Scapa Flow, advanced considerably to- 
wards completion. Progress was also made with the 
laying of mine-fields at the entrance. The anchorage at 
Swarbachs Minn, in the Shetlands, had been selected as 
a secondary coaling base for the ships of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron, and steps were taken to prepare a submarine 
obstruction for the entrance, and to provide the necessary 
labour for coaling the ships from colliers. 

The blockade work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron con- 
tinued actively during the month, the average number 
of ships intercepted per week being 62, and the average 
number sent into port for closer examination, 16. 

The weather at Scapa during the month was misty, 
fog being experienced on the 5th, 6th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 
27th and 28th, and snow on the 11th and 12th. The wind 
during the month was not strong. 



CHAPTER VIII 

GERMAN MINES AND SUBMARINES 

In the early summei' of 1915 there was a vague impression 
in some quarters, unsupported, so far as I am aware, by 
any confirmatory evidence, that the enemy might exhibit 
greater activity at sea. But during June, so far as 
could be ascertained by our intelligence system and by 
our submarine patrols, the Germans made no attempt to 
move to sea, but concentrated attention on increased 
submarine activity. The Grand Fleet, for various reasons 
unconnected with this development, spent the greater 
part of the time in harbour, exercising in Scapa Flow, 
the ships from the Rosyth base being sent up in pairs to 
exercise and carry out gunneiy and torpedo practices. 
The opportunitjr of this change of base was usually taken 
for a searching sweep whilst en route between the 
bases, so that the North Sea was continually under obser- 
vation. 

On June 11th, however, the Grand Fleet went to 
sea for a cruise in northern waters principally for gunnery 
practices and battle exercises, which were carried out on 
a large scale. On this occasion the sea-planes working 
from the Campania were utilised, so far as I am aware, 
for the first time in history in observing the movements 
of tlie squadrons, which were ordered to represent a large 
hostile fleet. From this beginning, there was a great 
development in the work of heavier-than-air craft operat- 
ing with a fleet. The first step was the provision of a 

221 



222 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

flying-ofF deck in a ship for sea-planes, as the extreme 
difficulty experienced by sea-planes in rising from the 
water, except in very fine weather, rendered the provision 
of a flying-off deck essential; the next was the substitu- 
tion of aeroplanes for sea-planes, working from special 
carriers ; and, finallj^, the provision of flying-off platforms 
in fighting ships themselves, first in light cruisers, after- 
wards in battle cruisers, and, eventually, in battleships; 
these successive developments were rendered possible by 
the progressive improvement in aircraft. In this way. 
naval power was given the assistance which air power 
could give it, both in reconnaissance and in making its 
gunnery more effective. 

The Scapa force proceeded to the westward through 
the Pentland Firth on the 11th. It carried out target 
practice at special targets towed by colliers to the north- 
westward of the Shetlands on the 12th, being joined by 
the Cromarty force (the 1st Battle Squadron and 7th 
Cruiser Squadron) that evening; the fleet then separated 
for night-firing. 

The Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had also left Rosyth 
on the 11th, carried out night-firing on the 12th, and the 
whole Grand Fleet practised battle exercises on the 13th, 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet afterwards firing at the targets 
which were towed by colliers, and rejoining my flag at 
daylight on the 14th. On that day further battle exer- 
cises were carried out. The Campania, with her sea- 
planes, again took part in these exercises, and an im- 
provement in the scouting work of the sea-planes was 
noticeable. The Fleet then returned to the various bases, 
the Scapa force passing westward of the Orkneys. 

Whilst the main portion of the Grand Fleet was ex- 
ercising in northern waters, the 3rd Battle Squadron and 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 223 

3rd Cruiser Squadron, with one-half of the 1st Flotilla, 
cruised in the central portion of the North Sea. 

Other operations during the month included: 

From the 1st to the 3rd, and the 5th to the 7th, fur- 
ther mine-sweeping operations were carried out by the 
Fleet sweepers and paddle sweepers in connection with the 
German mine-field in the southern portion of the North 
Sea, the operation being covered by four light cruisers and 
a force of destroyers. The work of clearing that portion 
of the mine-field, which it was decided to sweep up, was 
completed on the 7th. On several days during the month 
a force from Harwich, comprising light cruisers and de- 
stroyers, was cruising off the Dutch coast with the object 
of intercepting and attacking zeppelins. The force did 
not, however, meet with any success. 

From the 4th to the 7th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, 
with three armed boarding-steamers and three destroyers, 
operated on the two trade routes, St. Abbs Head to the 
Skagerrak and Rotterdam to Norwegian ports, examin- 
ing all vessels encountered; nothing of special interest 
occurred. But when returning diiring a thick fog to 
Scapa the armed boarding-steamer Duke of Albany 
grounded on the Lother Rock, Pentland Firth, at 4 a.m. 
on the 7th, remained ashore for seven days, and was con- 
siderably damaged. 

From the 18th to the 21st the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 
with the light cruisers Nottingham and Birmingham, of 
the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied by four 
destroyers, swept across the North Sea, steering to the 
eastward from Rosyth to the entrance to the Skagerrak, 
thence to the coast of Norway and back to Rosyth. This 
force was attacked by at least three submarines during 
the sweep, and topedoes were fired at the BirTningham 
on the 19th, and at the Argyll, the Roxburgh (on two 



224 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

occasions), and the Nottingham on the 20th. Two torpe- 
does were fired at the Nottingham. These ships were pro- 
ceeding at high Sliced and all the attacks failed, except 
the second attack on the lioxhurgh (Captain C. R. de C. 
Foot), which was hit in the bows by a torpedo at 2 p.m. on 
the 20th in Lat. 56.47 N., Long. 0.38 E. Fortunately, 
the damage was well forward, and the Roxburgh was able 
to maintain a speed of 14 knots during her return to 
Rosyth, all available destroyers of the 1st Flotilla being 
sent out to meet and screen her in. At the time of the 
attack the Roxburgh was proceeding at high speed and 
zigzagging, with one destroyer screening her. The ship 
was considerably damaged, and her repairs at a dock- 
yard occupied a lengthened period. 

The incident furnished an example of the risks run 
by heavy ships cruising in the North Sea in waters fre- 
quented by submarines, unless accompanied by a much 
stronger screen of destroyers than it was possible to pro- 
vide owing to the paucity of destroyers and the immense 
amount of work required of them. It was noted at the 
time, and considered to be suspicious, that a large fleet 
of trawlers flying neutral colours was fishing in the neigh- 
bourhood of these submarine attacks. 

As a result a force comprising three armed boarding- 
steamers and three destroyers was despatched from Scapa 
on June 26th to examine a fleet of neutral fishing vessels 
working to the south-eastward of the Pentland Firth and 
on the ordinary track of the Fleet when proceeding to sea. 
Six vessels were sent in for detailed examination, but 
nothing suspicious was found on board. The fishing fleet, 
however, shifted its ground to a position clear of the track 
of the Fleet. 

Operations against enemy submarines carried out by 
Grand Fleet forces during June included the following: 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 225 

June 1st to Znd. — A division of destroyers endeavoured, with- 
out success, to locate and attack a submarine 60 to 80 miles to 
the eastward of May Island. 

Jime Uh to 5th. — Two destroyers and two sloops operated 
against a submarine, with a supposed tender, to the eastward 
of the Pentland Firth. 

June 5 th. — The armed trawler Hawk, of the Peterhead area, 
disabled submarine U 14 by gun fire and sank her by ramming 
at 7.30 A.M. in Lat. 57.15 N., Long. 0.32 E. One officer and 
21 men were rescued. It was a fine exploit, typical of the con- 
sistently good work of the vessels of the Peterhead patrol; it 
was a success that was specially welcome at this time when sub- 
marines were very active in northern waters. 

There were many other engagements between aux- 
iliary patrols and submarines during the month, but no 
other certain successes. It was believed that at least one 
submarine was sunk in a deep mine-field which had been 
laid at my request off Tod Head on the Aberdeen coast. 
Appended are notes of further operations against the 
enemy's under-water craft: 

June 18th and IQth. — Anti-submarine operations by three de- 
stroyers and sloops were carried out in the Fair Island Channel. 

June 9,0th. — Four destroyers were operating against subma- 
rines to the westward of the Orkneys. 

June Zlst and 22nd. — The Botha and eight destroyers of the 
1st Flotilla were operating against submarines in an area be- 
tween Lat. 56.20 and 57-10 N. and Long. 1 E. to 1 W. 

June 21st. — Four destro3'^ers and six gunboats were operat- 
ing to the east of the Pentland Firth against a submarine. 

June 23rd. — Submarine U 40 was sunk 50 miles S.E. by S. 
of Girdle Ness at 9 a.m. by submarine C 24, working in com- 
pany with a trawler. 

June 2Srd. — A division of destroyers was sent to operate 
against a submarine to westward of the Fair Island Channel. 

June 24<th-26th. — Three sloops were engaged in searching for 
a submarine to the eastward of Orkneys and Shetlands. 



226 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

June 26th. — A large force, comprising 20 armed trawlers 
from Granton in the Firth of Forth, began to operate against 
submarines in an area round Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E., remaining 
out until July 7th. Two armed trawlers, with C class subma- 
rines in company, were also ojjerating to the southward of this 
position. 

June 30th- July 1st. — A force of eight destroyers was operat- 
ing against submarines in the Fair Island Channel. 

The anti-submarine operations by destroyers or sloops 
met with no success. The invariable difficulty was the 
provision of a sufficiently large number of vessels to keep 
the submarine down long enough to cause her to exhaust 
her battery power, a period of some 48 hours. When 
destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet were used for 
anti-submarine operations at anj^ distance from the base, 
the disadvantage of their not being available to accompany 
the Fleet to sea in an emergency had to be accepted. 
This would have led to awkward results had the Fleet 
proceeded to sea with any considerable shortage of de- 
stroyers for screening purposes on passage south and for 
Fleet purposes during a Fleet action. The dilermna was 
one which faced me during the whole period of my com- 
mand of the Fleet. 

My experience convinced me that anti-submarine 
operations by destroj^ers in such open waters as existed 
near the northern bases had but little prospect of success 
unless undertaken by a considerably larger number of 
vessels than were usually available at Scapa for such 
operations; a contributory reason for the shortage of de- 
stroyers was that in addition to the operations carried out 
by the heavy ships, cruisers and light cruisers, for which 
the presence of destroyers was necessary, there was a 
constant call on these vessels for escort work during the 
movements of single ships or of squadrons between bases. 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 227 

Other events of interest during this month included: 

The formation of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron of 
new hght cruisers under the command of the late Com- 
modore Le Mesurier, C.B., in the Calliope. This 
squadron was attached to the Battle Fleet, and in cruising 
order at sea was usually stationed from three to five miles 
ahead of the Battle Fleet to act as an advanced submarine 
screen forcing submarines to dive. From this position 
it could reach the A-an of the Fleet on deployment for 
action, and was stationed there for the purpose of attack- 
ing enemy destroyers with gunfire and the enemy's Battle 
Fleet ^^'iih torpedoes. It was a squadron on which, as 
Commander-in-Chief, I kept a hold so that I might be 
certain it would be at my disposal when action with the 
enemy was joined. Other light cruiser squadrons, which 
occupied an advanced position in the cruiser screen, could 
not be depended upon with the same certainty to occupy 
the van position to which they were allotted during a fleet 
action, since thej'- might become engaged with enemy ves- 
sels of the same class. 

The battle cruiser Inflexible joined the Fleet from 
Gibraltar on June 19th. 

The Liverpool left to pay off on the 26th for repair 
to boilers. Rear- Admiral W. B. Fawckner took charge 
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron base at Swarbachs Minn on 
the 18th. 

During the month observation mine-fields at the en- 
trance to Cromarty and off Hoy Sound, Scapa Flow, were 
completed. 

A short visit was paid to the Fleet at Scapa Flow by 
the Archbishop of York on the 26th. He held a Fleet 
Confirmation in the h-on Duke, a great open-air service 
on Flotta Island, many thousands of officers and men at- 
tending; there was another service at Longhope, and, in 



228 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

addition, he visited the majority of the ships. He was 
indeed indefatigable and left amidst the most sincere ex- 
pressions of regret. To me personally his visit gave the 
greatest pleasure. From Scapa he passed to Invergorden, 
where, during a two days' staj', he held a large open- 
air service, and visited most of the ships based there, mov- 
ing on to Rosyth, where an impressive open-air service 
took place in one of the large graving-docks. 

The activities of the 10th Cruiser Squadron continued 
throughout the month, an average of 73 ships being in- 
tercepted weekly and 15 sent in for detailed examination. 
A serious attack was made by an enemy submarine 
on the fishing fleet some 50 miles to the eastward of 
the Shetlands on the night of the 23rd-24th June, about 
16 drifters being sunk by bombs and gunfire. This inci- 
dent emphasised the necessity for better control over the 
movements of our fishing vessels in northern waters and 
of providing some form of protection for them. Steps 
were taken in both directions, although they naturally 
resulted in some unavoidable reduction in the operations 
of the fishing fleet. 

The weather at Scapa during June was very misty, 
fog or mist being experienced on the 7th, 8th, 12th, 13th, 
26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th. 

During July, 1915, fleet movements were kept to the 
lowest possible minimum owing to a threatened strike in 
the Welsh coal-fields, which eventually took place on the 
18th, and caused considerable anxiety as to its effect on 
Fleet movements. 

From the 11th to the 14th the Dreadnought Battle 
Fleet, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, and the 
Campania cruised in the vicinity of the Shetland Islands 
and carried out a series of battle exercises during the 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 229 

cruise. The Battle Cruiser Fleet made a sweep between 
the 11th and 13th down to the Dogger Bank. Whilst 
the Battle Fleet was at sea the destroyer flotillas were 
sent into Balta Sound (Shetland Islands) to complete 
with fuel in case a move south on the part of the Battle 
Fleet became necessary. 

On the 28th the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with 
two ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, the 2nd 
Light Cruiser Squadron, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 
and 14 destroyers of the 1st and 4th Flotillas from Rosyth 
and Scapa, together with Commodore Tyrwhitt and four 
light cruisers and 12 destroyers from Harwich, left their 
bases to carry out an operation in the Skagerrak, with the 
object of intercepting trade and searching for any enemy 
vessels. Only one German vessel (a trawler) was encoun- 
tered, and she was sunk after removal of the crew. A 
Danish steamer was sent in to a British port with a guard 
on board and the force returned to their various bases on 
the 31st. 

As the threatened coal strike limited the movements 
of the coal-burning heavy ships, the oil-burning destroy- 
ers were used for anti-submarine work to a greater extent 
than would have been desirable if greater activity of the 
Fleet had been anticipated. 

Operations against enemy submarines included: 

On July 1st the Hampshire reported that a torpedo 
had been fired at her in the Moray Firth. Twelve de- 
stroyers and all available local patrol vessels were sent to 
endeavour to locate and sink the submarine. The steam- 
boats from the ships at Cromarty were also despatched 
to operate in the various bays in the Moray Firth, where 
a submarine might elect to lie on the bottom. The boats 
exploded a large number of charges on the bottom in the 
hope of forcing any submarine to the surface. The opera- 



230 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

tions were abandoned on the evening of the 2nd, the sub- 
marine not having been located. 

On the 4th a division of the 2nd Flotilla hunted for 
another submarine reported in the IVIoray Firth. 

From the 5th to the 10th the sea-plane carrier Cam- 
pania, with a flotilla leader, eight destroj^ers, four sloops 
and a large number of trawlers and net-drifters, operated 
against submarines that were reported to be passing 
through the Fair Island Channel, being based on Piero- 
wall Harbour, in the north of the Orkneys. The de- 
stroyers, sloops and patrol vessels operated in conjunction 
with the sea-planes. No success was achieved, however, 
although these extensive operations covered a large area. 

On the night of the 16th a division of destroyers 
operated against a submarine reported to the southward 
of the Pentland Firth, off Duncansby Head, but again 
without result. 

From the 15th to the 19th six sloops and seven gun- 
boats were despatched against submarines in the Fair 
Island Channel and north of the Shetlands, the Cam- 
pania's sea-planes again assisting from Pierowall Har- 
bour. Destroyers were also helping during a portion of 
the period covered by the operations. On the 16th the 
gunboat Speedwell reported having sighted the periscope 
of a submarine, ramming her at a speed of 15 knots. The 
submarine was struck on her starboard quarter at an angle 
of 10 degrees, but there was, unfortunately^ no evidence 
to show that she was sunk, although it was probable that 
she was considerably damaged. She was not seen again. 
On the same day a submarine was reported b}^ the armed 
yacht Zaza, as being in a drift-net 12 miles east-north- 
east from Fair Island. Local patrol vessels, gunboats 
and four destroyers concentrated on the position and ex- 
plosive charges were fired, but without certain result. 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 231 

From the 25th to the 27th a sub-division of destroyers 
searched, fruitlessly, a large area to the northward of the 
Hebrides for submarines and a reported submarine base 
shijD. They were assisted by four sloops operating in the 
area from the 26th to the 30th. 

On the 18th and 19th a division of destroyers was 
engaged in moving a neutral fishing fleet away from an 
area to the eastward of the Firth of Forth where they' 
interfered with Fleet operations. Submarine C 27 had 
for some little time been operating against submarines in 
the North Sea from Scapa, in tow of a trawler, to which 
vessel she was connected by telephone. This idea, which 
had first been conceived at the Rosyth base, had also been 
put into operation at Scapa, the arrangements being 
made under the direction of Admiral Sir Stanley Colville. 
On July 20th the trawder Princess Louise, Lieutenant 
Morton, R.N.R., being in command, with Lieutenant 
Cantlie, R.N., a submarine officer, on board, was towing 
Submarine C 27 (Lieutenant-Commander Dobson) in a 
submerged condition when a German submarine, U 23, 
was sighted II/4 miles off on the port bow^ C 27 was in- 
formed b);- telephone, telephonic communication then 
breaking down. U 23 opened fire at a range of 2,000 
yards on the Princess Louise. Lieutenant Cantlie, being 
unable to communicate further with C 27, slipped the 
tow and proceeded to abandon the trawler with every 
appearance of haste. U 23 closed to within 600 yards 
and stopped. Meanwhile, Lieutenant- Commander Dob- 
son, hearing nothing further by telephone, but noticing 
the splash and explosion of the projectiles in the water, 
got well clear of the trawler after slipping, and then 
brought his periscope to the surface for a look around. 
He sighted U 23 about 900 yards off, closed to a good 
position for attack within 500 yards, and fired his first 



232 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

torpedo, which missed. His second shot hit; there was a 
heavy explosion, and U 23 sank ; four officers and six men 
were picked up out of a crew of 34. The whole attack 
was exceedingly well managed and a very well deserved 
success scored, which reflected much credit on all con- 
cerned in the operations. 

On the 26th a submarine was engaged about 120 miles 
east of Dundee by the armed trawler Taranahi, which 
claimed to have sunk her. 

On the 27th an engagement took place between the 
armed trawler No. 830 and a submarine to the southward 
of St. Kilda, the trawler reporting that the submarine was 
hit several times by gunfire and considered to have been 
badly damaged. 

Other events of interest during the month included 
an attempt by the Digby to tow the Norwegian steamer 
Oscar II., damaged by collision with the Patuca on July 
1st, into Stornoway, the destroyers Fury and Staunch 
being detached from Scapa and local patrol vessels from 
Stornoway to assist. In spite of perseverance under very 
bad weather conditions, during which the ships and the 
destroyers were handled with great ability, the Oscar II. 
sank on the night of the 3rd. 

An expedition consisting of the armed merchant-ship 
Columhella, the sloop Acacia and the two trawlers Arley 
and Maf eking, left Scapa on July 29th for Bear Island 
and Spitzbergen to search for a reported German sub- 
marine base and wireless station. These vessels carried 
out as thorough a search as was possible, in face of the 
ice-fields in the neighbourhood of the islands ; but no trace 
of a submarine base was discovered, nor could it have been 
possible for one to operate under such conditions. 

The average figures per week for the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron during the month were: 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 233 

Number of ships intercepted, 62; number of ships 
sent iii with armed guards, 10; number of ships on patrol, 
15 ; number of ships refitting, coaling or on passage to or 
from base, 9. 

German submarines were active in the vicinity of the 
ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, and 
the ColumhcUa was unsuccessfully attacked on the 21st. 

Some armed boarding steamers were detailed to assist 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron during the month, being with- 
drawn from the patrol eastward of the Pentland Firth. 

The anti-submarine defence of the base at Swarbachs 
Minn was practically completed during the month. 

An event of great interest to the officers and men of 
the Fleet was a visit from His Majesty the King, who 
arrived at Scapa on July 7th, crossing from Thurso in the 
Oak, escorted by a portion of the 2nd Flotilla. 
During His Majesty's visit he stayed with Admiral Sir 
Stanley Colville at Longhope and spent two very busy 
days with the Fleet. His Majesty visited all the flagships, 
and a large number of the officers and men of the ships 
of each division of the Battle Fleet and of each vessel in 
the cruiser squadrons were assembled on board the vari- 
ous flagships and passed before the King. His Majesty 
reviewed the ofiicers and men of the smaller vessels, de- 
stroyers, sloops, etc., on the island of Flotta, visited hos- 
pital ships, and reviewed the great mass of auxiliary 
vessels anchored in Scapa Flow, being greeted with en- 
thusiastic loyalty by the crews of these vessels ; visited the 
various shore batteries, and inspected the anti-submarine 
defences and the boom vessels. The weather was bad, but 
the programme was carried out in spite of these condi- 
tions. The officers and men of the Fleet derived the ut- 
most encouragement from His Majesty's gracious visit. 
The King made the following signal to the Commander- 



234 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

in-Chief as the Oak left the Fleet, escorted by a portion of 
the 4th Flotilla: 

"I am delighted that I have been able to carry out a long- 
cherished desire to visit my Grand Fleet. After two most in- 
teresting days spent here, I leave with feelings of pride and 
admiration for the splendid force which you command with the 
full confidence of myself and your fellow-countrymen. 

"I have had the pleasure of seeing the greater portion of the 
officers and men of the Fleet. I realise the patience and deter- 
mined spirit with which you have faced long months of waiting 
and hoping. I know how strong is the comradeship that links 
all ranks together. 

"Such a happy state of things convinces me that whenever 
the day of battle comes my Navy will add fresh triumphs to its 
old glorious traditions." 

In reply to His Majesty's gracious message, I ex- 
pressed the appreciation of the officers and men of the 
Grand Fleet, adding that it was "my conviction that the 
glorious traditions of the Navy are safe in the hands of 
those I have the honour to command." 

During August the coal strike continued to influence 
Fleet movements to a certain extent. 

On August 2nd the Iron Duke, the 2nd Battle Squad- 
ron and the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out target prac- 
tice from Cromarty. This was a new departure, the 
practice hitherto having been limited to firing at a small 
target towed by other ships or by a collier to the northward 
or eastward of the Shetlands, or firing at a rock. Both 
were highly unsatisfactory methods, which did not enable 
the gunnery efficiency of ships to be either tested or 
greatly improved. Accordingly I decided to risk sending 
ships out from Cromarty to fire at a large target of the 
pattern used in peace practices; it was towed across the 
Moray Firth, the ships firing and the towing vessels being 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 235 

protected from submarine attack by destroyers, sloops 
and gunboats. The system was an improvement, 
although very expensive in the employment of destroyers, 
etc. It was continued until practice in the Pentland 
Firth took its place. The usual procedure was for two 
ships, screened by destroyers, to be on the firing ground 
at a time, firing either independently or with concentrated 
fire, with two more vessels approaching the fii'ing ground 
ready to fire when the first pair had finished. On com- 
pletion of practice the first pair returned to harbour and 
were met at the entrance bj-^ the third pair, to which they 
turned over their destroyers. Careful organisation insured 
that ships did not have to wait at the entrance, nor was 
there delay for the target to be turned round for the 
return run. A large number of destroyers, sloops or gun- 
boats, patrolled to seawai-d of the target to prevent sub- 
marines from approaching. The total number usually em- 
ployed screening and patrolling during a day's firing was 
from 22 to 28. 

The Iron Duke, with the 2nd Battle Squadron and 
the 1st Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to Scapa on com- 
pletion of the practice, being relieved later by another 
battle squadron and cruiser squadron in accordance with 
the routine which had been established of changing bases 
periodically. The special service ship No. 6 left Scapa 
for Rosyth, with two destroyers, to endeavour to "draw" 
submarines to attack her and give the destroyers an op- 
portunity of engaging them ; but no attack took place. 

From August 5th to the 9th extensive anti-submarine 
operations were carried out to the westward of the 
Orkneys by a force consisting of nine destroyers, six 
sloops, five gimboats and a large number of patrol 
trawlers. The operations covered a very large area, the 
general idea being to compel any submarine intending 



236 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

to pass round the Shetland Islands or through the Fair 
Island Channel to submerge for a period that would ex- 
haust her batteries and eventually bring her to the sur- 
face to recharge. The limited duration of darkness in 
northern latitudes assisted the operations of the hunting 
vessels. No certain success was attained. A submarine 
was sighted on the 6th at 7 p.m., and a heavy explosion, 
under water, close to the sloop Hollyhock at 9.30 p.m. on 
the same night might have been due to a submarine com- 
ing to grief, while another submarine was sighted at 10.30 
A.M. on the 7th. Examination of a sailing vessel found 
in the vicinity of this latter submarine was unproductive. 

The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left Scapa on August 
6th to cruise off the Norwegian coast, and the battleships 
Albemarle and Russell, of the 6th Battle Squadron, ar- 
rived at Scapa for practices, having left the Channel 
Fleet. 

On August 7th I returned in the Iron Duke to 
Cromarty in order to meet the Prime Minister and Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer who were about to visit Inver- 
gorden. At 9 A.ii. on the 8th a wireless report was re- 
ceived in the Iron Duke that a submarine was attacking 
a steamer oiF Rosehearty on the southern shore of the 
Moray Firth. The "duty" destroyer division was ordered 
to sea at once, and the remaining three available destroyers 
followed shortljr afterwards. Meanwhile, the destroyer 
Christopher, already on patrol in the INIoray Firth, re- 
ported herself in action at 11 a.m. with the submarine, 
which had submerged, the report stating that the mer- 
chant-ship had been sunk. The second destroyer on 
patrol, the Midge, assisted in the search for the submarine, 
as did the remaining destroyers and patrol trawlers, with- 
out result. At 10 a.m. the trawler mine-sweepers, which 
had been carrying out the usual routine sweep on the 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 237 

southern shore of the Moray Firth, reported the discovery 
of a mine-field to the northward of Banff, and several 
reports were received during the day of drifting mines 
being sighted along the coast and in the Firth. All de- 
stroyers were ordered in at 4 p.m., except the two on 
patrol and any others in touch with the submarine, and 
vessels remaining on patrol were given the limits of the 
mine-field as far as they had then been ascertained. 

Such investigation as could be hurriedly carried out 
during the day, by signal and wireless, revealed the fact 
that a yacht and a trawler on patrol on the night of the 
7th-8th had sighted strange lights, but without identify- 
ing the vessel carrying them, and it became apparent 
that a Gei'man surface mine-laying vessel had been at 
work. The night had been somewhat misty. Directions 
were at once sent by wireless to the 4th Light Cruiser 
Squadron, still at sea, to proceed at full speed towards the 
Horn Reef to endeavour to intercept the returning mine- 
layei', and the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadrons, from 
Rosyth, were also sent out for the purpose ; the Admiralty 
was also informed, and as a result the Harwich force was 
sent on the same mission. 

As the other squadrons proceeded, the 4th Light 
Cruiser Squadron was directed to the Skagerrak in case 
the mine-layer endeavoured to return by that route, whilst 
the remaining light cruiser squadrons made for the Horn 
Reef. All the mine-sweepers and the destroyers engaged 
in the anti-submarine operation mentioned earlier were 
recalled to fuel with all despatch, and sweeping by the 
Fleet mine-sweepers, trawlers and destroyers, organised 
on a large scale, was begun on the 9th and continued until 
clear routes for the ships at Cromarty and for merchant- 
ships, gradually extending to 10 miles in width, had been 
swept on both the northern and southern shores of the 



238 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

IMoray Firth. These sweeping operations were greatly 
delaj^ed by persistent fog, although a clear channel suf- 
ficientlj'' wide to admit of the exit of the squadrons at 
Cromarty was quickly swept. The Campania was sent 
to Cromarty, so that her sea-planes might assist to locate 
the mines, but in the rather thick waters of the Moray 
Firth they were of no use for this purpose. 

On the afternoon of the 9th news was received that 
the destroyer Lynx had been sunk by a mine at 6 a.m. 
that morning in a position stated to be two miles to the 
northward of the mine-field as then located. It was very 
regrettable that onlj^ three officers and 21 men were saved 
out of her fine ship's company; those lost included her 
captain, Commander John F. H. Cole, an officer of great 
promise. The loss of such a comparatively shallow draft 
vessel showed that some of the mines had been laid near 
the surface, and mine-sweeping operations were suspended 
near the time of low water. 

At 4.30 P.M. Conmiodore Tyrwhitt, of the Harwich 
force, reported that the German mine-layer Meteor, 
which had been sighted by his vessels in the vicinity of 
the Horn Reef, had been abandoned and sunk by her 
own crew and that he had subsequently rescued four 
officers and 39 men, survivors of the armed boarding- 
steamer Ramsey, who had been prisoners on board the 
Meteor. The Ramsey had been on patrol south-east of 
the Pentland Firth, and it was ascertained from the sur- 
vivors later that she had sighted and closed the Meteor, 
which was disguised as a neutral merchant-ship, shortly 
after daylight on August 8th, with the intention of 
boarding her. On closing, however, the Meteor suddenly 
showed her true character; her powerful armament, 
hitherto concealed, opened a heavy fire on the Ramsey, 
which was returned by the latter ship's greatly inferior 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 239 

armament of 12-pounder guns. But the surprise was too 
complete and the odds too heavy, and the liamsey was 
sunk very quickly with her colours flying, four officers 
and 39 men out of a complement of 97 being picked up by 
the Meteor. Acting-Lieut. P. S. Atkins, R.N.R., the 
senior surviving officer of the Ramsey, came north to re- 
port himself to me, and gave full details of his experiences. 
He stated that when the officers of the Meteor abandoned 
and sank their ship on sighting Commodore Tyrwhitt's 
force, the crew, with the British prisoners, went on board 
a neutral fishing vessel. Shortly afterwards the British 
light cruisers passed close to the fishing vessel, and Lieut. 
Atkins signalled to the Commodore, stating that they were 
survivors of the Ramsey and asked to be taken off. He 
added that the Commodore, who was at that time being 
attacked hy both aircraft and submarines, replied, "Steer 
south-west; I will return and pick you up." 

Lieut. Atkins thereupon asked the Captain of the 
Meteor to steer south-west, but the Germans naturally 
enough objected, as they desired to make their own coast. 
However, in spite of the fact that the British were un- 
armed and numerically very inferior, their arguments 
prevailed and a south-west course was steered for a short 
time until another fishing vessel was sighted; the British 
suggested transferring to her; this was agreed to by the 
Germans. As the British were leaving, the German cap- 
tain, Konstten-Kapitan von Knorr, asked Lieut. Atkins 
if he had any money, to which he replied, "How could I, 
seeing that you picked me up in pyjamas?" Captain von 
Knorr pressed money on him, but Lieut. Atkins said that 
he did not see that he would require it. However, he 
eventually took it, Captain von Knorr handing him an 
English <£5 note and other money. It is pleasant to record 
so gentlemanly and courteous an act, which stands out 



240 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

in strong contrast to the usual behaviour of German naval 
officers during the War. The money was given to me, and 
I sent it to the Admiraltj^ asking that it might be repaid, 
with the thanks of the British for the courtesy shown to 
our prisoners of war. 

The 1st, 2nd and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons were 
ordered to return to their bases on receipt of the news 
of the sinking of the 3Ieteor. 

The mine-sweeping operations in the Moray Firth on 
August 9th showed that the mine-field was larger than 
had been at first reported, and additional paddle mine- 
sweepers were sent from the Clyde to assist the other 
vessels. 

Mr. Asquith and Mr. McKenna were on board the 
Iron Duke from the 7th to the 9th, and various matters 
of importance were discussed. When questioned as to 
urgent requirements I pressed for the building of a large 
number of sloops, a class of vessel which had proved most 
useful, both as mine-sweepers and as patrol vessels, and 
which could supplement the numerous destroyers then 
building, which took much longer to complete. 

The persistence of the fog at this period is shown by 
the fact that the Agincourt, returning to Scapa from 
Portsmouth, was unable to enter the base for 36 hours 
after passing Cape Wrath, only 60 miles distant, and was 
forced to cruise to the westward, making repeated at- 
tempts at entry. The Ajax was similarly delayed in entry 
for 12 hours during the same period. 

On August 10th the armed merchant-ship India, of 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was torpedoed and sunk by 
en enemy submarine off the coast of Norway with con- 
siderable loss of life. 

Four destroyers were sent on August 13th to locate 
and engage a submarine that had attacked one of the 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 241 

Fleet mine-sweepers. They did not succeed in finding 
her, but on the following day an armed yacht engaged 
a submarine off the Aberdeen coast and claimed to have 
hit her by gunfire; and the trawler Shamrock claimed to 
have run over another submarine. 

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron from Rosyth, the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron from Scapa, and seven destroyers 
carried out a search between the 16th and 18th for enemy 
vessels in the northern and central portion of the North 
Sea, sweeping towards the Skagerrak, and covering a 
large area by wide zigzags. 

The Iron Duke returned to Scapa from Cromarty on 
the 16th. 

From the 18th to the 21st the Lion, with the 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron, was cruising in the North Sea and carrying out 
exercises off the Shetland Islands, proceeding to Scapa 
for practices on the 21st, and returning to Rosyth on 
the 23rd. 

On August 18th the Fleet mine-sweeper Lilac, Lieut.- 
Commander Leslie Fisher, while at work on the Moray 
Firth mine-field, struck a mine. The whole fore part of 
the ship was destroyed and the wreck of it hung down 
from the after part, causing her to draw 30 feet of water 
forward, instead of the usual nine to ten feet. The 
weather was very bad and a heavy sea running, but by 
great persistence and good seamanship, aided by very 
gallant work on the part of her own crew and that of the 
Hollyhock, Captain Preston, senior officer of Fleet mine- 
sweepers, who was in command of the Hollyhock, suc- 
ceeded in towing her to Peterhead. She was eventually 
reconstructed and rejoined the Fleet mine-sweeping flo- 
tillas. The value of this class of vessel was clearly shown 
by the incident. 



242 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Eight destroyers from Scapa, with a flotilla leader, 
were carrying out on August 23rd and 24th anti-sub- 
marine operations in the Fair Island Channel, and a divi- 
sion was similarly employed east of May Island, in the 
Firth of Forth. 

Between August 24th and 26th the 3rd and 7th 
Cruiser Squadrons exchanged bases, between Scapa and 
Rosyth, carrying out a wide search of the North Sea en 
route, destroyers screening the ships by day. 

On the 24th Rear- Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G., 
reheved Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas in the 1st 
Battle Squadron, the latter officer being designated to 
take command of the new 5th Battle Squadron (five ships 
of the "Queen Elizabeth" class), as it was formed. 

On August 30th-31st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, 
with destroyers, searched to the eastward of May Island 
for enemy vessels; and from August 31 to September 
1st the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, accompanied by four 
destroyers, was cruising between the Firth of Forth and 
the Dogger Bank for the same purpose. 

During the month the 2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons 
carried out target practice in the Moray Firth, and all 
battle squadrons and cruiser squadrons proceeded to sea 
for cruises, independently, from their bases, screened by 
destroyers. 

His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visited Sir 
Stanley Colville at Longhope during the month, remain- 
ing for six days. He went on board many of the ships 
of the Grand Fleet. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron report for the month 
showed the average weekly results as follows: Ships in- 
tercepted, 65; ships sent in, 13; number of vessels on pa- 
trol, 14 ; number refitting, coaling or en route to or from 
patrol, 9. 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 243 

The weather at Scapa was very mistj'. Fog or mist 
was experienced on the 3rd, 6th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 
14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 23rd, 31st. There were no gales. 

On August 3rd the large floating-dock from the Med- 
way, which had been towed to the Tyne, was reported as 
ready for use. 

On the 29th the old light cruiser Brilliant arrived at 
Lerwick to act as guard and depot ship at that base, 
which was being developed as a secondary examination 
base for vessels sent in by the 10th Cruiser Squadron. 

An extended patrol to the south-eastward of the Pent- 
land Firth during the month was maintained by three 
armed boarding steamers and three destroyers. 

The principal events of September, 1915, may perhaps 
be given most conveniently and briefly in diary form: 

On September 1st eight destroyers, fitted for mine- 
sweeping, swept the waters to the westward of the Pent- 
land Firth. This was the first occasion on which destroyers 
were used for this purpose. 

September 1st and 2nd.- — The Black Prince and four 
light cruisers, with six destroyers, carried out a sweep to 
the eastward from Scapa. 

September 2nd-5th. — The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, and the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron w^ere cruising in northern waters. 
Destroyers screened the Fleet out and back, but did not 
remain with it during the cruise, being kept at the base, 
ready fuelled, in case it became necessary to move to the 
southward. Battle exercises and night-firing were car- 
ried out during the cruise, as opportunity offered. The 
battleship Superb reported sighting the periscope of a 
submarine. 

On September 2nd the Fleet was visited by five 
French gentlemen of eminence, and a representative of 



244 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the United States Press. This was the first visit paid to 
the Grand Fleet base by anyone not immediately con- 
nected with the Service, and we were flattered that the 
occasion should have brought to Scapa Flow representa- 
tives of our gallant Allies from across the Channel. The 
Fleet left immediately after the visit, and an opportunity 
was afforded our visitors of seeing the ships leave harbour. 

September 4th. — Another mine-sweeping sloop, the 
Dahlia, Lieutenant G. Parsons, R.N., struck a mine in 
the Moray Firth mine-field during sweeping operations. 
She was very badly damaged ; Lieut. Parsons himself was 
severely injured. The ship reached Invergordon with the 
loss of three killed and one missing. She was subsequently 
repaired. 

September 7th. — The 3rd Cruiser Squadron left 
Scapa, with destroyers, swept down in the direction of 
the Horn Reef, and arrived at Rosyth on the 9th with- 
out sighting-- enemy vessels. Visibility was low during the 
sweep. 

September 8th.— The 7th Cniiser Squadron left 
Rosyth, with destroyers, swept out to the eastward, to- 
wards the Skagerrak, then turned to the northward and 
arrived at Scapa on the 10th. 

Two destroyers were damaged by collision with 
steamers in a fog on the 8th, necessitating repairs at a 
dockyard in both cases. 

September 10th-12th.— The Lion, with the 1st and 
3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Light 
Cruiser Squadrons and 16 destroyers, was cruising in the 
North Sea to cover mine-laying operations carried out by 
our mine-layers in the Heligoland Bight, the remainder 
of the Grand Fleet being, as was usual on such occasions, 
at short notice for steam. The Fearless and a destroyer. 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 245 

part of the force with the battle cruisers, collided while 
at sea, the former sustaining considerable damage. 

September 11th. — The Patia and Oropesa, of the 10th 
Cruiser Squadron, collided ; the Patia was seriously dam- 
aged, and was brought into port under convoy of a de- 
stroyer and armed trawlers with considerable difficulty, 
being unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine en route. 

September 12th. — Submarine E 16, attached to the 
Grand Fleet flotilla, was sent to the coast of Norway 
from Aberdeen to operate against an enemy submarine 
thought to be operating in those waters. On the 15th 
E 16 sighted a hostile submarine off the Norwegian coast 
and sank her with a torpedo. This success, one of the 
earliest achieved by one submarine operating against 
another, was very encouraging after the somewhat similar 
success of C 27 in July. 

September 17th. — The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, 
with four destroyers, left Rosyth to sweep to the 
Skagerrak. They returned on the 19th, without having 
sighted any enemy vessels. 

September 23rd. — The destroyer Christopher was 
damaged in collision with the armed boarding-steamer 
King Orry in a fog. 

September 26th. — The s.s. Caribbean^ which had 
been fitted out as a receiving-ship for dockyard workmen, 
encountered very heavy weather whilst en route from her 
port to Scapa, and got into serious difficulties, taking in 
a great deal of water. Her wireless distress calls off Cape 
Wrath were answered by sending to her assistance the 
light cruiser Birkenhead from Scapa, together with tugs 
and yachts from Scapa and Stornoway. At 4.45 a.m. on 
the 27th the Birkenhead and patrol vessels, which were 
then standing by, took off most of the crew of the Carib- 



246 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

bean, which sank at 7.30 a.m., unfortunately with the 
loss of 15 lives. 

During the month the battle and cruiser squadrons 
carried out independent cruises by day and at night from 
the Scapa and Rosyth bases, being screened by destroyers 
during the exercises. The squadrons of the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet, also, all visited Scapa for the purpose of 
carrying out gunnery and torpedo practices. 

A widely extended patrol by one or more light 
cruisers with destroyers, working to the south-eastward 
from Scapa, was maintained during the month, in order 
to guard against any attempt at mine-laying in the 
Pentland Firth by enemy vessels disguised as merchant- 
ships. Similar precautions were taken at Rosyth. This 
patrol was henceforth regularly established when the 
conditions of the moon rendered attempted mine-laying 
operations at night probable. 

The sweeping operations in the Moray Firth were 
continued on a large scale throughout the month, and 
clear channels on each shore were provided. Up to 
September 19th, 222 mines had been accounted for out of 
the 450 which survivors of the Ramsey stated had been 
laid by the Meteor. The Moray Firth mine-field, in the 
centre of the Firth, was purposely left undisturbed, as it 
formed an excellent anti-submarine defence in that posi- 
tion and reduced the area to be patrolled by our vessels. 

The 3rd Cruiser Squadron became non-existent dur- 
ing the month, two ships being detached by the Admiralty 
on special service, and the remaining two sent into port for 
somewhat extensive repairs. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron's weekly average for the 
inonth worked out at: 

Ships intercepted, 64; sent in with armed guards, 11; 



MINES AND SUBMARINES 247 

number of vessels on patrol, 13; number absent or en 
route to or from patrols, 10, 

The weather at Scapa showed fog or mist on the 6th, 
8th, 9th, 10th, 14th, 18th, 23rd and 24th; a very heavy 
gale occurred between the 25th and 28th, during which 
great damage was done to the anti-submarine obstructions 
at Scapa, and a good deal of damage was suffered on the 
mainland in the north of Scotland, a portion of the High- 
land Railway being washed away. 

Between June and August, 1915, I had pressed upon 
the Admiralty my opinion that we should carry out a 
much more comprehensive mining policy in the Heligo- 
land Bight. I had urged this early in the War, but the 
view taken at the Admiralty was that mining on any 
large scale would impede both our submarine operations 
and also any Fleet operations that might be undertaken 
in those waters. I felt that unless we adopted one of 
two policies — namely, either a close watch by surface 
ships on the exits from the German bases, or an 
extensive mining policy — we could never feel that we 
should receive sufficient warning of the exit of enemy 
forces as to prevent mischief being done. The close 
blockade by surface ships was not a feasible operation 
in view of the number of craft at our disposal and the 
submarine danger ; our submarines were too few in number 
and had not the necessary means of communication to take 
the place of surface ships. 

I could see no alternatives to very extensive mining, 
limited only by the number of mines that could be pro- 
duced. The mining proposed by me was intended to 
hamper the operations of both surface vessels and sub- 
marines. I pointed out that earlier in the War the view 
had been expressed to me by the Admiralty that we 
should not risk our cruisers too freely in the North Sea 



248 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

owing to the submarine danger, and that, if we adhered 
to this poHcy, it was impossible to insure that the exits 
to the Fleet bases would not be mined by surface mine- 
layers, as the Meteor incident had shown, and as was also 
indicated by the success of our own infrequent mining ex- 
cursions to the Heligoland Bight. 

The correspondence resulted in increased activity on 
the part of our mine-layers, but the success of our work 
was unfortunately handicapped by defects in the pattern 
of mine in use at that time, especially as against 
submarines. 

In 1917, shortly after my return to the Admiralty, 
I undertook a very extensive mining policy. In the 
previous year, during Sir Henry Jackson's period as First 
Sea Lord, a new and much improved mine was designed, 
the trials of which were carried out after I relieved him. 
This was one of the replies to the submarine. One hun- 
dred thousand of these mines were ordered by me early in 
1917 to carry out various schemes for mining the Heligo- 
land Bight and the Straits of Dover. Later in 1917, with 
the assistance of the United States, provision was made 
for the large mine-field across the North Sea known as the 
Northern Barrage. It was not until the large supplies 
of mines became available in the autumn that really effec- 
tive results against submarines by mining began to be 
achieved, although the operations of German surface ves- 
sels had previously been hampered to a very considerable 
extent. 



CHAPTER IX 

CONTKOLLING THE NORTH SEA 

During the later months of 1915 the Grand Fleet con- 
tinued to sweep and control the North Sea in spite of the 
enemy's efforts to effect attrition by submarines and 
mines. On October 1st the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, 
with destroyers escorting, left Rosyth and proceeded 
towards the Little Fisher Bank; on reaching that locality 
the squadron turned to the north-westward and steered 
towards Scapa, arriving on the 3rd, The line thus swept 
was the possible course of enemy mine-laying or other 
vessels, proceeding towards, or returning from, the 
vicinity of Scapa and Cromarty. No enemy ships were 
sighted. 

On October 2nd the battleship BarJiam, Flagship of 
the new 5th Battle Squadron, arrived at Scapa. 

Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th Light Cruiser 
Squadron (now comprising six light cruisers) and nine 
destroyers, left Harwich on the 6th to sweep towards the 
Skagerrak in search of enemy vessels, particularly fishing 
trawlers, which were suspected of acting as outpost vessels. 
The operation on this occasion was fruitful in result; 14 
German trawlers were captured and sent in ; one was also 
sunk. As usual during such operations when a supporting 
force was not actually at sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet was 
kept at short notice for steam, to be ready to put to sea 
if required. 

On October 10th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron left 
Scapa and swept down to the Little Fisher Bank, and 

249 



250 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

thence to Rosyth with the same object in view as that of 
the Harwich force, being met at daylight on the 11th by 
destroyers from Rosyth, and arriving at that base on the 
12th. On this occasion the operation gave no result. 

The Dreadnought Battle Fleet, comprising the 1st, 
2nd and 4th Battle Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th 
Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and 
the 2nd and 4th Flotillas, left Scapa on the 13th, and 
proceeded into the northern portion of the Xorth Sea for 
a cruise. Owing to bad weather the destroyers were sent 
back on the 11th, one, the Mandate, being damaged by 
a heavy sea; the Ardent and Fortune collided, the former 
vessel being damaged. The fleet carried out battle exer- 
cises during the cruise, and returned to the bases at Scapa 
and Cromarty on the 15th, on which day the new battle- 
ship Canada joined the Grand Fleet. 

On October 18th the Harwich force, consisting of the 
5th Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers, sailed to 
operate off the Danish coast, north of the Horn Reef, 
against any enemy vessels found there. The Lion, with 
the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers, left 
Rosyth to support the Harwich force, which closed the 
Danish coast at daylight on the 19th, then steered to the 
north-westward, till dark, returning afterwards to Har- 
wich. The search was unproductive, no enemy vessels 
being sighted. The Lion and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron 
proceeded towards Cromarty, but were diverted to Scapa 
during the night of the 19th-20th, owing to a report of 
suspicious vessels, possibly mine-layers, being sighted off 
Noss Head. These vessels were subsequently identified 
as two of our own trawlers. 

On October 22nd three divisions of destroyers were 
sent from Scapa to hunt a submarine off Fair Island, but 
were forced to return owing to bad weather. 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 251 

On October 27th the 1st Cruiser Squadron, with two 
armed boarding-steamers, left Scapa to search the 
northern portion of the North Sea, returning on the 30th. 
Nothing was sighted. 

On October 30th Commodore Tyrwhitt, with the 5th 
Light Ci'uiser Squadron and destroyers, left Harwich for 
another sweep off the Danish coast. His force passed 
through a position some 70 miles north-west of Heligo- 
land before daylight on the 21st, steered for the Little 
Fisher Bank, and thence to Harwich. A portion of the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet kept steam at short notice during the 
operation, which was unproductive, except for the inter- 
ception of an ore-laden neutral steamer which was sent 
in to a British port. 

On October 30th the Birkenhead and Liverpool, 
newly commissioned light cruisers, left Scapa for a search- 
ing and exercise cruise in the northern portion of the 
North Sea, and returned to Scapa on November 1st. 

During October squadrons cruised independently in 
the North Sea from Scapa, as in previous months, by day 
and at night. The ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, as 
well as the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth and squad- 
rons from Scapa, proceeded to Cromarty, in turn, in 
order to carry out long-range firing at towed targets in 
the IMoray Firth, being screened from submarine attack 
by destroyers. Squadrons from Rosyth proceeded also 
to Scapa to carry out practices. 

A patrol, comprising the Sappho and eight armed 
whalers, based on Peterhead, M^as instituted as a guard 
against further attempted mine-laying in the Moray 
Firth. The Peterhead and Cromarty mine-sweeping 
vessels, which had been working under the Senior 
Officer of Fleet mine-sweepers (Captain Preston) for the 
clearance of the Moray Firth mine-field, reverted to their 



252 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

proper commands, and arrangements were made for a 
constant sweep by mine-sweeping trawlers of the channel 
along the south shore of the JNIoray Firth, which was that 
used by ships based on Cromarty when concentrating with 
the remainder of the Grand Fleet in the North Sea. It 
was essential to ensure that this channel was kept clear 
of mines so long as any portion of the Grand Fleet was 
based on Cromarty. 

It may not be out of place here to state the patrol 
arrangements existing in the vicinity of the Pentland 
Firth at this time. Usually three armed boarding- 
steamers and three destroyers were patrolling to the east- 
ward of the Firth. They moved to the northward during 
daylight and worked for a considerable distance to the 
south-eastward of the Firth at night. An extended patrol, 
usually consisting of a light cruiser and a destroyer, also 
worked from Peterhead. A patrol of one or two 
destroyers was maintained at night off Noss Head on the 
north shore of the Moray Firth. Destroyers were kept 
off the entrance to Hoy Sound and Holm Sound, and* 
a large number of trawlers near the Hoxa Sound 
entrance. In bad weather the eastern destroyer patrol 
was withdrawn to work between Swona Island and 
the land to the eastward and to the north-westward. The 
old local defence destroyers also carried out patrol work 
off the entrance, and off Kirkwall. These particulars 
are of interest as convejang some idea of the sea work 
in a restricted area which had to be carried out in all 
weathers. 

From October 1st to October 11th the Fleet Flagship 
Iron Duke was refitting at Invergordon. 

On October 28th the Argyll, en route from Devon- 
port to Rosyth to rejoin the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 
grounded on the Bell Rock, near Dundee, early in the 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 253 

morning in thick weather, and became a total wreck; all 
hands were taken off in a heavy sea by destroyers from 
Rosyth. The destroyers were exceedingly well handled 
under very difficult conditions. On the following day the 
Arlanza, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which had been 
sent to the White Sea, struck a mine and was seriously 
damaged, but succeeded in reaching the Yakanski anchor- 
age, in the neighbourhood. Repairs were impossible dur- 
ing the winter and the greater part of her crew was, there- 
fore, brought home in the Orcoma, of the same squadron 
which had been sent north for the purpose. 

From October 29th to October 30th a heavy gale was 
experienced at Scapa, and considerable damage was done 
to the anti-submarine defences and to the block-ships at 
the entrances. Fog or mist was experienced on October 
3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 14th, 16th and 30th. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron's work showed as a weekly 
average the following figures: Ships intercepted, 56; sent 
in, 16; number on patrol, 14; number absent, 8. The 
bad weather experienced interfered with the work of the 
squadron. 

On November 2nd the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle 
Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 
1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyers of the 4th 
and 11th (old 2nd) Flotilla left for a cruise to the west- 
ward of the Orkneys. The destroyers were sent back on 
the 3rd owing to bad weather. Battle exercises and sub- 
calibre firing took place during the cruise, which was 
otherwise uneventful; the Fleet arrived at Scapa and 
Cromarty on November 5th, being screened in by the 
destroj^ers. 

On November 6th the 1st and 2nd Light Cruiser 
Squadrons, with destroyers, left Scapa and Rosyth re- 
spectively, to carry out an operation in the Skagerrak. 



254 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The force was timed to arrive at the eastern end of the 
Skagerrak at dawn on the 7th, and to sweep westward 
during daylight in order that our ships should be between 
the enemj^ and his Baltic base if enemy ships were 
sighted. The Lion, with the 1st and 3rd Battle Cruiser 
Squadrons and destroyers, left Rosyth in time to be in 
a supporting position by daylight on the 7th. A large 
number of vessels were boarded by the destroyers, but 
nothing suspicious was encountered, and the forces re- 
turned to the bases on November 8th. 

During the night of November 6th- 7th the battleship 
Hibernia, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral S. Fremantle, 
with the Zealandia and Albemarle, passed through the 
Pentland Firth to the westward en route for southern 
ports and the Mediterranean. A strong wind was 
blowing against the sjDring tides, and a very heavy sea 
was running in the Firth, as was not unusual. Whilst 
passing through the Firth the Albemarle, Captain R. A. 
Nugent, shipped two heavy seas which washed away her 
fore bridge, with everyone on it, and even displaced the 
roof of the conning tower; hundreds of tons of water 
flooded the decks and poured down below. An officer 
and one man were washed overboard and drowned, 
and several men injured; Captain Nugent found him- 
self on the upper deck amidst the wreckage of the 
bridge. The Hibernia, which was ahead, turned to assist 
the Albemarle, and an urgent signal for assistance 
was received on board the Iron Duke. One of the 
emergency cruisers at Scapa was directed to raise steam 
with all despatch; the Hibernia arrived in with the Albe- 
marle at daylight. The ship presented an extraordinary 
sight, the sea having made a clean sweep of her bridge 
and everj^ihing on it. In all our experience of the Pent- 
land Firth, we had never witnessed such havoc before. The 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 255 

Zealandia was also obliged to turn back to repair her 
gunports, damaged by the sea in the Firth. 

The next few days were marked only by compara- 
tively trifling incidents. On November 6th the 
Birkenhead, which had recently been commissioned, com- 
pleted her practices at Scapa and joined the 3rd Light 
Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth. Two days later the Princess 
Margaret laid mines successfully in the Heligoland 
Bight; on the 9th the Crescent, harbour-defence vessel at 
Hoy Sound, was withdrawn and left to pay off; and 
the Matcliless, of the 10th Destroyer Flotilla, struck a 
drifting mine in southern waters, her stern being blown 
off. 

On the 12th Submarine E 17 was sent into the Katte- 
gat to reconnoitre and ascertain whether any German 
traAvlers or other vessels were working there. She returned 
on the 19th and reported in the negative. On the night of 
the 15th-16th the s.s. Kristianiafiord, of the Norwegian- 
American line, a ship which had been endeavouring on 
other occasions to evade the blockading squadron, was 
intercepted by the Teutonic in high latitudes; she was 
steaming fast Mdthout lights, and was sent to Kirkwall for 
examination. In this and in other similar cases the ships 
ran great risk of being mistaken for enemy vessels and 
sunk, since the methods employed by the Germans made 
it very difficult to abstain from opening fire on vessels 
without running the serious danger of our own ships 
being sunk by surprise attack. In the case of a ship car- 
rying a large number of passengers, like the Kristiania- 
fiord, the risk taken was very great and could not be 
' justified. 

On November 16th the 7th Cruiser Squadron, without 
the Donegal, but accompanied by the Liverpool and one 
armed boarding-steamer, left Scapa to patrol an area 



256 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

north of the Shetlands and Faroe Islands, with a view to 
intercepting possible raiders or other vessels. 

At noon on the 18th a report reached me that an 
enemy three-funnelled cruiser had been seen on the 17th 
to pass through the Danish Sound going north. The 
possible objectives of this vessel, if the report were true, 
appeared to be either mine-laying off our bases or an at- 
tempt to interfere with the White Sea traffic, the Ad- 
miralty having informed me on the 16th that large con- 
signments of arms and ammunition would be passing from 
France to the White Sea during November and Decem- 
ber. In view of the fact that the news had reached me too 
late to intercept this vessel in southern waters, the dis- 
positions made were as follows: 

The Donegal, which had left Scapa on the 17th to 
cruise along the trade route to the White Sea, was directed 
to rendezvous with the Orcoma (a ship of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron on patrol off the Norwegian coast), and to 
patrol the parallel of Lat. 66 N. between the meridians 
of 5.30 E. and 7.30 E. 

The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Scapa for 
a position Lat. 63 N., Long. 4 E., there to meet the 7th 
Cruiser Squadron, already at sea. Both squadrons, widely 
spread, were to sweep to the northward along the Nor- 
wegian coast, as far as the Rost Islands, and to cruise 
to the westward of the Lofoten Islands during daylight 
of the 20th, then returning to their base. The 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron also left Scapa and proceeded north, the ships 
spread to cover a wide area to the westward of the 7th 
Cruiser Squadron, in order to protect the Archangel trade. 
The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron also left Scapa on the 
18th to sweep to the eastward, with orders to return to 
Cromarty on the 19th. 

Strong destroyer patrols were despatched from Scapa 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 257 

and Rosyth to prevent mine-laying off the bases, and one 
Battle Cruiser Squadron was j^ut at short notice for steam. 
No enemy vessels were sighted, and the Donegal even- 
tually proceeded to the White Sea, being accompanied 
by the Minotaur as far as the North Cape. 

On November 19th three submarines proceeded from 
Harwich to the Kattegat to obtain information relative 
to the presence of any enemy vessels. 

On November 23rd the War spite rejoined the 5th 
Battle Squadron, after having been for some weeks under 
repair in the Tyne, owing to injuries sustained through 
grounding in the Firth of Forth. 

On November 28th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left 
Ros}'th for a cruise in the northern portion of the North 
Sea, during Avliich cruiser exercises and gunnery practices 
were carried out; the squadron returned to Rosyth on 
December 2nd. 

From November 22nd to December 7th, the Donegal 
and Hampshire were protecting the White Sea trade, 
working on the trade route and coaling at Alexandrovsk. 

During the month independent squadron exercise 
cruises from the bases were continued, as was target prac- 
tice from Cromarty. 

The figures for the 10th Cruiser Squadron gave as a 
weekly average: Ships intercepted, 30; sent in, 9; num- 
ber on patrol, 10; absent at ports or en route, 9; on 
special service, 3. The bad Aveather experienced during 
the month interfered considerably with the boarding 
operations of the squadron and also hampered Fleet 
movements. 

On December 1st the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle 
Squadrons, the 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron, and the Minotaur of the 7th 
Cruiser Squadron, proceeded to the westward for a cruise. 



258 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Battle exercises were carried out on the 2nd and 3rd, and 
the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty on December 
4<th. The exercises were specially intended to represent 
the conditions that might arise if the High Sea Fleet tried 
to draw the Grand Fleet over areas in which mines had 
been laid or in which submarines were operating. During 
the exercises the Barham and Warspite of the 5th Battle 
Squadron collided, both being considerably damaged. 
They were escorted to Scapa for temporary repairs and 
left later, the Barham for Invergordon and the Warspite 
for Devonport. 

On December 8th the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron 
left Rosyth, swejit to the easlward to the Little Fisher 
Bank, and returned on the 10th. 

From the 11th to the 13th two ships of the 4th Light 
Cruiser Squadron were ci'uising to the eastward of the 
Fair Island Channel. 

On December 12th Submarines D 7 and D 8, which 
were based temporarily on Blyth, were directed to leave 
for the Norwegian coast to operate against enemy trade 
and against enemy submarines. D 7 was directed to make 
the Ryvingen Light during the dark hours and then to 
cruise to intercept trade between Ryvingen and Aren- 
dal, and between Ryvingen and the west coast of Den- 
mark. It was anticipated that this might draw enemy 
submarines to the northward from German ports to try to 
sink D 7, and D 7 was directed to be back at Ryvingen 36 
hours after she expected that the first vessel she examined 
had reached port, so that she might be ready to attack 
enemy submarines sent after her. D 8 was directed to 
cruise on a bearing 270° from the Hantsholm Light (coast 
of Denmark) in order to intercept enemy submarines sent 
after D 7. Bad weather prevented D 7 leavins before 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 259 

December 15th. The enemy was apparently not drawn, 
and no success was obtained. 

On December 15th the 2nd Cruiser Squadron left 
Scapa for a s^veep to the south-eastward, and returned 
on the 17th. 

Two neutral ships, steaming at high speed at night 
without lights on the 15th and 16th, evidently intending to 
evade the blockade, were intercepted by the 10th Cruiser 
squadron and sent into Kirkwall. 

On December 20th Commodore Tyrwhitt left Harwich 
with the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, to sweep to the 
Danish coast, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was kept at 
the usual short notice for steam during the time that he 
was absent until the 23rd. 

On December 24th the 1st Cruiser Squadron left 
Scapa to search the central portion of the North Sea. 
During the day anxiety was felt as to the safety of the 
destroyers Porpoise and Morning Star, which had been 
escorting a Russian ice-breaker to the northward and 
which had hove to near the Fair Island Channel in a heavy 
gale during the 23rd. The 1st Cruiser Squadron was 
directed to spread and search for them, and the Hamp- 
shire and Donegal were also sent from Scapa to endeavour 
to gain touch. Both the destroyers, however, reached 
Cromarty in safety, the Porpoise on the 25th, and the 
Morning Star on the 26th, after having experienced very 
heavy weather. Many compartments were flooded, and 
very considerable damage was done. They had been 
handled with great ability during the exceptionally heavy 
weather. The 1st Cruiser Squadron, with the Hampshire 
and Donegal, returned to Scapa on the 26th. 

On the 24th the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron also pro- 
ceeded from Rosyth to search the North Sea, down to 
the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, thence towards the Little 



26o THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. No enemy vessels were 
sighted. The weather in the North Sea at this period 
was very severe, and the Sappho, which was suj)porting 
the armed trawler patrol to the north-eastward of Peter- 
head, lost her rudder in a heavy sea. 

On the 30th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and 1st 
Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, left Rosyth and 
carried out a sweep to the south-eastward, returning on 
the 31st. 

On the same day, a lamentable disaster occurred, the 
cruiser Natal (Captain Eric Back) being blown up in 
Cromarty harbour with great loss of life. Captain Back 
was amongst those who lost their lives. It was reported 
by adjacent vessels at 3.25 p.m. that the ship was on fire, 
and at 3.30 p.m.^ before any action could be taken, the 
ship blew up and sank, the explosion taking place in her 
after magazines. Steps were taken to deal with the situa- 
tion in case the explosion had been caused by an enemy 
submarine having entered the harbour, but it soon became 
evident that this was not the case. Examination of the 
wreck by divers later showed no signs of any external 
explosion. A court-martial was subsequently held at 
Chatham to investigate the causes of the disaster, but the 
conclusions were not made public. 

During the montli of December independent exercises 
from the Fleet bases were continued, as well as target 
practice from Cromarty. As to the latter, an interesting 
practice was carried out by the l7'on Duke at the range, 
and under the conditions of battle practice before the 
War, in order to ascertain, by examining the actual hits 
made on the canvas of the target, whether the pre- War 
standard of shooting was being maintained. Some uncer- 
tainty existed owing to the great increase in the ranges 
at which practices were carried out during the War, 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 261 

namely, 10,000 to 19,000 yards, as compared with the 
9,500 yards, which was the maximum peace range. The 
result was very satisfactory and indicated a most decided 
advance on pre- War accuracy of fire. 

On December 13th the first target practice was car- 
ried out in the Pentland Firth. This was in the nature 
of an experiment and, being successful, practice in this 
locality was later substituted for practice in the Moray 
Firth ; it was far more convenient for the main Fleet base 
and much less extravagant in the use of screening and 
protecting destroyers. 

On December 16th Vice- Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, 
K.C.B., relieved Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, 
Bart., in command of the 2nd Battle Squadron, on the 
termination of the latter officer's three years' command. 

During December patrols seaward of the bases were 
strengthened and considerably extended during the first 
and fourth quarters of the moon in order to frustrate any 
attempted mine-laying on the part of the enemy. This 
"dark night" patrol subsequently became a matter of 
routine. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron's weekly average showed: 
Ships intercepted, 35; sent in, 14; number of ships on 
patrol, 12; number at bases or en route, 7; number on 
special service, 2. 

The long nights and bad weather were responsible 
for the reduction in the number of vessels intercepted. 
During December fog or mist were experienced at 
Scapa on the 15th, 22nd, 25th and 26th; gales on the 
6th, 8th and 23rd; and snow on the 3rd, 4th, 8th and 
12th. Although the weather at Scapa Flow was fairly 
good, gales in the North Sea and to the westward of the 
Orlaieys were frequent and violent during the month. 

Before turning to the events of 1916 it is of interest 



262 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

to notice the work of the "decoy ships," known later by 
the name of "Q" ships, fitted out at Scapa during the 
3'^ear 1915. These vessels, five in number, were designed 
to sink enemy submarines by inducing the latter to close 
them for the purpose of attack by gun fire or by torpedo. 
The same system was employed in southern waters, and 
■was developed greatly during the year 1917. At Scapa 
in 1915 and 1916 the ships were manned principally by 
volunteers from the Grand Fleet, or from the depot ships 
at the base. Colliers or store-ships were selected for their 
size and general suitability for the work, and they were 
fitted with a very carefully concealed armament, which was 
kept hidden until the submarine was within point-blank 
range, so that fire opened on her must be immediately 
effective; unless the submarine was holed in less than a 
minute after fire was opened on her she could submerge 
and escape, and probably torpedo the decoy ship as well. 
The five ships, the Prince Charles, Vala, Duncomhe, 
Penshurst and Glen Isla, were fitted up by Captain Far- 
rington of the Cyclops, under the direction of Admiral 
Sir Stanley Colvjlle and were marvels of ingenuity. Their 
usual cruising-grovmd was in the vicinity of the Orkne5^s, 
Shetlands, or Hebrides, or towards the Norwegian coast, 
or the White Sea, or down the east coast of Scotland. 
They worked on a route that was freely used by merchant- 
ships and altered their appearance according to their route 
so as to give them the look of vessels usuallj'^ trading on 
that route. 

Many stories of the "Q" ships have been told in the 
Press and need not be repeated here, but a high tribute 
must be paid to the extreme gallantry and splendid 
discipine of the officers and men who manned these ves- 
sels. I had personal knowledge of the work of the 
vessels operating from Scapa. Their opportunities for 



CONTROLLING NORTH SEA 263 

engaging submarines successfully were rare, and the work 
in the small ships in the lieavy seas encountered in northern 
latitudes was very arduous; there was never any lack of 
volunteers for the duty, the difficulty always being that 
of selection from the large number of officers and men 
anxious to serve. It is satisfactory to record that the first 
submarine sunk by a decoy ship fell a victim to a vessel 
working from Scapa Flow. 

On July 25th, 191.5, the Prince Charles (Lieutenant 
W. P. Mark-Wardlaw— of Admiral Colville's staff— in 
command) sighted, near North Rona Island, the Danish 
steamer Louise, stopped and with a submarine close to. 
When the submarine sighted the Prince Charles she pro- 
ceeded at full speed towards her and opened fire at 5,000 
yards' range. Lieutenant Mark-Wardlaw stopped his 
engines and went through the usual process of lowering 
boats in a great hurry. The submarine, which was the 
U 36, closed to within 500 yards, still on the surface, and 
at that range the Prince Charles revealed her true char- 
acter, unmasked her guns, and opened a most accurate 
fire with her two 6-pounders and two 3-pounders. The 
U 36 was immediately holed, and two men killed in the 
conning tower. She was unable to dive and sank stern 
first; 4 commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 9 
men were saved by the Prince Charles. 



CHAPTER X 

ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE THE ENEMY TO ACTION 

The year 1916 opened and still no general action had 
been fought in the North Sea, which the Grand Fleet 
continued to dominate, paying its price — though not so 
heavy as might have been expected — for the influence it 
exerted on all the operations — naval, military and eco- 
nomic — to which the country had by that time been com- 
mitted in face of the active operations pursued by enemy 
submarines and mine-laying craft. 

On Januarj^ 5th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth 
to cruise in the northern part of the North Sea, and re- 
turned during the night of the 8th-9th. 

The facility with which enemy mines could be laid 
in the vicinitj^ of naval bases during the long winter 
nights, when there was little or no moon (as shown, inter 
alia, by our own mine-laying in the Heligoland Bight, 
which, though not very frequent in 1916, became con- 
stant in 1917), led me to extend still further the patrols 
from the bases at such times; from January 2nd to 
January 10th inclusive, the patrol vessels (two light 
cruisers and a destroyer) worked in an area about 140 
miles and between bearings 80 and 130 degrees from the 
Pentland Firth, the ships being in the area by 2 p.m. 
each day. Similar patrols were ordered to be instituted 
from the Rosyth base. The enemy, however, instead of 
mining the exit from the bases to the eastward, selected 
the western approach to the Pentland Firth for the 

264 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 265 

purpose, possibly because of the considerable mercantile 
traifie using this route. Tlie patrols in this direction did 
not extend so far from the base, the sea being very fre- 
quently too heavy in the vi'inter months ; the practice vi^as to 
search the route periodically for mines. 

The weather early in January had been very bad, and 
both sweei^ing and patrol work were impracticable. In 
these circumstances the enemjr raider Moewe, disguised 
as a neutral merchant-ship, which had probably passed up 
the Norwegian coast and round the north of the Shetland 
Islands, laid an extensive and very scattered mine-field 
between Cape Wrath and a position about north from 
Strathie Point, on the Scottish coast, on the night of 
January 1st or 2nd. The work of the Bloewe was facili- 
tated by the fact that the lights on Cape Wrath and 
Sule Skerry Island were necessarily exhibited at night 
for the sake of the large mercantile traffic using the 
Pentland Firth and the Minches. 

On Januarj'' 6th, at 7 a.m., the pre-Dreadnought 
battleship King Edward VII., of the 3rd Battle Squad- 
ron, left Scapa for Belfast to refit, and at 10.47 a.m., 
when in Lat. .58.43 N., Long. 4.12 W., a violent explo- 
sion occurred under the starboard engine-room. Captain 
Maclachlan first reported that the ship had been tor- 
pedoed, but later came to the conclusion that she had been 
mined, as was eventually found to be, undoubtedly, the 
case. The ship heeled at once to starboard, and both en- 
gine-rooms filled. A strong westerly wind was blowing 
at the time with a rising sea. 

As soon as the report was received at Scapa the 
flotilla leader Kempenfelt and 12 destroyers were sent out 
to assist and to keep the submarine under, if one were 
present. Tugs were also despatched. Meanwhile the 
collier Melita, which had arrived on the scene, proceeded 



266 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

to take the King Edward VII. in tow, assisted by the 
Kempenfelt; but the shi]) was Yevy low in the water and 
unmanageable, and the tow parted. At 4 p.m., the bat- 
tleship having by this time a heavy list, Captain Mac- 
lachlan decided to abandon her for the night, and the 
destroyers Musketeer, Marne, Fortune and Nessus were 
taken alongside her in a heavy sea with great skill; they 
embarked all hands without loss of life, although the 
destroyer Musketeer received considerable injury from 
projections on the side of the battleship. The destroyer 
Nessus and a tug stood by the King Edward VII. until 
8.10 P.M. when she turned over and sank. The Africa, 
also of the 3rd Battle Squadron, en route from Belfast 
to Scapa, passed safely through the mined area a few 
hours before the King Edward VII. was mined — a very 
foi'tunate escape! 

Steps were at once taken to divert traffic from passing 
between Cape Wrath and the Pentland Firth, and a large 
force of mine-sweepers was detached to ascertain the 
limits of the mine-field and to sweep clear a passage along 
the coast. The mine-sweepers were based, some on Loch 
Eribol, an anchorage between Strathie Point and Cape 
Wrath, and some on Scapa, but continuous bad weather 
interfered with the sweeping operations to such an extent 
that, between January 7th and Januarj^ 21st, no sweeping 
was possible except close in shore in sheltered water. On 
January 14th a German mine drifted ashore in Dunnet 
Bay, near Thurso, and any doubt as to the cause of the 
loss of the King Edward VII. was thereby removed. 

On January 7th the battleship Albemarle left Scapa 
for Archangel, and, on the 9th, Submarine D 7 left Blyth 
to operate in the Skagerrak; she returned on the 16th, 
having met with no success. 

On January 12th a very heavy north-westerly gale was 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 267 

experienced at Scapa. The oiler Prudentia drifted across 
the bows of the Iron Duke during the night and sank, and 
one ammunition-ship, one store-carrier, a tug and three 
trawlers went ashore. The wind registered 80 miles an 
hour at the shore observatory during this gale. The Iron 
Duke Avas undamaged. 

Between January 20th and 22nd three ships of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron on patrol suffered considerable 
damage from the heavy seas. The month of January, 
as a whole, was indeed conspicuous for the exceptionally 
bad weather prevailing in northern latitudes and over 
the Avhole North Sea. Great injury was done to all the 
anti-submarine obstructions at Scapa, many of them being 
entirelj^ destroyed. In order to make the base tempo- 
rarily as secure as possible from submarine attack, the 
Fleet was directed to make and lay improvised net ob- 
structions. 

On January 24 the destroyer Talisman reported that 
a torpedo had been fired at her off Blyth. The Botha and 
10 destroyers were sent out from Rosyth to locate and 
destroy the submarine, but they saw nothing of her. 

On January 25th the Ehro, of the 10th Cruiser Squad- 
ron, picked up a dismasted Norwegian sailing-ship and 
towed her to Lerwick, arriving on the 28th. 

On January 26th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 
with six destroyers, and the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squad- 
ron, with five destroyers, left Rosyth for operations in 
the Skagerrak. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and de- 
stroyers, during daylight on the 27th, swept through the 
Skagerrak to the Skaw, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
being in support. The ships then moved to the north- 
ward; at daylight on the 28th, the whole force, joined by 
the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and three destroyers from 
Scapa, spread on a line 210° from Udsire Lighthouse and 



268 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

again swept into the Skagerrak, The squadrons then 
returned to their respective bases. During the operations 
the remainder of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was at short 
notice for steam. No suspicious vessels were sighted out- 
side territorial waters, but Commodore Le Mesurier, of 
the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, reported a stream of 
small vessels passing along the Norwegian coast inside 
territorial waters. 

On January 28th the senior officer of the mine- 
sweepers reported that he had swept a clear channel along 
the north coast of Scotland from Cape Wrath to Scapa, 
between the coast and the Whiten Bank mine-field laid 
by the Moerve. This channel was instituted for warships 
only for use in daylight. Mercantile auxiliaries were di- 
rected to steer to the northward from Cape Wrath, thence 
to make Noup Head, on the northwest coast of the Ork- 
nej^s, passing afterwards down the west coast to Scapa; 
all other vessels were ordered to pass through the Fair 
Island Channel to their destination. 

During the month of January gunnery practices were 
carried out, both in the Moray Firth and in the Pentland 
Firth. 

The operations of the 10th Cruiser Squadron were 
much restricted by the bad weather experienced, the 
weekly average showing: 

Number of ships intercepted, 21 ; number sent in, 8 ; 
number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports or 
en route to or from patrol, 10; number on special 
service, 2. 

Gales were experienced at Scapa or the neighbour- 
hood on January 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 
15th, 19th, 20th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th and 30th. The weather 
during the month both at Scapa and in the whole northern 
area was exceptionally severe, and seriously hampered 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 269 

the work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron and the movements 
of all small craft. 

Independent squadron exercises at sea by day and by 
night from the various bases were continued in January, 
as was the change of base of the Rosyih squadrons to 
Scapa and Cromarty for practices. 

At 6 A.M. on February 1st the 1st Cruiser Squadron 
and four destroyers left Scapa, steering towards the little 
Fisher Bank, whence the destroyers returned to Scapa, 
and the squadron proceeded to sweep up the Norwegian 
coast during dajdight hours and thence to Scapa. These 
sweeps up the coast were undertaken because it was con- 
sidered probable that enemy raiders, attempting to pass 
out of the North Sea, would hug the coast on passage. 

On February 2nd the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, 
from Harwich, was at sea endeavouring to intercept Zep- 
pelins returning from raiding our east coast. The fishing 
trawler King Stephen on this day sighted Zeppelin L 19 
in a sinking condition in the North Sea. 

On February 5th Submarine D 8 left Blyth to operate 
off the Norwegian coast. She returned on the 13th. 

On February 7th the 7th Cruiser Squadron proceeded 
to a position about 150 miles to the south-eastward from 
Scapa for patrol during the night and returned on the 
8th, on which date the 1st Cruiser Squadron carried out 
a similar patrol, returning on the 9th. 

On the night of February 10th the 10th Sloop Flotilla, 
operating from the Humber under the orders of the Rear- 
Admiral of the East Coast, was attacked by enemy tor- 
pedo craft in the vicinity of the Dogger Bank, and the 
AraMs was sunk. On receipt of the news, and pending 
further information as to the strength of enemy forces at 
sea, the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Rosyth during the night 
of the lOth-llth, and proceeded to the southward; the 



270 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

5th Light Cruiser Squadron sailed from Harwich; and 
the remainder of the Grand Fleet left its bases at Scapa, 
Cromarty and Rosyth to rendezvous in the North Sea and 
move to the southward. The situation became clear dur- 
ing the 11th, when it was evident that the enemy's force, 
which had consisted only of destroyers, had returned to 
its base. 

At 10.30 P.M. (the Battle Fleet being then in Lat. 
57.57 N., Long. 0.20 E.) orders were given for the Grand 
Fleet to return to its bases, and the squadrons arrived on 
the 12th. 

From the 17th to the 19th the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 
with the armed boarding-steamers Dundee and Duke of 
Clarence J from Scapa, swept from that base to the Utvoer 
Lighthouse (Lat. 61.2 N,, Long. 40.31 E.), thence down 
the Norwegian coast and to Rosyth, the armed boarding- 
steamers returning to Scapa. The only vessels sighted 
were two enemy submarines off the coast of Norway. 

On February 18th the new battleship Malaya, the gift 
of the Federated Malay States, arrived at Scapa and 
joined the 5th Battle Squadron. 

On February 22nd Submarines D 7 and E 30 were 
sent to the Skagerrak to examine and board merchant- 
vessels with a view to stopping the iron ore trade from 
Narvik to Rotterdam. Armed guards were sent in the 
submarines. They were ordered, during the latter part 
of their cruise, to operate against two enemy submarines 
reported off the Norwegian coast. They returned on 
February 28th, not having met, outside territorial waters, 
the submarines or with any vessels which were engaged 
in the iron ore trade. 

On February 24th two divisions of destroyers were 
sent without result to operate against a submarine re- 
ported in the Fair Island Channel. 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 271 

On February 26th the Dreadnought Battle Fleet, with 
the 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser 
Squadron and flotillas, left Scapa before daylight for a 
watching and exercise cruise in the northern part of the 
North Sea. A sweep to the Heligoland Bight, in con- 
junction with the Harwich force, had been intended, but 
was abandoned on receipt of a report from Commodore 
Tyrwhitt that the weather and other conditions were un- 
suitable for his operations. Battle exercises took place 
during the afternoon, and the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which 
left Rosyth at 1.30 p.m. on the 26th, joined the Battle 
Fleet at 8 a.m. next day. During that day further battle 
exercises were carried out, including deployments of the 
whole Grand Fleet from its cruising order, so that the 
battle cruisers, cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers might 
become accustomed to taking up the stations assigned to 
them on deployment under certain conditions. The ex- 
ercises were of considerable interest. The Fleet returned 
to its bases on the 28th. 

During the absence of the Fleet from Scapa the mine- 
sweeping sloops patrolled to the eastward of the Orkneys 
to prevent mine-laying in the approaches to the base. 

On February 28th dispositions were made to intercept 
anj' enemy vessel that might be attempting to pass out into 
the North Sea. Information from neutral sources had 
led to a belief in the possibility of such an attempt being 
made. As was almost inevitable on such occasions, the 
information was received after the event, that is, it was 
reported that the vessel in question had already left Ger- 
man waters. The dispositions were made, therefore, on 
this assumption, and in making them it was necessary to 
place our vessels in areas which the enemy might be ex- 
pected to pass through in daylight. 

The dispositions were designed to intercept the ship. 



272 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

whether her mission were mine-laying near our bases, or 
an attempt to pass out into the Atlantic. The Patia and 
Cohimbella, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, were directed 
to patrol a line running north-east from Lat. 61.45 N., 
Long. 0.50 E., and shijos of the same squadron on the 
C Patrol line were directed to extend this line to the 
north-eastward. The Alcantara and Andes, of the same 
squadron, already on a special patrol line, were ordered 
to remain in their position till further orders. Two 
ships of the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and four de- 
stroyers left Rosyth at 8 p.m. on the 28th to patrol the 
area covering the Farn Island — Skaw and the May 
Island — Skaw trade routes, working to the eastward. 
Early on the 29th the Comus and the Calliope, of the 
4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had sailed on the 
28th with two destro5rers for areas in the vicinity of Lat. 
58.38 N., Long. 2.30 E., and Lat. 59.20 N., Long. 8.0 E. 
respectively, were directed to patrol lines 40 miles long, 
running 50° to 230° respectively from a position in Lat. 
61 N., Long. 1.10 E. The Blanche, which had also sailed, 
was ordered to a position Lat. 61.30 N., Long. 0.0. The 
Minotaur and a destroj^er were sent to patrol the Fair 
Island passage during daylight on the 29th. Steps were 
also taken to cover the approaches to the Pentland Firth 
against mine-laying. 

At 8.55 A.M. on the 29th the Andes, Captain G. B. 
Young, R.N., reported by wireless that an enemy vessel 
was in sight in Lat. 61.58 N., Long. 1.8 E., and gave 
her course, speed and description; her enemj^ character 
was assumed owing to her movements. The Alcantara, 
Captain T. E. Wardle, R.N., was not at this time in sight 
of the Andes, but sighted her at 9.10 a.m. chasing a 
strange vessel, joined in the pursuit, and, at 9.15 a.m., 
being then about 6,000 yards from her, ordered her to 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 273 

stop. She complied and informed the Alcantara that 
she was the Norwegian s.s. Rena from Rio to Trondjhem. 
She was flying the Norwegian flag, which was also painted 
on her sides. At 9.40 a.m. the Alcantara, then about 
2,500 yards on the quarter of the stranger, began to 
hoist out a boat for the purpose of boarding. At this 
moment the other vessel opened a heavy fire from her 
hitherto concealed armament, throwing her Norwegian 
ensign and staff overboard and hoisting a German ensign 
at the main. But she still showed the Norwegian flag on 
her sides, where it was displayed throughout the action. 
At the close range at which fire was opened hitting com- 
menced immediately, and as the first hits on the Alcantara 
cut all her communications, Captain Wardle experienced 
great difficulty in passing orders to the guns. But the 
enemj^'s fire was returned quickly and with effect, in spite 
of the difficulty of communication. Both ships went ahead 
and a hot action ensued; the enemy fired torpedoes, one of 
which hit the Alcantara between the boiler-rooms at about 
10 A.M., causing them gradually to fill. 

By 10.15 A.M. the enemy was badly on fire and stopped. 
A few minutes later, at 10.22 p.m., boats were observed 
to be leaving her and the Alcantara ceased firing. The 
latter ship was by this time listing heavily and was aban- 
doned shortly afterwards, sinking at 11.2 a.m. The Andes, 
which had been engaging the enemy at a longer range 
than the Alcantara, rendered assistance to the boats of 
the two ships. 

On receipt of the first signal from the Andes, the 
Calliope, Covins and Blanche had been ordered to the 
scene at full speed. The Comus, Captain Alan G. Hot- 
ham, R.N., the nearest vessel, with the destroyer Munster, 
arrived on the spot Lat. 61.48 N., Long. 1.40 E., as 
the Alcantara was sinking. The Munster picked up the 



274 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

crew of the Alcantara, and as the enemy raider still had 
colours flying the Comus proceeded to sink her by gun- 
fire and to pick up the survivors in her boats. The Cal- 
liope and Magic arrived at 1 p.m., but, not being required, 
returned to their patrol line. The enemy vessel turned 
out to be the disguised raider Grief, armed with four 
5.9-inch guns and two torpedo tubes; she had a comple- 
ment of 306, of whom 209, including many wounded, were 
rescued by the Comus and Andes. 

The incident showed the great difficulty of carrying 
out blockade Avork under modern conditions when deal- 
ing with an unscrupulous enemy. A raider disguised as 
a neutral, and armed with torpedo tubes, is a most diffi- 
cult customer to deal with, and every neutral vessel had 
perforce to be treated as "suspect" after an incident of 
this nature. It is not possible to examine a vessel without 
boarding her, and, except in very fine weather, it is neces- 
sary for the boarding ship to be close to the suspected ship 
before lowering her boat, as the latter obviously cannot 
pull long distances. The experience of the Alcantara 
showed the danger of closing the ship to be boarded. An 
attempt to solve the problem was made by informing all 
neutrals that, when any of our vessels displayed a certain 
signal, the ship to be boarded should steam towards the 
boarding boat, this boat being lowered some distance away. 
But, in order to carry this into effect, we were obviously 
dependent to a large extent on the co-operation of neutrals, 
which was not always in evidence. 

Modern blockade work undoubtedly bristles with dif- 
ficulties which did not exist in the days of our forefathers, 
not the least being the advent of the torpedo and the sub- 
marine. The German method of solving such difficulties 
was to sink vessels at sight, but such methods did not, and 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 275 

never will, appeal to the British mind, or to the mind of 
any seaman belonging to the Allied nations. 

During February, 1916, the somewhat shorter nights, 
combined with more favourable weather, gave the 10th 
Cruiser Squadron better opportunities for the blockade, 
and the average weekly results were: Number of ships 
intercepted, 39; number sent in. 111; number of ships on 
patrol, 12; number absent at ports or en route to or from 
patrol, 9; number detached on special service, 1. 

Gales were experienced at Scapa or in the neighbour- 
hood on February 6th, 7th, 8th, 12th, 14th. The usual 
exchange of bases for practices and the independent 
squadron exercises at sea from the bases were carried out 
during the month. 

On JMarch 1st a party of distinguished Russian gentle- 
men visited the Fleet at Scapa Flow, leaving again in 
the evening. The party included M. Danchenko, Count 
Alexis Tolstoy, M. Vladimir NabakoflP, M. BashmakofF, 
M. Yegoroff and M. Chukovsky. 

On March 2nd the new battleship Valiant, a vessel 
of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, arrived at Scapa and 
joined the 5th Battle Squadron. 

Submarine D7 was despatched on March 5th to the 
Kattegat to intercept trade and to ascertain the situation 
there on the chance of any enemy vessels being found. 
She did not sight any enemy craft. On the same day 
the 3rd Battle Squadron left Rosyth for a watching and 
exercise cruise in the centre portion of the North Sea. 
On the 6th the remainder of the Grand Fleet proceeded 
into the North Sea for a southerly sweep, concentration 
being ordered to take place in the vicinity of the "Long 
Forties," the centre of that area being in Lat. 57.20 N. on 
the meridian of Greenwich. The weather, however, became 
very unfavourable for destroyers, and speed had eventu- 



276 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ally to be reduced to such an extent that the sweep was 
abandoned, and tlie Fleet returned to its bases on the 7th. 
On ]March Otii a patrol consisting of one cruiser and 
one armed boarding-steamer was instituted in an area 
north of the Shetlands. It was designed to cover the 
track of vessels en route between the north of Iceland 
and a point on the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of 
Stadlandet (Lat. 62.10 N., Long. 5.10 E.), as it was 
considered probable that this route might be taken by 
enemy raiders as well as by vessels attempting to evade 
the blockade. The patrol was continued throughout the 
year, although occasional^ m.odified in details and fre- 
quently doubled in strength. It was eventually success- 
ful in intercepting and sinking the German raider Wolf, 
in the sj)ring of 1917, the Achilles (Captain F. M. Leake, 
R.N.) and the armed boarding-steamer Dundee (Com- 
mander Selwyn Daj% R.IST.R.) being the vessels engaged 
in this operation. This patrol was also of use for blockade 
work. 

On IMarch 11th the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 
a division of destroyers of the 1st Flotilla, left Rosyth 
at 7.30 A.M. for operations off the Norwegian coast, the 
objective being the capture of any enemj^ merchant-ships 
found outside territorial waters between Ekersund and 
the Naze. It had been ascertained that some of the Ger- 
man merchant-ships engaged in trade with Norwegian 
ports, and especially Narvik, occasionally ventured outside 
territorial waters in this locality. It was the only locality, 
besides the vicinity of Stadlandet, in which they did so 
venture, and in which, therefore, there was a chance of 
capturing them. The remainder of the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet sailed later, on the 11th, for a position to the south- 
ward of the Naze for supporting purposes. It was also 
intended that the remainder of the Grand Fleet should 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 277 

be cruising in the neighbourhood. But an easterly gale 
sprang up, which prevented the destroyers from accom- 
panying the Battle Fleet, and this portion of the pro- 
gramme was cancelled; Sir David Beatty was informed 
that, if the weather conditions farther south prevented 
his destrojrers from screening the battle cruisers, the latter 
should retui'n to their base and a light cruiser squadron 
be left to support the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron. The 
conditions being unfavourable for destroyers, this course 
was adopted. The weather eventually became too bad 
for the light cruiser squadrons to maintain their speed, 
and the sweep, which was unproductive, was curtailed. 

Submarine E30 proceeded into the Kattegat on 
March 14th to intercept contraband trade and for recon- 
noitring purposes. She did not sight any enemy vessels, 
but sent in one neutral vessel suspected of carrying, 
contraband. 

The 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, from Harwich, was 
at sea on March 14«th and 15th, and the Roxburgh and 
two destroyers left Rosyth on the 15th for another sweep 
on the Norwegian coast from Udsire Lighthouse to the 
Naze. This was again unproductive. 

The cruiser Theseus left Barry on the 15th for Alex- 
androvsk in the White Sea. On the same date the cruiser 
Crescent, en 7-oute from Scapa to the south, was fired at 
and missed by a submarine south of the Hebrides. 

On the 19th the light cruiser Calliope, with two de- 
stroyers, left the Tyne, where she had been refitting, with 
orders to proceed to the Naze and sweep up the Nor- 
wegian coast to Udsire ; and the Comus and two destroyers 
left Scapa to proceed to Udsire to sweep down the Nor- 
wegian coast to the Naze, the object being again the cap- 
ture of any German merchant-ships found outside ter- 
ritorial waters in this locality. The Calliope was forced 



278 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

to put in to Rosyth owing to a serious fire occurring in 
her after boiler-room. The Comus completed her sweep 
in bad weather without sighting any enemy vessels. 

On March 24th the Harwich force sailed to carry out 
aerial operations off the Danish coast, involving an attack 
on the enemy's zeppelin shed at Tondern, and the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet left early that day to cover the operation. 
In the course of the operations the destroyers of the 
Harwich force were stationed in positions to pick up re- 
turning sea-planes, some of them being despatched to the 
southward of the Horn Reef for this purpose. Some 
German outpost trawlers were encountered here by the 
destroyers ; they were engaged and destroyed. But during 
the engagement the destroyer Medusa was rammed by 
the destroyer Laverock, being very seriously damaged. 
The Medusa was taken in tow, but, the weather becoming 
very bad, the towing hawser parted, and all attempts to 
get her in tow again after dark failed. Our vessels were 
in close proximity to the enemy bases, and it was evident 
that the enemj'- would be aware of the incident bj' means 
of his directional wireless system, since a good deal of 
wireless signalling on the part of our ships had been nec- 
essary. It was expected, therefore, that he would send 
out a considerable force of destroyers during the dark 
hours to attack our vessels. In these circumstances, and in 
view of the weather conditions, Commodore Tyrwhitt 
rightly judged it expedient to abandon and sink the 
Medusa, and gave orders to this eff'ect. The ship's com- 
pany of the Medusa was taken off in a most seamanhke 
manner by Lieutenant-Commander Bullen of the Lassoo. 

Owing to the bad weather and the darkness it was 
difficult for Commander Tyrwhitt to ascertain the exact 
conditions, but during the night of the 25th, having sent 
his destroyers ahead, he steered with his light cruisers in 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 279 

order to pass to the northward of the enemy's North 
Sea mine-field. At about 10 p.m. two enemjr destroyers 
were sighted on the port bow of the Cleopatra (flying 
Commodore Tyrwhitt's broad pennant) at a distance of 
about 800 yards. Their i^resence was betrayed by the 
flame from their funnels; they were evidently part of 
the force which, as anticipated, had been sent out by the 
enemy. The Cleopatra at once opened fire and headed 
for the destroyers, and when it was seen that they were 
crossing from port to starboard, Captain Loder Symonds 
of the Cleojmtra ported his helm and rarmned the second 
destroyer very neatly amidships, cutting her practically 
in half. There was a tremendous crash, followed by 
what seemed to be two explosions, one possibly a boiler 
explosion, and the second due to either a mine or depth- 
charge, causing considerable damage to the stem piece 
of the Cleopatra. The injury was subsequently found to 
be far too great to have been caused by the impact alone. 
The sudden alterations of course by the Cleopatra^ com- 
bined with the gunfire and explosions, had thrown the 
squadron into some confusion, and, although fighting and 
navigation lights were all switched on very smartly, the 
Cleopatra, in separating from the sinking destroyer, found 
herself across the Undaunted' s stem; the latter was 
somewhat seriously damaged, and reported subsequently 
that she could only steam at slow speed. The Commodore, 
therefore, remained near the Undaunted for the night. 

JNIeanwhile the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had left 
Rosyth on the 24th to cover the operations, was in the 
vicinity of the Harwich force, and, on the morning of 
the 26th, the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron, except the 
Undawnted, closed the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and the force 
swept back towards her position, not sighting any enemy 
vessels. Three of the light cruisers covered the Un- 



28o THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

daunted during her passage to the Tyne, where she was 
sent for repairs. Considerable difficulty was experienced 
in locating the Undaunted, owing to a difference in "dead 
reckoning" between the various ships. In order to be 
l^repared for eventualities the remainder of the Grand 
Fleet proceeded to sea during the night of the 25th-26th, 
heavy snowstorms being experienced by both the Scapa 
and Cromarty forces on leaving their bases; the visibility 
was also very low; a heavy south-westerly gale sprang 
up when the snow ceased. During the early afternoon 
of the 26th the wireless reports from the Vice-Admiral 
of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, Commodore Tyrwhitt, and 
the Undaunted cleared up the situation, the latter 
ship reporting herself as hove to until the weather 
moderated. 

By 4.30 P.M., when the Fleet was in the vicinity of 
the "Long Forties," the sea had become so heavy and 
steep that destroyers with the Battle Fleet could not 
safely steam at 10 knots, and, as the presence of the 
whole Battle Fleet was no longer necessary in southern 
waters, and the Undaunted was approaching a safe area, 
the 5th Battle Squadron was detached at high speed, 
without destroyers, to assist in covering her passage back 
to the coast, and the remainder of the Battle Fleet and 
cruiser squadrons were ordered back to Scapa and 
Cromarty. The Iron Duke convoyed the destroyer 
flotillas in order that they could be given their position, 
as the coast was approached. The weather moderated 
during the night, and the fleet arrived at its bases on the 
27th. Two destroj'-ers collided off Noss Head just before 
daylight on the 27th, one, the Michael, being somewhat 
seriously damaged. 

By 8 A.M. on the 27th the Undaunted was in Lat 
56,35 N., Long. 2 E., and the 5th Battle Squadron r§'- 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 281 

turned to Scapa, the Battle Cruiser Fleet arriving at 
Rosyth on the 27th. 

The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, the 1st 
and 7th Cruiser Squadrons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron and flotillas again proceeded to sea on March 29th, 
for a watching and exercise cruise in the northern part 
of the North Sea. Battle exercises were carried out on 
the 30th. The Fleet returned to its bases on the 31st, 
the destroyers having to return independently as they 
were unable to maintain Fleet speed through bad weather 
conditions. 

During March the system of carrying out target prac- 
tice in the Pentland Firth off Dunnet Head, instead of 
in the JMoray Firth was regularly instituted, and no further 
practices took place in the Moray Firth during the year 
1916. The new procedure proved to be most satisfactory 
in every respect, no difficulty ever arising, except that 
of towing the target in the strong tides of the Pentland 
Firth. 

On March 19th the battleship Hercules, which had 
been laid up at Scapa with a defective turbine for nearly 
six weeks, completed her repairs. These were carried out 
with the assistance of artisans from the engine contractors. 

The usual visits to Scapa of the squadrons from Rosyth 
for the purpose of practices continued. 

The 10th Cruiser Squadron's weekly average for 
March showed: Number of ships intercepted, 43; number 
sent in, 11; number on patrol, 12; number absent at 
bases, or en route to or from patrol, 9 ; number on special 
service, 1, 

A great deal of fog, mist and snow was experienced 
during the month, and the Aveather generally in northern 
waters was bad, gales occurring on the 6th, 11th, 12th, 
85th, 26th, 27th, 28th and 29th, 



282 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

On April 2nd zeppelins reached the Firth of Forth 
and attacked Leith and Edinburgh, but did not make 
any attempt on the Fleet at anchor. The 2nd Light 
Cruiser Squadron was sent to sea in the hope of inter- 
cej)ting some of them during their return passage, but 
saw nothing of them. 

On April 3rd the Devonshire and two destroyers left 
Rosyth and proceeded to the Norwegian coast in the 
vicinity of Udsire lighthouse, and swept thence to the 
Naze to intercept German merchant-ships, or neutrals 
with contraband which might be found outside territorial 
waters. One Swedish steamer was sent in; heavy traffic 
in territorial waters was reported. 

On April 5th three submarines left Blyth to operate 
against enemy submarines on the route which it was 
thought was taken by them between the Shetlands and 
Heligoland. They were directed to work on lines about 
30 miles apart, zigzagging across the lines. They did not, 
however, sight any enemy submarines. Anti-submarine 
operations of this nature by the submarines attached to 
the Grand Fleet were carried out at frequent intervals 
during the remainder of the year 1916 whenever anj'- craft 
were available for this purpose; the plan of operations 
was constantly varied. The general scheme was to place 
our craft in positions through which hostile submarines 
were expected to pass, or along the routes which they 
usually took. 

On April 6th the Roxburgh left Rosyth with two de- 
stroyers, to repeat once again the operation of sweeping 
down the Norwegian coast from Udsire to the Naze. The 
search was again unproductive. 

On April 12th the armed liner Campania returned 
from a lengthy refit at Liverpool, during which the ship 
had, at my request, been provided with a "flying-off" 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 283 

deck for her sea-planes, as experience throughout the War 
had shown conchisively that it was of little use to depend 
on sea-planes rising from the water, except under the 
most advantageous conditions, and that the only system 
which would give reasonable certainty of the machines 
being able to get into the air when required was to fly 
them from the ship. At the same time I formed the con- 
clusion, after consultation with Captain O. Schwann, of 
the Campania, and pressed it upon the Naval Air Service, 
that the sea-plane should be replaced by aeroplanes flown 
from ships, since the weight of the floats of sea-planes 
greatlj' limited their climbing powers, their radius of ac- 
tion and their speed. This alteration to the Campania 
was the commencement of the system, gradually intro- 
duced, of providing light cruisers, battle cruisers and bat- 
tleships with scouting aeroplanes, which could rise from 
the ship under practically all conditions. I make no apol- 
ogy for referring again to this subject in view of its im- 
portance. 

The Campania had also been fitted to carry a kite 
balloon aft, for use for spotting the fall of shot and for 
reconnaissance purposes. This fitting was the beginning 
of the arrangement, gradually introduced during 1916, of 
carrying kite balloons in capital ships. The success in 
large ships led, before the end of the year, to their being 
also provided for light cruisers, destroyers, and other small 
craft, an arrangement which proved to be of great use 
for anti-submarine and convoy work. 

On April 17th the patrol areas of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron were modified; "A" and "C" patrols took up 
a line running from Lat. 56.30 N., Long. 11.30 W. to 
Lat. 63.30 N., Long. 16.00 W., ships 40 miles apart 
and steering 70° and 250°. Two ships were also stationed 
to the northward of Iceland. 



284 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

On April 20th a force left to carry out an exten- 
sive sweep into the Kattegat, designed (l) to intercept 
and examine all mercantile traffic, (2) to operate against 
enemy vessels in the Kattegat, (3) to engage any enemy 
vessels drawn out from North Sea ports by the move- 
ments in the Kattegat of the light forces, which it was 
intended should be sighted from neutral shores in the 
expectation that they might be reported to the enemy 
by his agents. 

The force included three submarines, which were oi'- 
dered to positions conmianding the northern entrance to 
the Sound, and the Great and Little Belts, so that enemy 
forces drawn from the Baltic by the movement might 
be engaged by them. On April 21st, however, it was 
decided to move south to the vicinity of the Horn Reef 
with the whole Grand Fleet, the object being to induce 
the enemy to keep the ships of the High Sea Fleet in 
North Sea ports instead of sending them to the Baltic, 
where they might cause interference with the relaying the 
Russian mine-fields, an operation which became necessary 
at this season of the year after the ice had broken up. 
It was thought tHat the appearance of the Grand Fleet 
in the vicinity of the Heligoland Bight would probably 
effect this object better than the operation in the Katte- 
gat. Consequently the Grand Fleet left its bases on the 
21st, with orders for the battle and cruiser squadrons to 
concentrate on the morning of the 22nd in a given posi- 
tion to the eastward of the "Long Forties," whilst the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet took station some 40 miles ahead 
of the Battle Fleet in its cruising formation. The 3rd 
Rattle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron, from Rosyth, 
were ordered to an area from which they could concentrate 
later, with the remainder of the Battle Fleet, if required. 

At 2.30 P.M. of the 22nd the 4th Light Cruiser 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 285 

Squadron was detached, with three destroyers, to pro- 
ceed to the Skagerrak, with directions to arrive in the 
vicinity of the Skaw by daylight on the 23rd, and to 
sweep out to the westward. The Battle Cruiser Fleet 
was ordered to push ahead, and at 6 p.m. of the 22nd 
was in Lat. 56.11 N., Long. 5.26 E., cruising in an area 
north-west of the Horn Reef until daylight, when it was 
intended to steer for the Horn Reef, provided the weather, 
which had become misty, was sufficiently clear. The Bat- 
tle Fleet, with cruiser squadrons disposed ahead, steered 
to the eastward from Scapa until shortly before dark, and 
then altered course to South 18 East for the Horn Reef, 
to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet by daylight on the 23rd. 

The weather had been gradually thickening since 3 
P.M., and at 6 p.m. Sir David Beatty reported that the 
Australia and A^ew Zealand had collided in a fog and 
had received damage necessitating both ships returning to 
their base. By 10 p.m. the Battle Fleet and cruisers were 
also in a dense fog, which continued throughout the night. 
It was undesirable to close the Danish coast under such 
conditions with so large a Fleet; the Battle Fleet, cruisers 
and destroyers, when to the westward of the Little Fisher 
Bank, were accordingly turned to the northward, the order 
of turning being rear squadrons first and thence to the 
van, so as to reduce the danger of collision. Special sig- 
nals had been introduced to provide for such circum- 
stances, and were of great use on this occasion. 

In spite, however, of this precaution, some difficulty 
was experienced in carrying out the turn in the dense 
fog that prevailed, especially amongst the destroyers, 
and three of them, namely, the Garland^ Ardent and 
Ambuscade, were in collision; the Ardent was so seriously 
damaged forward that it became necessary to tow her 
back to a repairing-port, stern first. During the night a 



286 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

neutral steamer, in passing through the Fleet in the fog, 
collided with the battleship Neptune, doing considerable 
injury to that ship. 

The weather cleared somewhat during the morning, 
and the Fleet cruised to the westward of the Little Fisher 
Bank until it was certain that the damaged destroyers 
were safely on their way to their bases. The operations 
were then abandoned, as the conditions were unsuitable, 
and the destroyers had not sufficient fuel to admit of the 
Fleet remaining out for a further twenty-four hours, so 
as to repeat the sweep to the Horn Reef on the following 
day. 

The whole Fleet returned to its bases during the 24th, 
fuelled, and again proceeded to sea for another move- 
ment south during the evening of that day, the 5th Battle 
Squadron being sent on in advance of the remainder of 
the Battle Fleet in order to gain touch with and strengthen 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which was, of course, short of 
the Australia and New Zealand, damaged in collision. 

At 4.6 A.M. on the 25th, however, whilst steering to 
the southward, a report was received from Commodore 
Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, that 
he had sighted enemy battle cruisers and light cruisers 
in Lat. 52.24 N., Long. 1.57 E. This report at once in- 
fluenced the direction of the sweep, and the Battle Fleet 
increased to full speed, and shaped a course to pass down 
the searched channel to the westward of the German mine- 
field to support the Battle Cruiser Fleet and the 5th 
Battle Squadron, which proceeded at full speed on a course 
designed to intercept the enemy battle cruisers during 
their expected return passage to their ports. At 4.20 a.m. 
the Admiralty informed me that the enemy was bom- 
barding Lowestoft, and that the 5th Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron was in touch with the enemy's ships; and at 5.40 a.m. 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 287 

the Aldeburgh wireless station reported enemy battle 
cruisers in sight steaming to the eastward. 

At 11 A.M. the Iron Diihe, with the Dreadnought 
Battle Fleet, was m Lat, 5G.22 N., Long. 0.0; the 3rd 
Battle Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron were about 
85 miles and the 5th Battle Squadron about 70 miles to 
the southward, the Battle Cruiser Fleet being well to the 
south-eastward in the direction of Terschelling, and, as 
appeared later, having evidently only just barely missed 
cutting the enemy off from his base. The Battle Fleet 
stood on to the south-eastward until the afternoon, when 
it became evident that the Germans had escaped to their 
bases, and the Fleet then turned to the northward and 
shaped course for the bases, arriving on the 26th. 

On returning, my opinion was asked by the Admiralty 
as to the steps which could be taken to minimise the 
danger of a recurrence of such raids on unfortified towns 
on the south-east coast as that of the 25th. Although 
they inflicted no military damage, they were undoubtedly 
a great annoyance owing to the alarm of the inliabitants, 
and might result in much loss of life. I suggested that 
the placing of the 3rd Battle Squadron in the Humber 
or in the Thames might act as a deterrent, and in any case 
would make it necessary for the enemy to bring heavy 
ships, which would give us an opportunity of inflicting 
injurjr bj^ submarines or by the ships of the Grand Fleet, 
if, by good fortune, we happened to be cruising sufficiently 
far to the southward at the time. The presence of the 
squadron in southern waters would be useful, also, in the 
unlikely event of landing raids, and would provide a good 
backing to the Harwich force, although the difficulties of 
movement, due to the frequent mine-laying by enemy sub- 
marines in southern waters, were considerable. I pointed 
out that since the arrival of the 5th Battle Squadron and 



288 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the other new ships, the 3rd Battle Squadron was no 
longer required to strengthen the Grand Fleet; the ships 
of the "Revenge" class were also approaching comple- 
tion. The projDOsal was adojjted, and the 3rd Battle 
Squadron and 3rd Cruiser Squadron sailed for the Hum- 
ber on the 29th, en route to the Medway. On that port 
the 3rd Battle Squadron was based in future, the 
ships of the 3rd Cruiser Squadron being gradually with- 
drawn for service in foreign waters. The Admiralty also 
stationed some of the monitors in the more important un- 
defended ports. 

During the month of April a policj^ suggested by 
me, of placing the Captains (D) in flotilla leaders instead 
of in light cruisers, was adopted. This was made possible 
by the completion of several vessels of the class. The 
object was to add the light cruisers thus released to our 
all too slender light cruiser force. 

The average weekly figures for the 10th Cruiser Squad- 
ron during April were : 

Number of ships intercepted, 40; number sent in, 10; 
number of ships on patrol, 12; number absent at ports 
or en route to or from patrol, 9; number on special 
service, 1. 

A very considerable amount of mist and fog was ex- 
perienced during the month, and gales on the 8th, 16th 
and 24th. 

On May 2nd forces left for an aerial operation in the 
vicinity of the Horn Reef. The operation was covered 
by the Grand Fleet. One of its objects was, as before, 
to attract the attention of the enemy's naval forces to 
the North Sea. Even if no enemy force were actually 
dravsTi out, it was expected that the presence of the Grand 
Fleet in southern waters would soon become known to 
the enemy from neutral sources, with the result that vessels 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 289 

of the High Sea Fleet, intended for operations in the 
Baltic, might be detained in, or brought back to, North 
Sea ports. From information obtained subsequently from 
reliable sources, it appeared that the operation produced 
the intended result. Between the afternoon of JNIay 2nd 
and daylight on the 3rd the Fleet left its bases. 

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with 16 destroyers 
convoying the sea-plane-carriers Vindeoo and Engadine, 
proceeded to a position just north of the Horn Reef, ar- 
riving at dawn on May 4th; the objective of the sea-planes 
was the zeppelin sheds at Tondern. The mine-layer Abdiel 
proceeded to lay mines on the night of the 3rd-4th to the 
southward of the V)^ Lightship on the expected track 
of enemj' vessels en route to the North Sea via the Horn 
Reef. The mine-layer Princess Margaret was directed 
to lay mines on the same night across the expected route 
taken by enemy vessels if coming out along the route 
passing the West Frisian Islands. Both mine-fields were 
completed without any interference on the part of the 
enemy. 

Three submarines were sent to positions off the Horn 
Reef, three to positions off the Vyl light vessel, and three 
to positions off Terschelling, to arrive on the evening of 
the 3rd.* 

The Battle Cruiser Fleet and destroyers proceeded to 
a position for supporting the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 
near the Horn Reef, with directions to arrive at daylight 
on the 4th, and the Battle Fleet, with its cruiser squad- 
rons, the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the destroyer 
flotillas, to a supporting position to the northward of the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet. The list of ships absent from the 
Fleet on this occasion, owing to refit, repair, or to being 

* Two of our submarines collided while submerged off the Horn Reef, one 
being slightly damaged. 



290 THE Gl^ND FLEET, 1914-1916 

engaged on other operations, is given below; it is useful 
as showing the reduction that takes place in the nominal 
numbers comiDrising a watching fleet at any given mo- 
ment: Battleships, Ajax and Dreadnought; battle 
cruisers, Nexv Zealand, Austi-alia, Invincible; cruisers. 
Black Prince, Warrior, Donegal; light cruisers, South- 
ampton, Gloucester, Blonde; destroyers, 3 from the 1st 
Flotilla, 6 from the 2nd Flotilla, 3 from the 11th Flotilla. 
During the passage south, the 4th Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron was detached to endeavour to locate a zeppelin re- 
ported by directional wireless to be in the centre of the 
North Sea (zeppelins had been seen off the north-east 
coast on the night of the 2nd). The search was unsuc- 
cessful, but the zeppelin descended off Stavanger later 
and was destroyed. 

On the morning of the 4th the conditions for sea- 
planes seemed from the Battle Fleet to be ideal, but, 
once more, the difficulty of getting these machines to rise 
from the water was experienced, a slight sea being suffi- 
cient to prevent all, except one, from carrying out the 
attack. This one sea-plane reported having dropped 
bombs on the objective. The remainder were damaged 
by the sea. 

At 10 A.M. a zeppelin, L 7, was sighted by the 1st 
Light Cruiser Squadron and attacked by gunfire by the 
Galatea and Phaeton. She was damaged sufficiently to 
cause her to descend near submarine E 31 in the vicinity 
of the Vyl Lightship. E 31 completed her destruction 
and rescued seven survivors. 

The Fleet cruised in the vicinity of the Horn Reef 
during May 4th, no enemy vessels being sighted, and then 
returned to its various bases. A thick fog was experienced 
during the return passage, which was made without in- 
cident; the Cromarty force was, however, taken to Scapa, 



OPERATIONS OFF HORN REEF MAY a''" to 5'" 1916. 




ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 291 

as a submarine had been reported off Tarbet Ness in the 
Moray Firth. 

On May 9th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron left 
Scapa to carry out another sweep on the Norwegian coast 
between the Naze and Udsire Lighthouse. The squadron 
was divided, two ships proceeding to the Naze and two 
to Udsire, arriving in position at dayhght on the 10th 
and then sweeping towards each other. One neutral 
steamer, carrying iron ore for Llibeck, was intercepted 
outside territorial waters and sent in. On the same day 
the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron left Rosyth for Scapa, 
searching the central portion of the North Sea en route. 

On the 9th, 11th and 13th the ships on the northern 
patrol off the Shetlands moved in to Stadlandet for a 
short period, on the chance of intercepting ships outside 
territorial waters. 

On the 14th an unsuccessful search for a reported sub- 
marine was carried out to the south-east of the Pentland 
Firth. 

On the 15th Submarines D 7 and E 30 left for the 
Kattegat to operate at the northern end of the Sound and 
off Anliolt Island. One German merchant-steamer was 
intercepted and sunk outside territorial waters off the 
Kullen on the 22nd by E 30. On the 18th another sub- 
marine was sent to operate off Goteberg in Sweden. She 
returned on the 25th, not having sighted any enemy vessels. 

On the same day a reliable report was received that 
an exceptionally large force of enemy submarines was now 
operating in the North Sea, and additional precautions 
were taken at all the bases to strengthen the patrols and 
to protect inward- and outward-bound vessels. The Vice- 
Admiral of the 10th Cruiser Squadron was warned to 
be ready to move all his patrol lines to given alterna- 
tive positions, and on the 19th was directed to move his 



292 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ships to the most western of these lines. Precautions 
against mine-laying by submarines were also taken, and 
the waters to the eastward of the "Long Forties," 
through which the Fleet usually passed when on passage 
south, were examined by the Fleet mine-sweepers, pro- 
tected by destroyers, on the 21st and subsequent days. 
These vessels searched without result on the 22nd for a 
submarine which was being chased by a patrol vessel in 
this neighbourhood. 

On the 21st the Donegal and two destroyers were sent 
to the vicinity of the entrance to Bergen to intercept a 
steamer which, it was thought, had passed through the 
10th Cruiser Squadron blockade during a fog. The ship 
however, called later at Kirkwall, and the force was re- 
called. 

On the 23rd the first of a series of deep mine-fields 
in the Moray Firth, which I had requested might be laid 
with the object of catching enemy submarines, was placed 
in position by the mine-layer Biarritz. 

On the 24th the Donegal and an armed boarding- 
steamer were sent to patrol off Stadlandet with a view to 
intercepting ships engaged in the iron ore trade from 
Narvik. This, as before stated, was one of the few posi- 
tions at which ships were obliged for navigational reasons 
to leave territorial waters. 

On the 24th the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, with 
destroyers, which had been at Rosyth, left for another 
search off the Norwegian coast from the Naze to Udsire, 
and thence to Scapa. The search was unproductive. 

On the 26th two submarines were despatched to 
operate against enemy submarines oiF the Norwegian 
coast, and, on the same date, the 1st Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron, with six destroyers, left, via the searched channel, 
to carry out a reconnaissance to the southward of the 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 293 

German North Sea mine-field. The squadron proceeded 
as far east as Long, 6 E., but, unfortunately, sighted 
nothing. 

The Broke and 12 destroyers left on the 27th to search 
for a submarine reported to have been sighted to the east- 
ward of the Pentland Firth, and returned on the 28th, 
not having seen her ; but on the 27th Trawler Unit No. 42, 
working from Peterhead, reported having engaged and 
sunk a submarine at 12.45 p.m. in Lat. 57.10 N., Long. 
1.20 E., thus adding one more success to the record of 
this patrol. On the 30th Fleet-sweeper Gentian was 
missed, in a position about 40 miles due east of the Pent- 
land Firth, by a torpedo fired evidently by the submarine 
that had been hunted on the 28th. A half flotilla and 
sea-planes were sent out to search, and a submarine was 
sighted at 3.45 p.m. near the position given, but she dived 
and got clear away. 

The movements of the Fleet between the time of leav- 
ing and returning to the bases in connection with the 
Battle of Jutland are given in Chapter XL, but some 
mention may be made of an incident which occurred on 
the night of May 31st. A report was received at Scapa 
that an enemy raider might be attempting to escape into 
the Atlantic. The Vice- Admiral of the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron was directed to assume a patrol north of the 
Shetlands in accordance with a plan which had been pre- 
arranged to meet such a case. On June 3rd, after the 
return of the Fleet to its bases, light cruisers were sent 
out to patrol to the north-westward of the Orknej^s, and 
the 10th Cruiser Squadron was then directed to fall back 
to a position farther west to form a second patrol line. 
Nothing came of the matter. 

During the month of May the weekly average results 
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed: Number of vessels 



294 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

intercepted, 55, besides 17 trawlers; number sent in, 18; 
number of ships on patrol, 11; number absent at ports 
or en route to or from patrol, 9; number on special 
service, 2. 

A good deal of fog and mist was experienced during 
the month, the worst periods being from the 17th to the 
20th, 24th, 26th, and the 28th to 30th. 

During the month of May the firing exercises in the 
Pentland Firth continued, as did the usual exchange of 
bases between squadrons. 

During the months of March, April and May, a 
flotilla of submarines had been gradually organised as a 
unit of the Grand Fleet. It was named the 11th Sub- 
marine Flotilla, was based on Blyth, with the Titania as 
parent ship and the Talisman and Trident as attendant 
destroyers. Separate spheres of activity for the Grand 
Fleet submarine flotillas and for the submarine flotillas 
based on Harwich and Yarmouth were also arranged, the 
dividing line running from a position a little to the south- 
ward of the Horn Reef to Flamborough Head. The line 
was subsequently slightly altered once or twice as the 
strength of the Grand Fleet submarine flotillas increased, 
but the general principle was that the Grand Fleet sub- 
marines worked to the northward of such a line and the 
remaining submarines to the southward. 

It may not be out of place here to mention the 
organisation for getting the Grand Fleet to sea from its 
bases to any desired point of concentration with rapidity 
and safety, and of bringing the Fleet back into the bases 
in face of probable submarine or mine attack. 

As the Grand Fleet increased in size, and the danger 
from mine and submarine grew, so the problem of leav- 
ing Scapa Flow and re-entering that base with safety 
became more complicated. The necessity for the Fleet 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 295 

leaving harbour in the shortest possible time and with the 
fewest possible number of signals was obvious. Similarly 
on returning the various squadrons had to enter the base 
with the least practicable delay in order to avoid giving 
submarines engaged in watching the approaches an oppor- 
tunity for getting into positions for attacking the squad- 
rons in rear, after having sighted those in the van. The 
ojierations, both of departure and entry, were rendered all 
the more difficult owing to the very strong and erratic tides 
experienced in the Pentland Firth, Avhile all ships navi- 
gating at night had to be navigated without showing lights. 

The usual method of departure from Scapa was as 
follows: A "Preparatory Signal for leaving Scapa" con- 
sisting of one word was made as soon as I decided to take 
the Fleet to sea. On receipt of this "Preparatory Signal" 
all ships raised steam for 18 knots at two hours' notice. 
Patrol destroyers were recalled by the Commodore (F) 
for refuelling. All officers and men absent on patrol 
dutj' in drifters were also recalled, and every preparation 
was made for leaving harbour. The Admiral Command- 
ing the Orkneys and Shetlands warned the outer patrols 
that the Fleet might be leaving shortly. 

Whilst the Fleet was raising steam in readiness to be 
off at two hours' notice a signal was made which indicated 
the time at which the first squadron to leave was to move 
ahead from the anchorage, together with the speed to be 
maintained after passing the submarine obstructions. No 
further signals were necessary. The organisation pro- 
vided for the order in which squadrons were to leave, as 
well as the interval between squadrons or divisions, which 
in daylight was usually one mile from the rear ship of 
one squadron, or division of four ships, to the leading ship 
of that following, or two miles at night. The organisa- 
tion also provided for successive squadrons or divisions 



296 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

being taken alternately north or south of the Pentland 
Skerries if the Fleet proceeded to the eastward, in order 
that the interval between those following the same course 
might be increased. 

In the strong tides, particularly at night, some such 
procedure had to be adopted, because the tide was not 
felt until the ships were clear of Swona Island, and then 
the effect of it, if running to the westward, and particu- 
larly at the period of spring tides, when it has a speed of 
10 knots, was to bring a leading squadron or division 
back on top of that in rear of it. Frequently also a ship, 
emerging from slack water into the strength of the tide, 
would be caught by the tide on the bow, and, unless 
the greatest possible care was taken to watch the steering 
(and even sometimes in spite of every care), the ship 
would be turned round through 8, 12 or even 16 points,* 
becoming a danger to those astern of her, as she would 
be almost unmanageable for a time. Such a situation on 
a dark night, with a large fleet showing no lights, was not 
pleasant, and it speaks well for the skill shown in handling 
the ships that no accident occurred from this cause. 

The practice in regard to the destroyers, when they 
accompanied the Fleet (as was necessary after the 
first twelve months of war), was for the various groups 
which were detailed by the Commodore (F) to screen the 
squadrons or divisions of the heavy ships, to meet them 
just outside the submarine obstruction and screen them 
from there in daylight, or on moonlight nights, and 
to form astern on dark nights, in readiness to re-establish 
the screen at daylight. In the early days of the War, and 
indeed for the first eighteen months, the practice was for 
the destroyer flotillas to be stationed some 10 miles from 
the Battle Fleet at night in order to avoid any chance of 

* 8 points = 90 degrees. 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 297 

their being sighted and mistaken for enemy destroyers; 
but this procedure caused considerable delay in forming 
the submarine screen at daylight, and in thick weather 
the destroyers frequently experienced difficulty in finding 
the Battle Fleet. Consequently, it became the practice 
to keep the destroyers actually in company at night, and 
this procedure was undoubtedly preferable. 

After the various squadrons had passed the Pentland 
Skerries, the organisation provided for their taking cer- 
tain defined routes; the usual practice was to use three 
routes with the squadrons divided between them, the 
routes being about seven miles apart. 

A concentration point, which the squadrons would 
reach at the ordered speed shortly after daylight, was 
given in the departure signal, and the squadrons closed 
in on this jJoint at the appointed time, so that the whole 
Battle Fleet, including detachments coming from Cro- 
marty, was concentrated shortly after daylight, with the 
cruisers in their assigned positions scouting ahead. 

The organisation of the Battle Fleet provided for the 
strongest squadron being on the eastern flank, because 
it was considered that the enemy would invariably make 
towards his bases if touch was gained, and it was desired 
to have our strongest squadron in the van. 

The "departure" organisation was carefully worked 
out b}' my Staff and very minutely described in the Grand 
Fleet orders. It was most useful, the whole Fleet, 
comprising frequently 50 or more battleships, cruisers 
and light cruisers, and as many as 50 destroyers, being 
in daylight under weigh in one hour, and clear of the 
harbour in an hour and a half after the signal was made 
to proceed; on dark nights this time was lengthened by 
half an hour. 

When returning to Scapa Flow, the usual practice 



298 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

was for the time of entry to be arranged so that the lead- 
ing squadrons passed the Pentland Skerries shortly before 
dawn, in order to minimise tiie danger from submarine 
attack; but it was not, of course, always possible to 
arrange the time of entry in this manner. In return- 
ing to Scapa, when the arrival was thus timed for dawn, 
the different squadrons were disposed, as a rule, in two 
separate lines, the lines being some five miles apart and 
the squadrons in each line having an interval of about 
three miles between them. One line would enter the 
Pentland Firth by passing north of the Pentland Skerries 
and the other by passing south of these rocks, the object 
being to confuse any enemy submarines that might be 
watching the approaches, and also to get the Fleet into 
the Firth as quickly as possible, as once in the tideway 
there was little to fear from submarine attack. 

If the Fleet entered Scapa Flow during darkness, 
the ships anchored in the centre of the Flow in certain 
specified berths, and waited for daylight before taking 
up their berths in the Fleet anchorage; towards the end 
of my period of command, however, coloured lights were 
arranged to be placed as leading-marks for the Fleet 
anchorage, so that ships could proceed to their final 
berths under all conditions. 

As regards mines, an exploratory search of the chan- 
nel intended to be used was always carried out, if time 
permitted, before the Fleet left, and similarly before 
it returned. Three channels were used, each some 7 
to 10 miles in width — one passing up the east side of 
the Orknej^s, one running to the eastward from the Pent- 
land Skerries, and one passing down the Scottish coast 
for a short distance and then to the eastward. Usually 
the second of these channels was used. 

The principal difficulty with which we had to deal 



ATTEMPTS TO ENTICE ENEMY 299 

when leaving or returning was fog. In a really dense 
fog there was great risk in attempting to leave Scapa 
with a large fleet, owing to the strong tides to be en- 
countered in the Pentland Firth, and nothing but the 
gravest emergency would have justified the attempt being 
made. If it became really necessarj'', an organisation 
had been provided to meet the case, and the attempt 
would have been made. The interval between the various 
squadrons would have been considerably greater, and the 
time occupied in leaving would have been correspondingly 
increased. 

The conditions for leaving the other two fleet bases, 
Cromarty and Rosj'-th, were, of course, simpler, owing to 
the absence of the very strong cross-tides, but fog was 
even more prevalent at Rosyth than at Scapa, and the 
operation of leaving with a considerable number of ships 
was not at all an easy one. It was skilfully performed 
under difficulties on very numerous occasions and with 
remarkable freedom from accident during my period of 
command. The approach to the Firth of Foi'th in thick 
weather was difficult, and many anxious moments were 
experienced in making the land when the position of 
the ships had not been accurately ascertained by sights 
for some time before approaching the base. These 
approaches could have been mined by the enemy with 
great ease by surface ships had they been sufficiently 
enterprising, and it was a standing wonder to me that 
the attempt was never made. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY, 1916 

It may not be out of place here to touch upon the general 
naval situation in the spring of 1916 — that is, on the eve of 
the Battle of Jutland. What were the strategical condi- 
tions? To what extent was it justifiable to take risks 
with the Grand Fleet, particularly risks the full conse- 
quences of which could not be foreseen owing to the new 
conditions of naval warfare? 

The Grand Fleet included almost the whole of our 
available capital ships. There was very little in the way of 
reserve behind it. The battleships not included in the 
Grand Fleet were all of them pre-Dreadnoughts and 
therefore inferior fighting units. They consisted of seven 
ships of the "King Edward VII." class, two ships of the 
" Lord Nelson " class, and four of the " Queen " class, 
all of these ships being in the JNIediterranean except five of 
the " King Edward VII." class. They were required 
there either for work with the Italian Fleet or for the 
operations in the ^gean. Five of our light cruisers were 
also in the Mediterranean. 

The French and Italian Battle Fleets were also in 
the Mediterranean, but, owing to political considerations 
and their duty in watching the Austrian Fleet, there 
was little prospect of their leaving that locality. 

It is interesting to compare this situation with that 
existing a century earlier. In September, 1805, the 
month before Trafalgar, the disposition of British ships 

300 



NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY 301 

in commission in home waters and the Mediterranean is 
given in the following table: 



Station 


Commander-in-Chief 


Ships 
of the 
Line 


Frig- 
ates 


Sloops 

and 

small 

vessels 


Total 


From Shetland to Beachy 
Head 


Lord Keith 
Port Admirals 
Sir J. Saumarez 
Admiral Comwallis 
Lord Gardner 
Lord Nelson 


10 

26 
26 

11 


15 
1 
2 
15 
10 
19 

7 


155 
51 
12 
20 
14 
24 

17 


180 




52 


Guernsey and Jersey 

Off Ushant, etc 


14 
61 




24 




69 


In port refitting and des- 
tined to reinforce Lords 
Nelson and Cornwallis. . . 


35 



In addition to Nelson's force of 26 capital ships and 
19 frigates, the Navy had, therefore, in commission in 
home waters and the Mediterranean a yet more numerous 
force of 47 capital ships and 50 frigates. The main por- 
tion of this force was with Cornwalhs off Ushant, and 
was watching Brest. Between the Shetlands and Beachy 
Head we had 155 sloops and small vessels. 

In 1916, in addition to the Grand Fleet of 39 capital 
ships (including battle cruisers) and 32 cruisers and light 
cruisers, w^e had in commission in home waters and the 
JMediterranean only 13 capital ships (all of pre-Dread- 
nought types and, therefore, obsolescent) and 5 light 
cruisers. Between the Shetlands and Beachy Head we 
had, exclusive of the Grand Fleet and Harwich force, 
about 60 destroyers (mostly of old type), 6 P boats, and 
33 old torpedo boats. 

In September, 1805, we had building 32 ships of the 
line in England, besides 10 under construction in Russia, 
and 36 frigates. In May, 1916, we had building five 
capital ships and about nine light cruisers. 



302 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

A consideration of these figures will show that the 
situation at the two periods under review was very dif- 
ferent, in that, in 1805, the force engaged at Trafalgar 
was only a relatively small portion of the available British 
Fleet, whilst in 1916 the Grand Fleet included the large 
majority of the vessels upon which the country had to 
rely for safety. 

Earlier in the War, at the end of October, 1914, I 
had written to the Admiralty pointing out the dangers 
which an intelligent use of submarines, mines and tor- 
pedoes by the Germans, before and during a Fleet action, 
would involve to the Grand Fleet, and had stated the 
tactics which I had intended to employ to meet the 
expected German movement in order to bring the enemj^ 
to action in the shortest practicable time and with the best 
chance of achieving such a victory as would be decisive. 
I stated that with new and untried methods of warfare 
new tactics must be devised to meet them. 

I received in reply an expression of approval of 
my views and of confidence in the manner in which I 
proposed to handle the Fleet in action. 

Neither in October, 1914, nor in May, 1916, did the 
margin of superiority of the Grand Fleet over the High 
Sea Fleet justify me in disregarding the enemy's torpedo 
fire or meeting it otherwise than by definite movements 
deduced after most careful analysis of the problem at sea 
with the Fleet and on the tactical board. 

The severely restricted forces behind the Grand Fleet 
were taken into account in making this decision. There 
was also a possibility that the Grand Fleet might later 
be called upon to confront a situation of much wider 
scope than that already existing. 

The position gradually improved after 1916. During 
the latter half of that year the remaining ships of the 



NAVAL SITUATION IN MAY 303 

"Royal Sovereign" class joined the Grand Fleet, and 
greatly increased the ratio of strength of the Fleet as 
compared with the High Sea Fleet. Early in 1917 it 
was also possihle to withdraw the four battleships of the 
"Queen" class from the Adi-iatic. This greatly eased the 
manning situation. And in April, 1917, the culminating 
event was the entry of the United States of America into 
the War on the side of the Entente. In December, 1917, 
the United States sent a division of battleships to join 
the Grand Fleet, and it was apparent that we could count 
upon the whole battleship strength of the United States 
Navy, if required, to second our efforts. 

Finally, and perhaps most important of all, the light 
cruiser and destroyer forces with the Grand Fleet in- 
creased steadily after the Battle of Jutland, and to a very 
considerable extent reduced the danger of successful tor- 
pedo attack on the Grand Fleet in action by surface craft. 
The inclusion of the K. class submarines — submarines of 
high speed — in the Grand Fleet in 1917 made it very 
probable that any losses suffered by us by submarine 
attack Avould be more than compensated by enemy losses 
from the same cause. 

In spite of the fact that, in 1918, the situation in 
regard to battle cruisers was becoming unsatisfactory, 
the general effect of all these considerations upon the 
tactics of the Grand Fleet was bound to be overwhelming. 
The position was assured, and we could have afforded to 
take risks later on which, in 1916, would have been most 
unwise. 



CHAPTER XII 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



On May 31st, 1916, the Grand Fleet and the High Sea 
Fleet fought the action which has become known as the 
Battle of Jutland. The despatch* describing the battle, 
as published some weeks later, was not quite in its original 
form as written by me. After a conference held at the 
Admiralty, early in June, modifications were made: some 
of them because it was considered that certain passages 
might convey useful information to the enemy, and others 
because it was thought to be undesirable to draw attention 
to certain features of British design. Amongst the latter 
was the insufficiency of the armour protection of our 
earlier battle cruisers. 

Throughout the War it had been our policy to cause 
our battle cruisers, with their attendant light cruisers, to 
occupy when at sea an advanced position, often at a con- 
siderable distance from the Battle Fleet. Battle cruisers 
were designed and built in order that they might keep 
in touch with the enemy and report his movements 
when he had been found; hence the heavy guns which 
they carried. They were intended to find the enemy for 
the Battle Fleet and to ascertain the enemy's strength in 
order to report to the Battle Fleet. Had this policy not 
been adopted the enemy's battle cruisers could not have 
been brought to action on such occasions as the engage- 
ment of January 24ith, 1915. And in the cases of raids 

* See Appendix. 
304 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 305 

on our coast, the battle cruisers were always sent ahead 
at full speed to endeavour to cut off the enemy battle 
cruisers. 

Bearing in mind our superiority in numbers in the 
middle of 1916 and the heavier armaments carried by our 
ships, the real risk involved in this policy was that of our 
battle cruisers being drawn on to the enemy's Battle 
Fleet, and one or more of our vessels being disabled. 
Provided that our ships were not disabled, they would, 
owing to their higher speed, have no difficulty in clear 
weather in keeping out of range of the enemy's Battle 
Fleet, if it were sighted, whilst still maintaining touch 
with it, and driving off lighter vessels. With the added 
support of the ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, which 
had been gi-ouped with the Battle Cruiser Fleet owing to 
the absence of the 3rd Battle Squadron at Scapa Flow, 
the tactical advantage of our ships was even stronger, 
provided always that the 5th Battle Squadron had an 
excess of speed over the fastest enemy's Battle Squadron. 

In these circumstances, when preparing my despatch, 
I had felt it necessary on the highest grounds, as well as 
only just to the officers and men of our battle cruisers, 
to give some explanation of the heavy losses incurred by 
our ships in the early part of the action, when we were 
opposing six battle cruisers (supported, though at long 
range, by four battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" 
class, comprising the 5th Battle Squadron) to five enemy 
battle cruisers, which were not then supported by the 
German Battle Fleet. Inquiry into this matter showed 
that one explanation was that our ships were very in- 
adequately protected by armour as compared with the 
German vessels of the battle cruiser type. It was con- 
sidered undesirable to draw attention to this publicly 
while the war was in progress. 



306 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The relative values of protection and gun power had 
frequently engaged my serious attention. It was also a 
subject of much discussion amongst writers on naval 
matters, some of whom went to the length of suggesting 
that all available weight should be put into gun power and 
that ships should be left practically without armour. 
Their views were based on the argument that "the best 
defense is a powerful offensive." Although this argu- 
ment is very true when applied to strategj^ the War has 
shown its fallacy as applied to materiel. The loss of the 
Good Hope, Monmouth, Queen Mary, Indefatigable, 
Invincible, Defence, and Warrior, and the considerations 
to which these losses gave rise, convinced naval officers 
afloat, even if they did not convince others less intimately 
associated with the Fleet during the War, that ships with 
inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those 
which possess them to a considerably greater degree, 
even if the former are superior in gun power. The con- 
viction was strengthened by the knowledge we obtained, 
that German ships, far more frequently hit by gunfire, 
torpedo, or mine than many of our ships that sank, were 
yet taken safely into port owing, partly, to their defensive 
qualities, but, partly, to the limitations of our armour- 
piercing shell at that time. 

There has been in the past a tendency in some quar- 
ters, when comparing the relative strength of the British 
and German Fleets for the purpose of future provision 
of large vessels in the Navy Estimates, to make com- 
parison only on the basis of the gun power of the vessels 
of the two Navies. Great superiority in fighting quali- 
ties on the part of the British Fleet was suggested by this 
blindness to other considerations. During my pre- War 
service at the Admiralty this question was often under 
discussion, and I consistently demurred to this line of 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 307 

argument as being very misleading, and pointed out that 
the true comparison lay between the ditiplacement of the 
ships of the various classes, because if we assumed, as 
War experience has since shown that we were justified 
in assuming that the German naval designers and 
constructors were not inferior in ability to our own, 
it was obvious that, taking ships of equal displacement 
and equal speed, and about contemporary date, if our 
vessels possessed superiority in gunfire, the Germans 
must possess superiority in some other direction. It was 
well known at the Admiralty that their superiority lay in 
greatly increased protection, combined with heavier tor- 
pedo armament. 

We were also aware that the German vessels were 
fitted with small tube boilers, which were very economical 
in weight for a given horse-power, and, consequently, the 
German vessels obtained thereby a further advantage, 
the weight saved being presumably utilised in giving the 
ships additional protection. In other words, they adopted 
a different disposition of the weight available in each 
ship. 

The tables on pp. 308-11 give particulars of the 
armament, protection, and displacement of the capital 
ships of the two Navies engaged in the Battle of Jutland, 
so far as they are known to me. 

The main facts revealed by an examination of these 
tables are: 

BATTLESHIPS 

1. The German ships of any particular period were of con- 
siderably greater displacement as compared with contemporary 
British ships. 

2. The German ships carried a much greater weight of ar- 
mour than their British contemporaries. 



TABLE 
BRITISH 







Designed 








Sub- 






load 




Fuel 


Main and 


merged 


Ships 


Programme 


displace- 
ment 


Speed 


capacity 


secondary 
guns 


torpedo 
tubes 




Year 


Tons 


Knots 


Tons 






"Royal Sovereign" 


1913-14 


25,750 


21.5 


3,400 


8, 15" 


4 


Class (5) 










14, 6" 




"Queen Elizabeth" 


1912-13 


27,500 


25.0 


3,400 


8, 15" 


4 


Class (5) 










12, 6" 




"Iron Duke" Class (4) 


1911-12 


25,000 


21.0 


4,300 


10, 13".5 
12, 6" 


4 


"King George V." 


1910-11 


23,000 


21.0 


4,000 


10, 13".5 


2 


Class (3) 










12, 4" 




"Orion" Class (4) 


1909-10 


22,500 


21.0 


4,100 


10, 13".5 
13, 4" 


2 


Canada 


Emergency 


28,000 


22.75 


3,800 


10, 14" 
12, 6" 


4 


Erin - 


War 
Programme 


23,000 


21.0 


2,800 


10, 13".5 
16, 6" 


3 


Agincouri 




27,500 


22.0 


3,800 


14, 12" 
20, 6" 


3 


"Hercules" Class (3). 


1909-10 


20,000 


21.0 


3,700 


10, 12" 
12, 4" 


2 


"St. Vincent" Class (2) 


1907-8 


19,250 


21.0 


3,700 


10, 12" 
13, 4" 


2 


" Bellerophon " Class 


1906-7 


18,600 


21.0 


3,500 


10, 12" 


2 


(3) 










12, 4" 






1905-6 


17 900 


21 


4 000 


10 12" 


i 












20, 12pds. 





TABLE 
BRITISH BATTLE 







Designed 






Main 


Sub- 










Fuel 


and 


merged 


Ships 


Programme 


displace- 
ment 


Speed 


capacity 


secondary 
guns 


torpedo 
tubes 




Year 


Tons 


Knots 


Tons 






Tiger (1) 


1911-12 


28,500 


29.0 


6,800 


8, 13".5 


2 












12, 6" 




"Lion" Class (3) 


1909-10 


26,350 


28.0 


4,600 


8, 13".5 
15, 4" 


2 


"New Zealand" Class 


— 


18,800 


26.0 


4,000 


8, 12" 


2 


(3) 










14, 4" 




"Inflexible" Class (3). 


1905-6 


17,250 


25.0 


3,800 


8. 12" 
12, 4" 


4 



308 



BATTLESHIPS 



Ahmoub 




Main 

belt 


Upper 
belt 


Belt 

at 
bow 


Belt 

at 

stem 


Second- 
ary gun 
battery 
armour 


Tur- 
ret 
front 
plates 


Protective 
decks 


Remarks 


13" 
13" 


C" 
6" 


4" 
4," 


4" 
4" 


C" 
6" 


13" 
13" 




to 4" 
to 3" 


Side armoured up to 
upper deck and second- 
ary battery above that. 
Ditto 


12" 


9" and 8" 


4" 


4" 


6" 


11" 


la 


to 2i" 


Ditto 


12" 
12" 


9" and 8" 
9" and 8" 


4" 
4," 


2A" 
24" 


nil 
nil 


11" 
11" 


1?' 
la' 


to 4" 
to 4" 


Side armoured up to 
upper deck. 
Ditto 


9" 

12" 


7" and 4J" 
9" and 8" 


i" 
4" 


4" 
4" 


6" 

5" 


10" 
11" 


li' 


' to 4" 
' to 3" 


Side armoured up to 
upper deck and second- 
ary battery above that. 
Ditto 


9" 


6" 


4" 


4" 


6" 


12" 


1" 


to IJ" 


Ditto 


11" 
10" 


8" 
8" 


ii" 
2" 


2|" 
2" 


nil 
nil 


11" 
11" 


r 


' to 4" 
' to 3" 


Side armoured up to 
main deck only. 
Ditto 


10" 


8" 


6" 


5" 


nil 


11" 


a.' 


' to 3" 


Ditto 


11" 


8" 


6" 


4" 


nil 


11" 


f" to 3" 


Ditto 



II 

CRUISERS 



Armour 




Main 
belt 


Upper 
belt 


Belt 
at 
bow 


Belt 

at 
stem 


Second- 
ary gun 
battery 
armour 


Tur- 
ret 
front 
plates 


Protective 
decks 


Remarks 


9" 

9" 
6" 
6" 


6" 
6" 


4" 

4" 
4" 
4" 


4" 

4" 
4" 
nil 


6" 

nil 
nil 
nil 


9" 

9" 

7" 
1" 


1" to 3" 

1" to 2i" 
1" to 2i" 
i" to 2J" 


Side armoured up to 
upper deck and second- 
ary battery above that. 

Side armoured up to 

upper deck. 
Side armoured up to 

main deck. 

Ditto 



309 



TABLB 
GERMAN 



Ships 


Prograrame 


Designed 
load 

displace- 
ment 


Speed 


Fuel 
capacity 


Main and 

secondary 

guns 


Sub- 
merged 
torpedo 

tubes 


"Konig" Class (4) . . . . 
"Kaiser" Class (6) . . . 
"Heligoland" Class (4) 
"Nassau" Class (4). . . 


Year 
1911-12 

1909-11 

1908-9 

1907-8 


Tons 
25,390 

24,410 

22,440 

18,600 


Knots 
23.0 

21.0 

20.5 

20.0 


Tons 
4,200 

3,700 

3,100 

2,800 


10, 12" 
14, 5".9 

10, 12" 
14, 5".9 

12, 12" 
14, 5".9 

12, 11" 
12, 5".9 


5 
5 
6 
6 



TABLE 
GERMAN BATTLE 



Ships 


Programme 


Designed 
load 

displace- 
ment 


Speed 


Fuel 
capacity 


Main and 

secondary 

guns 


Sub- 
merged 
torpedo 

tubes 


"Derfflinger" Class*. . 
Seydlitz 


Year 
1911-12 

1910-11 

1908-9 
1907-8 


Tons 
20,180 

24,610 

22,640 
19,100 


Knots 
28.0 

26.75 

27.25 
26.0 


Tons 
5,600 

3,700 

3,200 
2,900 


8, 12" 
14, 5".9 

10, 11" 
12, 5".9 

10, 11" 
12, 5".9 
8, 11" 
10. 5".9 


4 
4 


Moltke 


4 


Von der Tann 


4 



TABLE 

Comparison of weight of armour in British and German ships 



Battleships — 

Monarch British . . 

Kaiser German . 

Battle Cruisers — 

Queen Mary British . . 

Seydlitz German . 



Displacement 



22,500 
24,410 



27,000 
24,610 



Weight of 
armour 



Tons 
4,560 
5,430 

3,900 
5,200 



Note. — Similar comparisons between other ships 
* Lutzow was similar. 
310 



Ill 

BATTLESHIPS 



AUMODH 




Main 
belt 


Upper 
belt 


Belt 

at 
bow 


Belt 

at 

stern 


Second- 
ary gun 
battery 
armour 


Tur- 
ret 
front 
plates 


Protective 
decks 


Remarks 


14" 
13". 75 
11". 75 
11". 76 


10" 
9" 

73" 
7f" 


(i" 
7:J" 
7i" 
6" 


6" 

73" 
7J" 
4" 


8" 
75" 
7F' 
6J" 


14" 
llf 
llf" 
11" 


2J" to 3" 
U" to 4" 
IJ" to 2f" 
2" to 4f" 


Side armoured up to 
upper deck and second- 
ary battery above that. 

Ditto, but at after end 
side only armoured up 
to main deck. 

Side armoured up to 
main deck and second- 
ary battery above that. 
Ditto 



IV 

CRUISERS 



Armour 




Main 
belt 


Upper 
belt 


Belt 
at 
bow 


Belt 

at 
stern 


Second- 
ary gun 
battery 
armour 


Tur- 
ret 
front 
plates 


Protective 
decks 


Remarks 


12" 

iir 

11" ] 
91". 


8" 

8" 

taper- 
ing 


5" 

4" 
i" 
4" 


5" 

4" 
4" 
4" 


7" 

6" 
5" 
5" 


11" 

10" 
10'' 
9" 


1" to 3.2" 

1" to 3i" 

? same as 
Seydlitz 

? same as 
Seydlitz 


Side armoured up to 
upper deck with second- 
ary battery above that. 
Ditto 

Ditto 

Side armoured up to 
main deck with second- 
ary battery armoured 
to upper deck. 



of the same date. N. B. — The German figures are approximate. 



Weight of deck 
protection 


Total 


Length of ship 


Beam 


Tons 
2,010 
3,130 

2,300 
2,400 


Tons 
6,570 
8,560 

6,200 
7,600 


Feet 
645 
564 

660 
656 


Feet 
88§ 
96 

89 
93i 



of the same date would show similar results. 

311 



312 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

3. All German Dreadnoughts were provided with side ar- 
mour to the upper decic, whilst nine of the earliest British 
Dreadnoughts were provided with armour protection to the 
main deck only, thus rendering them far more open to artillery 
attack. The "Orion" class of battleship and the "Lion" class 
of battle cruiser, designed during my service at the Admiralty 
as Controller, were the first of our Dreadnoughts armoured to 
the upper deck. 

■1. The main belt and upper belt armour of the German ships 
was in nearly all cases thicker than in their British contempo- 
raries, whilst the protection at the bow and stern was in all cases 
considerably greater in the German ships. 

5. The deck protection in the German ships was usually 
greater than in the British vessels and the watertight subdivision 
more complete. 

6. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged 
torpedo tubes than the British vessels. 

BATTLE CRUISERS 

1. The earlier German battle cruisers were of greater dis- 
placement than their British contemporaries. 

2. The German ships carried a greater weight of armour than 
their British contemporaries. 

3. Five out of our nine battle cruisers were without protection 
above the main deck, the whole of the German vessels being 
provided with protection to the upper deck. 

4. The German vessels possessed thicker armour in all posi- 
tions, including deck protection, as well as more complete water- 
tight subdivisions. 

5. The German ships carried a greater number of submerged 
torpedo tubes than the British ships. 

As against the additional protection of the German 
ships our vessels of contemporary design were provided in 
all cases with heavier turret guns, whilst the German 
ships carried heavier secondary armaments. 

A point of considerable interest, which should also 
be mentioned because it was to prove important, was 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 313 

that the Germans possessed a delay-action fuse which, 
combined with a highly efficient armour-piercing pro- 
jectile, ensured the burst of shell taking place inside 
the armour of British ships instead of outside, or whilst 
passing through the armour, which was the case with 
British shells of that date fired against the thick German 
armour. 

The fuel capacity of the ships of the two Navies was 
not widely different, although the British ships, as a 
rule, were fitted to carry more fuel. Although I arranged, 
after the first few months of war, to reduce the amount 
of fuel carried by our ships very considerably — in fact, 
by more than 25 per cent.^ — I was unable to reduce it fur- 
ther in coal-burning ships without sacrificing some of the 
protection afforded bj^ the coal, since in our case it was 
necessary to be prej)ared to do a considerable amount of 
steaming at high speed, involving expenditure of coal, 
before obtaining contact with the enemy. It would have 
been unwise to contemplate meeting the Germans with 
coal below what I may call the "safety line." On the 
other hand, it was well known that, as the Germans had 
no intention of fighting an action far from their bases, 
they had effected a very much greater reduction in the 
quantity of fuel carried with consequently a correspond- 
ing advantage in speed. 

There was yet one other matter of great importance, 
namely, the vulnerability of the ships of the two Navies 
in regard to under-water attack. Here the Germans pos- 
sessed a very real advantage, which stood them in good 
stead throughout the war. It arose from two causes : 

1. The greater extent of the protective armour inside 
the ships, and in many cases its greater thickness. 

2. The greater distance of this armour from the outer 



314 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

skin of the ship and the consequent additional protection 
to under-water attack afforded thereby. 

In regard to the first point, the great majoritj'^ of 
our ships only carried partial internal protection, that is, 
protection over a portion of the length of the ship. The 
protection was usually confined to the region of the 
magazine and shell-rooms. In the German ships it ran 
throughout the length of the vessel. 

As to the second point, it was possible to place the 
protective bulkhead farther "inboard" in the German 
ships without cramping machinery and magazine spaces, 
because the ships themselves were of much greater beam. 
Consequently the" explosion of a mine or a torpedo against 
the hull of the ship was far less likely to injure the pro- 
tective bulkhead and so to admit water into the vitals of 
the ships than was the case with a British vessel. The 
result was that, although it is known that many German 
capital ships were mined and torpedoed during the war, 
including several at the Jutland battle, the Germans have 
not so far admitted that any were sunk, except the pre- 
Dreadnought battleshij) Pommern and the battle cruiser 
Lutzaw, whose injuries from shell fire were also very 
extensive. 

On the other hand, British capital ships, mined or 
torpedoed, rarely survived. The recorded instances of 
escape are the Inflexible (mined in the Dardanelles) and 
the Marlborough (torpedoed at Jutland) , and in the latter 
case, although the torpedo struck at about the most 
favourable spot for the ship, she had some difficulty in 
reaching port. 

The question will be asked why it was that British 
ships were under this disadvantage. The reply is that the 
whole of our Dreadnought battleships, designed before 
the War, were hampered by the absence of proper dock 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 315 

accommodation. The German Emperor once remarked 
to me at Kiel on this subject, that we had made the 
mistake of building our ships before we had proper dock 
accommodation for them, whilst in Germany they had pro- 
vided the dock accommodation first and had designed the 
ships subsequently. He was quite right, although, since 
docks took a long time to construct, the German policy 
involved delay in shipbuilding, whereas we got ships of 
a type, and hence our margin of superiority in 1914. As 
each successive type of Dreadnought was designed, our 
constructive staff were faced with the fact that if they 
went beyond a certain beam the number of docks avail- 
able would be insufficient; and it was always a matter 
of great difficulty to obtain money with which to con- 
struct adequate docks. Docks make no appeal to the 
imagination of the public and cost a great deal of money. 
The result was that August, 1914, found us with a superi- 
ority in ships, but woefully lacking in dock accommoda- 
tion; and for this reason alone a Fleet action early in 
the War, resulting in considerable damage to heavy ships, 
would have produced embarrassing results. 

It is only just to our very able constructive staff at 
the Admiralty to point this out ; it was one of the reasons 
which led to the German ships being much better equipped 
to withstand under- water attack than were our own. It is 
devoutly to be hoped that this lesson will be borne in mind 
in the future, and adequate dock accommodation provided 
for the Fleet. 

The matter is one of which I have considerable per- 
sonal knowledge, since it came within my province as 
Controller in 1909-11 and was also given to me to examine 
whilst Second Sea Lord in 1913. It is needless to say 
that on both occasions the necessities were pointed out 
with emphasis. These remarks are not out of place, as 



3i6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

will be shown, as an introduction in a consideration of the 
Battle of Jutland, if that action is to be rightlj^ judged. 

In following the proceedings of the Fleet it is essen- 
tial to bear in mind that the time of receipt of signals, 
especially of reports emanating from the bridge of a ship, 
is not a true indication of the time at which the officer 
making the report began his task. A varying but con- 
siderable interval is bound to elapse; this includes the 
time taken to write out the report, transmit it to the 
wireless office or signal bridge, code it, signal it, decode 
it on board the receiving ship, write it out and transmit 
it to the bridge. The interval is greater with wireless 
than with visual signals. 

I. — The Battle Cruiser Fleet's Action 

The Grand Fleet put to sea on IMay 30th for the pur- 
pose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the 
North Sea. The orders from me under which the Fleet 
acted were as follows: 

Vice- Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram, with the 2nd Battle 
Squadron from Cromart}^ was directed to pass through 
a position in Lat. 58.15 N., Long. 2.0 E., and to meet 
the remainder of the Battle Fleet at 2 p.m. on the 31st 
at position (A) in Lat. 57.45 N., Long. 4.15 E. 

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, with the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet and the 5th Battle Squadron, was directed 
to proceed to a position in Lat. 56.40 N., Long. 5 E., 
economising fuel in the destroyers as much as possible; 
it was expected that he would be in that position by about 
2 P.M. on the 31st, after which he was directed to stand 
to the northward to get into visual touch with the Battle 
Fleet. 

The Iron Duke and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons, 



<:^atae Meet 
I T (apprcnc .) 



Plan AP 7. 



. m-35 p.m..l?!-& 3V^ 
L.C.Ss Joined- 



Operations of 

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET 

n00p.mto^l5p.m.3l^!^May. 



Jr-35 p. m. 



B.CP. 
irOOp.m. 

o 

Lcot.S6''48'N. 
Lang. 4°48'E. 



ooiU 



lUhampton JI-35 p.m 




JV-30p.m.. 

Lon^.5°58i'E. 

'■37p.m.. 
Sighted, enemy Battle 'Fleet 

^ IVWp.TTV. „ 

-^£cU.56?33sN. 
'^^Lan(i.5f49'B. 

IV45p.rnXi ^■^. 

2V^L£.S. cdtureJ. 

coume to Northward . ^^ 



B.CJ'.'BattU Crudser I^Aiet 
L.C's "Light- Crxuiser'a. 



iy38/,.m.X:) 
"Enen^ Battle Fleet 
(apprcrjc.j 



30 SEA MILES 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 317 

together with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, and the 
newly commissioned light cruisers Chester and Canter- 
bury, which had been carrying out gunnery and torpedo 
practices at Scapa, left that base during the evening of 
May 30th, and proceeded towards position (A), Lat. 
57.45 N., Long, 4.15 E., having met the 2nd Battle 
Squadron eti route at 11.15 a.m. in Lat. 58.13 N., 
Long. 2.42 E. Sir David Beatty had been informed 
before sailing that the Battle Fleet would steer towards 
the Horn Reef from the position in Lat. 57.45 N., 
Long. 4.15 E. 

At 2 P.M. on May 31st the Battle Fleet was about 
18 miles to the north-westward of the positiooi (A), 
being actuallj'^ in Lat. 57.57 N., Long. 3.45 E., in 
organisation No. 5. The Fleet had been shghtly delayed 
for the purpose of enabling the usual and necessary prac- 
tice of examining trawlers and other vessels met with en 
route to be carried out without causing the examining 
vessels to expend unnecessary fuel in regaining station. 
We had to be on our guard against scouts. The divi- 
sions were in line ahead disposed abeam to starboard 
in the order: lst-6th Divisions (screened by the 4th, 
11th, and 12th Flotillas) with the 4th Light Cruiser 
Squadron, three miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. 
The cruisers, with one destroyer to each cruiser, were 
stationed 16 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, spread six 
miles apart on a line of direction N. 40 E. and S. 40 W.; 
the cruisers being eight miles apart and their positions 
being in the order from east to west : 

(F.) (F.) 

Cochrane Shannon Minotaur Defence Du£e oj Edinburgh BtaeH Prime 



Hampshire (linking ship 6 miles astern of the Minotaur) 



3i8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The attached cruisers, the Active, Boadicea, Blanche, 
and Bcllona, were on the flanks of the Battle Fleet, and 
the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, with the light cruisers 
Chester and Canterbury, about 20 miles ahead, the whole 
steering S. 50 E., and zigzagging, the speed of advance 
being 14 knots. 

The disposition of the Battle Fleet is shown below: 



Ist'Div. 2nd Div. 3rd Div. 4th Div. 5th Div. ' 6th Div. 

King George V. (P.) Orion (^.) Iron Duke (F.¥.) Baibow (F.) Colossus (F.) Marlborough (F.) 

Ajax Monarch Royal Oak BeUcrophon Collingwood Revenge 

Centurion Conqueror Superb (F.) Temeraire Neptune Hercules 

Erin Thunderer Canada Vanguard St, Vincent Agincourt 

F., Flagships; F.F., Fleet Flagship. 

It may be added in further explanation that the 
flagships of the Battle Fleet were: 

Iron Duke, Fleet-Flagship. — Flag of Admiral Sir John Jellicoe (Com- 
mander-in-Chief) . 

King George V. — Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir M. Jerram, Com- 
manding 2nd Battle Squadron. 

Orion. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. C. Leveson, Rear-Admiral in 
the 2nd Battle Squadron. 

Superb. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral A. L. Duff, Rear-Admiral in 
the 4th Battle Squadron. 

Benbow.- — Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Command- 
ing the 4th Battle Squadron. 

Colossus. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral E. F. A. Gaunt, Rear-Admiral 
in the 1st Battle Squadron. 

Marlborough. — Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, Com- 
manding 1st Battle Squadron and second in command of 
the Grand Fleet. 

The Battle Cruiser Fleet and 5th Battle Squadron, 
with destroyers, were at 2 p.m. in Lat. 56.46 N., Long. 
4.40 E., and had turned to the northward, steering N. by 
E., speed 19I/2 knots, in the order: 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 319 

The Lion and 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron in single 
line ahead, screened by the light cruiser Champion and 
10 destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, with the 2nd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron in single line ahead three miles E.N.E. 
of the Lion, screened by six destroyers.* The 5th Battle 
Squadron, in single line ahead, was five miles N.N.W. 
of the Lion, being screened by the light cruiser Fearless 
and nine destroyers of the 1st Flotilla. The Light Cruiser 
Squadrons formed a screen eight miles S.S.E. from the 
Lion, ships spread on a line of direction E.N.E. and 
W.S.W., five miles apart in the order from west to east: 

2nd Light Cruiser 3rd Light Cruiser 1st Light Cruiser 

Squadron Squadron Squadron 

Southampton (F.) Nottingham Falmonlh (F.) Birkenhead Inconstant Galatea (F.) 

Birmingham Dublin Gloucester Cordelia Phaeton 

It should be added that the flagships were : 

Lion. — Battle Cruiser Fleet-Flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir David 
Beatty. 

Prhicess Royal. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral O. de B. Brock, com- 
manding 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

Netv Zealand.- — Flagship of Rear-Admiral W. Pakenham, command- 
ing 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

Barham. — Flagship of Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, commanding 
5th Battle Squadron. 

The Engadine, a sea-plane carrier, was stationed be- 
tween the light cruisers Gloucester and Cordelia, and the 
light cruiser Yarmouth acted as linking ship between 
the Lion and the light cruiser screen. 

The first report of enemy vessels was received from the 
Galatea, the flagship of Commodore E. S. Alexander- 
Sinclair, commanding the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, 
who, at 2.20 p.m.^ sighted two enemy vessels to the 

* These destroyers belonged to the Harwich force, but happened to be at 
Rosyth. 



320 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

E.S.E. apparently stopped and engaged in boarding a 
neutral steamer. Sir David Beatty, recognising the possi- 
bilities of the situation, immediately turned his fleet to the 
S.S.E., the course for the Horn Reef, so as to get 
between the enemy and his base. 

At 2.35 P.M. the Galatea reported a large amount of 
smoke "as from a fleet" bearing E.N.E., followed by a 
report that the vessels were steering north. The course 
of the Battle Cruiser Fleet was then altered to the east- 
ward and N.E. towards the smoke, the enemy being 
sighted at 3.31 p.m. and identified as five battle cruisers 
accompanied by destroyers. 

Meanwhile the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons 
changed their direction, and, judging the situation 
accurately, spread to the east without waiting for orders, 
forming a screen in advance of the heavy ships. Our 
Light Cruisers sighted and engaged enemy vessels of a 
similar class at long range. The 2nd Light Cruiser 
Squadron, under Commodore W. E. Goodenough, with 
his broad pendant in the Southampton, came in at high 
speed towards the battle cruisers and formed ahead of 
them on an E.S.E. course, and at 3.30 p.m. sighted 
enemy battle cruisers bearing E.N.E. 

On receipt of the Galatea's report, Sir David Beatty 
ordered the Engadine to send up a sea-plane to scout to 
the N.N.E. This was the first time that sea-planes had 
been used for reconnaissance work with a fleet in an 
action, and the event is notable for that reason. The 
low-lying clouds made observation difficult, but the sea- 
plane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. S. Rutland, R.N., as 
pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as 
observer, was able, by flying low under the clouds, to 
identify and report four enemy light cruisers, the report 
being received on board the Lion at 3.30 p.m. The 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 321 

sea-plane was under heavy fire from the light cruisers 
during the observation. By this time the line of battle 
was being formed, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with 
the destroj^ers of the 9th and 13th Flotillas taking station 
ahead. The course was E.S.E., slightly converging on 
the enemy, the speed 25 knots, and the range 23,000 
yards. Sir David Beatty formed his ships on a line of 
bearing in order to clear the smoke. 

The 5th Battle Squadron, which had conformed to the 
movements of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, was now bearing 
N.N.W., distant 10,000 yards; the weather was favour- 
able, the sun being behind our ships, the wind S.E., and 
the visibility good. 

INIeanwhile the wireless reports from the Galatea to the 
Lion had been intercepted on board the Iron Duke, and 
directions were at once given to the Battle Fleet to raise 
steam for full speed, the ships being at the time at short 
notice for full speed. The cruisers had been ordered to 
raise steam for full speed earlier. At 3.10 p.m. the Battle 
Fleet was ordered to prepare for action, and at 3.30 p.m. 
I directed Flag Officers of Divisions to inform their ships 
of the situation. The earliest reports from the Galatea 
had indicated the presence of light cruisers and destroyers 
only, and my first impression was that these vessels, on 
sighting the British force, would endeavour to escape via 
the Skagerrak, as they were to the eastward of our vessels 
and were consequently not in so much danger of being 
cut off as if they turned to the southward. The 3rd 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, which was well placed for cut- 
ting the enemy off, had the anticipated move taken place, 
was ordered to frustrate any such intention ; but at 4 p.m., 
on the receipt of the information of the presence of enemy 
battle cruisers, it was directed to reinforce Sir David 



322 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Beatty. About 3.40 p.m. I received a report from Sir 
David Beatty that he had sighted five battle cruisers and 
a number of destroyers, and he gave his position at the 
same time. 

As soon as the presence of hostile battle cruisers was 
reported, course was altered in the Battle Fleet to close 
our battle cruisers, and speed increased as rapidly as 
possible. By 4 p.m. the "Fleet Speed" was 20 knots, 
being higher than had previously been obtained. Zig- 
zagging was abandoned on receipt of the Galatea's first 
report. The battleships were also directed to keep clear 
of the wake of the next ahead in order to prevent loss of 
speed from the wash. 

At 3.48 P.M. the action between the battle cruisers 
began at a range of about 18,500 yards, fire being opened 
by the two forces practically simultaneously. At the com- 
mencement the fire from the German vessels was rapid 
and accurate, the Lion being hit twice three minutes after 
fire was opened, and the JLion, Tiger and Princess Royal 
all receiving several hits by 4 p.m.; observers on board 
our own ships were also of opinion that our fire was 
effective at that stage. 

At about 4 P.M. it was evident by the accuracy of the 
enemy's fire that he had obtained the range of our ships, 
which was then about 16,000 yards. The enemy bore 
well abaft the beam, and course was altered slightly to 
the southward to confuse his fire control. Course was 
altered two or three times subsequently for the same pur- 
pose. The German ships frequently zigzagged for the 
purpose of confusing our fire control. 

At this period the fire of the enemy's ships was very 
rapid and accurate ; the Lion received several hits, the roof 
of one of her turrets being blown off at 4 p.m. At about 
4.6 p.m. the Indefatigable was hit, approximately at the 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 323 

outer edge of the upper deck level in line with the after 
turret, by several projectiles of one salvo; an explosion 
followed (evidently that of a magazine) and the ship fell 
out of the line, sinking by the stern. She was again hit 
by another salvo forward, turned over and sank. 

About this time (4.8 p.m.) the 5th Battle Squadron 
came into action, opening fire at a range between 19,000 
and 20,000 yards. This slower squadron was some dis- 
tance astern of the battle cruisers and, by reason partly of 
the smoke of the ships ahead of the enemy vessels and 
partlj^ of the light to the eastward having become less 
favourable, difficulty was experienced in seeing the 
targets, not more than two ships being visible at a time. 
At 4.12 P.M. the range of the enemy's battle cruisers 
from our own was about 23,000 yards, and course was 
altered from S.S.E. to S.E. to close the enemy. Fire 
had slackened owing to the increase in range. 

The tracks of torpedoes were now reported as crossing 
the line of our battle cruisers, and reports of sighting the 
periscopes of enemy submarines were also made by more 
than one ship. 

In accordance with the general directions given by 
Sir David Beatty to the destroyers to attack when a 
favourable opportunity occurred, the Nestor, Nomad, 
Nicator, Narborough, Pelican, Petard, Obd/urate, Nerissa, 
Moorsom, Morris, Turbulent and Termagant moved out 
at 4.15 P.M.; at the same time a similar movement took 
place on the part of an enemy force of one light cruiser 
and 15 destroyers. Both sides first steered to reach an 
advantageous position at the van of the opposing battle 
cruiser lines from which to deliver their attack, and then 
turned to the northward to attack. A fierce engagement 
at close quarters between the light forces resulted, and the 
enemy lost two destroyers, sunk by our vessels; and, in 



324 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

addition, his torpedo attack was partially frustrated ; some 
torpedoes were fired by the enemy, two of which crossed 
the track of the 5th Battle Squadron, which had been 
turned away to avoid the attack. 

During this action, ^vhich reflected the greatest credit 
on our destroyers, several of our attacking vessels, owing 
to their having dropped back towards the rear of our line, 
were not in a good position to attack the enemy's battle 
cruisers A^ith torpedoes. The Nestor, Nomad, and Nicator, 
most gallantly led by Commander the Hon. E. B. S. Bing- 
ham in the Nestor, were able to press home their attack, 
causing the enemy's battle cruisers to turn away to avoid 
their torpedoes. The Nomad was damaged and forced 
to haul out of line before getting within torpedo range of 
the battle cruisers, but the Nestor and Nicator succeeded 
in firing torpedoes at the battle cruisers under a heavy 
fire from the German secondary armaments. The Nestor 
was then hit, badly damaged by the fire of a light cruiser, 
and remained stopj)ed between the lines. She was sunk 
later by the German Battle Fleet when that force 
appeared on the scene, but not before she had fired her last 
torpedo at the approaching ships. The Nomad was also 
sunk by the German Battle Fleet as it came up, but this 
vessel also fired her torpedoes at the fleet as it approached. 
In both these destroyers the utmost gallantry in most try- 
ing circumstances was shown by the officers and men. It 
is gratifying to record that a considerable proportion of 
the ship's company of both destroyers was picked up by 
German destroyers as the German Battle Fleet passed 
the scene. After completing her attack upon the battle 
cruisers, the Nicator was able to rejoin her flotilla. The 
Moorsom also attacked the enemy's Battle Fleet and 
returned. In the meantime, the Petard, Nerissa, Turbu- 
lent and Termagant succeeded in firing torpedoes at long 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 325 

range (7,000 yards) at the enemy's battle cruisers. For 
his gallantry on the occasion of this destroyer attack 
Commander the Hon. E. B. S, Bingham, who was 
rescued from the Nestor and taken prisoner by the 
Germans, received the Victoria Cross. 

Meanwhile the engagement between the heavy ships 
had become very fierce, and the effect on the enemy battle 
cruisers began to be noticeable, the third ship in the line 
being observed to be on fire at 4.18 p.m., whilst our ships 
of the 5th Battle Squadron were also inflicting and re- 
ceiving some punishment. The accuracy and rapidity of 
the fire from the enemy's vessels was deteriorating at 
this period; our own ships were much handicapped by the 
decreasing visibility, due partly to the use by the enemy 
of smoke screens, under cover of which he altered course 
to throw out our fire. 

The flagship Barham, of the 5th Battle Squadron, 
received her first hit at 4.23 p.m. 

At about 4.26 p.m. a second disaster befell the British 
battle cruisers. A salvo fired from one of the enemy's 
battle cruisers hit the Queen Mary abreast of "Q" turret 
and a terrific explosion resulted, evidently caused by a 
magazine blowing up. The Tiger, which was following 
close astern of the Queen Mary, passed through the dense 
cloud of smoke caused by the explosion, and a great deal 
of material fell on her decks, but otherwise the Queen 
Mary had completely vanished. A few survivors from 
this ship and from the Indefatigable were afterwards 
rescued by our destroyers. The loss of these two fine 
ships with their splendid ships' companies was a heavy 
blow to the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the instantaneous nature 
of the disaster adding to its magnitude.* 

* I was not aware of the loss of the Queen Mary and Indefatigable until 
the morning of June 1st. 



326 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

At 4.38 P.M. Commotlore Goodenough, in the South- 
ampton, Flagship of tlie 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, 
which had been scouting ahead of the Battle Cruisers, re- 
ported that the enemy's Battle Fleet was in sight bearing 
S.E., and steering to the northward, and gave its position. 
Sir David Beatty recalled his destroyers, and on sighting 
the Battle Fleet at 4.42 p.m. turned the battle cruisers 
16 points in succession to starboard. This movement was 
followed by the enemy's battle cruisers, and Sir David 
Beatty directed Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas to turn 
his ships in succession 16 points to starboard. Commo- 
dore Goodenough led the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron 
to a favourable position from which to observe the 
movements of the enemy's Battle Fleet, within 13,000 
yards' range of the heavy ships, and, in spite of a very 
heavy fire, clung tenaciously to these ships and for- 
warded several reports of their position and movements; 
the skilful manner in which the Commodore, aided by his 
captains, handled the squadron under this fire undoubtedly 
saved the ships from heavy loss. Owing to the constant 
manoeuvring of the ships of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron during the engagement, the position of the Soiithamp- 
ton, as obtained by reckoning, was somewhat inaccurate, 
as was to be expected. This fact detracted from the value 
of the reports to me; the position of the enemy by lati- 
tude and longitude, as reported from time to time to 
the Iron Duke, was consequently incorrect. This dis- 
crepancjr added greatly to the difficulty experienced in 
ascertaining the correct moment at which to deploy the 
Battle Fleet, the flank on which to deploy, and the direc- 
tion of deployment. Such discrepancies are, however, 
inevitable under the conditions. 

The necessary move of the battle cruisers to the south- 
ward in their pursuit of the enemy, at a speed consid- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 327 

erably in excess of that which the Battle Fleet could 
attain, resulted in opening the distance between the two 
forces, so that at the time of the turn of Sir David Beatty's 
force to the northward, the Iron Diihe and the ILion were 
over 50 miles apart, and closing at a rate of about 45 miles 
per hour. 

As soon as the position of the Lion was known after 
the receipt of the report of enemy battle cruisers being 
in sight, Rear- Admiral the Hon. H. S. Hood was directed 
to proceed immediately to reinforce Sir David Beatty's 
force, whose position, course and speed was signalled to 
the Rear- Admiral. The latter officer reported his own 
position and gave his course and speed as S.S.E., 25 knots. 
At the same time the Battle Fleet was informed that our 
battle cruisers were in action with the enemy's battle 
cruisers, and an inquiry was addressed to Rear-Admiral 
Evan-Thomas to ascertain whether he was in company 
with Sir David Beatty, a reply in the affirmative being 
received, with a report that his squadron was in action. 

At this time I was confident that, under the determined 
leadership of Sir David Beatty, with a force of four of our 
best and fastest battleships and six battle cruisers, very 
serious injurjr would be inflicted on the five battle cruisers 
of the enemy if they could be kept within range. 

The report of the presence of the German Battle Fleet, 
which was communicated to our Battle Fleet, did not 
cause me any uneasiness in respect of the safety of our 
own vessels, since our ships of the 5th Battle Squadron 
were credited with a speed of 25 knots. I did not, how- 
ever, expect that they would be able to exceed a speed of 
24 knots; the information furnished to me at this time 
gave the designed speed of the fastest German battleships 
as 20.5 knots only. Even after making full allowance for 
the fact that our ships were probably carrying more fuel 



328 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

and stores proportionately than the Germans, and giving 
the Germans credit for some excess over the designed 
speed, no doubt existed in my mind that both our battle- 
ships and our battle cruisers vi^ith Sir David Beatty could 
keep well out of range of the enemy's Battle Fleet, if 
necessary, until I was able to reinforce them. I learned 
later, as an unpleasant surprise, that the 5th Battle Squad- 
ron, when going at its utmost speed, found considerable 
difficulty in increasing its distance from the enemy's 3rd 
Battle Squadron, consisting of ships of the "Konig" 
class, and on return to Scapa I received a report from the 
Admiralty which credited this enemy squadron with a 
speed of 23 knots for a short period, this being the first 
intimation I had received of such a speed being attainable 
by them. 

To return to Sir David Beatty. The action between 
the battle cruisers was renewed during the retirement of 
our ships to the northward, and the two leading ships of 
the 5th Battle Squadron, the Barham and Valiant, sup- 
ported our battle cruisers by their fire, whilst the two rear 
ships of that force, the Warspite and Malaya, engaged 
the leading ships of the enemy's Battle Fleet as long as 
their guns would bear, at a range of about 19,000 yards. 

The light cruiser Fearless, with destroj^ers of the 1st 
Flotilla, were now stationed ahead of the battle cruisers, 
and the light cruiser Champion, with destroyers of the 
13th Flotilla, joined the 5th Battle Squadron. The 1st and 
3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been in the rear 
during the southerly course, now took up a position on the 
starboard, or advanced, bow of the battle cruisers, the 2nd 
Light Cruiser Squadron being on the port quarter. Dur- 
ing this northerly run the fire from our ships was very 
intermittent, owing to the weather thickening to the east- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 329 

ward, although the enemy was able at times to fire with 
some accuracy. 

From 5 P.M. until after 6 p.m. the light was very much 
in favour of the enemy, being far clearer to the westward 
than to the eastward. A photograph taken on board the 
Malaya at 5.15 p.m. towards the western horizon estab- 
lished this clearly. Our destroyers, shown silhouetted 
against the bright horizon, were at this time at least 16,000 
yards distant. 

Our battle cruisers ceased fire altogether for about 30 
minutes after 5.12 p.m. owing to the enemy's ships being 
invisible, fire being reopened at about 5.40 p.m. on the 
enemy's battle cruisers, three or four of which could be 
seen, although indistinctly, at a distance of some 14,000 
yards. Between 5.42 and 5.52, however, our fire seemed 
to be effective, the Lion alone firing some 15 salvoes during 
this period. 

At 5.10 P.M. the destroyer Moresby, which had re- 
joined the Battle Cruiser Fleet after assisting the Enga- 
dine with her sea-plane, fired a torpedo at the enemy's 
line at a range of between 6,000 and 8,000 yards from a 
favourable position — two points before the beam of the 
enemy's leading battle cruiser. 

At 5.35 P.M. the Lion's course was gradually altered 
from N.N.E. to N.E. in order to conform to the 'signalled 
movements and resulting position of the British Battle 
Fleet. The enemy's battle cruisers also gradually hauled 
to the eastward, being probably influenced in this move- 
ment by reports received from their light cruisers, which 
were by this time in contact with the light cruiser Chester 
and in sight of our 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron led by 
Rear- Admiral Hood. 

The proceedings of these vessels will now be described. 

At 4 P.M., in accordance with my directions, the 3rd 



330 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Battle Cruiser Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Hood, 
proceeded at full speed to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 
5 P.M. the squadron, comprising the Invincible (Flag), 
Inflexible, and Indomitable, in single line ahead in that 
order, with the destroyers Shark, Christopher, Ophelia, 
and Acasta, disposed ahead as a submarine screen, had 
the light cruiser Canterbury five miles ahead and the light 
cruiser Chester bearing N. 70° W., and v^^as steering S. 
by E. at 25 knots. The visibility was rapidly decreasing. 
According to the Indomitable' s report, objects could be 
distinguished at a distance of 16,000 yards on some bear- 
ings, and on others at only 2,000 yards, and from then 
onwards, according to the same report, the visibility 
varied between 14,000 and 5,000 yards, although other 
reports place it higher at times. 

At 5.30 P.M. the sound of gunfire was plainly heard 
to the south-westward, and the Chester turned in that 
direction to investigate, and, at 5.36 p.m., sighted a thi-ee- 
funnelled light cruiser on the starboard bow, with one or 
two destroyers in company. The Chester challenged and, 
receiving no reply, altered course to west to close, judg- 
ing from the appearance of the destroyer that the vessel 
was hostile. 

As the Chester closed, course was altered to about 
north in order to avoid being open to torpedo attack by 
the destroyer on a bearing favourable to the latter. This 
turn brought the enemy well abaft the port beam of the 
Chester and on an approximately parallel course. During 
the turn the Chester sighted two or more light cruisers 
astern of the first ship, and the leading enemy light cruiser 
opened fire on the Chester, the latter replying immediately 
afterwards, at a range of about 6,000 yards. The visi- 
bility at this time, judging by the distance at which the 
enemy's light cruisers were sighted from the Chester, 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 331 

could not have exceeded 8,000 yards. The enemy's fourth 
salvo hit the Chester, put No. 1 gun port out of action, 
and killed and wounded a large proportion of the gun 
crews of Nos. 1, 2, and 3 port guns. The light cruisers 
sighted by the Chester undoubtedly belonged to one of 
the enemy's scouting groups stationed on the starboard 
bow of their battle cruisers. 

Captain Lawson of the Chester, in view of the superior 
force to which he was opposed, altered course to the N.E. 
and towards the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, bringing 
the enemy's light cruisers, all of which had opened a rapid 
and accurate fire, astern of him. The enemy vessels 
turned after the Chester, and during the unequal engage- 
ment, which lasted for 19 minutes, Captain Lawson suc- 
cessfully manoeuvred his ship with a view to impeding 
the accuracy of the hostile fire, realising that she was in no 
condition to engage such superior forces successfully in 
her damaged state. 

The Chester closed the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
and took station N.E. of this squadron, joining the 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron at a later phase of the action. The 
ship suffered considerable casualties, having 31 killed and 
50 wounded ; three guns and her fire control circuits were 
disabled; she had four shell holes a little distance above 
the water line. It was on board the Chester that the 
second Victoria Cross of the action was earned, post- 
humously, by Jack Cornwell, Boj^ 1st Class, who was 
mortally wounded early in the action. This gallant lad, 
whose age was less than I6I4 j^ears, nevertheless re- 
mained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly 
awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the guns' 
crew, dead and wounded, all round him. 

Meanwhile flashes of gunfire were seen from the 3rd 
Battle Cruiser Squadron at 5.40 p.m., and Rear- Admiral 



332 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Hood turned his ships to starhoard and brought the 
enemy light cruisers, which were engaging the Chester, 
and from which vessels the flashes came, on to his port 
bow. During this turn the destroyers attached to the 
3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were brought on to the port 
quarter of the squadron. As soon as Rear- Admiral Hood 
made out his position he led his squadron with the Canter- 
bury between the enemy and the Chester, on a course 
about W.N.W., and at 5.55 p.m. opened an effective fire 
on the German light cruisers with his port guns, at a 
range of about 10,000 to 12,000 yards. The enemy ves- 
sels turned away from this attack and fired torpedoes at 
the battle cruisers; the tracks of five torpedoes were seen 
later from the Indomitable. At about 6.10 p.m. the In- 
vincible and Indomitable turned to starboard to avoid 
these torpedoes, three of which passed very close to the 
latter ship, and ran alongside within 20 yards of the ves- 
sel. The Inflexible turned to port. 

Meanwhile more enemy light cruisers were sighted 
astern of the first group, and the four British destroyers, 
Shark, Acasta, Ophelia and Christopher, attacked them 
and the large destroyer force in company with them, and 
were received by a heavy fire which disabled the Shark 
and damaged the Acasta. On board the Shark the third 
V.C. of the action v/as earned by her gallant captain, 
Commander Loftus Jones, this award also being, I regret 
to say, posthumous. 

The attack of the British destroyers was carried out 
with great gallantry and determination, and having frus- 
trated the enemy's torpedo attack on the 3rd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, Commander Loftus Jones turned his 
division to regain his position on our battle cruisers. At 
this moment three German vessels came into sight out 
of the mist and opened a heavy fire, further disabling the 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 333 

Shark and causing many casualties on board ; Commander 
Loftus Jones was amongst those wounded. Lieut.- 
Commander J. O. Barron, commanding the Acasta, came 
to the assistance of the Shark, but Commander Loftus 
Jones refused to imperil a second destroyer, and directed 
the Acasta to leave him. The Shark then became the 
target for the German ships and destroyers. Commander 
Loftus Jones, who was assisting to keep the only un- 
damaged gun in action, ordered the last torj)edo to be 
placed in the tube and fired; but whilst this was being 
done the torpedo was hit by a shell and exploded, causing 
many casualties. Those gallant officers and men in the 
Shark who still survived, continued to fight the only gun 
left in action, the greatest heroism being exhibited. The 
captain was now wounded again, his right leg being 
taken off by a shell; but he still continued to direct the 
fire, until the condition of the Shark and the approach of 
German destroyers made it probable that the ship would 
fall into the hands of the enemy, when he gave orders 
for her to be sunk, countermanding this order shortly 
afterwards on realising that her remaining gun could still 
be fought. Shortly afterwards she was hit by two tor- 
pedoes, and sank with her colours flj^ing. Only six sur- 
vivors were picked up the next morning by a Danish 
steamer. In recognition of the great gallantry displayed, 
the whole of the survivors were awarded the Distinguished 
Service Medal. Their names are: W. C. R. Griffin, 
Petty Officer; C. Filleul, Stoker Petty Officer; C. C. 
Hope, A.B.; C. H. Smith, A.B.; T. O. G. Howell, A.B.; 
T. W. Swan, Stoker. 

At this point it is well to turn to the proceedings of 
our advanced cruiser line, which at 5 p.m. was about 16 
miles ahead of the Battle Fleet, the latter being at that 
time in Lat. 57.24i N., Long. 5.12 E., steering S.E. by S. 



334 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

at 20 knots. It should be noted that, owing to decreasing 
visibihty, which was stated in reports from the cruisers to 
be shghtly above six miles, the cruisers on the starboard 
flank had closed in and were about six miles apart by 5.30 
P.M. The 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron was about 16 
miles due east of the advanced cruiser line, but was steer- 
ing more to the southward on a converging course at a 
speed of about five knots faster. 

At 5.40 P.M. firing was heard ahead by the cruiser line, 
and shortly afterwards ships were seen from the Minotaur 
to be emerging from the mist. Rear- Admiral Heath, the 
senior officer of the cruiser line, had recalled the ships 
of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron on hearing the firing and 
had ordered them to form single line ahead on the 
Minotaur. He then made the signal to engage the 
enemy, namely, the ships in sight ahead; but before fire 
was opened they replied to his challenge and were identi- 
fied as the ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, en- 
gaged with the enemy's light cruisers and steering to the 
westward. 

At 5.47 P.M. the Defence, with the Warrior astern, 
sighted on a S. by W. bearing (namely, on the starboard 
bow) three or four enemy light cruisers, and course was 
altered three points to port, bringing them nearly on a 
beam bearing. Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, in 
the Defence, then signalled "Commence fire." Each 
ship fired three salvoes at a three-funnelled cruiser. The 
salvoes fell short, and the Defence altered course to star- 
board, brought the enemy first ahead, and then to a 
bearing on the port bow, evidentlj;^ with the intention of 
closing. The latter alteration of course was made at 6.1 
P.M., and by this time projectiles from the light cruisers 
were falling in close proximity to the Defence and the 
Warrior. These ships opened fire with their port guns 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 335 

at 6.5 P.M. and shortly afterwards passed close across the 
bows of the Lion from port to starboard. One light 
cruiser, probably the Wiesbaden, was hit by the second 
salvoes of both shijDS, appeared to be badly crippled, and 
nearly stopped. Our ships continued to close her until 
within 5,500 yards. From about 6.10 p.m. onwards they 
had come under fire of guns of heavy calibre from the 
enemy's battle cruisers, but Sir Robert Arbuthnot, as 
gallant and determined an officer as ever lived, was evi- 
dently bent on finishing off his opponent, and held on, 
probably not realising in the gathering smoke and mist 
that the enemy's heavy ships were at fairly close range. 
At about 6.16 P.M. the Defence was hit by two salvoes in 
quick succession, which caused her magazines to blow up 
and the ship disappeared. The loss of so valuable an 
officer as Sir Robert Ai-buthnot and so splendid a ship's 
company as the officers and men of the Defence was a 
heavy blow. The Warrior was verj^ badly damaged by 
shell fire, her engine-rooms being flooded; but Captain 
Molteno was able to bring his ship oat of action, having 
first seen the Defence disappear. From diagrams made 
in the Warrior it appears that the German battle cruisers 
turned 16 points (possibly with a view either to close their 
Battle Fleet or to come to the aid of the disabled Wies- 
baden), engaged the Defence and Warrior, and then 
turned back again. This supposition is confirmed by 
sketches taken on board the Duke of Edinburgh at the 
same time. Owing to the smoke and the mist, however, 
it w^as difficult to state exactly what occurred. From the 
observations on board the Warrior it is certain that the 
visibility was much greater in her direction from the 
enemy's line, than it was in the direction of the enemy 
from the Warrior. Although the Defence and Warrior 
were being hit frequently, those on board the Warrior 



336 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

could only see the ships firing at them very indistinctly, 
and it is probable that the low visibility led to Sir Robert 
Arbuthnot not realising that he was at comparatively short 
range from the German battle cruisers until he was already 
under an overwhelming fire. 

The Warrior passed astern of the 5th Battle Squadron 
at the period when the steering gear of the Warspite had 
become temporarily disabled.* 

The Duke of Edinhurgli, the ship next to the west- 
ward of the Defence and the Warrior in the cruiser 
screen, had turned to close these ships when they became 
engaged with the enemy's light cruisers in accordance 
with a signal from the Defence. The Duke of Edinburgh 
joined in the engagement, but, on sighting the Lion on 
her starboard bow, did not follow the other ships across 
the bows of the battle cruisers, as to do so would have 
seriously incommoded these vessels; she turned to port to 
a parallel course and eventually joined the 2nd Cruiser 
Squadron. 

The Black Prince was observed from the Duke of 
Edinburgh to turn some 12 points to port at the same 
time that the Duke of Edinburgh turned, but her subse- 
quent movements are not clear; the German accounts of 
the action stated that the Black Prince was sunk by gun- 
fire at the same time as the Defence, but she was not seen 
to be in action at this time by anj^ of our vessels, and, 
moreover, a wireless signal, reporting a submarine in sight 
and timed 8.48 p.m., was subsequently received from her. 
It is probable that the Black Prince passed to the rear 
of the Battle Fleet at about 6.30 p.m., and that during the 
night she found herself close to one of the German battle 
squadrons, and was sunk then by superior gunfire. In 
support of this theory, the German account mentions that 

* Cf. page 350. 




g-^- 



50 

5 i 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 337 

a cruiser of the "Cressy" type was sunk in that manner 
during the night. None of the ships of this class was 
present during the engagement, but the Black Prince 
might well have been mistaken for a ship of this type in 
the circumstances. 

We left the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron at about 
6.10 P.M. at the termination of their engagement with 
enemy light cruisers, turning to avoid torpedoes fired at 
them. At about this time Rear- Admiral Hood sighted 
the Lion and the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, and at 
about 6.16 P.M. hoisted the signal to his squadron to form 
single line ahead, and turned to take station ahead of the 
Lion and to engage the hostile battle cruisers, which at 
6.20 P.M. were sighted at a range of 8,600 yards. 

A furious engagement ensued for a few minutes, and 
the fire of the squadron was judged by those on board 
the Invificible to be very eff'ective. Rear- Admiral Hood, 
who was on the bridge of the Invincible with Captain 
Cay, hailed Commander Dannreuther, the gunnery officer 
in the fore control, at about 6.30 p.m., saying, "Your fir- 
ing is very good. Keep at it as quickly as you can ; every 
shot is telling." At about 6.34 p.m. the Invincible, which 
had already been hit more than once by heavy shell with- 
out appreciable damage, was struck in "Q" turret. The 
shell apparently burst inside the turret, as Commander 
Dannreuther saw the roof blown off. A very heavy ex- 
plosion followed immediately, evidently caused by the 
magazine blowing up, and the ship broke in half and sank 
at once, only two officers, including Commander Dann- 
reuther, and four men being subsequently picked up by 
the destroyer Badger. The British Navy sustained a most 
serious loss in Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace Hood, 
one of the most distinguished of our younger flag officers, 
and in Captain Cay and the officers and men of his flagship. 



338 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The difficulties of distinguishing enemy ships even at the 
close range of this engagement is revealed by the fact that 
the officers in the Invincible and Indomitable were under 
the impression that they were engaging battle cruisers, 
whilst officers in the Inflexible, stationed between these 
two ships in the line, reported that her fire was being di- 
rected at a battleship of the "Kaiser" or "Konig" class, 
and that only one ship could be seen. 

Just before the loss of the Invincible, the 3rd Light 
Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear- Admiral Napier, 
had carried out an effective torpedo attack on the enemy's 
battle cruisers ; both the light cruisers Falmouth and Yar- 
mouth fired torpedoes at the leading battle cruiser. It was 
thought that one of the torpedoes hit its mark as a heavy 
under-water explosion was felt at this time. 

After the loss of the Invincible, the Inflexible was 
left as leader of the line, and as soon as the wreck of the 
Invincible had been passed, course was altered two points 
to starboard to close the enemy ships, which were dis- 
appearing in the mist. A further turn to starboard for 
the same purpose was made, but at this time, 6.50 p.m., 
the battle cruisers being clear of the leading battleships 
(which were bearing N.N.W. three miles distant), Sir 
David Beatty signalled the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron 
to prolong the line of the battle cruisers, and the Inflexible 
and Indomitable took station astern of the New Zealand. 

The course of events can now be traced with accuracy. 
The Chester- with the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, which 
by 5.40 P.M. had got ahead of the Battle Fleet's cruiser 
screen, encountered some of the light cruisers composing 
the enemy's screen, and engaged them, and, in doing so, 
drew the enemy's light cruisers towards the 3rd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, which, with the Canterbury and de- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 339 

stroyers, turned to about W.N.W. to assist the Chester 
and to engage the eneni)'- vessels. 

In the course of this movement a destroyer attack was 
made by four British destroyers on the enemy's hght 
cruisers. This attack was apparently thought by the Ger- 
mans to come from the flotillas with the Battle Fleet, as 
far as can be judged from their report of the action; the 
ships of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron were undoubt- 
edly mistaken by their vessels for the van of our Battle 
Fleet, since mention is made in the German report of the 
British Battle Fleet having been sighted at this time by 
the German light forces, steering in a westerly or north- 
westerly direction. The mistaken idea caused the van of 
the High Sea Fleet to turn off to starboard. 

So far from our Battle Fleet being on a westerly course 
at this time, the fact is that our Battle Fleet held its south- 
easterly course before, through, and immediately subse- 
quent to deployment, gradually hauling round afterwards, 
first through south to south-west, and, then, to west, but 
it was not tmtil 8 p.m. that a westerly course was being 
steered. 

The only point that is not clear is the identity of the 
light cruiser engaged and seriously damaged by the 3rd 
Battle Cruiser Squadron. The ship engaged by the De- 
fence and Warrior was apparently the Wiesbaden. It 
seems to be impossible that the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squad- 
ron engaged the same vessel, and it is more likely to have 
been another light cruiser in the enemy's screen. The two 
engagements took place at almost the same time, the 3rd 
Battle Cruiser Squadron opening fire at 5.55 p.m., and 
the Defence and the Warrior (the 1st Cruiser Squadron) 
commencing their engagement with the starboard guns at 
about 5.50 p.m. and continuing it with the port guns at 
6.5 P.M. It is hardly possible, even in the conditions of low 



340 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

visibility that prevailed, that the two squadrons could have 
been engaging the same vessel. 

Mention should be made liere of the work of the de- 
stroyer Onslow, commanded by Lieut.-Commander J. C. 
Tovey, which at 6.5 p.m. sighted an enemy's light cruiser 
in a position on the bows of the Lion and favourable for 
torpedo attack on that ship. The Oiislow closed and en- 
gaged the light cruiser wqth gunfire at ranges between 
2,000 and 4,000 yards, and then, although severely dam- 
aged by shell fire, succeeded in closing a German battle 
cruiser to attack with torpedoes ; she was struck by a heavy 
shell before more than one torpedo could be fired. Lieut.- 
Commander Tovey thought that his order to fire all tor- 
pedoes had been carried out, and finding that this was not 
the case, closed the light cruiser and fired a torpedo at her, 
and then sighting the Battle Fleet fired the remaining tor- 
pedoes at battleships. The Onslow's engines then stopped, 
but the damaged destroyer Defender, Lieut.-Commander 
Palmer, closed her at 7-15 p.m. and took her in tow under 
a heavy fire, and, in spite of bad weather during the night 
and the damaged condition of both destroj^ers, brought 
her back to home waters, transferring her on June 1st to 
the care of a tug. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — {Continued) 

II. — The Battle Fleet in Action 

The "plot" made on the reports received between 5 and 
6 P.M. from Commodore Goodenough, of the 2nd Light 
Cruiser Squadron, and the report at 4.45 p.m. from Sir 
David Beatty in thfe Lion giving the position of the 
enemy's Battle Fleet, showed that we, of the Battle Fleet, 
might meet the High Sea Fleet approximately ahead and 
that the cruiser line ahead of the Battle Fleet would sight 
the enemy nearly ahead of the centre. Obviously, how- 
ever, great reliance could not be placed on the positions 
given by the ships of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which had 
been in action for two hours and frequently altering course. 
I realised this, but when contact actually took place it was 
found that the positions given were at least twelve miles 
in error when compared with the Iron Duke's reckoning. 
The result was that the enemy's Battle Fleet appeared 
on the starboard bow instead of ahead, as I had expected, 
and contact also took place earlier than was anticipated. 
There can be no doubt as to the accuracy of the reckon- 
ing on board the Iron Duke, as the movements of that ship 
could be "plotted" with accuracy after leaving Scapa 
Flow, there being no disturbing elements to deal with. 

The first accurate information regarding the position 

of affairs was contained in a signal from the Black Prince, 

of the 1st Cruiser Squadron (the starboard wing ship of 

the cruiser screen), which was timed 5.40 p.m., but re- 

■ 341 



342 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ceived by me considerablj' later, and in which it was re- 
ported that battle cruisers were in sight, bearing south, 
distant five miles. It was assumed by me that these were 
our own vessels. 

Prior to this, in view of the rapid decrease in visibility, 
I had directed Captain Dreyer, my Flag-Captain, to cause 
the range-finder operators to take ranges of ships on bear- 
ings in every direction and to report the direction in which 
the visibility appeared to be the greatest. My object was 
to ascertain the most favourable bearing in which to en- 
gage the enemy should circumstances admit of a choice 
being exercised. Captain Dreyer reported that the visibil- 
ity appeared to be best to the southward. 

At 5.45 P.M. the Comus (Captain Hotham) , of the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron, which was stationed three miles 
ahead of the Battle Fleet, reported heavy gunfire on a 
southerly bearing, i.e., three points from ahead, and shortly 
afterwards flashes of gunfire were visible bearing south- 
south-west although no ships could be seen. 

At about 5.50 p.m. I received a wireless signal from 
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, re- 
porting having sighted ships in action bearing south-south- 
west and steering north-east. There was, however, no clue 
as to the identity of these ships. It was in my mind that 
they might be the opposing battle cruisers. 

At 5.55 P.M. a signal was made by me to Admiral Sir 
Cecil Burney, leading the starboard wing division in the 
Marlhoroughj inquiring what he could see. The reply was : 
"Gun flashes and heavy gunfire on the starboard bow." 
This reply was received at about 6.5 p.m. 

The uncertainty which still prevailed as to the position 
of the enemy's Battle Fleet and its formation caused me 
to continue in the Battle Fleet on the course south-east by 
south at a speed of 20 knots, in divisions line ahead dis- 













;r8E'- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 343 

posed abeam to starboard, the Iron Duke at 6 p.m. being 
in Lat. 57.11 N., Long. 5.39 E. 

The information so far received had not even been 
sufficient to justify me in altering the bearing of the guides 
of columns from the Iron Duke preparatory to deploy- 
ment, and they were still, therefore, on the beam. The 
destroyers also were still disposed ahead in their screening 
formation, as it was very desirable to decide on the direc- 
tion of deployment before stationing them for action. 

At 5.56 P.M. Admiral Sir Cecil Burney reported 
strange vessels in sight bearing south-south-west and steer- 
ing east, and at 6 p.m. he reported them as British battle 
cruisers three to four miles distant, the Lion being the 
leading ship. 

This report was made by searchlight and consequently 
reached me shortly after 6 p.m., but as showing the inter- 
val that elapses between the intention to make a signal 
and the actual receipt of it (even under conditions where 
the urgency is apparent, no effort is spared to avoid delay, 
and the signal staff is efficient) , it is to be noted that where- 
as the report gave the bearing of our vessels as south- 
south-west, notes taken on board the Colossus placed our 
battle cruisers one point on the starboard bow of that ship, 
that is, on a south-south-east bearing and distant two miles 
at Q.5 P.M. 

Shortly after 6 p.m. we sighted strange vessels bearing 
south-west from the Iron Duke at a distance of about five 
miles. They were identified as our battle cruisers, steering 
east across the bows of the Battle Fleet. Owing to the 
mist it was not possible to make out the number of ships 
that were following the Lion. 

At this stage there was still great uncertainty as to the 
position of the enemy's Battle Fleet; flashes of gunfire 
^^'■ere visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, and 



344 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the noise was heavy and continuous. Our cruisers ahead 
seemed to be hotly engaged, but the fact that they were not 
closing the Battle Fleet indicated to me that their oppo- 
nents could hardly be battleships. 

In order to take ground to starboard, with a view to 
clearing up the situation without altering the formation 
of the Battle Fleet, a signal had been made to the Battle 
Fleet at 6.2 p.m. to alter course leaders together, the re- 
mainder in succession, to south (a turn of three points). 
Speed was at the same time reduced to 18 knots to allow 
of the ships closing up into station. Immediately after- 
wards it became apparent by the sound of the heavy firing 
that enemy's heavy ships must be in close proximity, and 
the Lion, which was sighted at this moment, signalled at 
6.6 P.M. that the enemy's battle cruisers bore south-east. 
Meanwhile, at about 5.50 p.m., I had received a wireless 
report from Commodore Goodenough, commanding the 
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, to the effect that the 
enemy's battle cruisers bore south-west from their Battle 
Fleet; in other words, that his Battle Fleet bore north- 
east from his battle cruisers. 

In view of the report from Sir Cecil Burney that our 
battle cruisers were steering east, and observing that Sir 
David Beatty reported at 6.6 p.m. that the enemy's battle 
cruisers bore south-east, it appeared from Commodore 
Goodenough's signal that the enemy's Battle Fleet must 
be ahead of his battle cruisers. On the other hand, it 
seemed to me almost incredible that the Battle Fleet could 
have passed the battle cruisers. The conflicting reports 
added greatly to the perplexity of the situation, and I 
determined to hold on until matters became clearer. 

The conviction was, however, forming in my mind 
that I should strike the enemy's Battle Fleet on a bearing 
a little on the starboard bow, and in order to be prepared 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 345 

for deployment I turned the Fleet to a south-east course, 
leaders together and the remainder in succession, and the 
destroyer flotillas were directed by signal, at 6.8 p.m., to 
take up the destroyer position No. 1 for battle. This order 
disposed them as follows : 






2 milts I } 1 flotiUa 



1 flomin I I / 



Iron Duke /Cing Oivrge V. 

\^ I } 1 flotilla 



There was, however, a very short interval between this 
signal to the destroyers and the signal for deployment, 
and consequently the destroyers did not reach their posi- 
tions before deployment. The subsequent alterations of 
course to the southward and westwai'd added to their 
difficulties and delayed them greatly in gaining their sta- 
tions at the van of the Fleet after deployment. The cor- 
rect position for the two van flotillas on deployment was 
three miles ahead of the Fleet, but slightly on the en- 
gaged bow. 

At 6.1 P.M., immediately on sighting the Lion, a signal 
had been made to Sir David Beatty inquiring the position 
of the enemy's Battle Fleet. This signal was repeated at 
6.10 P.M., and at 6.14 p.m. he signalled: "Have sighted the 
enemy's Battle Fleet bearing south-south-west " ; this re- 
port gave me the first information on which I could take 
effective action for deployment. 

At 6.15 p.m. Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan- Thomas, in 
the Barham, commanding the 5th Battle Squadron, sig- 
nalled by wireless that the enemy's Battle Fleet was in 
gight, bearing south-south-east. The distance was not re- 



346 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ported in either case, but in view of tlie low visibility, I 
concluded it could not be more than some five miles. Sir 
Cecil Burney had already reported the .5th Battle Squad- 
ron at 6.7 P.M. as in sight, bearing south-west from the 
Marlborough. 

The first definite information received on board the 
Fleet-Flagship of the position of the enemy's Battle Fleet 
did not, therefore, come in until 6.14 p.m., and the position 
given placed it thirty degrees before the starboard beam 
of the Iron Duke, or fifty-nine degrees before the star- 
board beam of the Marlborough, and apparentlj^ in close 
proximity. There was no time to lose, as there was evident 
danger of the starboard wing column of the Battle Fleet 
being engaged by the whole German Battle Fleet before 
deployment could be effected. So at 6.16 p.m. a signal 
was made to the Battle Fleet to form line of battle on the 
port wing column, on a course south-east by east, it being 
assumed that the course of the enemy was approximately 
the same as that of our battle cruisers. 

Speed was at the same time reduced to 14 knots to 
admit of our battle cruisers passing ahead of the Battle 
Fleet, as there was danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet 
being blanketed by them. 

During the short interval, crowded with events, that 
had elapsed since the first flashes and sound of gunfire 
had been noted on board the Iron Duke, the question of 
most urgent importance before me had been the direction 
and manner of deployment. 

As the evidence accumulated that the enemy's Battle 
Fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well 
before the beam of the Iron Duke, the point for decision 
was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or on 
the port wing column. My first and natural impulse was 
to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring 




o la 

1^ 5 

o y 

a " 
.1 a 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 347 

the Fleet into action at the earliest possible moment, but 
it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of 
gunfire and the reports from the Lion and the Barham, 
that the High Sea Fleet was in such close proximity and 
on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in 
such a movement. I assumed that the German destroyers 
would be ahead of their Battle Fleet, and it Avas clear that, 
owing to the mist, the operations of destroyers attacking 
from a commanding position in the van would be much 
facilitated; it would be suicidal to place the Battle Fleet 
in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers 
during such a deployment, as such an event would throw 
the Fleet into confusion at a critical moment. 

The further points that occurred to me were, that if 
the German ships were as close as seemed probable, there 
M'as considerable danger of the 1st Battle Squadron, and 
especially the Marlborough's Division, being severely 
handled by the concentrated fire of the High Sea Fleet 
before the remaining divisions could get into line to assist. 
The 1st Battle Squadron was composed of many of our 
weakest ships, with only indifferent protection as com- 
pared with the German capital ships, and an interval of 
at least four minutes would elapse between each division 
coming into line astern of the sixth division and a further 
interval before the guns could be directed on to the ship 
selected and their fire become effective after so large a 
change of course. 

The final disadvantage would be that it appeared, from 
the supposed position of the High Sea Fleet, that the van 
of the enemy would have a very considerable "overlap" 
if the deployment took place on the starboard wing divi- 
sion, whereas this would not be the case with deployment 
on the port wing column. The overlap would necessitate 
a large turn of the starboard wing division to port to pre- 



348 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

vent the "T" being crossed, and each successive division 
coming into line would have to make this turn, in addition 
to the 8-point turn required to form the line. I therefore 
decided to deploy on the first, the port wing, division. 

The further knowledge which I gained of the actual 
state of affairs after the action confirmed my view that the 
course adopted was the best in the circumstances. 

The reports from the ships of the starboard wing divi- 
sion show that the range of the van of the enemy's Battle 
Fleet at the moment of deployment was about 13,000 
yards. The fleets were converging rapidly, with the High 
Sea Fleet holding a position of advantage such as would 
enable it to engage effectively, first the unsupported star- 
board division, and subsequently succeeding divisions as 
they formed up astern. It is to be observed that it would 
take some twenty minutes to complete the formation of 
the line of battle. 

The German gunnery was always good at the start, 
and their ships invariably found the range of a target with 
great rapidity, and it would have been very bad tactics 
to give them such an initial advantage, not only in regard 
to gunnery but also in respect of torpedo attack, both 
from ships and from destroyers. 

A subsequent study of the reports and the signals 
received has admitted of the accompanying plans being 
drawn up. 

The reports on being reviewed fit in very well, and 
show clearly how great would have been the objections to 
deploying to starboard. It will be seen that the bearings 
of the enemy Battle Fleet, as given by the Lion and the 
Barham at 6.14 and 6.15 respectively, give a fair "cut," 
and the bearing on M'hich the Marlborough opened fire 
enables the position of the Battle Fleet to be placed with 
considerable accuracy. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 349 

Assuming that the German Battle Fleet was steaming 
at 17 knots on an easterly course between 6.14 and 6.31, 
it will be observed that at the latter time it bore 21 degrees 
before the starboard beam of the Iron Duke at a range 
of 12,000 yards. The Ij'on Duke actually engaged the 
leading battleship at this time on a bearing 20 degrees 
before the starboard beam at a range of 12,000 yards. 
The accuracy of the "plot" is therefore confirmed, so far 
as confirmation is possible. It appears certain that be- 
tween about 6.0 P.M. and 6.16 p.m. the German battle 
cruisers turned 16 points towards their Battle Fleet, and 
again turned 16 points to their original course. This 
is borne out by observations on board the Warrior /which 
ship was being engaged by the starboard guns of enemy 
vessels. The German account also shows such a turn at 
this i^eriod. 

Rear-Admiral Evan- Thomas, commanding the 5th 
Battle Squadron, had sighted the Marlborough at 6.6 p.m. 
and the remainder of the 6th Division of the Battle Fleet 
a little later. Not seeing any other columns, he concluded 
that the Marlborough was leading the whole line, and de- 
cided to take station ahead of that ship. At 6.19 p.m., 
however, other battleships were sighted, and Admiral 
Evan-Thomas realised that the Fleet was deploying to 
port, the 6th Division being the starboard wing column. 
He then determined to make a large turn of his squadron 
to port, in order to form astern of the 6th Division, which 
by this time had also turned to port to form line of battle. 
During the turn, which was very well executed, the ships 
of the 5th Battle Squadron were under fire of the enemy's 
leading battleships, but the shooting was not good, and 
our vessels received little injury. 

Unfortunately, however, the helm of the Warspite 
jammed, and that ship, continuing her turn through six- 



350 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

teen points came under a verj'' heavy jfire and received con- 
siderable injur j\ The disabled Warrior happened to be 
in close proximity at this time, and the turn of the War- 
spite had the effect for the moment of diverting attention 
from the Warrior, so that the latter vessel got clear. 

The Warspite was well extricated by Captain Phill- 
potts from an unpleasant position and was steered to the 
northward to make good damages, and eventually, in 
accordance with directions from Rear-Admiral Evan- 
Thomas, returned independently to Rosyth, considerably 
down by the stern owing to damage aft, but otherwise not 
much injured. 

By 6.38 P.M. the remaining ships of the 5th Battle 
Squadron were in station astern of the Agincourt (1st 
Battle Squadron), the last ship of the line. 

At 6.33 P.M., as soon as the battle cruisers had passed 
clear, the speed of the Battle Fleet was increased to 17 
knots, and this speed was subsequently maintained. The 
reduction of speed to 14 knots during the deployment 
caused some "bunching" at the rear of the line as the 
signal did not get through quickly. The reduction had, 
however, to be maintained until the battle cruisers had 
formed ahead. 

Experience at all Fleet exercises had shown the neces- 
sity for keeping a reserve of some three knots of speed in 
hand in the case of a long line of ships, in order to allow 
of station being kej^t in the line under conditions of action, 
when ships were making alterations of course to throw 
out enemy's foe, to avoid torpedoes, or when other inde- 
pendent action on the part of single ships, or of divisions 
of ships, became necessary, as well as to avoid excessive 
smoke from the funnels; for this reason the Fleet speed 
during the action was fixed at 17 knots. The experience 
of the 1st Battle Squadron, in which some ships had at 



*^^ 



!4' 



^^rspite I 



/Harj' Pose 









JPlan. S 



"^ CUampixm. 



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE 

GRAND FLEET AT 6-45. P. M. ON 

31st. MAY 1916. 



Onslaught ' 



^BCrrrvOncfh^ijrrL 
5i Snuxhaxnpton, 

vus ^ Malaya, 



^^rcuLes ^ Bellana 

^Marlborough 

^Nfptnne 

^^CoHCrhgwooci' 
% Colossus 

% Van<^ uarci 
% leTtiercuCrc 

^ BeUeropliort 
^ Benhow 



^ Cord^^iia. 



i,Oa/r 

^ Blanche 



i;^ > Ufity 



r4~ 



Broke 



Q C/iesUr 

QzhiAt- of EdOihurglx, 

^Coc/frnne 
^Xriru/laur 



Bocudijr.ea. 



^ Canada, 
^Superh 

^ Royal, Ocih 
%^Jrorb DuAe 

^Tlmrbderer 



Active.'^ 



^^f 



«<f< 



^Canquycrar ,, , 

^MoTWbTcK ''°!/ 

^OrCon "^cijj 

^Erin, "" 

^Cervturioih 

"^P ^^l«^ George V. 



Q Caroline, 
^ Connis 

Q CaUlope 



Prohahle anproxiTruit^: movements 
of 
Sigh. Seo/Iteet 



^iiulamiioMLe 

^Irj/'lejcCble •• iap» 

KifevfZeaXartdL '•"^ 

%7^'ger 

\Priricess jRcyal 

s Christopher 
Q > Opheli'a 
(AXntiirhiLry 

Q Gloiicester 

^JBi;rkcTi/i,eoujb 
^YurmouUt 

'iiFobinhoixth- 



7 Sea 
^ Miles 



German, 
BaMe 
CrvubSers 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 351 

times to steam at 20 knots, is proof of the necessity for 
this reserve. 

At G.14 P.M. the enemy's salvoes were falling near 
ships of the 1st Battle Squadron, and the Marlborough's 
Division of the Battle Squadi-on became engaged with 
some ships of the enemy's Battle Fleet at 6.17 p.m. 
immediately after turning for the deployment. At this 
time fire was opened by the Marlborough on a ship stated 
to be of the "Kaiser" class, at a range of 13,000 yards 
and on a bearing 20° abaft the starboard beam; this 
knowledge enables us to deduce the position of the van 
of the German Battle Fleet at this time. 

Our rear ships were now able to make out the enemy's 
Fleet steering to the eastward, the battle cruisers leading, 
followed by the Battle Fleet in single line, the order 
being, four ships of the "Konig" class in the van, followed 
by ships of the "Kaiser" and "Heligoland" classes, the 
rear of the line being invisible. A report that had reached 
me at 4.48 p.m. from the Commodore of the 2nd Light 
Cruiser Squadron indicated that ships of the "Kaiser" 
class were in the van of the Battle Fleet. The order of 
the Fleet maj^ have been changed subsequent to this report, 
but there is no doubt that ships of the "Konig" class led 
during the Fleet action. The point is not, however, of 
importance. 

At about 6.38 p.m. the 6th Division was in line and 
our deployment was complete. 

Enemy shells had been falling close to the Colossus and 
her 5th Division since 6.18 p.m., and these ships opened 
fire at 6.30 p.m. ; but the conditions of visibility made it 
difficult to distinguish the enemy's battleships. 

At 6.23 P.M. a three-funnelled enemy vessel had passed 
down the line, on the starboard, or engaged, side of our 
Fleet, apparently partly disabled. Her identity could not 



352 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

at the time be clearly established, but her German colours 
were flying and she was in a position for attacking the 
Battle Fleet by torpedoes; at 6.20 p.m. the Iron Duke 
fired a few turret salvoes at her; she was fired at with tur- 
ret guns by other vessels and was seen to sink at the rear 
of the line. 

At this time, owing to smoke and mist, it was most dif- 
ficult to distinguish friend from foe, and quite impossible 
to form an opinion on board the Iron Duke, in her position 
towards the centre of the line, as to the formation of the 
enemy's Fleet. The identity of ships in sight on the star- 
board beam was not even sufficiently clear for me to per- 
mit of fire being opened ; but at 6.30 p.m. it became certain 
that our own battle cruisers had drawn ahead of the Battle 
Fleet and that the vessels fhen before the beam were battle- 
ships of the "Konig" class. The order was, therefore, 
given to open fire, and the Iron Duke engaged what ap- 
peared to be the leading battleship at a range of 12,000 
yards on a bearing 20° before the starboard beam; other 
ships of the 3rd and 4th Divisions (the 4th Battle Squad- 
ron) opened fire at about the same time, and the van divi- 
sions (2nd Battle Squadron) very shortly afterwards; 
these latter ships reported engaging enemy battle cruisers 
as well as battleships. The fire of the Iron Duke, which 
came more directly under my personal observation, was 
seen to be immediately effective, the third and fourth sal- 
voes fired registering several palpable hits. It appeared 
as if all the enemy ships at that time in sight from the Iron 
Duke (not more than three or four, owing to smoke and 
mist) were receiving heavy punishment, and the second 
battleship was seen to turn out of the line badly on fire, 
and settling by the stern. A large number of observers 
in the Thunderer, Benhow, Barham, Marne^ Morning Star 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 353 

and Magic stated afterwards that they saw this ship blow 
uj) at 6.50 P.M. 

The visibility was very variable and perhaps averaged 
about 12,000 yards to the southward, though much less on 
other bearings, but ranges could not at times be obtained 
from the range-finders of the h'on Duke at a greater dis- 
tance than 9,000 yards, although at 7.15 p.m., in a tem- 
porary clear channel through the mist, good ranges of 
15,000 yards were obtained of a battleship at which four 
salvoes were fired bj^ the Iron Duke before she was again 
hidden by smoke and mist. The very baffling light was 
caused principally by low misty clouds, but partly also by 
the heavy smoke from the funnels and guns of the oppos- 
ing Fleets. The direction of the wind was about west- 
south-west with a force 2, causing the enemy's funnel 
smoke to drift towards our line, thus further obscuring oUr 
view of his Fleet. 

The visibility at the rear of the battle line was appar- 
ently greater than in the centre at about 7 p.m., and the 
enemy's fire, which was probably being concentrated on 
our rear ships, was more accurate at this period, but quite 
ineffective, only one ship, the Colossus^ being hit by gun- 
fire, although numerous projectiles were falling near the 
ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squadrons. 

Whilst observers in ships in the van and centre of the 
Battle Fleet could see only three or four enemy vessels at 
any one time, those in the ships of the rear division did 
occasionally see as many as eight, and were consequently 
better able to distinguish the formation and movements 
of the enemy's Battle Fleet. It was not possible, owing 
to the small number of ships in sight, due to smoke and 
mist, to distribute the fire of the battleships by signal in 
the customarj^ manner; the only course to adopt was for 



354 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the captains to direct the fire of their guns on to any target 
which they could distinguish. 

The course of the Fleet on deployment had been south- 
east by east, as already stated, but the van had hauled on 
to south-east without signal shortl}^ after deployment in 
order to close the enemy, and at 6.50 p.m., as the range was 
apparently opening, the course was altered by signal to 
south "by divisions" in order to close the enemy. The 
King George V., leading the van of the Battle Fleet, had 
just anticipated this signal by turning to south. The alter- 
ation was made "by divisions" instead of "in succession" 
in order that the enemy should be closed more rapidly by 
the whole Battle Fleet. v 

This large turn (of four points) "by divisions" in- 
volved some small amount of "blanketing" of the rear 
ships of one division by the leading ships of that next 
astern, and at one time the Thunderer was firing over the 
bows of the Iron Duke, causing some slight inconvenience 
on the bridge of the latter ship; the "blanketing," how- 
ever, was unavoidable and the loss of fire involved was in- 
appreciable. 

At 6.45 P.M. one or two torpedoes crossed the track 
of the rear of our battle line, and the Marlborough 
altered course to avoid one. They were apparently 
fired, at long range, by enemy destroyers, which were 
barely visible to the ships in rear and quite invisible to 
those on board the L'on Duke. They might, however, 
have been fired by enemy battleships which were within 
torpedo range, or by a submarine, the Revenge reporting 
that it was thought that one had been rammed by that 
ship. The tracks of some of the torpedoes were seen by 
the observers stationed aloft, and were avoided by verj; 
skilful handling of the ships by their captains. 

At 6.45 P.M., however, a heavy explosion occurred 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 355 

under the fore bridge of the Marlborough, abreast the 
starboard forward hydrauhc engine-room. The ship took 
up a list of some seven degrees to starboard, but continued 
in action so effectively that she avoided three more tor- 
pedoes shortly afterwards, re-opened fire at 7.3 p.m., and 
at 7.12 P.M. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the 
"Konig" class, hitting her so frequently that she was seen 
to turn out of line. 

The signal from Sir Cecil Burney of the damage to 
his flagship stated that the vessel had been struck by a 
"mine or torpedo." It was assumed by me that a torpedo 
had hit the ship, as so manj^ vessels had passed over the 
same locality without injury from mine. This proved 
to be the case, the track of this torpedo not having been 
sufficientljr visible to enable Captain Ross to avoid it. 

The fact of the tracks of so many of the enemy's tor- 
pedoes being visible was a matter of great surprise to me, 
and I think to other officers. Reports had been prevalent 
that the Germans had succeeded in producing a torpedo 
which left little or no track on the surface. The infor- 
mation as to the visibility of the tracks did not reach me 
until the return of the Fleet to harbour, as although one 
torpedo was reported b}^ observers on board the destroyer 
Oak to have passed close ahead of the Iron Duke at about 
7.35 P.M., finishing its run 2,000 yards bej^ond that ship, 
and a second was observed by the Benbow to pass appar- 
ently ahead of the Iron Duke at 8.30 p.m., neither of them 
was seen on board the flagship by the trained look-outs 
specially stationed for the purpose. 

Some ten minutes after the alteration of course to 
south, a signal was made to the 2nd Battle Squadron to 
take station ahead of the Iron Duke and for the 1st Battle 
Squadron to form astern. This signal had, however, been 
already anticipated by the vessels ahead of the Iron Duke. 



356 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

in accordance with tlie general battle orders giving dis- 
cretionary powers to the commanders of squadrons, and 
the line had been j)artly reformed before the signal was 
made. 

An incident occurred at about 6.47 p.m. which was an 
indication of the spirit prevailing in the Fleet, of which 
it is impossible to speak too highly. The destroyer Acasta, 
which had been badly hit aft during her attack on enemy 
light cruisers in company with the Shark and had her 
engines disabled, was passed by the Fleet. Her command- 
ing officer, Lieut.-Commander J. O. Barron, signalled 
the condition of his ship to the Iron Duke as that ship 
passed, leaving the Acasta on her starboard or engaged 
side. The ship's company was observed to be cheering 
each ship as they passed. It is satisfactory to relate that 
this destroj'er and her gallant ship's company were sub- 
sequently brought into Aberdeen, being assisted by the 
Nonm.ch. 

Shortly after 6.55 p.m. the Iron Duke passed the 
wreck of a ship with the bow and stern standing out of 
the water, the centre portion apparently resting on the 
bottom, with the destroyer Badger picking up survivors. 
It was thought at first that this was the remains of a 
German light cruiser, but inquiry of the Badger elicited 
the lamentable news that the wreck was that of the Invin- 
cible. It was assumed at the time that she had been sunk 
either by a mine or by a torpedo, and, in view of the safe 
passage of other ships in her vicinity, the latter appeared 
to be the more probable cause of her loss. Subsequent 
information, however, showed that she was destroj^ed by 
gunfire, causing her magazines to explode, as already 
recorded. 

At 7 P.M. Sir David Beatty signalled reporting that 
the enemy was to the westward. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 357 

Our alteration of course to south had, meanwhile, 
brought the enemy's line into view once more, and be- 
tween 7.0 and 7.30 p.m. the Battle Fleet was again in 
action with battleships and also battle cruisers, as they 
could be distinguished in the haze, which at that period 
was very baffling. The range varied from as much as 
15,000 yards at the van to as little as 8,000 in the rear, 
this difference in range indicating that the enemy's Fleet 
was turning to the westward, as shown in the accom- 
panying plan facing page 358. 

In spite of the difficult conditions the fire of many of 
our battleships was very effective at this period. Some 
instances may be given. At 7.15 p.m. the Iron Duke, as 
already mentioned, engaged a hostile battleship at 15,000 
yards' range and on a bearing 74 degrees from right ahead. 
At 7.20 she trained her guns on a battle cruiser of "Lut- 
zow" type, abaft the beam, which hid herself by a destroyer 
smoke screen; at 7.17 p.m. the King George V. opened 
fire on a vessel, taken to be the leading ship in the enemy's 
line at a range of about 13,000 yards; the Orion at a 
battleship*; the St. Vincent was "holding her target (a 
battleship) effectively till 7.26 p.m., the range being be- 
tween 10,000 and 9,500 yards"; the Agincourt at 7.6 p.m. 
opened fire at 11,000 yards on one of four battleships that 
showed clearly out of the mist, and judged that at least 
four of her salvoes "straddled" the target; the Revenge 
was engaging what were taken to be battle cruisers, ob- 
taining distinct hits on two of them; the Colossus from 
7.12 to 7.20 P.M. was engaging a ship taken to be a battle 
cruiser, either the Derfflinger or Lutzow, at ranges be- 
tween 10,000 and 8,000 yards, and observed several direct 
hits, two being on the water line ; whilst the Marlborough, 

* The Calliope reported at 7.1 p.m.: "Two enemy battleships, 'Konig' class, 
engaged by Orion's division, observed to be heavily on fire." 



358 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

as already mentioned, "engaged a ship of the 'Konig' 
class." Other vessels reported being in effective action 
during this period. The Royal Oak, the ship next astern 
of the h'on Duke, opened fire at 7.15 p.m. on the leading 
ship of three vessels taken to be battle cruisers, at a range 
of 14,000 yards; this ship was hit and turned away, and 
fire was shifted to the second ship which was lost to sight 
in the mist after a few rounds had been fired. It was 
difficult to be certain of the class of vessel on which fire 
was being directed, but one or more of the enemy's battle 
cruisers had undoubtedly dropped astern by 7 p.m., as a 
result of the heavy punishment they had received from our 
battle cruisers and the 5th Battle Squadron, and were 
engaged by ships of the Battle Fleet. 

Both at this period and earlier in the action, the ships 
of the 1st Battle Squadron were afforded more opportun- 
ities for effective fire than the rest of the Battle Fleet, and 
the fullest use was made of the opportunities. This squad- 
ron, under the able command of Sir Cecil Burney, was 
known by me to be highly efficient, and very strong proof 
was furnished during the Jutland battle, if proof were 
needed, that his careful training had borne excellent re- 
sults. The immunity of the ships of the squadron from 
the enemy's fire, whilst they were inflicting on his vessels 
very severe punishment, bears very eloquent testimony to 
the offensive powers of the squadron. 

At 7.5 P.M. the whole battle line was turned together 
three more points to starboard to close the range further ; 
immediately afterwards two ships ahead of the Iron Duke 
reported a submarine a little on the port bow; at 7.10 
P.M. a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a cruiser, 
was observed to be approaching on a bearing S. 50 W. 
from the Iron Duke, and the Fleet was turned back to 
south in order to turn on to the submarine and bring the 



Destroyers 



2 -Light CruL&er Squcub'onx 

Southximptcn\ 



Southxunph 
n'^FlotiUay 



APPROXIMATE POSITIONS OF SHIPS OF THE 

G RAND FLEET 

At 7. 15 P. M. 31st May 1916. 
-Probable approximate course of the German Battle Fleet, 
fS^'FLouUa °^ evidenced by the positions of the ships engaged at the time. 



\5-BaMl^ Squxixirojv 
\Bca'hx!Lni' 



\ Mcci^lhoroTAxpL 

\. Colossus 

% Benhow 



Eitemy ships taken, fi/r Battle Cruisers, 
J engaged^ iy Colossits, 
I Other .shps encjoged, hy MarUorouffh; 
I Re\'enae,S- Vincent aruLotlier ships oF 

5^ caul e^BUdsiona ami 5*i^BcMle 

SqvLOjdron. 

E^Tvemy ships turned awcty 8 points 

xuvder cover of smohe sereen. 



Snemy Battl^^ihips sighted ijv dear patch 
and engaijed hyB-orvBiJe^ andBoyal Oah. 

Ships sighted also hyJSjtg George V.and. 
Orion.. 

3 -Light/ Cruiser Squadron' 
"^ Ships Inst tosigTUinTTMrt. Falmouih 



shown in Red. 

The Battle Cr! 

the Battle Fleet 

Note.- Their bailie station is between B and 6 miles 

slightly on the engaged bow of the Van of the 

Battle Fleet. 

The 2nd Battle Squadron ia forming ahead of the 

Iron Duke. 

The 1st Battle Squadron !s forming astern of the 

Iron DuVp 

The 4th Lighl Cruiser Squadron is getting into its 

battle' station on ihe Van of the Battle Fleet. 

The 4th and 11th Flotillas are moving towards their 

battle slations. 

The lat Light Cruiser Squadron is coming up from 

the rear of the Battle Fleet to Join the Bnttio Cruisers. 

The Minotaur and Qpuisers are trying to get up tO 

their battle stations ahead of the Battle Fleet. 



IronlHth{^ 



t-BivisioTV 
Ring George V | ( 



^bvconstanb 
I Cruisers 

f Minotaur 

tl^i^Tlotaia. ! 1 I , ,, 

I I 4l^Floti]la. 



4- Light/ Cruiser Sguadi'orv 
WCdUiape 



Battle Cruisers 



fLiOTV 



Q''-' 



Fiotaio/ 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 359 

ships in line ahead ready, for any requii-ed manoeuvre. 
A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges be- 
tween 10,000 and G,500 yards. At the latter range the 
destroyers turned and passed towards the rear of the line 
in a heavy smoke screen. One destroyer was seen by 
several observers to sink from the effects of the gunfire. 

At a sufficient interval before it was considered that 
the torpedoes fired by the destroj^ers would cross our line, 
a signal was made to the Battle Fleet to turn two points 
to port by subdivisions. Some minutes later a report was 
made to me by Commander Bellairs (the officer on my 
Staff especially detailed for this duty and provided with 
an instrument for giving the necessary information) that 
this turn was insufficient to clear the torpedoes, as I had 
held on until the last moment; a further turn of two 
points was then made for a short time. As a result of 
this attack and another that followed immediately, some 
twenty or more torpedoes were observed to cross the track 
of the Battle Fleet, in spite of our turn, the large majority 
of them passing the ships of the 1st and 5th Battle Squad- 
rons at the rear of the line. It was fortunate that, owing 
to the turn away of the Fleet, the torpedoes were appar- 
ently near the end of their run, and were consequently 
not running at high speed. They were all avoided by the 
very skilful handling of the ships by their captains, to 
whom the highest credit is due, not only for their skill in 
avoiding the torpedoes, but for the manner in which the 
ships, by neighbourly conduct towards each other, pre- 
vented risk of collision and kept their station in the line. 
The captains were most ably assisted by the admirable 
look-out kept by the organisation that existed for dealing 
with this danger. 

The skill shown could not, however, have prevented 
several ships from being torpedoed had the range been 



360 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

less and the torpedoes consequently running at a higher 
speed. Frequent exercises carried out at Scapa Flow 
showed conclusively that the percentage of torpedoes that 
would hit ships in a line when fired from destroyers at 
ranges up to 8,000 yards was comiJaratively high, even 
if the tracks were seen and the ships were manoeuvred to 
avoid them. One verjr good reason is that torpedoes are 
always a considerable but varying distance ahead of the 
line of bubbles marking their track, making it difficult to 
judge the position of the torpedo from its track. Many 
ships experienced escapes from this and other attacks; 
thus the Hercules reported that she "turned away six 
points to avoid the torpedoes, one of which passed along 
the starboard side and 40 yards across the bow, and the 
other passed close under the stern"; the Neptune reported 
that "the tracks of three torpedoes were seen from the fore- 
top, one of which passed very close and was avoided by 
the use of the helm" ; in the Agincourt's report, a statement 
occurred that "at 7.8 p.m. a torpedo just missed astern, 
it having been reported from aloft and course altered"; 
and again, "at 7.38 p.m. tracks of two torpedoes running 
parallel were observed approaching; course altered to 
avoid torpedoes which passed ahead; and at 8.25 p.m. 
torpedo track on starboard side, turned at full speed; 
torpedo broke surface at about 150 yards on the star- 
board bow" ; the Revenge remarked, "at 7.35 p.m. altered 
course to port to avoid two torpedoes, one passed about 
ten yards ahead and the other about twenty yards astern, 
and at 7.43 p.m. altered course to avoid torpedoes, two 
passing astern"; the Colossus stated, "at 7.35 p.m. turned 
to port to avoid a torpedo coming from starboard side"; 
the Barham at this period reported that "at least four 
torpedoes passed through the line close to the Barham"; 
the ColUngrvood reported, "torpedo track was seen 20 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 361 

degrees abaft the beam and coming straight at the ship; 
large hehn was put on and the torpedo passed very close 
astern; at the same time another was seen to pass about 
thirty yards ahead." The captain of the Collingwood, in 
remai'king on the destroyer's attack, added, "the great 
value of this form of attack on a line of ships is, to me, 
an outstanding feature of the Battle Fleet action." 

The first two-point turn was made at 7.23 p.m. and 
the Fleet was brought to a south by west course by 
7.33 P.M. (that is, to a course one point to the westward 
of the course of the Fleet before the destroyer attack). 
The total amount by which the range was opened by the 
turns was about 1,750 yards. 

The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the Mh and 11th 
Flotillas had been delayed in reaching their action station 
at the van until about 7.10 p.m., owing to the turns to the 
westward made by the Battle Fleet to close the enemy. 
In accordance with arrangements m£\de previously to 
counter destroyer attacks, these vessels were ordered out 
to engage the enemy destroyers, which, according to the 
report of the Commodore Le Mesurier, commanding the 
4th Light Cruiser Squadron, were steering towards the 
head of the division led by the King George V., the van 
ship of the Battle Fleet. Although not very well placed 
for the first attack for the reason given above, they were 
in a very favourable position to counter the second de- 
stroyer attack, which took place at 7.25 p.m. The enemy's 
flotilla was sighted bearing 30 degrees before the starboard ' 
beam of the Iron Duke at a range of 9,000 yards and was 
heavily engaged by the light forces and the 4th, 1st, and 
5th Battle Squadrons. During this attack three enemy 
destroyers were reported as sunk by the fire of the battle- 
ships, hght cruisers and destroyers; one of them, bearing 
a Commodore's pendant, being sunk at 7.50 p.m. by a di- 



362 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

vision of the 12th Flotilla, consisting of the Obedient, 
Marvel, Mindful and Onslaught, which attacked them 
near the rear of our battle line. The Southampton 
and Dublin, of the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, attacked 
and sank a second destroyer at this period. At least six 
torpedoes were observed to pass ahead of, or through the 
track of, the -ith Light Cruiser Squadron during their 
attack on the German flotilla. 

The destroj^er attacks were combined with a retiring 
movement on the part of the enemy's Battle Fleet, the 
movement being covered with the aid of a heavy smoke 
screen. Although this retirement was not visible from the 
Iron Duke owing to the smoke and mist, and was, there- 
fore, not known to me until after the action, it was clearly 
seen from the rear of our line, as is indicated by the fol- 
lowing citations: 

The Captain of the Valiant stated in his report: 
"At 7.23 P.M. enemy's Battle Fleet now altered 
course together away from us and broke off the 
action, sending out a low cloud of smoke which 
effectually covered their retreat and obscured them 
from further view." 

The Captain of the Malaya reported, referring to 
this period: "This was the last of the enemy seen in 
daylight, owing to their Battle Fleet having turned 
away." 

Sir Cecil Burney stated in regard to this period: 
"As the destroyer attack developed, the enemy's 
Battle Fleet in sight were observed to turn at least 
eight points until their sterns were towards our line. 
They ceased fire, declined further action, and dis- 
appeared into the mist." 

The Captain of the St. Vincent said: "The tar- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 363 

get was held closely until 7.26 p.m. (32 minutes in 
all), when the enemy had turned eight or ten points 
away, disappearing into the mist and with a smoke 
screen made by destroyers to cover them as well." 

Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas remarked: "After 
joining the Battle Fleet the 5th Battle Squadron 
conformed to the movements of the Commander-in- 
Chief, engaging the rear ships of the enemy's battle 
line, until they turned away and went out of sight, 
all ships apparently covering themselves with artificial 
smoke." 

The Captain of the Revenge recorded: "A flotilla 
of destroyers passed through the line and made a 
most efficient smoke screen. At this period the 
enemy's fleet turned eight points to starboard and 
rapidly drew out of sight." 

In the German account of the action at this stage, it 
is stated, in more than one passage, that the British Fleet 
during this action between the Battle Fleets was to the 
northward of the High Seas Fleet. This is correct of the 
earlier stages. The account refers to the attacks on our 
line by the German destroyer flotillas, and states finally 
that in the last attack the destroyers did not sight the 
heavy ships, but only light cruisers and destroyers to the 
north-eastward. The accuracy of this statement is doubt- 
ful, since the destroyers were clearly in sight from our 
heavy ships. But the account then proceeds to state that 
"the German Commander-in-Chief turns his battle line 
to a southerly and south-westerly course on which the 
enemy was last seen, but he is no longer to be found." 

This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships 
bore north and north-east from the enemy and then that 
the enemy turned to south and south-west, that is, directly 



364 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

away from the British Fleet. Thus the fact that the Ger- 
man Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans. 

No report of this movement of the German Fleet 
reached me, and at first it was thought that his temporary 
disappearance was due to the thickening mist, especially 
as firing could be heard from the battleships in rear, but 
at 7.41 P.M., the enemy Battle Fleet being no longer in 
sight from the Iron Duke, course was altered "by divi- 
sions" three points more to starboard (namely, to south- 
west) to close the enemy, and single line ahead was again 
formed on the Iron Duke on that course. 

At this period the rear of our battle line was still in 
action at intervals with one or two ships of the enemy's 
fleet, which were probably some that had dropped astern 
partially disabled, but by 7.55 p.m. fire had practically 
ceased. 

At about 7.40 P.M. I received a report from Sir David 
Beatty stating that the enemy bore north-west by west 
from the Lion, distant 10 to 11 miles, and that the Lion's 
course was south-west. Although the battle cruisers were 
not in sight from the Iron Duke, I assumed the Lion to 
be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet, 
but it appeared later from a report received in reply to di- 
rections signalled by me at 8.10 p.m. to the King George V. 
to follow the battle cruisers, that they were not in sight 
from that ship either. 

At this time the enemy's Battle Fleet seems to have 
become divided, for whilst Sir David Beatty reported the 
presence of battleships north-west by west from the Lion, 
other enemy battleships were observed to the westward 
(that is, on the starboard bow of the Iron Duke), and 
the course of the Fleet was at once altered "by divisions" 
to west in order to close the enemy; this alteration was 
made at 7.59 p.m. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 365 

It will be observed that all the large alterations of 
course of the Battle Fleet during the engagement were 
made "by divisions" instead of "in succession fi*om the 
van, or together." The reason was that in this way the 
whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with 
far greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation, 
than if the movement had been carried out by the line 
"in succession." 

The objection to altering by turning all ships together 
Avas the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as 
the result of such a mancEuvre carried out with a very 
large Fleet under action conditions in misty weather, 
particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of bear- 
ing for a long period. 

The battleships sighted at 7.59 p.m. opened fire on the 
ships of the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, which had moved 
out to starboard of the battle line to engage a flotilla of 
enemy destroyers which were steering to attack the Battle 
Fleet. The Callioj)e, the flagship of Commodore Le 
Mesurier, was hit by a heavy shell and received some 
damage, but retained her fighting efficiency, and fired a 
torpedo at the leading battleship at a range of 6,500 
yards; an explosion was noticed on board a ship of the 
"Kaiser" class by the Calliope.* The ships sighted 
turned away and touch could not be regained, although 
sounds of gunfire could be heard from ahead at 8.25 p.m., 
probably from our battle cruisers, which obtained touch 
with and engaged some of the enemy's ships very effec- 
tively between 8.22 and 8.25 p.m. The Falmouth was 
the last ship of the Battle Cruiser Fleet to be in touch 
with the enemy, at 8.38 p.m.; the ships then in sight 
turned eight points together away from the Falmouth. 

* All our battle cruisers felt this heavy explosion which was clearly concus- 
sion under water, and may have been caused by the Calliope's torpedo obtaining 
a hit. 



366 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

At 8.30 P.M. the light was failing and the Fleet was 
turned "by divisions" to a south-west course, thus re- 
forming single line again. 

During the proceedings of the Battle Fleet described 
above, the battle cruisers were in action ahead as men- 
tioned in Sir David Beatty's report in the Aj^pendix. 

At first, touch with the enemy was lost owing to the 
large alterations of course carried out by the High Sea 
Fleet, but it was regained at 7.12 p.m., the battle cruisers 
opening fire at 7-14 p.m., though onlj^ for two and a half 
minutes, and increasing speed to 22 knots. At this 
period the battle cruisers were steering south-west by 
south to south-west, and this course took them from the 
port to the starboard bow of the Battle Fleet by 7.12 p.m. 
The movements of our battle cruisers, which were at this 
time between four and five miles ahead of the van of the 
Battle Fleet, could not be distinguished, owing, partly, to 
the funnel and cordite smoke from the battle cruisers 
themselves, but even more to the funnel smoke from the 
numerous cruisers, light cruisers and destroyers which 
were attempting to gain their positions ahead of the van. 

The movements of the enemy's fleet could not be dis- 
tinguished from our Battle Fleet owing again to their own 
funnel and cordite smoke, and, also, to the smoke screens 
which ships and destroyers were making to conceal their 
movements. 

It will be realised that these conditions, which par- 
ticularly affected the Battle Fleet, did not apply to the 
same extent to our ships ahead of our Battle Fleet. They 
had little but the smoke of the enemy's leading ships to 
obscure the view. Farther to the rear, the Battle Fleet 
had the smoke of all our craft ahead of it as well as that 
of the enemy's long line of ships. 

Conditions which were perhaps difficult ahead of the 



S 2 




THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 367 

Battle Fleet were very much accentuated in the Battle 
Fleet. Vice-Admh"al Sir Martyn Jerram, in his report, 
remarked on this point: "As leading ship, in addition to 
the hazy atmosphere, I was much hampered by what I 
imagine must have been cordite fumes from the battle 
cruisers after they had passed us, and from other 
cruisers engaged on the bow, also by funnel gases from 
small craft ahead, and for a considerable time by dense 
smoke from the Duke of Edinburgh, which was unable 
to draw clear." 

The general position at 6.45 p.m. and again at 7.15 
P.M. is shown in plans 8 and 9. 

At 7.10 P.M., according to remarks from the Mino- 
taur, flagship of Rear-Admiral W. L. Heath, command- 
ing the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the position as seen from 
that ship was as follows: "The 2nd Cruiser Squadron 
was in single line ahead three to four miles on the port 
side of the King George V., gaining on her slightly, but 
with all the destroyers and light craft between her and 
the King George V. The battle cruisers were about four 
miles distant on the starboard bow of the Minotaur; 
owing to their higher speed, the battle cruisers rapidly 
increased their distance from the Battle Fleet to some 
eight miles."* 

At 7.5 P.M. according to a report from the Shannon, 
of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, the Shannon s course was 
S. 10 W., "the 2nd Cruiser Squadron endeavouring to 
take station on the engaged bow of the Battle Fleet; the 
Battle Fleet still engaged, the battle cruisers not en- 
gaged and turned slightly to port." And again at 7.22 
P.M. a report says: "The Duke of Edinburgh had now 
taken station astern of the Shannon, the battle cruisers 

* Judged by reports from other cruisers the positions here described should 
be timed at about 6.50 to 7 p.m., and the diagrams show this accordingly. 



368 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

were engaged and had wheeled to starboard. Leading 
ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron were starting to cross 
the bows of the Battle Fleet from port to starboard. 
Battle cruisers firing intermittently, light cruisers mak- 
ing their way through the destroyer flotillas to attack the 
enemy light cruisers." Rear- Admiral Heath stated: 
"At 7.11 P.M. I proceeded with the squadron at 20 knots 
to take up station astern of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, which 
was then engaged with the enemy." He added: "One 
salvo fell short on the starboard bow of the Minotaur and 
some others in close proximity"; and later says, "even 
when the salvo referred to in the preceding paragraph fell, 
no more than the flashes of the enemy's guns could be 
seen." 

Further remarks from the Shannon, at a later stage, 
were: "At 8 p.m. Battle Fleet altered course to starboard 
to close the enemy, and by 8.15 was lost to sight, bearing 
about north by east." 

"At 8.15 P.M. Battle Fleet, out of sight from Shan- 
non, was heard to be in action." 

"At 8.30 P.M. the visibility of grey ships was about 
9,000 yards." "At 8.45 p.m. King George V. again 
sighted, bearing north-north-east. Visibihty had again im- 
proved, and her range was estimated at about 10,000 
yards. Conformed to her course S. 75 W. to close 
enemy." 

At 7.20 P.M. the ships engaged by our battle cruisers 
turned away and were lost to sight. They were located 
for a moment at 8.20 p.m. with the aid of the 1st and 3rd 
Light Cruiser Squadrons, and, although they disappeared 
again at once, they were once more located and effectively 
engaged between 8.22 and 8.28 p.m. at about 10,000 yards 
range. They turned away once more and were finally lost 
to sight by the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron (the last ships 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 369 

to keep in touch) at 8.38 p.m., steaming to the westward. 

This was the last opportunity which the battle cruisers 
had of putting the finishing touch upon a fine afternoon's 
work. They had, under the very able and gallant leader- 
ship of Sir David Beatty, assisted by the splendid squad- 
ron so well comnianded by Admiral Evan-Thomas, gone 
far to crush out of existence the opposing Battle Cruiser 
Squadron. 

It will be seen from the above account that our battle 
cruisers experienced great difficulty in locating and hold- 
ing the enemy after 7-20 p.m., even when far ahead of the 
Battle Fleet, with its small craft, and therefore in a 
position of freedom from the smoke of our own vessels and 
the enemy's line. After this time, 7.20 p.m., the battle 
cruisers were only engaged for some six minutes. The 
enemy turned av,aj on each occasion when he was lo- 
cated and showed no disposition to fight. 

The visibility by this time had become very bad; the 
light was failing, and it became necessary to decide on the 
disposition for the night. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — {Continued) 

III. — The Night Action 

The situation, which had never been at all clear to me 
owing to the fact that I had not seen more than a few 
ships at a time, appeared to be as follows : 

We were between the enemy and his bases, whether 
he shaped a course to return via the Horn Reef, via 
Heligoland direct, or via the swept channel which he was 
known to use along the coast of the West Frisian Islands. 

I concluded that the enemy was well to the westward 
of us. He had been turning on interior lines throughout. 
We had altered course gradually during the action from 
south-east by east to west, a turn of 13 points, or 146 
degrees, in all, and the result must have been to place his 
ships well to the westward and ahead of us; although it 
was possible that ships, which had fallen out owing to 
damage, might be to the northward. 

The possibility of a night action was, of course, 
present to my mind, but for several reasons it was not 
my intention to seek such an action between the heavy 
ships. 

It is sufficient to mention the principal arguments 
against it. 

In the first place, such a course must have inevitably 
led to our Battle Fleet being the object of attack by a 
very large destroyer force throughout the night. No 
370 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 371 

senior officer would willingly court such an attack, even 
if our battleships were equipped with the best searchlights 
and the best arrangements for the control of the search- 
lights and the gunfire at night. 

It was, however, known to me that neither our search- 
lights nor their control arrangements were at this time of 
the best type. The fitting of director-firing gear for the 
guns of the secondary armament of our battleships (a very 
important factor for firing at night) had also only just 
been begun, although repeatedly applied for. The delay 
was due to manufacturing and labour difficulties. Without 
these adjuncts I knew well that the maximum effect of 
our fire at night could not be obtained, and that we could 
place no dependence on beating off destroyer attacks by 
gunfire. Therefore, if destroyers got into touch with the 
heavy ships, we were bound to suffer serious losses with 
no corresponding advantage. Our own destroyers were 
no effective antidote at night, since, if they were disposed 
with this sole object in view, they would certainly be taken 
for enemy destroyers and be fired on by our own ships. 

But putting aside the question of attack by destroyers, 
the result of night actions between heavy ships must 
always be very largely a matter of chance, as there is 
little opportunity for skill on either side. Such an action 
must be fought at very close range, the decision depend- 
ing on the course of events in the first few minutes. It 
is, therefore, an undesirable procedure on these general 
grounds. The greater efficiency of German searchlights 
at the time of the Jutland action, and the greater num- 
ber of torpedo tubes fitted in enemy ships, combined with 
his superiority in destroyers, would, I knew, give the 
Germans the opportunity of scoring heavily at the com- 
mencement of such an action. 

The question then remained as to the course to be 



372 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

steered. The first desideratum was to keep the British 
Fleet between the enemy and his bases, so as to be in a 
position to renew the action at dawn. Dayhght was 
rapidly disappearing; it was necessary to form the Fleet 
for the night as quickly as possible to avoid visual sig- 
nalling after dark; and it was also necessary to place 
our destroyers in a position where the chances of their 
coming in contact with our own ships was reduced to a 
minimum, and yet giving them an opportunity of attack- 
ing the enemy's capital ships during the night. The Grand 
Fleet was formed at the time in practically a single line, 
steering approximately west-south-west. I considered 
that a southerly course would meet the situation and 
would enable me to form the Fleet very quickly, and, 
if I put the destrojrers astern, they would fulfil three 
conditions: first, they would be in an excellent position 
for attacking the enemy's fleet should it also turn to the 
southward with a view to regaining its bases during the 
night (which seemed a very probable movement on the 
part of the enemy) ; secondly, they would also be in 
position to attack enemy destroyers should the latter 
search for our fleet with a view to a night attack on the 
heavy ships ; finally, they would be clear of our own ships, 
and the danger of their attacking our battleships in error 
or of our battleships firing on them would be reduced to 
a minimum. 

Accordingly, at 9 p.m., I signalled to the Battle 
Fleet to alter course by divisions to south, informing the 
Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the cruiser and 
light cruiser squadrons, and the officers commanding de- 
stroyer flotillas, of my movements in order that they 
should conform. Shortly afterwards I directed the Battle 
Fleet to assume the second organisation and to form 
divisions in line ahead disposed abeam to port, with the 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 373 

columns one mile apart. This had the effect of placing 
the Battle Fleet as shown in the diagram: 



My object in closing the columns to one mile apart was 
to ensure that adjacent columns should not lose sight of 
each other during the night, and that therefore they would 
not mistake our own ships for those of the enemy. 

As soon as the Battle Fleet had turned to the southerly 
course the destroyer flotillas were directed to take station 
five miles astern of the Battle Fleet. At 9.32 p.m. a 
signal was made to the mine-laying flotilla leader Abdiel 
(Captain Berwick Curtis) to proceed to lay a mine-field 
in a defined area some 15 miles from the Vyl Lightship, 
over which it was expected the High Sea Fleet would 
pass if the ships attempted to regain their ports during 
the night via the Horn Reef. The Abdiel carried out this 
operation unobserved in the same successful manner as 
numerous other similar operations had been undertaken 
by this most useful little vessel; from the evidence of one 
of our submarines, stationed near the Horn Reef, which 
reported on return to her base having heard several under- 
water explosions between 2.15 and 5.30 a.m. on June 1st, 
it was judged that some enemy ships had struck mines. 

At 10 P.M. the position of the Iron Duke vp^as Lat. 
56.22 N., Long. 5.47 E., course south, speed 17 knots, 
and the order of the Fleet from west to east was : 



Battle Cruiser Fleet (except Snd Light Cruiser Squadron) ; 
Cruiser Squadrons; 



374 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Battle Fleet; 

2nd Light Cruiser Squadron astern of the 5th Battle Squad- 
ron; 

4th Light Cruiser Squadron ahead of the Battle Fleet; 

11th, 4th, 12th, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas disposed from 
west to east, in that order, astern of the Battle Fleet. 

Shortly before the turn of the Fleet to the southward 
for the night a destroyer attack took place on the 2nd 
Light Cruiser Squadron at the rear of our Battle line. 
This was reported to me shortly after 9 p.m., but imme- 
diately afterwards a further report stated that the enemy 
had been driven off to the north-west. 

At 10.4 P.M. Commodore Hawkesley, in the Castor, 
commanding the destroyer flotillas, after dropping astern, 
sighted three or more vessels at a range of 2,000 yards 
which he took to be enemy battle cruisers. If the German 
report is to be believed, the ships were light cruisers and 
included the Hamburg and Elbing. The enemji' at once 
opened a rapid and accurate fire, and the Castor was hit, 
and her bridge and wireless telegraphy gear damaged, 
making it impossible to signal to the 11th Flotilla, which 
the Castor was leading. The damage to the Castor was 
slight. The Castor, Magic, and Marne fired torpedoes 
at the enemy, but the remaining destroyers of the flotilla 
refrained from doing so, not being certain of the identity 
of the vessels in sight. The enemy disappeared after a 
violent detonation, following on the discharge of the tor- 
pedoes, had been felt in the engine-rooms of the destroyers 
near the Castor. 

At 0.15 A.M. the Castor sighted a German destroyer 
on her starboard bow and opened fii-e with all guns at 
point-blank range. She was not seen again. 

At 10.20 P.M. the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron sighted 
and engaged five enemy vessels, apparently a cruiser with 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 375 

four light cruisers, probably of the 4th Scouting Group. 
The enemy again opened fire with great rapidity and 
accuracy, and concentrated his fire on our two leading 
ships, the Southampton and Dublin, at very short range. 
Both vessels suffered considerable damage during the 15 
minutes' engagement and there were fairly heavy casual- 
ties ; three fires which broke out on board the Southampton 
were promptly extinguished b)^ fine work on the part of 
the officers and men, in spite of the fact that the hoses had 
been much cut up by shell fii-e. 

The enemy squadron disappeared after this short but 
fierce engagement, and it is probable that the German 
light cruiser Frauenloh, whose loss was admitted by the 
enemy, was sunk during this action, which took place in 
that case between our own 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron 
and the German 4th Scouting Group. 

At 11.30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla sighted and attacked 
enemy cruisers steering a south-easterly course. Again 
the vessels sighted opened fire immediately, and the flotilla 
leader Tipperary, commanded by Captain Wintour, the 
leader of the flotilla, was severely damaged by gunfire 
and set on fire forward ; the Broke, leader of the 2nd half 
Flotilla, received injury to her steering-gear, rendering 
her temporarily unmanageable and causing her to ram 
the destroyer Sparrotjcha'wk, with the result that it be- 
came necessary to abandon the latter destroyer on the 
following morning after taking off her crew. The de- 
stroyer Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander C. W. Tre- 
lawny), next astern of the Tipperary, fired torpedoes at 
a four-funnelled cruiser which appeared to be hit and in 
a sinking condition, and the Spitfire then collided with a 
German light cruiser and, in scraping along her side, car- 
ried off some 29 feet of her skin plating. 

The remainder of the 4th Flotilla, after this engage- 



376 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ment, while steering to the south-eastward, came into con- 
tact at midnight with the enemy's 2nd Battle Squadron, 
and one ship (probably the Povimem) was torpedoed and 
sunk either by the Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Mars- 
den) or Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander G. A. 
Coles) or Garland (Lieutenant-Commander R. S. Goff). 
A heav)^ and accurate fire was opened by the enemy and 
the destroyer Fortune (Lieutenant-Commander F. G. 
Terry) was sunk. 

The flotilla was again in action a little later with some 
enemy battleships, and the Ardent attacked, and fired a 
torpedo, but the result could not be observed as a very 
heavy fire was concentrated on the Ardent, which sank 
with colours flying after a very gallant night's work. It 
is sad to record that Lieutenant-Commander Marsden 
and one man were the only survivors, being picked up 
by a destroyer on June 1st after having been five hours in 
the water. 

The 12th Flotilla had formed after dark astern of 
the 1st Battle Squadron. The 1st Battle Squadron was 
somewhat astern of the remainder of the Fleet during 
the night, owing to the Marlborough not being able 
to keep up 17 knots, although steaming at the revolutions 
for this speed. Consequently the 1st Flotilla was also 
more than five miles astern of the main portion of the 
Battle Fleet. At 11.30 p.m. also this flotilla was obliged 
for some little time to steer a south-easterly course, owing 
to the movements of another flotilla on the starboard 
hand, the identity of which cannot be determined with 
certainty. The result was that the 12th Flotilla was prob- 
ably some ten miles to the north-eastward of the 1st Battle 
Squadron by midnight. The incident was a fortunate one 
since it brought the flotilla into contact with one of the 
enemy's battle squadrons. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND. 377 

At 1.45 A.M. Captain Stirling, leading the flotilla in 
the Faullmor, sighted on the starboard bow this battle 
squadron, consisting of six ships steering south-east. The 
leading ships were thought to belong to the "Kaiser" 
class. Captain Stirling altered his course to one parallel 
to that of the enemy and increased speed to 25 knots 
to draw ahead, with the intention of turning to attack 
on a north-westerly course (the reverse of the enemy's 
course), in order to give an opportunity of getting into 
close range. This attack was carried out at 2 a.m. at a 
range of about 3,000 yards, and all destroyers fired their 
torpedoes at the second and third ships in the line. Some 
took effect on the third battleship in the line, the explo- 
sion being so violent and the flame reaching to such a 
height that it appeared to those in our destroyers that 
the explosion of the torpedoes must have detonated the 
magazine and destroyed the ship. 

Our destroyers were then forced to withdraw by the 
enemy light cruisers, which were in company with the 
battle squadron. The destroyer WIcenad (Commander 
J. P. Champion) had, however, not turned to the north- 
westward with the remainder of the flotilla, as it had 
been anticipated that the attack would have been made 
with torpedo tubes bearing to starboard, and her tubes 
were not ready to fire to port. Commander Champion 
held on the south-easterly course and, turning later than 
the rest of the flotilla, fired one port tube, then turned 
again to south-east, trained his tubes to starboard, and at 
2.25 A.M. fired two torpedoes to starboard at the fourth 
ship in the line at a range between 4,000 and 5,000 yards, 
one of which took effect. In this case, too, the flame of 
the explosion reached the mast head, and the ship was 
not seen again, although those ahead and astern of her 
■^ere visible. 



378 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

It is of interest to note that at the time of the first 
attack on this squadron six battleships vere visible. After 
the first attack only five were seen b}' Captain Stirling, 
and twenty-five minutes later five were sighted by the 
Mcenad, and after the Mcenad's attack only four were 
visible. The evidence that at least one of the battleships 
was sunk was considered at the time to be ver)' strong, 
particularly as the reports from the Mcenad and from 
Captain Stirling were sent to me quite independently, 
and Commander Champion was unaware of the fact that 
Captain Stirling had reported six ships as the original 
number in the battle squadron, and five as the number 
remaining after his attack. 

When Captain Stirling had located the enemy's battle 
squadron he reported the fact by wireless, but the signal 
was, unfortunately, not received by any ship, owing, pre- 
sumably, to the strong interference caused by German 
wireless signalling at the time. 

The destroj'ers of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Flotillas 
took station astern the Battle Fleet in company with the 
Champion (CajDtain Farie), leader of the 13th Flotilla; 
the Feai'less, leader of the 9th Flotilla, had not been able 
to maintain touch with her flotilla. Many of the de- 
stroyers of these flotillas lost touch with the Champion 
during the night, and the flotillas became somewhat 
scattered. 

At 12.30 A.M. a large vessel, taken at first for one of 
our own ships, crossed the rear of the flotilla at high 
speed, passing close to the Petard and Tiirhulent. She 
rammed the Turbulent and opened a heavy fire on both 
the Turbulent and Petard; the Turbulent sanTi and the 
Petard was damaged. 

At 2.35 A.M. the destroyer Moresby, of the 13th Flo- 
tilla, sighted four battleships of the "Deutschland" class. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 379 

and attacked, firing one torpedo; an explosion was sub- 
sequently heard. 

It was impossible to state with certainty which of our 
destroyers were actually successful in their attacks. The 
enemy, of course, denied that any marked success was 
obtained by our attacks, but information obtained after 
the action made it certain that at least four battleships 
of the "Dreadnought" type were hit by torpedoes, in ad- 
dition to the pre-Dreadnought battleship Pommern, which 
was admitted to have been sunk by a torpedo, as was the 
light cruiser Rostock. 

Although the credit for the successful attacks cannot' 
be attributed to particular destroyers, the work of the 
flotillas as a whole, and particularly of the 4th and 12th 
Flotillas, was characterised by the splendid dash, skill and 
gallantry for which our destroyers had been conspicuous 
throughout the War. They A^^ere most ably led and 
achieved magnificent work under very difficult conditions. 

There is no doubt at all that the German organisa- 
tion for night action was of a remarkably high standard. 
In the first place, the use of star shell, at that time un- 
familiar to us, was of the greatest use to them in locating 
our destroyers without revealing their own positions ; and, 
secondly, their searchlights were not only very powerful 
(much more so than ours) , but their method of controlling 
them and bringing guns and searchlights rapidly on to 
any vessel sighted was excellent. It also appeared that 
some system of director-firing was fitted to the guns of 
their secondary armament. 

The increased offensive power given by these devices 
did not, however, prevent our destroyers from inflicting 
great damage on the enemy during their night attacks, 
although they led to the loss of some valuable destroyers 
and still more valuable lives. Captain Wintour, leader 



380 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

of the 4th Flotilla, an officer of wide experience of de- 
stroyer work and a fine leader, was a very heavy loss, and 
other splendid officers perished with their gallant crews. 
Our destroyer service has, indeed, every reason to be ex- 
ceedingly proud of the achievements of the flotillas, both 
during the day action of May 31st and during the night 
following that action. 

Gunfire and under-water explosions were heard at in- 
tervals during the night, and, curiously enough, the under- 
water explosions, four or five in number, were quite 
clearly recorded on a barograph in the Malaya, a ship 
well placed for the j)urpose, as she was in the rear. There 
is little doubt that these records showed the explosion of 
our torpedoes against enemy ships. 

From the Battle Fleet it was evident shortly after dark 
that our destroyers were in action. Star shells were fired 
with great frequency by the enemy, and they produced 
a very brilliant illumination, leaving the enemy ships in 
complete darkness and not revealing their positions. 

At 11 P.M. the light cruiser Active, astern of the 2nd 
Battle Squadron, observed a ship coming up from astern, 
and shortly afterwards saw searchlights switched on and 
a heavy fire opened against this vessel by a ship, or ships, 
on her starboard quarter. She appeared to be heavily hit 
and to sink. It is possible that this ship may have been 
the Blach Prince, which had apparently lost touch with 
our fleet during the day action. 

Shortly after this incident the Active passed over some 
submerged object which she bumped heavily. Subse- 
quent examination showed that some 15 feet of her bilge 
keel had been torn away. It was not conceivable that 
the object struck could have been submerged wreckage 
from any ship which had taken part in the action, no 
fighting ha^ang taken place in the vicinity, and it seemed 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 381 

possible that the Active had struck an enemy submarine. 
At 11.30 P.M. the Colossus also passed over some sub- 
merged object which was felt to scrape along the bottom 
of the ship. Subsequent examination showed damage to 
both starboard projjeller blades. Again there is doubt 
as to what the obstruction could have been; it was cer- 
tainly not wreckage from any ship that had been in action. 

At 2 A.M. on June 1st Vice- Admiral Sir Cecil Burney 
informed me that the Marlborough could not maintain 
the Fleet speed of 17 knots any longer, on account of the 
stress on the bulkheads, and that she had been obliged 
to ease to 12 knots. I directed him to order the ship to 
proceed to the TjTie or Rosyth, passing south of the 
German mined area. Sir Cecil Burney called the light 
cruiser Fearless alongside the Marlborough,, and was 
transferred in her, with his Staff, to the Revenge, the 
Fearless being then detached to escort the Marlborough. 

Some idea of the area covered by the different engage- 
ments which constituted the Battle of Jutland will be 
gathered from a consideration of the distances steamed 
by our ships during the operations. 

The Battle Cruisers steamed some 64 miles between 
3.48 P.M., the time of opening fire, and 6.17 PIM., the 
time that the Battle Fleet commenced action, and a 
further distance of some 57 miles to 9 p.m., when the 
Fleet turned to the southward for the night. The Battle 
Fleet steamed some 47 miles between the commencement 
of their engagement with the High Sea Fleet and the 
turn to the southward at 9 p.m. 

The whole Fleet steamed some 85 miles during the 
period covered by the night action — 9 p.m. to 2 a.m. 

At 2.47 A.M., as dawn was breaking, the Fleet altered 
course to north and formed single line ahead in the order 
— 2nd Battle Squadron, 4th Battle Squadron, 1st Battle 



382 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Squadron (less the 6th Division). The 5th Battle Squad- 
ron rejoined at 3.30 a.m. and stook station ahead of the 
2nd Battle Squadron. 

The weather was misty and the visibility even less than 
on May 31st, being onlj^ some three or four miles, and 
I considered it desirable under these conditions, and in 
view of the fact that I was not in touch with either my 
cruisers or destroyers, to accept the danger of submarine 
attack on a long line in order to be ready to meet the 
enemy's Battle Fleet, if suddenly sighted. The 6th 
Division of the Battle Fleet was not in sight at daylight, 
having dropped astern during the night owing to the 
reduction in speed of the Marlborough and the change 
of flag from the Marlborough to the Revenge. Partly on 
account of the low visibility, and partlj^ because of the 
inevitable difference in dead reckoning between ships, due 
to their many movements during the action and during 
the night, considerable difficulty was experienced in col- 
lecting the Fleet. This applied particularly to the de- 
stroyer flotillas, which had been heavily engaged, and 
whose facilities for computing their positions under these 
conditions were only slight; but the same difficulty was 
experienced with all classes of ships, and, although awk- 
ward, the fact did not cause me any surprise. The cniisers 
were not sighted until 6 a.m., the destroyers did not join 
the Battle Fleet until 9 a.m., and the 6th Division of the 
Battle Fleet with the Vice-Admiral of the 1st Battle 
Squadron, was not in company until the evening. 

The difficulties experienced in collecting the Fleet 
(particularly the destroyers), due to the above causes, 
rendered it undesirable for the Battle Fleet to close the 
Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention when 
deciding to steer to the southward during the night. 
It was obviously necessary to concentrate the Battle 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 383 

Fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By 
the time this concentration was effected it had become 
apparent that the Pligh Sea Fleet, steering for the Horn 
Reef, had passed behind the shelter of the German mine- 
fields in the early morning on the way to their ports. The 
presence of a Zeppelin, sighted at 3.30 a.m., made it 
certain that our position at that time would be known 
to the enemy, should he be at sea, but the information 
obtained from our wireless directional stations during the 
early morning showed that ships of the High Sea Fleet 
must have passed the Horn Reef on a southerly course 
shortly after daylight. 

At 3 A.M. the destroyer S parrowhawh , which was 
lying disabled in Lat. 55. 54 N., Long. 5.59 E., sighted 
a German light cruiser two miles to the eastward, steam- 
ing slowly to the northward. After being in sight for 
about five minutes this vessel slowly heeled over and sank, 
bows first. The S parrowhaiick was subsequently sighted 
by the Marksman and others of our destroyers, and, being 
too seriously damaged for towing back to a base, was 
sunk by the Marksman. 

Shortly after 3.30 a.m. the report of gunfire to the 
westward was audible in the Battle Fleet, and at 3.38 
Rear-Admiral Trevelyan Napier, commanding the 3rd 
Light Cruiser Squadron, reported that he was engaging 
a Zeppelin in a position to the westward of the Battle 
Fleet. Course was altered "by divisions" to west at 
3.44 a.m., as it seemed that the presence of the airship 
might possibly indicate the presence also of the High Sea 
Fleet. At 3.50 a.m. a Zeppelin was in sight from the 
Battle Fleet, but nothing else; course was altered back 
again to north and fire opened on the airship, which, 
however, was too high for the fire to be effective. She 



384 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

disappeared to the eastward. She was sighted subse- 
quently at intervals. 

At 4.10 A.M. the Battle Fleet was formed into divi- 
sions in line ahead, disposed abeam to starboard, in order 
to widen the front and to reduce the risk of submarine at- 
tack. At 4.25 A.M. the cruiser Dublin reported by wireless 
that she had sighted an enemy cruiser and two destroyers, 
and she gave her position. 

At 5.15 A.M. the Battle Cruiser Fleet joined the Battle 
Fleet in accordance with orders signalled, and was directed 
to locate the cruiser reported by the Dublin^ whilst the 
Battle Fleet searched to the south-eastward for one of 
the enemy's battle cruisers which was thought to be in 
a damaged condition and probably, therefore, still making 
for a German port. At 4.45 a.m. the Battle Fleet was 
in Lat. 55.29 N., Long. 6.02 E.; at 5 a.m. the Commo- 
dore of the flotillas (Commodore Hawkesley), with de- 
stroyers, reported himself as being in Lat. 55.48 N., 
Long. 6.22 E.; at 5.48 a.m. the Battle Cruiser Fleet was 
in Lat. 55.45 N., Long. 6.16 E., steering south-east at 
18 knots, and at 6.15 a.m. altered course to south. At 
6 A.M,, not having met the destroyers, the Battle Fleet 
altered course to south-east, with the cruisers in company, 
steaming at 17 knots, and maintained that course until 
7.15 A.M., at which time course was altered to north, the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet altering to north-east at 7-30 a.m. 
and to north at 8 a.m. 

The Dublin was sighted at 7.55 a.m. and reported 
having lost sight in a fog, in Lat. 55.28 N., Long. 6.32 
E., of the cruiser and torpedo boat destroyers she had 
reported, and, in reply to further inquiries, stated that 
the cruiser was apparently not disabled and was steaming 
fast. 

At 8.15 A.M. the Battle Fleet was in Lat. 55.54 N., 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 385 

Long. 6.10 E., steering north at 17 knots, turning at 
8.52 A.M. to a south-west course. 

Between 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. a considerable amount of 
wreckage was passed, and the bodies of dead German 
bluejackets were seen in the water. The wreckage of the 
destroyer Ardent was also passed. Drifting mines in con- 
siderable numbers were seen during the whole forenoon 
of the 1st June, and there were one or two reports of sub- 
marines being sighted. At 10 a.m. the Battle Cruiser 
Fleet was again in sight, ahead of the Battle Fleet, and 
course was altered to north by west, the destroyers, which 
had now joined, being stationed to form a submarine 
screen. 

At noon the Battle Fleet was in position Lat. 56.20 
N., Long. 5.25 E., and at 12.30 p.m. the Battle Cmiser 
Fleet was in Lat. 56.32 N., Long. 6.11 E. 

It was now clear that all disabled enemy vessels had 
either sunk or had passed inside the mine-fields en route 
to their bases. It had been evident since the early morn- 
ing, from the definite information obtained by our direc- 
tional stations, that the enemy's fleet was returning to 
port. All our own injured vessels were also en route for 
their bases, and I decided to return with the whole Fleet, 
and gave the necessary instructions to the Rosyth force 
to return independently. Diagram 4 shows the move- 
ment of the Fleet during the night of May 31st and the 
forenoon of June 1st. 

The Harwich force, under Commodore Tyrwhitt, had 
been kept in port by Admiralty orders on ]May 31st, and 
was despatched to sea on the morning of June 1st, when 
I was informed that it was being sent out to join me and 
to replace vessels requiring fuel. At 7 a.m. I instructed 
Commodore Tyrwhitt to send four of his destroyers to 
screen the Marlborough to her base; he informed me at 



386 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

2.30 P.M. that he had sighted the Marlborough. At 10.40 
A.M. I had reported to the Admiralty that I did not re- 
quire the Harwich force. I desired Commodore Tyrwhitt 
to strengthen the Marlborough's escort and told him that 
I did not need his ships. They would have been of great 
use at daylight in June 1st had they been on the scene 
at that time, and it is needless to add how much I should 
have welcomed the participation of the Harwich force in 
the action had circmnstances admitted of this. I knew 
well the extreme efficiency and the fine fighting spirit 
of this force which, under its gallant and distinguished 
commodore, had rendered such splendid service through- 
out the War. 

The Marlborough reported at 11 a.m. that a torpedo 
had been fired at her and had missed. Some anxiety was 
felt about the ship on the morning of June 2nd, as bad 
weather set in and her pumps became choked; tugs were 
ordered out to meet her, but she arrived in the Humber 
at 8 A.M. 

The Warrior, which had been taken in tow by the 
sea-plane carrier Engadine, was in Lat. 57.18 N., Long. 
3.54 E. at 8 A.M. on the 1st June, but the crew was 
taken off by the Engadine and the ship abandoned later 
in the day, as the weather had become bad and it was 
evident the ship could not remain afloat. The work of 
rescue was very smartly carried out, the Engadine being 
skilfully placed alongside the Warrior in a considerable 
sea way by her Captain, Lieutenant-Commander C. G. 
Robinson, and the large number of wounded transferred 
to her. The reports as to the condition of the Warrior 
were not clear, and it was feared that she might remain 
afloat, and later fall into the hands of the enemy. There- 
fore I detached the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and subse- 
quently the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, to search for 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 387 

her. The search continued until the evening of June 23rd, 
no trace of the ship being found. It became clear from a 
report received subsequently from the Captain of the 
War'rior that her condition was such that she must have 
sunk shortly after having been abandoned. During the 
search for the Warrio?; one of the cruisers of the 2nd 
Cruiser Squadron sighted a submarine on the surface at 
dusk, opened fire, and tried to ram. It was reported 
quite definitely that the submarine had been sunk. Later 
evidence sho^^'ed, however, that the submarine was one 
of our own vessels of this class, that she had a very narrow 
escape, but had dived in time to escape injury. This 
was one instance, amongst others, of our own submarines 
being mistaken for an enemy, attacked by our own ships, 
and considered to be sunk. The difficulty of ascertain- 
ing definitely the result of an engagement with a sub- 
marine was thereby exemplified, and was one of the 
weighty reasons which led the Admiralty during the War 
to refrain from publishing any figures giving the results 
of engagements with submarines. 

Some anxiety had been felt as to the safety of the 
destroyer Broke, and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron was 
directed to search for that vessel also, assisted by two 
light cruisers. She, however, arrived safely in the Tyne, 
having been delayed by bad weather. Other disabled or 
partially disabled destroyers requiring assistance to reach 
port were the A cast a, towed by the Nonsuch, and the 
Onslow, towed by the Defender. 

The Fleet arrived at its bases on June 2nd, fuelled, 
and was reported ready for sea at four hours' notice at 
9.45 P.M. on that date. 

Note. — In the diagrams embodied in this chapter 
there are some slight departures from those which accom- 
panied my original despatch to the Admiralty. 



388 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

That despatch was sent in under constant pressure 
for its early receipt and at a time when I, in common 
with my Staff, was very fully occupied with the arrange- 
ments connected with the repair of damaged ships, the 
constructive alterations which the action had shown to 
be necessary in our ships, and the various committees 
which I had formed to repoi't on different subjects in 
the light of our experience. I was not, therefore, able 
to give the personal attention to the reports which later 
opportunities have afforded rae, and such slight 
modifications as I have made are due to a closer study 
of these reports, and of the signals received during May 
31st. 

One of my first acts on returning to Scapa was to 
send to the King on the morning of June 3rd a message 
of humble duty, respectful and heartfelt wishes on His 
Majesty's birthday. 

The following reply was received from His Majesty, 
and communicated to the Fleet: 

*T am deeply touched by the message which you 
have sent me on behalf of the Grand Fleet. It 
reaches me on the morrow of a battle which has once 
more displayed the splendid gallantry of the officers 
and men under your command. I mourn the loss of 
brave men, many of them personal friends of my 
own, who have fallen in their country's cause. Yet 
even more do I regret that the German High Sea 
Fleet in spite of its heavy losses was enabled by 
the misty weather to evade the full consequences of 
an encounter they have always professed to desire, 
but for which when the opportunity arrived they 
showed no inclination. Though the retirement of the 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 389 

enemy immediately after the opening of the general 
engagement robbed us of the opportunity of gain- 
ing a decisive victory, the events of last Wednesday 
amply justify my confidence in the valour and effi- 
ciency of the fleets under your command. 

"George R. I." 

The simple duty remained of acknowledging this gra- 
cious message, and I added in my telegram to His 
Majesty that it was "a matter of the greatest gratifica- 
tion to all ranks to receive such an expression of Your 
Majesty's approval and sympathy for the loss of our 
gallant comrades." 



CHAPTER XV 

REFLECTIONS ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

There has been some discussion on the tactics of the 
Jutland Battle, and no doubt there will be more. I have 
endeavoured to give the facts, so that future discussions 
may take place with adequate knowledge. 

It is as well, first, to dispel the illusion, which I have 
seen expressed, that the Grand Fleet was divided with 
the object of enticing the enemy out to attack the 
weaker portion in order to provide the opportunity for 
a Fleet action. There was no such intention. On May 
31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet was scouting to the 
southward of the Battle Fleet in pursuance of the pol- 
icy which had been frequently carried out on previous 
occasions. 

Many surmises have been made as to the object with 
which the High Sea Fleet put to sea on this occasion. 
The view which I have always held is that the frequent 
light cruiser sweeps, which had taken place down 
the Norwegian coast and in the vicinity of the 
Skagerrak during the spring of 1916, may have induced 
the German Commander-in-Chief to send out a force 
with the object of cutting off the light cruisers engaged 
in one of these operations, and that he took the Battle 
Fleet to sea in support of this force. There is no doubt 
that he did not expect to meet the whole Grand Fleet. 
If confirmation of this were needed it is supplied in the 
German account of the battle, in which it is stated 

390 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 391 

that "there was no reason for supposing that any- 
enemy forces were about, much less the entire British ' 
Fleet." 

Consideration of the tactics at Jutland, or indeed of 
the whole strategy and tactics of the War, leads natu- 
rally to the fresh problems which the advent of new 
weapons had introduced. When I took command of 
the Grand Fleet one of these problems was that 
of how to counter a destroyer attack in a day action. 
It had excited more attention in the two or three 
years before the War than any other question of 
tactics, much attention was devoted to it during the 
War, and for that reason it is desirable to discuss it 
fully. 

It was not, I believe, until the year 1911, during what 
were then known as "P.Z. Exercises" (that is, actions 
between Battle Fleets as an exercise), that destroyer at- 
tacks were actually carried out in the British Navy on 
a large scale. 

During that year manoeuvi-es took place between the 
3rd and 4th Divisions of the Home Fleets, commanded 
by Admiral the Marquis of Milford Haven, and the At- 
lantic Fleet, commanded by myself; and the first phase 
of the manoeuvres of that year included some Battle 
Fleet "P.Z. Exercises," during which attacks by con- 
siderable forces of destroyers were carried out. Before 
this date the risk attendant on such exercises, and the 
fact that our Main Fleet exercises frequently took place 
without destroyer flotillas being present, had prevented 
the matter from being made the subject of thorough 
practical experiment on such a scale as to give reliable 
guidance. The 1911 exercises brought the question into 
greater prominence. 

The Fleet manoeuvres of 1912 did not throw further 



392 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

light on the question, as no Fleet action took place in 
which destroyers were engaged; and the subsequent 
Battle Fleet exercises did not, so far as I recollect, 
include destroyer flotillas amongst the vessels engaged. 
During the Fleet action at the close of the 1913 ma- 
noeuvres most of the destroyer attacks on the "Red" 
Fleet were made from towards the rear of the "Blue" 
battle line, and we did not gain much fresh knowledge 
from them. 

To turn from manceuvre experience; during the 
years 1911-14, covering the period of Sir George Cal- 
laghan's command of the Home Fleets, destroyer 
attacks were practised in the smaller Fleet exercises that 
were constantly being carried out, and officers were 
impressed with the supreme importance of the whole 
matter. 

This was the position when I took over the command 
of the Grand Fleet on the outbreak of War, and the mat- 
ter immediately engaged my attention. The "counter" 
which had usually been favoured by flag officers com- 
manding Fleets up to the date named, had been the 
obvious one of an attack by our own light cruisers' tor- 
pedo craft on those of the enemy, as the latter advanced 
to attack. It was difficult to forecast how far such a 
"counter" would be successful in preventing the destroy- 
ers from firing their torpedoes. Much depended on the 
distance the torpedo could be relied upon to run with 
accuracy, and on its speed, both constantly increasing 
figures. 

The great number of destroyers possessed by the 
enemy, the largely increased range of torpedoes, the dif- 
ficulty which our light cruisers and flotillas might experi- 
ence in reaching a favourable position for meeting and 
disposing of the enemy destroyers before the latter could 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 393 

discharge their torpedoes, together with the danger at- 
tendant on meeting the enemy's fleet in weather of low 
visibility, when a destroyer attack could be instantly and 
effectively launched before such a "counter" could take 
place, made it essential to consider other means for dealing 
with the situation. 

Some German documents which came into our pos- 
session early in the War proved the importance which 
the enemy attached to this form of attack, and emphasised 
the gravity of the question. 

It was, of course, fully realised that the question had 
two sides, and that if our own Battle Fleet was open to 
this form of attack, that of the enemy was equallj^ so, 
but as against this there were important considerations 
to which it was necessary to devote attention. 

The first Avas that the element of chance enters very 
largely into torpedo warfai'e of this nature. A flotilla 
of destroyers attacking a Battle Fleet at long range does 
so with the idea that a certain percentage of the torpe- 
does fired will take effect on the ships, the remainder 
passing between the ships. 

Obviously a torpedo fired at a range of 8,000 yards 
having a speed of 30 Icnots an hour, or, in other words, 
of 50 feet per second, is not comparable to a projectile 
from a gun which has a velocity at 8,000 yards of say 
2,000 feet per second. The torpedo may run perfectly 
straight after discharge, but unless the speed and course 
of the target have been determined with considerable ac- 
curacy, the torpedo will not hit. Let us assume that the 
target ship x at position A is steaming at 15 knots, and 
that the destroyer attacks from a favourable position on 
the bow so that the torpedo with its speed of 30 knots is 
discharged on a line at right angles to the course of the 
target at a distance of 8,000 yards {see diagram). The 



394 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

target ship will advance 4,000 yards along the line a B 
whilst the torpedo is running 8,000 yards along the line 
c D. The time occupied in each case is eight minutes. 

It M'ill be seen that if 

^ 4.000yards > d i 

■i* < r^A the course 01 the target 

/ ship has been misjudged 
/ very slightly, or had been 
/ altered during the passage 

/ from A to B, the torpedo 

/ vi'ill pass ahead or astern of 

/ it. In that case it might 

/ hit instead a ship z ahead or 

/ one Y astern of x. 

/ There are no means 

/ available on board a de- 

/ stroyer for determining 

/ w'\\h any real accuracy 

/ either the speed or the 

/ course of a ship at a dis- 

tance of four or five miles. 
Hence the difficulty, and 
the reason why torpedoes 
are fired at a ship a little way down a line of ships, in 
expectation that one of the ships in the line will be hit. 
The object in view is thus rather to "brown" the 
enemy, and the chances of achieving this object are nat- 
urally proportional to the target presented by a ship as 
compared with the space between adjacent ships. 

In the case of a British line of eight battleships at- 
tacked "beam on," the chances of a hit for torpedoes which 
reach the British line may be assessed roughly at seven 
to nine, taking the length of a ship as 600 feet, and the 
distance from the bow of one ship to the bow of her next 
astern as two and a half cables, that is 1,500 feet, thus 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 395 

giving a total length of ships of 4,800 feet, and the total 
of the interval between them as 6,300 feet. 

A German destroyer usually carries six torpedoes, 
and at long ranges one may calculate the chances of hits 
on the above reasoning at between three and four per 
destroyer, provided all the torpedoes are correctly fired 
at such a range as to ensure that they reach the British 
battle line, and provided that the British ships can take 
no effective steps to avoid the torpedoes.* 

It has been said that the element of chance is a large 
factor in torpedo warfare of the nature herein discussed. 
By this it is meant that skill is not a factor that can pro- 
duce a decisive effect when dealing with torpedoes, as in 
the case of guns dealing with guns. It is true that skilful 
manoeuvring may enable a ship to avoid a torpedo, if suf- 
ficient warning of its approach is given, and if its position 
with reference to any track it is leaving can be correctly 
judged. When experience at the Jutland Battle showed 
that under favourable weather conditions the track of 
German torpedoes was visible for some distance, great 
care was taken to avoid all mention of this in the dis- 
patches so that future use could be made of the fact. 

Another factor in this matter was the knowledge that 
our enemy was almost certain to possess a very consider- 
able superiority over us in the nxmiber of destroyers likely 
to be present during a Fleet action. This was a question 
which had given rise to anxiety in the minds of the then 
First Sea Lord and myself before the War; we had dis- 
cussed it on more than one occasion when the destroyer 
building programme was being considered. 

Our fears were realised, particularly during the first 
two years of the War. 

* Few British destroyers carried more than four torpedoes up to the year 
1917, although they mounted a much heavier gun armament than their enemies. 



396 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The relative position of the two Fleets in this respect 
at different periods is shown in the following table, so far 
as it is known to me : — 



Date 


British 
destroyers 
with the 
Grand Fleet, 
including 
Flotilla 
Leaders* 


German 

destroyers 

probably 

attached to 

the 

High Sea 

Fleet 


Additional German 
destroyers, less than 
12 years old, that 
could join the High 
Sea Fleet at Ger- 
many's selected 
moment. 


August 4th 1914 . . 


42 
42 
42 
58 
65 
65 
66 
74 
80 


88 
88 
88 
88 
88 
88 
88 
88 
88 


20 


October 1st, 1914 


20 




30 


April 1st, 1915 




July 1st, 1915 





October 1st, 1915 





January 1st, 1916 


60 


April 1st, 1916 




May 31st, 1916 


70t 







Of the 80 destroyers belonging to the Grand Fleet at 
the end of May, 1916, 70 were available to go to sea on 
May 30th (an unusually large proportion). There hap- 
pened, also, to be on this date at Rosyth eight destroyers 
belonging to the Harwich force, and these accompanied 
the battle cruisers to sea, making a total of 78, of which 
47 were with the Battle Fleet and cruisers, and 31 with 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet, including the 3rd Battle Cruiser 
Squadron. The smaller German Fleet had 88, a far 
larger proportion to each ship. 

This superiority in numbers on the part of the Ger- 
mans arose from three causes: 

(a) The formation, by us, of a light cruiser and de- 
stroyer force at Harwich, the presence of which 
force during a Fleet action was very improbable, 
owing to the fact that a Fleet action would, if 

* The Harwich force, as a whole, is not included in the figures in column 2, 
since I never expected that it would be able to concentrate with the Grand 
Fleet. 

t No account is taken in column 4 of German losses in destroyers. 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 397 

it took place, probably do so at Germany's se- 
lected moment and not at ours, and to the dif- 
ficulty of concentration under such circumstances. 

(b) The necessity of utilising a large number of our 
destroyers for patrol purposes in the Straits of 
Dover and elsewhere. 

(c) We had not built an adequate number of de- 
stroyers in the years before the War to meet the 
many needs that only this class of vessel could ful- 
fil, particularly as the enemy developed his sub- 
marine warfare against merchant-ships. 

The shipbuilding programmes of 1908-09, and fol- 
lowing years up to 1912-13, included provision for twenty 
destroyers each year. Subsequent to the latter date, the 
programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in order 
to provide for light ci-uisers, a class of vessel in which we 
were woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in 
the Estimates, there was never sufficient money to meet 
all the Admiralty's needs. It was intimated that one or 
other of the requirements had to give way at a time when 
the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and 
as the light cruisers were considered to be even more nec- 
essary than the destroyers, the number of the latter class 
of vessel was reduced. 

Although, in spite of the great destroyer progranmie 
initiated by Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage 
of destroyers was most seriously felt throughout the whole 
War, the conditions would probably have been even worse 
had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been sacri- 
ficed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard 
desired by the Admiralty. 

A third consideration that was present in my mind 
was the necessity for not leaving anything to chance in a 



398 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Fleet action, because our Fleet was the one and only fac- 
tor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as indeed 
to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle 
Fleet which could in any way take its place, should dis- 
aster befall it or even should its margin of superiority over 
the enemy be eliminated. 

The situation was in many respects different from that 
with which our Navy was faced in the time of the old wars. 
In those days disaster could only come about by reason 
of bad strategy or tactics owing to our enemy being in 
overwhelming strength when met, or handling his force 
better, and, apart from manoeuvring, the action was in- 
variably decided by gunfire, a well-known and well-tried 
weapon. 

During the recent War two entirely new features of 
the greatest importance were introduced. First, the tor- 
pedo could be fired at very long range, up to 15,000 yards, 
either from large ships or destroyers, and at shorter range 
from submarines, and the mine had been developed; the 
invisibility of these weapons made it difficult for it to be 
known when they were being employed. 

The reasons which make it necessary to be more cau- 
tious when dealing with the attack of under-water weap- 
ons than with gun attack are the greater damage which 
one torpedo hit will cause, which damage may well be 
fatal to many ships, in most cases compelling the ship to 
reduce speed and leave the line of battle. With the gun, it 
is usually different; a ship which is being heavily hit 
can — if her own off'ensive powers will not save her by 
crushing the fire of the enemy — so manoeuvre as to de- 
range temporarily the accuracy of that fire. Therein 
lies the whole necessity for the exercise of care when deal- 
ing with the underwater weapon. 

These considerations led me to introduce measures 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 



399 



for dealing with destroyer attacks on the Battle Fleet 
other than the counter of attack by our light craft on 
the enemy's destroyers. These measures involved a turn 
on the part of the ships, either towards the torpedoes or 
away from them. 

In the first case, the object was to turn the ships so 
that they would present as small a target as possible to 
tlie torpedo, and incidentally that the space between the 
ships should be correspondingly large. The matter is 
verj'- technical, and presents many interesting features, 
one of which may be illustrated by an example : 



MJli2 2120 191S17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 sXj 2 I 




Scale 1 inch -6,000 yard: 



Generally speaking a safe course to pursue is for ships 
to steer direct for the attacking destroyers if the moment 
at which the torpedoes are fired can be ascertained. 

This course, although applicable to one attack, leads 
to difficulties in the case of successive attacks, since fur- 
ther turns towards will bring the battle line within effec- 
tive range of torpedoes fired from the enemy's battleships ; 
occasions will arise when this risk must be accepted. 

The accompanying diagram shows that the van and 
centre squadrons are not so well safeguarded by a turn 
towards the attacking destroyers as is the rear squadron, 
for if the enemy's flotilla is seen to fire torpedoes from c 
,(a threatening position to the van) and the van squadron 



400 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

turns inwards 4 points, the 4th ship of the squadron will 
steer along the line A B. 

If the torpedoes have been fired at the rear squadron 
instead of the van squadron as supposed, and their ob- 
jective is the twentieth ship in the line, they will run along 
the line c d, i.e., directly at the fourth ship in the line. 

The target presented is, however, small, and the 
chances of a flotilla attacking the rear squadron when 
in a favourable position for attacking the van are not 
great. 

The important point in the case of a turn towards is, 
however, the necessity for ascertaining the moment of 
discharge of the torpedoes. 

In the second case, that of turning away, the object 
is to place the ships at such a distance from the attacking 
destroyers that the torpedoes will not cross their tracks, 
but if this object is not achieved the ships are in a good 
position for avoiding the torpedoes if their tracks are 
visible; the objection to this manoeuvre is that the range 
of the enemy's battle line is necessarily opened. 

It was my intention in a Fleet action to use one or 
other of the manoeuvres should destroyer attacks take 
place under conditions which prevented an effective 
"counter" by our own hght craft; both manoeuvres were 
arranged to be carried out "by subdivisions" as a turn 
by divisions of four ships would delay the completion of 
the manoeuvre to too great an extent. 

The Grand Fleet Battle Orders contained a great 
deal in the way of discussion and instructions on the sub- 
ject of torpedo attack in a Fleet action. The duties of 
light cruisers and destroyers in this connection were dealt 
with at considerable length, and stress was laid on the su- 
preme importance both of making early torpedo attacks 
on the enemy's line and of immediately countering such 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 401 

attacks, and it was pointed out that an early attack by 
our own destroyers would not only tend to stop an enemy 
attack, but would place our attacking vessels in the best 
position to meet a hostile attack. 

The battle stations of both light cruisers and destroy- 
ers were so fixed that they should be in the best positions 
to effect these two objects, such positions being obvi- 
ously in the van of the Fleet; in order to provide against 
a 16-point turn on the part of the enemy, or deployment 
in the opposite direction to that anticipated, one or two 
flotillas, according to the numbers available, and a light 
cruiser squadron, were also stationed in the rear. 

The probable tactics of the German Fleet had been 
a matter of almost daily consideration, and all our ex- 
perience and thought led to the same conclusion, namely, 
that retiring tactics, combined with destroyer attacks, 
would be adopted by them. There were many reasons for 
this belief, and some of them were as follows: 

1. On each occasion when German vessels were met, 
they had immediately retired towards their bases. 

2. The tactical advantages of such a move were ob- 
vious. They might be enumerated thus: 

(a) The retiring fleet places itself in a position of 
advantage in regard to torpedo attack on the fol- 
lowing fleet. The retiring fleet also eliminates, 
to a large extent, danger of torpedo attack by the 
following fleet. 

(h) Opportunity is afforded the retiring fleet of 
drawing its opponent over a mine or submarine 
trap. 

(c) Smoke screens can be used with effect to inter- 



402 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

fere with the observation of gunfire by the follow- 
ing fleet. 
(d) Considerations of moral effect will force the 
stronger fleet to follow the weaker, and play into 
the hands of the enemy. 

We were so certain that the enemy would adopt these 
tactics that in all the many exercises carried out by the 
Fleet during the War, it was the invariable rule to in- 
dicate beforehand an assumed position of Heligoland, 
and the Flag officer, representing the Commander-in- 
Chief of the High Sea Fleet in these exercises, always 
deployed his Fleet in the direction of Heligoland and 
adopted retiring tactics. The difficulties resulting from 
the emploj'^ment of these retiring tactics and the best 
method to adopt in the circumstances were, therefore, the 
subject of constant thought, both by myself and by all the 
senior officers in the Fleet, and the subject was very fre- 
quently discussed and worked out on the tactical board. 

The difficulty is, to a certain extent, insuperable if 
retiring tactics are employed in conjunction with a free 
and skilful use of under-water weapons. 

When, therefore, the two Fleets met on May 31st, 
1916, these thoughts were in my mind, and were no doubt 
present in the minds of all Flag officers in the British 
Fleet. It has been mentioned that the circumstances of 
the meeting made it very difficult to ascertain with any 
degree of certainty the disposition of the enemy's Battle 
Fleet, and the deployment of our own Fleet took place 
under these conditions. Even so, however, the course on 
deployment (that is, south-east by east) was to a certain 
extent governed by the idea of getting between the enemy 
and his base on the supposition that he would be making 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 403 

towards it by the shortest route, namely, the Horn Reef 
Channel. 

The arrival of the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron in a 
commanding position on the bow of the enemy caused the 
enemy to make a large turn to starboard, largely because 
this squadron — Rear- Admiral Hood's — was mistaken for 
the British Battle Fleet. The German account, as I have 
already mentioned, bears out this view, as it is stated that 
at about 5.45 p.m. "dim shapes of enemy battleships are 
discerned in a north-easterly direction." These shapes 
were undoubtedly the 3rd Battle Ci''uiser Squadron. The 
German account states that their battle cruisers turned 
away on sighting these ships. This gave the British Bat- 
tle Fleet the chance of placing itself between the enemy 
and his base. Advantage was taken of this opportunity, 
and the enemy was then forced to pursue his retiring 
tactics in a westerly direction. In making the large turns 
required to effect our object, we were inevitably placed 
in a position of tactical disadvantage owing to the British 
Fleet working round on a wide circle outside the enemy. 

A careful study of the movements of the two Fleets 
will show this at once.* The course of the British Fleet 
on^ deployment was south-east by east. Successive turns 
to starboard brought the course through south by west 
to south-west and finally to west, a total alteration of 13 
points on the outer of two similar arcs, some 12,000 yards 
apart, the German Fleet moving on the inner of these two 
circles. 

The result was that the "overlap," which the Germans 
erroneously thought was in favour of the British Battle 
Fleet, but which was always with the enemy, was accen- 
tuated, and the Grand Fleet was gradually brought far- 
ther and farther abaft the beam of the High Sea Fleet, 

* Cf. diagram in the pocket at the end. 



404 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

placing the latter in a position of tactical advantage in 
regard to torpedo attack. This advantage was increased 
by the low visibility, which rendered it difficult to see 
flotillas approaching to attack until they were at fairly 
short range. 

When the first attack by German destroyers took 
place and the first of the enemy's flotillas was seen to be 
approaching on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of 
the Iron Duke, and had reached a distance of 9,000 yards 
or less, the "counter" of a turn "towards" or "away" was 
essential. Our own flotillas had been using every en- 
deavour to get to the van, but the frequent turns to star- 
board and the movement of our battle cruisers across the 
bows of the Battle Fleet had delayed their movement, and 
it was evident that neither they nor the light cruisers could 
prevent the attack from developing. 

The moment of discharge of torpedoes could not be de- 
termined with sufficient accuracy for a turn "towards" 
and therefore the Battle Fleet was "turned away," in 
subdivisions. 

Although I was not aware of the fact at the time, co- 
incidentally with the destroyer attack the enemy made a 
very large turn-away from our Fleet, and thus opened the 
range much farther, disappearing entirely from view even 
from our rear; this process was repeated on each occasion 
of our ships getting back into range. The enemy was, 
therefore, continually refusing action. 

It may be asked whether it was necessary to turn the 
whole line of battle away for this attack, or whether the 
leading squadron could not have held the original course. 
Such a movement was provided for in the Battle Orders, 
but the destroyers were observed at a range of 9,000 
yards on a bearing 30 degrees before the beam of the 
Iron Duke, the leading ship of the centre battle squadron. 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 405 

and therefore the leading Battle Squadron was as open 
to attack by torpedoes as was the centre or rear squadron ; 
indeed, the destroyers were standing in a direction to at- 
tack the van squadron. The rear of the leading Battle 
Squadron was also not at the time clear of the van of the 
centre squadron, as the turns that had been made had pre- 
vented line ahead being re-formed, and the Iron Duke's 
Division could not turn unless the division ahead also 
turned. These facts strengthened the reasons which led 
me to make the signal general to the Battle Fleet. 

According to the reports of the captains of the ships 
of the Battle Fleet, a total of at least 20 torpedoes crossed 
the line of our Battle Fleet during the 7.10 p.m. destroyer 
attack alone, in spite of the turn. The large majority 
of these were observed by the ships of the 1st and 5th 
Battle Squadrons, but one torpedo is known to have 
crossed the line ahead of the Iron Duke, and at least 
six crossed the track of the 4!th Light Cruiser Squadron, 
which was moving out to attack the enemy's flotilla. 

In the case of a long line of ships there is always dan- 
ger of the torpedo menace to the ships at the rear being 
forgotten or minimised by ships that are in the van, owing 
to failure to realise how dangerous the torpedo fire of 
ships or destroyers abreast of them may be to vessels a 
long way in rear, although they themselves are quite 
immune from this danger. 

The Grand Fleet Battle Orders provided for con- 
siderable decentralisation of command, and great stress 
was laid on this point in the general instructions for "Bat- 
tle Tactics." The opening paragraphs of this section of 
the Battle Orders emphasised this strongly. It was 
pointed out that whilst the Commander-in-Chief would 
control the movements of the whole Battle Fleet before 
and on deployment (except in the extreme case of very 



4o6 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

low visibilitjr rendering it necessary for the Flag officer 
of a wing division to take immediate action), he could 
not be certain of doing so after deployment, when funnel 
and other smoke made both vision and communication dif- 
ficult. The necessity for wide decentralisation of com- 
mand was then pointed out, combined with a close watch 
on the movements of the Commander-in-Chief, with which 
Flag officers should generally conform. 

The Battle of Jutland was the first Fleet action since 
Trafalgar if we except the actions in the Russo-Japanese 
War, and advantage was naturally taken of the experi- 
ence to make some changes in the Battle Orders ; but there 
were no surprises in the way of enemy tactics, and, there- 
fore, no radical alterations were necessarj^ As the Chief 
of the Staff remarked to me during the Battle Fleet en- 
gagement, "This is all going according to expectation." 
We did, however, obtain confirmation of our views as to 
the probable retiring tactics that would be adopted by 
the German fleet. 

The principal changes that were made in the Battle 
Orders were in the direction of laying still further em- 
phasis on the discretionary power which was vested in 
Flag Officers commanding squadrons, owing to the dif- 
ficulty, always clearly recognised, and confirmed at Jut- 
land, which the Commander-in-Chief would experience in 
controlling the movements of the whole Fleet in the heat 
of action ; also in defining still further the different move- 
ments that might be adopted to deal with torpedo at- 
tacks, whether the torpedoes were fired from battleships 
or from destroyers. 

A very exhaustive analysis of the subject of torpedo 
attacks in action had been prepared by my Staff during 
the spring of 1916, and a memorandum, with diagrams, 
had been written showing the various situations that might 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 407 

arise and the effect of the different counter-movements in 
each case. It is of interest to note that this memorandum 
was on the point of issue when the Jutland Battle was 
fought. It was dated May 27th, 1916, but it had not 
actually been issued. 

The experience gained at Jutland was embodied in 
the memorandum before it was finally issued to the Fleet. 

The questions of the use of the torpedo in action and 
the "counter" measures adopted have been dealt with 
at considerable length, since this form of attack and its 
"counter" have been much discussed in the Service since 
1911, and it is a subject on which discussion is likely to 
continue. It is also certain that it will form the subject 
of much future experiment. 

The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any 
great effect, and their importance should not be exag- 
gerated. The turn of the British Battle Fleet opened 
the range some 1,750 yards, but it was not this turn which 
led to the dijficulty of keeping touch with the enemy. 
That difficult}'- was due to the fact that the German Fleet 
made a very large turn to the westward under cover of a 
smoke screen at the moment of launching the earliest de- 
stroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers in the van 
which did not turn away at the time, as it was not neces- 
sary in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to re- 
gain touch until 8.20 p.m. because of the retirement of 
the enemy. 

The instructions as to my intentions as the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, in regard to the ranges at which the 
opening phases of the action should be fought, remained 
unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the policy 
of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside 
torpedo range from the enemy's battle lin^ in ordinary 
circunistances. 



408 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

As is very frequently the case when naval actions 
do not result in overwhelming material losses by one side 
or the other, or the capture or destruction of a large part 
of the opposing Fleet, both sides at the time claimed a 
victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped to 
support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, 
besides influencing neutral, and probably in particular 
American, opinion. 

The Germans apparently based their claim on two 
grounds, the first being that of having inflicted heavier 
losses than they received. In order to make good this 
contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk one bat- 
tleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and 
five destroyers more than actually were sunk on the Brit- 
ish side; and they concealed, until further concealment 
was impossible, the sinking of the battle cruiser Lutzoto 
and the light cruiser Rostock, besides omitting to mention 
that the Seydlitz had to be beached to prevent her sinking, 
thereby slurring over the point that the Seydlitz would 
undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own Warrior 
did, had the action been fought as far from German bases 
as it was from British bases. They also said nothing of 
at least four German battleships being torpedoed, and 
of several battleships and all their battle cruisers being 
so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of fur- 
ther fighting for several months. The case was very dif- 
ferent with the Bi'itish ships, as has been already stated. 
If these points are borne in mind, the original German 
claim to victory falls to the ground, even on the material 
side. After the surrender of the German ships in No- 
vember, 1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed 
writer on naval matters, stated in the Berliner Tagehlatt 
of November 18th that "our Fleet's losses were severe," 
adding that "on June 1st, 1916, it was clear to every think- 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 409 

ing person that this battle must, and would be, the last 
one. Authoritative quarters," he declared, "said so 
openly." 

But a victory is judged not merely by material losses 
and damage, but by its results. It is profitable to ex- 
amine the results of the Jutland Battle. With the single 
exception of a cruise towards the English coast on August 
19th, 1916 — undertaken, no doubt, by such part of the 
High Sea Fleet as had been repaired in order to show 
that it was still capable of going to sea — the High Sea 
Fleet never again, up to the end of 1917, ventured much 
outside the "Heligoland triangle," and even on August 
19th, 1916, the much reduced Fleet made precipitately 
for home as soon as it was warned by its Zeppelin scouts 
of the approach of the Grand Fleet. This is hardly the 
method of procedure that would be adopted by a Fleet 
flushed with victory and belonging to a country which 
was being strangled bj^ the sea blockade. 

Again, in the German account of the "victory" it 
is remarked that "as the dawn coloured the eastern sky 
on the historic 1st of June, everyone expected that 
the rising sun would illuminate the British line de- 
ployed in readiness to renew the battle. This expecta- 
tion was not realised. As far as the eye could reach the 
horizon was clear. Not until the late morning did our 
airships, which had gone up in the meantime, announce 
that a Battle Squadron consisting of twelve ships was 
approaching from the southern part of the North Sea at 
full speed on a northerly course. To the great regret of 
all concerned, it was too late for our Fleet to overtake 
and attack theirs." 

What are the facts? We know now that as the sun 
rose, the High Sea Fleet (except such portions as were 
escaping Ada the Skaw) was close to the Horn Reef, 



4IO THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

steaming as fast as the damaged ships could go for 
home behind the shelter of the German minefields. 
And the Grand Fleet was waiting for them to appear 
and searching the waters to the westward and north- 
ward of the Horn Reef for the enemy vessels; it main- 
tained the search during the forenoon of June 1st, 
and the airship, far from sighting the Fleet late in the 
morning, as stated, did so, first at 3.30 a.m., and on sev- 
eral occasions subsequently during the forenoon. And 
if that airship reported only twelve ships present, what 
an opportunity for the victorious High Sea Fleet to an- 
nihilate them! One is forced to the conclusion that this 
victorious fleet did not consider itself caj)able of engaging 
only twelve British battleships. 

I cannot conclude these remarks on the Jutland 
Battle without mentioning the personnel of the Fleet. 
From the second in command. Sir Cecil Burney, to the 
youngest boy, who was possibly young Cornwell in the 
Chester, the Fleet was imbued with the same high spirit 
and determination. Sir Cecil Burney was an old and 
trusted friend, a fine seaman who always handled his 
squadron — or, in my absence, the Fleet — with marked 
skill and ability. Sir Martyn Jerram, who held a high 
reputation as a squadron commander; Sir Doveton 
Sturdee, the victor at the Falkland Islands, an officer 
who had made a special study of tactics; Rear- Admiral 
Evan-Thomas, and the other squadron leaders, including 
my very old friends and gallant brother officers Sir 
Robert Arbuthnot and Rear- Admiral Hood, by whose 
deaths the nation and Fleet lost of their best — were aB 
officers of proved ability, in whom not myself only, but 
the Fleet, had absolute confidence. 

In Sir David Beatty the Battle Cruiser Fleet pos- 
sessed a leader who throughout his Service career had 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 411 

shown fighting quahties of the highest order, and he had 
imbued his force with his own indomitable spirit. 

The Flag officers second in command of squadrons 
had all led divisions for a considerable period, and I was 
confident that they would handle their divisions as well 
in action as they did during exercises, as proved to be 
the case. 

The officers commanding Light Cruiser Squadrons 
and destroyer flotillas had invariably fulfilled every ex- 
pectation that I had formed of them. I had always ad- 
mired the manner in which the personnel of these vessels 
hud endured the conditions under which their work was 
so frequently performed. 

Assisted as I was by a brilhant Staff, with Rear- 
Admiral Sir Charles Madden (my righthand man 
throughout) and Commodore Lionel Halsey as its chief 
members, seconded by such able and experienced Flag 
officers, and with captains who had on countless occasions 
shown their skill, I was indeed in a fortunate position. 

To the above advantages I must add those obtained 
by the magnificence of the personnel of the lower ranks. 
The oflficers and ships' companies were as keen as any 
Commander-in-Chief could desire. The long wait had 
never produced the slightest feeling of staleness. Offi- 
cers and men were day after day striving to perfect the 
fighting efficiency of their ships, and well had they suc- 
ceeded. The engine room staffs had demonstrated early 
in the War that they would respond magnificently to any 
demand that I called upon them to make, and they did it 
on the occasion of the Jutland Battle. The spirit and 
moral of the Fleet never stood higher than at the time 
of the Battle of Jutland, and because of that spirit I 
knew that the Fleet under my command was the most 
formidable fighting machine in the world. 



412 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Of the gallantry shown it is difficult to write with 
proper restraint. Whenever and wherever there was op- 
portunity, officers and men displayed courage and self- 
sacrifice of the highest order. There were innumerable 
instances which proved that the personnel of the present 
Navy has nothing to learn in this respect from its fore- 
fathers. The dead died heroic deaths; the wounded be- 
haved with marvellous fortitude. Forty-four years 
passed in the Service had given me unbounded faith in, 
and admiration for, the British officer and bluejacket, 
but they surpassed all my expectations, and so long as 
that spirit endures, this country will be fortunate, and 
with adequate forces will be safe. 

It may not be out of place to quote the memorandum 
issued to the Fleet after the Jutland Battle: 

Iron Duke, 

June 4th, 1916. 
H.F. 0022 349. 

MEMORANDUM. 

I desire to express to the Flag Officers, Captains, 
Officers and Men of the Grand Fleet my very high 
appreciation of the manner in which the ships were 
fought during the action on May 31st, 1916. 

2. At this stage, when full information is not avail- 
able, it is not possible to enter into details, but quite 
sufficient is already known to enable me to state defi- . 
nitely that the glorious traditions handed down to us 
by generations of gallant seamen were most worthily 
upheld. 

3. Weather conditions of a highly unfavourable 
nature robbed the Fleet of that complete victory 
which I know was expected by all ranks, which is 



REFLECTIONS ON BATTLE 413 

necessary for the safety of the Empire and which 
will yet be ours. 

4. Our losses were heavy and we miss many most 
gallant comrades, but, although it is very difficult to 
obtain accurate information as to the enemy losses, 
I have no doubt that we shall find that they are cer- 
tainly not less than our own. Sufficient information 
has already been received for me to make iSiat state- 
ment with confidence. 

I hope to be able to give the Fleet fuller informa- 
tion on this point at an early date, but do not wish 
to delay the issue of this expression of my keen 
appreciation of the work of the Fleet, and my con- 
fidence in future complete victory. 

5. I cannot close without stating that the wonder- 
ful spirit and fortitude of the wounded has filled me 
with the greatest admiration. 

I am more proud than ever to have the honour of 
commanding a fleet manned by such officers and men. 
J. R. JELLICOE. 
Admiral, 
Commander-in-Chief. 

The Flag Officers, Commodores 
and Officers in command of 
H.M. ships of the Grand Fleet. 

My official despatch on the battle to the Board of 
Admiralty was forwarded on June 19th, and the 
following letter was afterwards promulgated to the 
Grand Fleet: — 



414 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

Admiealty, 

July 4th, 1916. 
Sir, — ^^My Lords Commissioners of the Admir- 
alty have considered j^our reports on the action off 
the Jutland Bank between the Grand Fleet under 
your command and the German High Sea Fleet on 
the 31st May, together with the report of the Vice- 
Admiral Commanding the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and 
those of the various Flag Officers and Commanding 
Officers of the Grand Fleet. 

2. Their lordships congratulate the officers, sea- 
men, and marines of the Grand Fleet on this, the 
first Fleet action which has occurred since the out- 
break of the war, as a result of which the enemy, 
severely punished, withdrew to his own ports. The 
events of the 31st May and 1st June gave ample 
proof of the gallantry and devotion which character- 
ised all who took part in the battle; the ships of 
every class were handled with skill and determina- 
tion; their steaming under battle conditions afforded 
a splendid testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the 
engineering staff; while mdividual initiative and tac- 
tical subordination w='ere equally conspicuous. 

3. The results of the action prove that the offi- 
cers and men of the Grand Fleet have known both 
how to study the new problems with which they are 
confronted and how to turn their knowledge to ac- 
count. The expectations of the country were high; 
they have been well fulfilled. 

4. My Lords desire me to convey to you their 
full approval of your proceedings on this occasion. 

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant, 

W. Graham Greene. 



CHAPTER XVI 

THE LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE; LORD KITCHENER'S 
FAREWELL 

The ships which had received damage in the Jutland 
Battle had to be repaired without delay. The great 
majority of the repairs were completed during June 
or by the first week in July, and, whilst under repair, 
the opportunity was taken of effecting certain altera- 
tions which experience gained in the action had shown 
to be desirable. The 3Iarlhorougli was the only large 
ship whose repairs occupied any considerable length of 
time, and even she rejoined the Fleet in August, al- 
though the work upon her was handicapped to some ex- 
tent by being carried out in a floating dock moored in a 
somewhat inconvenient position. The light cruiser 
Chester was also detained at Hull until July 29th, as 
her injuries from gunfire were fairly extensive, and a 
great many alterations were carried out. The principal 
points aff'ecting materiel to which attention was directed 
were: 

(a) The urgent need for arrangements to prevent 
the flash of cordite charges, ignited by the ex- 
plosion of a shell in a turret or in positions be- 
tween the turret and the magazine, being com- 
municated to the magazine itself. It was prob- 
able that the loss of one, if not two, of our battle 
cruisers was due to this cause, after the armour 
had been pierced. 

415 



416 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

(b) Better measures were required to prevent the 
charges of small guns from being ignited by 
bursting shell, and to localise any fires due to this 
cause, in the case of guns of the secondary bat- 
tery in large ships, and the main armament in 
small ships. 

(c) Increased deck armour protection in large 
ships had been shown to be desirable in order 
that shell or fragments of shell might not reach 
the magazines. This need was particularly felt 
in all our earlier ships of the Dreadnought type, 
since their side armour was not carried to the 
upper deck level. The long range at which most 
modern sea actions are fought, and the conse- 
quent large angle of descent of the projectiles 
made our ships very vulnerable in this respect. 

(d) The pressing need for a better armour-pierc- 
ing projectile with an improved fuze was also 
revealed. 

{e) Improved arrangements for flooding maga- 
zines and drenching exposed cartridges had to 
be made. 

Committees were immediately appointed in the Fleet 
to deal with all questions of this nature, as well as the 
important matter of possible developments in the fire- 
control system with a view to improving the methods of 
correction of fire to enable enemy ships to be "straddled" 
with greater rapidity. In all these matters, the great 
gunnery knowledge and experience of Captain F. C. 
Dreyer, my Flag Captain, were of immense assistance, 
and he was most ably seconded by the numerous highly 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 417 

skilled gunnery officers on the staffs of the Flag officers 
and in the ships of the fleet. 

The action taken in connection with these matters 
was prompt, with the gratifying result that before I re- 
linquished the command of the Fleet, the great majority 
of the heavy ships had been provided with additional 
deck protection on an extensive scale, and with fittings 
for rendering their magazines safe. Most of the work 
was carried out while the ships were at their usual notice 
for jsteam, much of it being actually done at Scapa Flow 
by the dockyard artificers berthed there on board the 
Victorious: the work carried out hj these artificers and 
by the dockyard staff at Invergordon was executed with 
most commendable rapidity. 

Later, during my period of service at the Admiralty, 
as First Sea Lord, and under the immediate direction 
of Captain Dreyer, then Director of Naval Ordnance, a 
new design of armour-piercing projectile, with a new 
type of burster and an altered fuse, was introduced for 
guns of 12-inch calibre and above, which certainly doubled 
their offensive power. 

The investigation into the possibility of further de- 
velopment in fire-correction methods, a subject to which 
constant attention had been given throughout the War, 
was at first carried out by two independent committees. 
Their conclusions were considered by a third Committee, 
composed of the most experienced and most successful 
gunnery officers in the Fleet, and modified rules were, as 
the result, drawn up and passed for adoption in the Fleet ; 
these had already produced a most convincing and most 
satisfactory advance in accuracy and rapidity of fire be- 
fore I gave up Command of the Grand Fleet. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the average time taken to find 



4i8 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the gun range of the enemy with these new methods was 
about one half of that previously required. 

Some delay occurred in improving our range-finders. 
The majority had been installed in the Fleet before the 
great increases in the range of opening effective fire had 
come about, as the result of experience during the War. 
Our most modern ships at Jutland were provided with 
range-finders 15 feet in length, but the majority of the 
ships present were fitted with instruments only nine feet 
long. During 1917 successful steps were taken to supply 
range-finders up to 25 and 30 feet in length; a series of 
experiments with stereoscopic range-finders was also in- 
stituted in the same year. It had become known that the 
Germans used this type of range-finder. It should be 
stated, in passing, to prevent any misunderstanding, that 
the developments introduced in the fire-control arrange- 
ments of the Grand Fleet after the Battle of Jutland 
did not affect the instruments already in use, which fully 
met our requirements, but the methods of using those 
instruments and particularly the system of correction of 
fire. 

On June 5th the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 
Cruiser Squadrons were re-organised as follows: — 

Battle Cruiser Squadron 

Lion (Fleet-Flagship of Battle Cruiser Fleet). 
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron: 

Princess Royal (Flag), New Zealand, Tiger. 
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron : 

Australia (Flag), Indomitable, Inflexible. 

Cruiser Squadrons 

2nd Cruiser Squadron: 

Minotaur (Flag), Duke of Edinburgh, Cochrane, Shannon, 
Achilles, Donegal. 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 419 

3rd Cruiser Squadron: 

Antrim, Roxburgh, Devonshire. 

On June 5th Field Marshal Lord Kitchener arrived 
at Scapa en route to Archangel. In the morning he 
crossed from Thurso in the Oak, and came on board the 
Iron Duke on arrival at Scapa. He lunched with me, 
and the Flag officers present were invited to meet him. 
Before lunch we went round the ship. The officers and 
men naturally greeted him with much respect, and he can 
have had no doubt of the admiration in which he was held. 
During lunch he discussed with me his forthcoming trip, 
and said once or twice that he was looking forward to it 
as a real holiday. The strain of the last two years, he con- 
fessed, had been very great, adding that he had felt that 
he could not have gone on without this break, which he 
welcomed very much. He was not, however, very 
sanguine that he could achieve much in Russia. He men- 
tioned the difficulty which he experienced in dealing with 
questions discussed in the Cabinet, a difficulty felt by 
most soldiers and sailors, whose training does not fit them 
to state or to argue a case, and who frequently find great 
difficulty in doing so. They are, as a rule, accustomed 
to carry out their ideas without having first to bring con- 
viction to the minds of men who, although possessing 
great general knowledge and administrative experience, 
have naturally but little acquaintance with naval and 
military affairs which in themselves form a lifelong 
study. 

After limch conversation turned to the Jutland 
action, and Lord Kitchener evinced much interest in 
the tactics and the general story of the action. 

Lord Kitchener impressed me strongly with the 
idea that he was working to a time-table, and that 
he felt that he had not a day to lose. He mentioned 



420 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

three weeks as the limit of his absence, and I expressed 
astonishment at the programme which he had planned 
to carry out in the restricted period. He was most 
anxious not to lose a moment on the sea trip and 
asked me more than once what I thought was the shortest 
time in which the passage could be made. 

During the day the weather at Scapa, which had 
been bad in the morning, gradually became worse, 
and by the afternoon it was blowing a gale from the 
north-eastward. It had been originally intended that 
the Hampshire should take the route which passed 
up the eastern side of the Orkneys, following the 
channel ordinarily searched by mine-sweeping vessels as 
a routine measure; but as the north-easterly gale 
was causing a heavy sea on that side, mine-sweep- 
ing was out of the question, and it was also obvious 
that the escorting destroyers could not face the sea 
at high speed. I discussed with my Staff which 
route on the west, or lee, side would be the safest, 
and finally decided that the Hampshire should pass 
close in shore, and not take the alternative route 
passing farther to the westward near Sule Skerry 
Lighthouse. The reasons which influenced this de- 
cision were : — 

{a) With a north-easterly wind there would be less 
sea and, therefore, more chance of the destroyers 
being able to keep up with the Hampshire. 

(b) It was practically impossible that this route 
could have been mined by any surface mine- 
layer owing to the dark period in Northern 
latitudes being confined to a couple of hours, 
during which no ship could expect to approach 
the shore for mine-laying without having first 
been sighted. 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 421 

(c) The route was one used by Fleet auxiliaries, 
and was, therefore, under frequent observation. 

At this date, mine-laying by enemy submarines 
had been confined to water well to the southward of the 
Firth of Forth, presumably because of their small radius 
of action. Danger from this source was, therefore, con- 
sidered to be very remote. 

Finally the weather itself was a protection against 
submarine attack which was at that time more to be 
feared than the danger from submarine laid mines. 
JMine-sweeping on either side of the Orkneys had not 
been practicable for three or four days owing to the 
weather conditions. 

At about 4 P.M. Lord Kitchener proceeded on board 
the Hampshire, accompanied by his Staff comprising 
Brigadier-General Ellershaw, Sir F. Donaldson, Colonel 
FitzGerald, Mr. O'Beirne of the Foreign Office, Mr. 
Robertson of the Munitions Department, and Second- 
Lieutenant McPherson, Cameron Highlanders. The 
Hampshire sailed at 5.30 p.m. escorted by two destroyers. 
Her orders were to proceed at a speed of at least 16 
knots, if the weather permitted, and to send the destroyers 
back if they could not maintain the Hampshire's speed. 
Experience had proved that high speed was a valuable 
protection against submarines. 

At about 7 P.M. Captain Savill, commanding the 
Hampshire, ordered the two destroyers back to Scapa, 
as they were unable to face the heavy seas at the 
speed of the Hampshire. Between 7.30 and 7-45 p.m. 
the Hampshire struck a mine about l^'o miles off shore, 
between the Brough of Birsay and Marwick Head; 
she sank in 15 minutes, bows first. The incident was 
witnessed by observers on shore, and a telephone mes- 



422 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

sage was sent to the Vice-Admiral Commanding Ork- 
neys and Shetlands that the cruiser was in difficulties. 
He at once ordered out patrol vessels and informed me, 
with the result that destroyers were sent to the scene 
immediately. 

The evidence of the few survivors of the Hampshire 
showed that Lord Kitchener was below when the ship 
was mined, and that an officer escorted him on deck. 
Captain Savill was heard to give directions from the 
bridge for a boat to be prepared for Lord Kitchener and 
his Staff, and Lord Kitchener was seen subsequently 
on deck, but was not seen after the ship sank. The 
weather conditions prevented any boats being hoisted 
out or lowered, although four boats floated clear as the 
ship sank. 

The scene of the disaster was searched during the night 
by destroyers and patrol craft, but the only survivors 
were twelve men who drifted ashore on a Carley raft, al- 
though many bodies were picked up by the searching 
vessels, and many drifted ashore. 

The body of Lord Kitchener was not recovered. 

At the time of the disaster the Hampshire was 
steaming at 131/4 knots, the wind being north-north- 
west, with a force of 50 miles an hour. The cold water 
and the very heavy sea were against even the strongest 
swimmers surviving for any time. The wind, which 
was north-east at 4 p.m. at Scapa, had become north- 
north-west by the time the Hampshire was outside, and 
there was, therefore, no lee on the west side of the Ork- 
neys, as had been anticipated. 

The hours that passed after the receipt of the report 
of the Hampshire being in difficulties were most anxious 
ones. In spite of the fact that the destroyers had 
been sent back, it seemed almost incredible that the 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 423 

wind and sea could have risen to such an extent as 
was actually the case, as the conditions in Seapa Flow 
were not so bad as to indicate so extremely heavy a 
sea off the Brough of Birsay; and even when it was 
reported that the Hampshire had sunk (a report which 
took some time to come through ) , there was hope that, 
at any rate, Lord Kitchener and his mission would be 
saved by boat. As the hours passed and no news was 
received of the rescue of any survivors, the anxiety 
became intense. With the arrival of daylight, and the 
certainty that this great man, who had served his 
country so faithfully and well in its greatest emergency, 
had met his death when under the care of the Navy, 
the anxiety turned to consternation and grief. Lord 
Kitchener had inspired the Service with confidence 
and trust. The Navy had frequently worked under 
him in Egypt and in South Africa, and he had been 
one of the outstanding figures in the European War 
on the side of the Entente. Everyone in the Grand 
Fleet felt the magnitude of the disaster that had fallen 
upon the nation, and it can well be imagined that the 
feelings of the Fleet generally were intensified in me, 
on whom lay the main responsibility for his safe 
passage to Ai-changel, so far as such safety could be 
ensured. 

I have often wondered since that fatal day whether 
anything could have been done that was not done, 
but short of postponing the departure of the Hamp- 
sMre altogether, until weather conditions admitted 
of a channel being swept ahead of her, nothing could 
have been done. Such a decision would have resulted 
in two or three days' delay in starting, and would never 
have been agreed to by Lord Kitchener. Moreover, 
with the knowledge then at my disposal as to enemy 



424 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

mine-laying possibilities, I did not consider the delay- 
necessary as I should not have hesitated, if need had 
arisen, to take the Grand Fleet to sea on the same 
night and by the same route as that traversed by 
the Hampshire. 

My own sorrow for the incident was overwhelming. 
There was, at first, doubt in the minds of some people 
as to whether the loss of the Hampshire was due to 
a mine or to a submarine, but these doubts were set 
at rest by the sweeping operations which were under- 
taken as soon as the weather admitted. They resulted 
in the discovery of moored mines of the type laid in 
southern waters by enemy submarines, these mines 
being easily distinguishable from those laid by surface 
vessels. 

During the month of June cruisers were kept con- 
stantly patrolling the route to Archangel to protect 
shipping against possible enemy raiders, as the traffic 
was very heavy at this period. The Donegal, Antrim, 
Devonshire and Roxburgh were the vessels employed. 
They visited the Norwegian coast in the vicinity of 
Stadlandet, en route to and from patrol, with a view to 
intercepting vessels carrying ore from Narvick. 

The submarines of the 11th Submarine Flotilla 
were employed in watching the waters in the Kattegat 
and cruised in the Skagerrak and off the Norwegian 
coast, looking for enemy submarines and surface craft. 
A regular submarine patrol was also begun off the 
Horn Reef, and was continued up to the time of my 
relinquishing command of the Fleet. At first two, 
and later, three, submarines were used for this patrol, 
which was of great utility in giving information of the 
movements of the few enemy surface vessels that ever 
ventured so far from their base, and also proved of 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 425 

use for attacking enemy submarines. At the commence- 
ment, the efficiency of our submarines for patrol and 
look-out purposes was very inferior as compared with 
that of the German submarines, by reason of their bad 
wireless equipment, which admitted of a range of 
some 50 miles only. As soon as submarines were 
attached to the Grand Fleet, I represented strongly 
the absolute necessity of effecting an improvement in 
this particular, stating that I was quite prepared to 
sacrifice some of the torpedo ai'mament should this 
be necessary, but that it was a vital matter to install 
efficient wireless apparatus in the only class of vessel 
that could carry out a watching patrol in the vicinity 
of German bases. Eventually arrangements were made 
to provide them with a wireless installation which gave 
a range of 300 to 400 miles. 

When our submarines had been equipped in this 
way we were at once able to establish an eflficient 
chain of outposts off the Horn Reef by the Grand 
Fleet submarines; and from Terschelling to the north- 
ward the Harwich submarines were on duty, with the 
result that in daylight, at any rate, it was very difficult 
for the enemy to put to sea unobserved and unreported. 
The comparative inefficiency of the wireless installa- 
tion in our submarines, and to a lesser extent in our 
destroyers, was one of the disadvantages which we had 
to face during the first two years of War. It should be 
added that while patrolling in the Kattegat, submarine 
G 4 sank by gunfire on June 19th, outside territorial 
waters, the German steamship Ems, on passage from 
Christiania to Liibeck with oil, zinc and copper. The 
crew were rescued. 

The cruiser and light cruiser movements during the 
month, other than the usual patrols, were as follows; — 



426 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers, 
left Rosyth on the 14th for the Naze, thence steered 
up tlie Norwegian Coast to Udsire, and returned to 
Rosyth. 

The Comus and Constance left Scapa on the 25th, 
swept down the Norwegian coast and returned on 
the 27th. 

The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron and destroyers car- 
ried out a similar sweep from Rosyth between the 29th 
June and July 1st. 

On June 22nd the first mines from a British sub- 
marine mine-layer were laid by E 41 in the German 
Bight. 

His Majesty the King honoured the Grand Fleet with 
a visit on the 14th, arriving at Scapa from Thurso in 
the Oak, at 5 p.m., being escorted by the destroyers of 
the 11th Flotilla. After steaming round the Fleet in 
the Oak, His Majesty proceeded on board the Iron Duke, 
where he spent the night. On the following day the 
King visited all the flagships, on board of which a large 
percentage of officers and men from the various squadrons 
were assembled, and left for Thurso in the Oak at 5 p.m., 
proceeded to Invergordon, and thence to Rosyth, hon- 
ouring the squadrons at each of these bases with a 
visit. 

His Majesty addressed a representative gathering 
of officers and men from the ships at Scapa, who had 
been assembled on board the Iron Duke on the morning 
of the 15th in the following terms: — 

"Sir John Jellicoe, officers, and men of the Grand 
Fleet, you have waited for nearly two years with most 
exemplary patience for the opportunity of meeting and 
engaging the enemy's fleet. 

"J can well understand how trying has been this period. 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 427 

and how great must have been the rehef when you knew 
on May 31st that the enemy had been sighted. 

"Unfavourable weather conditions and approaching 
darkness prevented that complete result which you all 
expected, but you did all that was possible in the circum- 
stances. You drove the enemy into his harbours, and 
inflicted on him very severe losses, and you added yet 
another page to the glorious traditions of the British 
Navy. 

"You could not do more, and for your splendid work 
I thank you." 

The average weekly report of the 10th Cruiser Squad- 
ron during June, gave as the figures: — 

No. of ships intercepted, 55 and 22 trawlers; No. 
sent in, 20; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports 
or en route to a given patrol, 8; No. on special 
service, 1. 

A great deal of fog and mist was experienced during 
the month — especially in the latter half — and this inter- 
fered somewhat with the work of the 10th Cruiser Squad- 
ron. A very dense fog prevailed in the Pentland Firth 
on June 22nd and 23rd. Strong winds, principally from 
the northward, were prevalent during the first portion 
of the month, and a northerly gale occurred on the 
5th. 

No large Fleet movements took place during June, 
as it was knovni that the greater part of the High Sea 
Fleet was under repair as the result of the Jutland 
action. 

During July the Battle Fleet as a whole only en- 
gaged in one cruise, namely, from the 17th to the 20th. 
The 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 2nd 
and 3rd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron, the Campania, with sea-planes, and destroyer 



428 "THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

flotillas left Scapa between noon and 1.30 p.m. on the 
17th, and proceeded to the northward and eastward 
of the Shetlands. The opportunity was taken of 
carrying out a series of battle exercises on the 18th 
and 19th; they were based on the experience gained 
of enemy tactics during the Jutland action. Some of 
the flotillas were re-fuelled at Lerwick during the cruise, 
and the Fleet returned to Scapa and Cromarty during 
the forenoon of the 20th. Fog was met wdth as the ships 
approached the Pentland Firth, making entry somewhat 
difficult. 

Cruiser movements during the month comprised: — 

(a) A regular patrol of the Archangel route by 
Grand Fleet Cruisers to protect trade against 
raiders. 

(b) The establishment on the 7th of a regular 
patrol of two cruisers and tw^o destroyers in an 
area well to the northward of the Shetlands, this 
patrol taking the place of that of a cruiser and 
armed boarding-steamer which had been previous- 
ly placed there. 

(c) Extensive dispositions were made on the 
9th to intercept a German raider rej)orted 
from neutral quarters, as about to leave for 
the Atlantic. These dispositions included a 
close patrol by two light cruiser squadrons and 
eight destroyers from Rosyth of an area 80 to 
100 miles off the Norwegian coast through which 
it was expected the enemy w^ould pass; a fur- 
ther patrol by the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron 
and six destroyers was established farther north 
to ensure a daylight intercept of hostile vessels; 
two cruisers were ordered to patrol north of 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 429 

the Shetlands, local patrol vessels being be- 
tween these cruisers and the Shetlands; a half 
flotilla of destroyers patrolled the Fair Island 
Channel.* 

(d) Two light cruisers and six destroyers left 
Rosyth on the 12th and swept up the Noi-wegian 
coast and back, returning on the 15th. 

(e) On the 17th two more light cruisers and six 
destroyers repeated the sweep, returning on the 
20th. 

(/) On the 21st two light cruisers and four destroy- 
ers left Rosyth and swept to the southward in 
the direction of the Horn Reef from a position 
near the Naze, returning on the 23rd, not having 
sighted anything, 

(g) Two light cruisers and four destroyers re- 
peated the sweep of the Norwegian coast on the 
24th. 

(h) The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with four 
destroyers, left Rosyth on the 26th, and pro- 
ceeded to a position to the westward of the Little 
Fisher Bank, thence swept during daylight to 
the Naze on the look out for enemy raiders or 
Zeppelins, reports having been received of the fre- 
quent presence of Zeppelins on this line ; the force 
turned to the northward from the Naze and swept 
along the 100-fathom line to Lat. 59 N., proceed- 
ing thence to Scapa. The sweep was again un- 
eventful. 

The submarines of the 11th (Grand Fleet) Flotilla 
were active during the month in the Kattegat and patrol- 
ling off the Horn Reef. They reported on the 20th 

* The dispositions remained in force until the 14th, no enemy vessels being 
sighted; the report was probaljly incorrect. 



430 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

that nothing but enemy submarines and aircraft were 
visible. 

The attacks by enemy submarines on warships re- 
ported during the month were: 

The mine-sweeping sloop Rosemary of the Southern 
Force was torpedoed on the 4th, but was towed into the 
Humber. 

The light cruiser Galatea was missed by a torpedo on 
the 12th, in Lat. 57.43 N., Long. 1.14 E. 

The armed boarding-steamer Duke of Cornwall was 
missed by two torpedoes on the 13th, whilst engaged 
in boarding a ship south-east of the Pentland 
Skerries. 

The light cruiser Yarmouth was missed by a torpedo 
on the 26th. 

Three armed trawlers of the Peterhead patrol were 
sunk by the gunfire of four enemy submarines, on the 
11th, in Lat. 57.14 N., Long. 1.11 E., their guns being 
entirely outranged by the 4-inch guns with which the sub- 
marines are armed. This combined attack on the trawl- 
ers of the Peterhead patrol, although resulting in the 
regrettable loss of the three trawlers, was a great and 
well deserved tribute paid by the enemy to the work 
of that patrol which had been uniformly successful, 
and had proved a great annoyance to the German sub- 
marines. 

Attempts were made to locate and destroy enemy sub- 
marines on the 7th, to the eastward of the Pentland Firth ; 
on the 12th, two divisions of destroyers were sent from 
Scapa to attack the submarine that had fired at the Duke 
of Cornwall, the Musketeer dropping a depth charge close 
to the periscope of the submarine, and it was thought con- 
siderably damaging her; on the 15th, destroyers and sea- 
planes from Scapa were sent after a subma.rine reported 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 431 

by the armed boarding steamer Dundee as sighted 10 
miles east-south-east of the Pentland Skerries, but she 
was not seen again; on the 29th, a division of destroyers 
again attempted to locate a submarine in that vicinity, 
but failed to do so. 

Mines laid by an enemy submarine were discovered 
by the sweeping trawlers in the southern channel in the 
Moray Firth on the 26th, and were swept up by trawlers 
and fleet sweepers before any damage was done. 

The weekly average of the 10th Cruiser Squadron 
showed : 

No. of vessels intercepted, 62 and 34 trawlers; No. 
sent in, 23; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports or 
en route to or from patrol, 10; No. on special service, 0. 

The armed merchant-steamer Arlanza, after tem- 
porary repairs at Alexandrovsk, arrived at Belfast in July 
for refit. 

The weather during July was very foggy, fog or mist 
being experienced at Scapa or in the neighbourhood on 
the 2nd, 3rd, 15th, 18th, 23rd, 24th and 25th. 

During the month of August the principal cruiser 
movements, apart from those in connection with the Battle 
Fleet, were as follows : 

(a) The patrol of two cruisers and two destroyers 
in an area well to the northward of the Shet- 
lands was continued. 

(6) The "dark night" light cruiser extended- 
patrol seaward of the Fleet bases was main- 
tained. 

(c) The patrol of a cruiser on the Archangel route 
was continued. 

{d) Light cruiser sweeps were carried out as fol- 
lows: 



432 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

On the 1st, two liglit cruisers and four destroyers 
left Rosji;!! for a sweep down the Nor^vegian coast, re- 
turning on the 3rd, having sighted nothing of interest; 
on the 8th, two light cruisers and four destroyers from 
Rosyth swept from Lat, 60 N., Long. 2 E., to Lat. 57.30 
N., Long. 5.0 E., and returned to their base on the 10th, 
without result. On the 12th the 4th Light Cruiser Squad- 
ron, with four destroyers, left Scapa and proceeded to- 
wards Udsire Lighthouse, where they met a convoy of 
10 British merchant-ships which had been brought out of 
the Baltic. These vessels were escorted across the North 
Sea to Rattray Head. The convoy arrived safely on 
the 14th. 

On the night of the 15th the armed boarding-steamers 
Dundee and King Orry, which had been disguised as 
merchant-ships, left Scapa for operations off the Nor- 
wegian coast. It was hoped that they would be able to 
close enemy and neutral vessels carrying contraband with- 
out exciting suspicion, and that they would stand a better 
chance of capturing them than any vessel having the 
appearance of a warship. The Dundee operated between 
Udsire and Lister, and the King Orry off Stadlandet, 
both being localities in which ships were in the habit of 
leaving territorial waters. The light cruiser Constance 
and two destroyers were sent to support the Dundee, 
keeping well to seaward of her, as that ship was operating 
in waters in which enemy warships might be found. The 
operation resulted in a Norwegian steamer, carrying a 
cargo of magnetic iron ore for Rotterdam, being 
sent in. 

On the 30th the Abdiel left Scapa to lay mines in the 
vicinity of the Horn Reef. She carried out the operation 
successfully, and without being observed, on the night of 
the 31st-lst. 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 433 

The work of the 11th Submarine Flotilla in the Kat- 
tegat and in the vicinity of the Horn Reef continued. 
The submarines, returning on the 17th, reported having 
been attacked by a Grerman decoy trawler in the 
Kattegat. On the 30th submarine E 43 sailed to 
operate against this vessel, but met with no suc- 
cess. 

Casualties to war-vessels during the month included: 
The light cruiser Cleopatra, of the Harwich force, 
which was mined on the 4th near the Thornton Ridge 
off the Dutch coast, and reached the Nore to be 
repaired; the destroyer Lassoo, also of the Harwich force, 
was sunk by mine or submarine near the Maas Light- 
ship off the Dutch coast on the 13th; the armed boarding- 
steamer Duke of Albany was sunk by a submarine on 
the 24th, 20 miles to the eastward of the Pentland Sker- 
ries, with considerable loss of life, including Commander 
G, N. Raniage, R.N.R. Sixteen destroyers, sea- 
planes, and an airship were sent out from Scapa 
at once to hunt this submarine, but saw nothing of 
her, although the armed boarding-steamer Duke of 
Clarence which had stood by the Duke of Albany and 
rescued the survivors reported that she had passed 
over and struck a submerged object. The light cruiser 
Blonde went ashore on the Lowther Rock, Pentland 
Firth, in thick weather on the 10th, but was lightened 
and towed off on the 11th, having sustained con- 
siderable injuries; the battleships Warspite and Val- 
iant collided in the Scapa Flow on the night of the 
24th, whilst, respectively, returning from and proceed- 
ing to the night firing area, both ships being con- 
siderably damaged, with the result that they had to 
be docked. 

On August 3rd mines were laid off the Longstone by 



434 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

an enemy submarine, and the departure of the Marlbor- 
ough from the Tyne was thereby delayed ; the coincidence 
that mines were frequently laid in this neighbourhood 
when warships were due to leave the Tyne after repairs, 
led to suspicion that enemy agents were working in that 
locality. On the 4th or 5th August a considerable number 
of mines of the submarine type were also laid in the War 
channel in the White Sea by enemy vessels. 

On August 3rd four "C" class submarines left the 
Nore in tow of tugs for Archangel, ci route by the canal 
system for service in the Baltic. These submarines per- 
formed very useful work in those waters during the year 
1917. 

The increase in mine-laying by German submarines 
gave rise to anxiety that the movements of the Grand 
Fleet might be hampered by mine-fields near the bases 
at a critical moment, and, in the absence of any new 
mine-sweepers, the mine-sweeping force at Scapa was 
strengthened during July by withdrawing a certain num- 
ber of trawlers from patrol duty in order to form a mine- 
sweeping flotilla; during the latter half of 1916 the Grand 
Fleet mine-sweeping force at Scapa or Cromarty com- 
prised two flotillas composed of sloops and gunboats, as 
well as two flotillas, each consisting of 12 trawlers; in 
addition one flotilla of paddle mine-sweepers was based 
on Granton in the Firth of Forth. These flotillas were 
all additional to the small local sweeping force of trawlers 
at the various fleet bases. 

On August 18th the- Grand Fleet proceeded to sea 
for a sweep in southern waters. The presence of an un- 
usually large number of submarines in the North Sea — 
a phenomenon which had been observed shortly before 
the Jutland Battle — had suggested the possibility of 
movement on the part of the enemy and a sweep appeared 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 435 

desirable. The Iron Duke, after leaving Scapa Flow, 
proceeded ahead of the remainder of the Battle Fleet 
screened by two destroyers to communicate with the 
Royalist, and at 7.55 p.m., as the ships were about to com- 
municate, a submarine on the starboard bow, about 250 
yards off, fired a torpedo, which passed close astern of the 
screening destroyer Onslaught on that bow. Only one 
torpedo was seen. Possibly the submarine misjudged the 
attack, and did not get into the position intended for at- 
tacking the Iron Duke, which was proceeding at high 
speed, and zigzagging, and, therefore, fired at the On- 
slanght instead. Communication between the Iron Duke 
and Royalist was deferred until after dark in consequence 
of this attack; the Fleet was warned by signal. 

The squadrons from Scapa were opened out to avoid 
the submarine, and passed her without further incident, 
and the Battle Fleet and cruisers concentrated at day- 
light on the 19th, in the vicinity of the "Long Forties," 
steering to the southward at a speed of advance of 17 
knots. The Battle Cruiser Fleet had been ordered to a 
position 30 miles ahead of the Battle Fleet. At 5.55 a.m. 
on the 19th the Nottingham, one of the light cruiser 
screen ahead of the battle cruisers, whilst zigzagging at 
20 knots speed, was hit by two torpedoes in Lat. 55.34 
N., Long. 0.12 E. The submarine was not seen, and the 
torpedoes struck the port side almost simultaneously. The 
first report indicated that she had been hit by mines or 
torpedoes, and, until it was clear that a mine-field did not 
exist, it was prudent for the Fleet to avoid this locality, 
and course was accordingly reversed until it was ascer- 
tained that the damage was due to torpedoes; when this 
became clear the southward course of the Fleet was 
shaped to pass to the eastward of the submarine. Mean- 
while the Dublin cruised at high speed in the vicinity of 



436 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the Nottingham for the purpose of keeping the subma- 
rine down so as to prevent further attacks. But at 6.26 
A.M. the Nottingham was hit by a third torpedo, and it 
became evident that she could not float much longer. Her 
boats were lowered, and the majority of the ship's com- 
pany placed in them. The ship sank at 7.10 a.m., just 
as the destroyers Penn and Oracle, which had been sent 
to her assistance, arrived on the scene. These two de- 
stroyers picked up all the survivors, excei^t Captain Mil- 
ler, one officer, and several men who remained on board 
until the ship sank, and who were rescued by a cutter 
from the Dublin. Several torpedoes were fired at the 
Dublin and the two destroyers during their work of rescue, 
but all fortunately missed. 

From 8.24 a.m. onwards Zeppelins were frequently 
in sight from both the Battle Fleet, and the Battle 
Cruiser Fleet, and were fired at, but they kept at too 
long a range for our fire to be effective. The Galatea 
sighted the first airship at 8.24 a.m., and the second was 
seen by the Battle Fleet at 9.55 a.m.; at 10 a.m. Com- 
modore Tyrwhitt, who was at sea with the Harwich force, 
reported himself in position Lat. 52.50 N., Long. 3.38 E., 
and also being followed by a Zeppelin. He stated later 
that his force was shadowed by airships during the whole 
period of daylight on the 19th. Reports were also received 
from the patrol trawler Ramexo that she had two Zep- 
pelins in sight in Lat. 57 N., Long. 1 E. It was evident 
that a very large force of airships was out. A total of at 
least ten was identified by our directional wireless sta- 
tions and they appeared to stretch right across the North 
Sea. 

At 10.10 A.M. a report was received from submarine 
E 23, on patrol in the Heligoland Bight, that she had 
sighted ships of the High Sea Fleet steering west at 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 437 

9.19 A.M.; the position as received in the signal appeared 
incorrect, and I rightly assumed it to be Lat. 54.20 N., 
Long. 5.0 E. Information received earlier from our di- 
rectional wireless stations also led me to consider that a 
ship of the Lligh Sea Fleet was in the position named at 
5.30 A.M., instead of at 9.19 a.m. On the return of E 23 
to Harwich, her captain reported that he had attacked 
the battle cruiser Derjflinger unsuccessfullj'^ at 3.13 a.m. 
on the 20th. At 5 a.m., in spite of the strong enemy de- 
stroyer screen, he succeeded in torpedoing the rear battle- 
ship of the first Battle Squadron, a ship of the "Nassau" 
type. This ship turned for home on being torpedoed, 
and proceeded under the escort of five destroyers, but 
at 7.20 A.M. E 23 succeeded in again torpedoing her, 
and the captain of E 23 was of opinion that the ship was 
sunk. Subsequent information, however, showed that she 
reached port in a damaged condition; the persistent ac- 
tion of the captain of E 23 in the face of great opposition, 
was a fine example of the determined spirit animating our 
submarine service. 

On receipt of the reports from E 23, and from our 
directional wireless stations, speed was increased, and 
course shaped to a position at which it was hoped the 
High Sea Fleet would be met, if the objective of that 
fleet was a bombardment of the works on the Tyne or in 
the neighbourhood as appeared possible. My intention 
was to make for a position in about Lat. 55 N., Long. 0.40 
E., where the Fleet would be favourably placed either to 
engage the enemy before he closed the coast or to cut him 
off from his bases afterwards. From previous experience 
of coast raids, I formed the opinion that if that was his 
objective the bombardment would be carried out either 
shortly before dusk, or at daylight, in order to facilitate 
escape afterwards, or approach before, unobserved. In 



438 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the possible alternative of the movement being designed 
to cover a landing, the Fleet would also be favourably 
placed to prevent such an operation. At noon the Battle 
Fleet was in position Lat. 55.42 N., Long. 1.04 E. steer- 
ing south-south-east. Submarines were sighted by the 
cruiser Minotaur at 1.23 p.m., and by the light cruiser 
Boadicea at 1.38 p.m.; both these ships were in the vicin- 
ity of the Battle Fleet which was manceuvred as neces- 
sary to avoid the submarines ; this caused some shght delay 
in the southward movement. 

The 11th Submarine Flotilla had been ordered to sea 
in readiness to meet the Fleet, if required, and during 
the forenoon of the 19th, was directed to spread on a line 
running 180° from Lat. 55 N., Long. 0, where the sub- 
marines would be clear of our Fleet and would be in a 
position to attack the enemy's vessels should they pro- 
ceed towards our coast north of Flamborough Head; in 
such an event the enemy would be between the Fleet and 
the submarines. 

The Active, with nine destroyers of the newly formed 
4th Flotilla in the Humber, which was also at sea, was 
directed to join the Battle Fleet. 

At 1.45 P.M. I received information by wireless that 
directional wireless stations placed enemy vessels at 12.30 
P.M. in a position approximately Lat. 54.30 N., Long. 
1.40 E. Our Battle Fleet at 1.45 p.m. was in Lat. 55.15 
N., Long. 1.0 E., and the Battle Cruiser Fleet was well 
ahead. If the High Sea Fleet had continued on the 
same course after 12.30 p.m. as it had steered between 
5.30 A.M. and 12.30 p.m., which would take them to 
Hartlepool, it was evident that it might be sighted at any 
moment by the Battle Cruiser Fleet, the distance between 
the opposing Battle Fleets being only 42 miles; a signal 
was therefore made to the Battle Fleet that the High 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 439 

Sea Fleet might be encountered at any moment. The 
meeting appeared to be so certain that I arranged the 
distribution of gunfire of the Battle Fleet. On the as- 
sumption that the enemy would turn to the eastward on 
meeting us, I directed a concentration of fire of ships that 
would be ahead of the Iron Duke on deployment, of two 
ships on one, leaving the Iron Duke to deal with one 
ship singly, as a compliment to her accurate firing at 
Jutland. The conditions were eminently favourable to 
us. The weather was clear. There seemed to be a very 
good prospect that we might, on gaining touch with the 
enemy, find that the Grand Fleet was in a position to cut 
off the High Sea Fleet from its base, as it was probable 
that we should be to the eastward, although farther north. 
Our submarines were also well placed should the enemy 
elect to make for our coast and try to escape to the north- 
ward, where he would have foimd himself between the 
Grand Fleet and the submarines. As time passed, how- 
ever, and no reports of enemy vessels being sighted came 
in from our light cruisers, it became evident that the High 
Sea Fleet had turned back, probably owing to the fact 
that the Zeppelins had warned the German Commander- 
in-Chief of our presence and movements. On this as- 
sumption, at 2.35 P.M. I directed Commodore Tyrwhitt 
to steer for a position to the north-westward of Terschel- 
ling, so that he might be ready to deliver a night attack 
on the enemy's fleet with the Harwich force. 

It seemed fairly certain to me that the enemy would 
leave a trap behind him in the shape of mines or subma- 
rines, or both; and, indeed, the numerous submarines al- 
ready sighted made it probable that the trap was ex- 
tensive; it was therefore unwise to pass over the waters 
which he had occupied unless there was a prospect of 
bringing the High Sea Fleet to action. 



440 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

It was clear that if no enemy vessels were in sight 
by 4 P.M., and if he had turned for home, it would be 
impossible to bring him to action; I therefore passed a 
visual signal out at 3.5 p.m. to Sir David Beatty to the 
effect that his force was to turn 16 points, if nothing was 
in sight by 4 p.m. 

At 3.20 p.m., however, the Rear-Admiral Command- 
ing the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron reported a subma- 
rine in sight, and I signalled to Sir David Beatty to turn 
at once, as it seemed that my supposition as to the sub- 
marines was correct. 

At 3.40 P.M. I directed the 5th Battle Squadron and 
the cruisers ahead to turn. At this time I received in- 
formation from our directional wireless stations that 
enemy ships were in Lat. 54.14 N., Long. 2.0 E., at 2.45 
P.M. It was evident then that the enemy was returning 
to his bases, and was far beyond pursuit. I therefore 
turned the Battle Fleet at 3.56 p.m., when in Lat. 54.40 
]Sr., Long. 1.01 E., I'eversing the course to pass up the 
searched channel so as to avoid mines. 

At 4.52 p.m. the Falmouth of the 3rd Light Cruiser 
Squadron in Lat. 54.27 N., Long. 1.15 E., was hit by 
two torpedoes, one right forward, and one right aft. The 
ship was zigzagging at 23 knots speed at the time, and 
the submarine was not seen, although the tracks of the 
torpedoes were visible for about 300 yards on the star- 
board bow after she had been hit. The Chester ^ stationed 
astern of the Falmouth, proceeded at full speed to zigzag 
in the vicinity with the object of keeping the submarine 
submerged and preventing further attack. Another tor- 
pedo was fired at the Falmouth at 5.14 p.m., but missed. 

At 5.20 P.M. the destroyers Pasley, Pelican, and 
Negro, detached to assist the Falmouth, arrived on the 
scene and the Falmouth, under their escort, proceeded 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 441 

towards the coast under her own steam, the Chester then 
leaving to rejoin her squadron to the northward. 

At 6.55 P.M. the Pelican sighted a periscope, tried 
to ram the suhmarine, but missed. She then dropped six 
depth charges and reported that the subnjarine came to 
the surface almost immediately, and then appeared to 
sink. Requests for tugs had meanwhile been signalled, 
and four more destroyers were detached to assist to screen 
the Falmouth, which was proceeding at five knots. The 
ship eventually reached the vicinity of Flamborough 
Head safely, and was there again hit by two more tor- 
pedoes fired from a submarine. She still remained afloat, 
and was towed by four tugs, and escorted by nine de- 
stroyers until 8 P.M. on the 20th, when she sank in Lat. 
54 N., Long. 0.2 W. 

At 2.30 P.M. on the 20th, the destroyer Porpoise re- 
ported having rammed a submarine that had attacked the 
Falmouth. 

To return to the Grand Fleet proceedings on the 19th. 
From 3.10 p.m. onwards frequent reports were received 
of submarines being sighted. The Phaeton, Dublin 
(twice), and Southampton all reported submarines in 
sight between 3.10 and 4.52 p.m., the time at which the 
Falmouth was torpedoed. At 6 p.m. Sir David Beatty 
reported that there was a German submarine screen of 
several boats extending northeast for some 25 miles from 
Lat. 54.19 N., Long. 1.0 E. At 6.7 p.m. Commodore 
Tyrwhitt reported that he was following an enemy's 
force of heavy shi]Ds steering east, accompanied by two 
Zeppelins. A reply was sent giving the position of the 
Grand Fleet; the conditions for night attack proved to 
be unfavourable, and at 7.30 p.m. the Commodore re- 
ported that he had abandoned the pursuit; he returned 
with his force to Harwich. At 6.20 p.m. reports received 



442 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

from our directional stations showed that enemy ships 
were in Lat. 54.16 N., Long. 2.51 E., at 4.52 p.m., giv- 
ing clear evidence that the enemy was returning to his 
base. 

During the passage up the searched channel a 
number of submarines were sighted and frequent, and 
in some cases, large alterations of course were necessary 
to avoid them; if all the reports were correct, the 
locality indeed seemed to be a hotbed of submarines. 
Reports of submarines being seen were received between 
4 P.M. and dark, from the Galatea, Phaeton, Bellona, 
Dublin, Southampton, Lion, Royal Sovereign (two sub- 
marines), Queen Elizabeth, and Inflexible, the last ship 
reporting that two torpedoes had been fired at her at 
7.50 P.M., and that both had passed close astern; at this 
time the Battle Fleet and Battle Cruiser Fleet were in 
company. 

Zeppelins were also sighted during the afternoon by 
the Chatham, Galatea, and Lion, and the trawlers Sea 
Ranger and Ramexo; the last-named reported having 
sighted a Zeppelin at a low altitude, and having scored 
two hits and caused a fire in the forward car. 

During the evening the Battle Cruiser Fleet was de- 
tached to Rosyth, and the Battle Fleet continued to the 
northward. Reports of submarines being sighted to the 
eastward of the Pentland Skerries were received at 5 
A.M. and 3.30 p.m. on the 20th, and the Battle Fleet was 
therefore taken well to the northward to avoid them, and 
approached the Pentland Firth from a north-easterly 
direction, arriving without incident between 6.30 and 

8 P.M. 

The experience of August 19th showed that light 
cruisers, proceeding at even the highest speed un- 
screened by destroyers, ran considerable danger from 



LESSONS OF EXPERIENCE 443 

enemy submarines. The enemy's submarine commanders 
were no doubt increasing in efficiency, and risks, 
which we could afford to run earlier in the War, were 
now unjustifiable. Representations were made to the 
Admiralty to the effect that it was considered that in 
future light cruisers should be screened by at least one 
desti'oyer per ship; the number of destroj'^ers available 
for the Grand Fleet did not at the time admit of 
this, but as the total complement of 100 (the number 
intended to be appropriated to the Fleet) was reached, 
destroyers could be allotted to most of the light cruisers 
in the advanced line, provided there were not many 
absent from the Fleet carrying out extraneous ser- 
vices. 

The ease with which the enemy could lay a sub- 
marine trap for the Fleet had been demonstrated on the 
19th of August; what had constantly puzzled me was 
that this had not been done very frequently at an earlier 
stage in the War. Since, however, it had been attempted 
and with some success, there seemed to be every reason 
to expect a repetition of the operation, and it was 
clear that it was unwise to take the Fleet far into 
southern waters unless an adequate destroyer force 
was present to act as a submarine screen for all ships. 
If the circumstances were exceptional and the need 
very pressing, it would be necessary to accept 
the risk. There was general agreement on this point 
between the Flag officers of the Fleet and the 
Admiralty. 

During the month of August the weekly average of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron showed: 

No. of ships intercepted, including trawlers, 112; 
No. sent in, 35; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent at ports 



444 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

or en route to or from patrols, 10; No. on special serv- 
ice, 0. 

The weather at Scapa and in the neighbourhood was 
foggy and misty during a great part of the month. Much 
mist or fog was experienced from the 1st to the 6th, the 
10th to the 12th, and 13th to 16th. 

During the month Grand Fleet submarines were ex- 
ercised at Scapa Flow in carrying out attacks on ships 
under way, and the destroyer flotillas were similarly 
practised in making torpedo attacks, the Battle Fleet 
divisions being exercised in countering such attacks 
by turning movements. These exercises were continued 
for the remainder of the year, and much experience was 
obtained from them as to the different methods of deal- 
ing with attacks by enemy destroyers during a Fleet 
action. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE SUBMARINE PERU. TO MERCHANT SHIPPING; 
RECALL TO THE ADMIRALTY 

EXTENTS were to prove that my period of command 
of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer 
to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November, 
1917. 

But before coming to that development something 
must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work 
of the Grand Fleet. 

During the month of September, 1916, there was 
not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the 
4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light 
Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, 
swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward 
of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On 
the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa 
endeavoured without success to locate a submarine re- 
ported by the Talisman to the eastward of the Pent- 
land Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful 
search for a submarine was carried out in the same 
locality. 

On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squad- 
rons left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange 
bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea en route, 
and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers 
left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on 
the 4th. 

d45 



446 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the 
eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west. 

On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, Cam- 
pania, and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise 
between the Orknpys and Shetland Islands and the Nor- 
wegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light 
cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. 
Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A 
submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet 
on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by an- 
other route, the available local patrol vessels being em- 
ployed to keep the submarine submerged during the entry 
of the fleet to Scapa. 

Submarines were again active during the latter part 
of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 
10th Cruiser Squadron,' the position of the squadron being 
shifted for that reason. 

On the 26th two light cruisers and foiir destroyers 
left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the 
German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th. 

On the same date the yacht Conqueror II., the patrol 
trawler Sarah Alice, and two British steamers were tor- 
pedoed in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines. 
On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were 
detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against 
the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these 
waters. 

Early on the 30th the Lion, with the 1st and 2nd 
Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser 
Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left 
Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned 
to the northward and proceeded to Scapa. 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 447 

During September the cruiser patrols were continu- 
ously maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and 
on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser 
and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol, 
consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the 
Horn Reef. The enemy had presumably found the pa- 
trols inconvenient, and German destroyers on several oc- 
casions during the month cruised at night in the area pa- 
trolled with a view to interrupting our submarines when 
recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent 
change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when re- 
turning from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy sub- 
marine on the surface, and, being unable to get into posi- 
tion to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did 
not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged. 

The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flo- 
tilla (the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the 
month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship 
the Luciaj with two attendant destroyers. The forma- 
tion of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced, 
this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be 
formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet de- 
stroyers to 100. 

On the 21st the new battle cruiser Repulse, heavily 
armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection 
for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up 
gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection 
of this ship was about equal to that of the Australia and 
New Zealand, and she was greatly inferior in this respect 
to the Lion, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, 
experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly 
that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage 
in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they 
were provided with better protection than that given to 



448 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

the Australia and earlier vessels. Proposals were, there- 
fore, forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very con- 
siderably to the deck protection of both the Repulse and 
her sister ship, the Benown. These proposals were ap- 
proved and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. Al- 
though the ships were much improved by the alteration, 
they were still far inferior in protection to the German 
battle cruisers. 

On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built 
on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroj^ers, arrived at 
Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most 
valuable refitting base. 

The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser 
Squadron during September were : 

No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on 
patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or en route to or from 
patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0. 

The favourable weather and short nights, combined 
with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol 
were responsible for the increase in the number of ships 
intercepted. 

The weather as a whole was good during the month. 
Fog or mist was prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th 
and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise 
the conditions were favourable. 

In the early part of October, the activities of the 
enemy's submarines in the White Sea, which had been 
considerable during the month of September, became 
more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three 
Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Slet- 
ness, and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell vic- 
tims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some 
submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat. 
69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the at- 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 449 

tack was successful. The Fearless, now a submarine 
parent ship, and three submarines started for the White 
Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alex- 
androvsk against the hostile submarines. They arrived 
on the 20th and began operations at once. During their 
stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any 
enemj^ submarines, but there was a marked decrease in 
enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of 
the presence of our vessels in those waters. The Fearless, 
with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return 
passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these 
waters before the ice began to form. 

On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships 
of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer 
Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning 
on the 4th. 

On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and 
swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position 
to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which 
our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had 
reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting 
suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours 
were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; 
three were selected and sent in for examination, but were 
found to be in order. 

On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left 
Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside, 
near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in air- 
ships and light cruisers working together. The pro- 
gramme arranged could not be completed owing to bad 
weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, 
and some useful hints were gained. This work was under- 
taken as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to 
accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the 



450 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

number of these craft completing in the near future jus- 
tified such a procedure ; although we still lacked airships of 
the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller 
class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance 
work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western 
side of the North Sea. We had already had consider- 
able experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German 
High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had 
fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this 
subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval 
Air Service came under my supervision. These views 
were expressed on an occasion when the building of a 
fleet of Zeppehns was being urged on behalf of the Navy. 
It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would 
be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in 
connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual 
conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zep- 
pelin and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed 
were that whatever future there might be for the latter as 
development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their 
having the radius of action necessary for scouting work 
in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already 
possessed it. My apology for making mention of this 
fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made 
that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the 
value of air-craft before the War. 

On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some 
cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of 
the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the 
eastward, returning on the 10th. 

On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers 
left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to 
bad weather. 

On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 451 

sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of 
Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher 
Bank and hack to Rosyth, without sighting anything of 
interest. 

On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight 
destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line be- 
tween Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 
4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course 
approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order 
to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was 
repeated during daylight hours on two successive days; 
no enemy vessels were sighted. 

On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and 
the 14ith and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching 
and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24!th, 

During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried 
out during the month of October, the Flag officers were 
directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics 
employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with 
a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet 
these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from 
all Flag officers. 

On October 24th a division of destroyers, together 
with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel 
to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using 
this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the 
patrol. 

On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak 
to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in 
those waters. On the same day the Kildonan Castle, 
of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a sub- 
marine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., 
Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol 
line was consequently moved temporarily to the west- 



452 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

ward, and trawlers were despatched to the neighbour- 
hood. 

On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers 
sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the 
waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They 
returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy 
vessels. 

On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th 
Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise 
cruise in the central and northern positions of the 
North Sea, and returned without incident on November 
3rd. 

During the month the Northern patrol north of the 
Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer 
was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel 
route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn 
Reef. 

The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron 
showed the following figures : — 

No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on 
patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or en route to or from^ 
patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0. 

Bad weather during the month interfered with the 
operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on 
the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or 
mist. 

On November 1st I left the Iron Duke at Cromarty 
and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the 
First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of 
letters I had vsritten on the subject of the ever-growing 
danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and 
the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures 
to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my 
opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means, 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 453 

first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to pro- 
tect our communications more successfully until the sub- 
marines could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of 
our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace. 
From information furnished to me it was evident that 
the Germans were making special efforts to increase 
the number of their submarines very largely, and there 
did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we 
were at the time employing, of destroying subma- 
rines at a rate at all approaching that of their con- 
struction. 

So far as I was aware there was an insufficient 
reserve of food in the country to provide against the 
consequences of successful action by enemy sub- 
marines; and the construction of merchant-ships on 
an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been 
taken in hand, this being obviously an essential 
measure. I had written semi-officially for eighteen 
months before on the matter.* It seemed to me 
questionable whether our organisation at the Ad- 
miralty included a sufficiently numerous and impor- 
tant staff, having as its sole business the work of 
dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem 
which was assuming such very serious proportions. 
It did not appear that new proposals and inven- 
tions for dealing with the submarine campaign were be- 
ing pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, pos- 
sibly because of the absence of such an organisa- 
tion, of difficulties connected with labour and materiel; 
and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dan- 
gers confronting us would be successfully com- 
bated. 

* The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food supplies or, at that 
time, for merchant-ship building. 



454 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, 
was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much 
anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all sub- 
jects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty, 
and I was aware of his views on matters connected 
with the War, on which we had always been in complete 
agi-eement. His direction and assistance in cormection 
with matters concerning the development and employ- 
m^ent of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, 
and invaluable to the nation, and my hope Avas that 
in putting forward my views as to the new and serious 
danger confronting us, and the possible methods of 
dealing with it, I should be rendering him assist- 
ance in combating the menace. One of my suggestions 
was the formation of a committee, or department, at 
the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of 
some of the clever and younger officers who had shown 
marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole 
object would be the development of arrangements for 
dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant 
shipping, and the production of the necessary material. 
I pointed out that our existing methods were not 
meeting with the success attained at an earlier period, 
and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were respon- 
sible for this result. 

I had also formed and expressed the opinion that 
the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a 
Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign 
against merchant shipping had been fully tried and 
had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I 
suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing 
the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one 
flotilla for work against the enemy's submarines in 
waters where such action had some chance of success. 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 455 

I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against 
submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the 
only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be 
used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in 
an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results, 
as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water 
open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in 
which destroyers could act more effectively against 
submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters; 
in restricted localities, such as some parts of the 
English Channel, where the depth did not allow 
of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My conten- 
tion was that it was probably wise to reduce the number 
of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen 
the force required to deal with the submarine danger, 
even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand 
Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should 
it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as at- 
tempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt we 
could not face, was to run the graver risk of serious 
disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant 
shipping. 

It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would 
not risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this 
Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some 
military advantage, I considered that with the 1st, 2nd 
and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had 
been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be 
engaged with every prospect of success, provided always 
that it was well screened from submarine attack and care- 
fully handled. The only direction, apart from an attack 
on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet 
could inflict any material damage on us and which the 
Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent. 



456 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast 
towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could 
not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it hap- 
pened to be at sea and in the right position at the right 
moment. 

The objection which might be raised to this policy, 
which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect 
on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea 
without being brought to action, even if it could achieve 
no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised 
very fully the force of this objection, and the responsi- 
bility involved in disregarding it. On the other hand, 
the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing 
and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs, 
and without delay, since the existence of the armies as 
well as that of the civil population depended on merchant 
shipping. 

I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admir- 
alty on November 5th. 

On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left 
Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, return- 
ing on November 4th. 

On the 3rd the Botha, with four destroyers of the 
14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the 
Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse 
on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to 
their bases. On the same day the Faulknor and six 
destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried 
out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the 
vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser 
Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla from 
Rosyth supported both forces. 

At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 457 

patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships 
of the "Kaiser" class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 E. 
A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to 
prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had 
a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack 
were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded, 
in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow tor- 
pedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took 
effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned 
to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a con- 
siderable period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned sub- 
sequently that the two damaged ships managed to reach 
port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit 
attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack 
under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident 
showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German 
system of underwater protection in their capital ships. 

On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against 
enemy submarines on their expected tracks. 

From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was 
experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships 
were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the 
ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from 
Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 
17th. 

On the 18th the Otway, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, 
intercepted the Norwegian steamship Older, which was 
found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German sub- 
marine. She had on board, in addition, survivors of an 
Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the sub- 
marine. The Otway recaptured her, but was not in time 
to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs 
in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however, 
succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway. 



458 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

During the period up to November 19th, the weekly 
average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the 
following figures: — 

No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on 
patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0. 

The weather throughout the period to the 19th No- 
vember was very bad, and the figures showed a corre- 
sponding reduction in the number of ships intercepted. 

Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 
16th, 17th and 18th. 

On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squad- 
rons, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser 
Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in 
northern waters, during which battle exercises were car- 
ried out. 

Shortly before the Iron Duke slipped from her buoy, 
and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its 
way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First 
Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea 
Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I 
consulted mj^ chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and 
he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in 
order to be in a position to put into practice the views I 
held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine 
menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to 
leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since 
the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was 
the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to 
fill in war time. 

I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to 
do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in 
accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed 
to meet him at Rosji;h. 

I then followed the Fleet to sea in the Iron Duke, 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 459 

and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned 
over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil 
Burney (second in command), with directions that the 
ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded 
in the Iron Duke to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning 
of the 27th. 

I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 
27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Ad- 
miralty, and accepted the appointment. He intimated 
to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir 
David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the 
Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes 
in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made 
suggestions on some of these matters. 

]Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started 
my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer 
of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty 
of the task before me. The attacks already made upon 
the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due 
to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids 
on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with 
the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to 
come. 

I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the 
production of fresh material, could become effective for 
a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed, 
I was so certain of the course that events would take, 
that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of 
the Iron Duke (a very difficult task in view of the in- 
tense regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that 
they must expect to see me the object of the same 
attacks as those to which my distinguished prede- 
cessor. Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was 
not wrong in this surmise. I left the Iron Duke with 



460 THE GRAND FLEET, 1914-1916 

a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and can- 
not close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet 
during my twenty-eight months' service as Com- 
mander-in-Chief better than by quoting my fare- 
well memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so 
well. 

"In bidding farewell to the Flag officers. Captains, 
officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my 
privilege to command since the commencement of the 
War, I desire to express my warmest thanl^s to all ranks 
for their loyal support during a period which I know must 
have tried their patience to the breaking-point. 

"The disappointment which has so constantly attended 
the southern movements of the Fleet might well have re- 
sulted in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the 
strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of 
efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing 
the result were so seldom provided by our enemy. 

"But this is far from being the case. I am proud to 
be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit 
of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I 
am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day 
to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have 
turned that experience to good account. 

"Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest 
regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men 
are imbued with that spirit which has carried their fore- 
fathers to victory throughout all ages, whenever and 
wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and 
whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, 
I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they 
will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes, 
and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt. 



SUBMARINE PERIL TO SHIPPING 461 

"May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious 
victory resulting in a just and lasting peace ! 

"J. R. Jellicoe, 

"Admiral." 



Appendix I 



BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH 

Iron Duke, 

18th June, 1916. 
No. 1395 H.F. 0022. 
The Secretarji- 

of the Admiralty, 

Sir, — 

Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty 
that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on SI May, 
1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark. 

2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the 
general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left 
its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued 
by me. 

3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were 
as follows: 

(a) Those in company with me: 
Iron Duke — Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag). 
Marlborough — Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of Vice- 

Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E. 

Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff). 
Colossus — Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of Rear- 

Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.). 
Hercules — Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker. 
Neptune — Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard. 
Collingwood — Captain James C. Ley. 
Revenge — Captain Edward B. Kiddle. 
Agincourt — Captain Henry M. Doughty. 
463 



464 APPENDIX 

St. Vincent — Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O. 

Bellona — Captain Arthur B. S. Button. 

King George V. — Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of 

Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.). 
Orion — Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of Rear- 

Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.). 
' Centurion — Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O. 
Conqueror — Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill. 
i;n7i— Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C. 
Thunderer — Captain James A. Fergusson. 
Monarch — Captain George H. Borrett. 
Ajax — Captain George H. Baird. 
Boadicea — Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O. 
Benbom — Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice- 

Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.). 
Superb — Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear- 

Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B.). 
Canada — Captain William C. M. Nicholson. 
Bellerophon — Captain Edward F. Bruen. 
Temeraire — Captain Edwin V. Underbill. 
Vanguard — Captain James D. Dick. 
Royal Oak — Captain Crawford Maclachlan. 
Blanche — Captain John M. Casement. 
Minotaur — Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth (flying the Flag of Rear- 

Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.). 
Hampshire — Captain Herbert J. Savill. 
Cochrane — Captain Eustace La T. Leatham. 
Shannon — Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O. 
Defence — Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral 

Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.). 
Duke of Edinburgh — Captain Henry Blackett. 
Black Prince — Captain Thomas P. Bonham. 
Warrior — Captain Vincent B. Molteno. 
Invincible — Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral 

The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.). 
Indomitable — Captain Francis W. Kennedy. 
Inflexible — Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O. 
Calliope — Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier. 
Caroline — Captain H. Ralph Crooke. 
Comus — Captain Alan G. Hotham. 



APPENDIX 465 

Constance — Captain Cyril S. Townsend. 

Royalist — Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O. 

Canterbury — Captain Percy M. R. Royds. 

Chester — Captain Robert N. Lawson. 

Active — Captain Percy Withers. 

Castor — Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O. 

Tipperary — Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour. 

Broke — Commander Walter L. Allen. 

Shark — Commander Loftus W, Jones. 

Acasta — Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron. 

Spitfire — Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny. 

Sparrowhawk — Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins. 

Achates — Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C. 

Ambuscade — Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles. 

Ardent — Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden. 

Fortune — Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry. 

Porpoise — Commander Hugh D. Colville. 

Unity — Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky. 

Garland — Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff. 

Christopher — Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr. 

Contest — Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master. 

Owl — Commander Robert G. Hamond. 

Hardy — Commander Richard A. A. Plowden. 

Midge — Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish. 

Ophelia — Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe. 

Kempenfelt — Commander Harold E. Sulivan. 

Ossory — Commander Harold V. Dundas. 

Martial — Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison. 

Magic — Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter. 

Minion — Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings. 

Mystic — Commander Claude F. AUsup. 

Mons — Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin. 

Mandate — Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie. 

Michael — Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate. 

Marne — Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford. 

Milbrook — Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor. 

Manners — Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison. 

Moon — Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin. 

Mounsey — Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre. 

Morning Star — Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher. 



466 APPENDIX 

Faulknor — Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling. 

Marksman — Commander Norton A. Sulivan. 

Obedient — Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell. 

Mindful — Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley. 

Marvel — Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb. 

Onslaught — Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C. 

Mwnad — Commander John P. Champion. 

Narrvhal — Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson. 

Nessus — Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter. 

Noble — Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer. 

Opal — Commander Charles G. C. Sumner. 

Nonsuch — Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon. 

Menace — Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand. 

Munster — Lieutenant-Commander Spenper F. Russell. 

Mary Rose — Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan. 

Mischief — Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O. 

Oak — Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O. 

Abdiel — Commander Berwick Curtis. 

(b) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty: 

iioM— Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of 
Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); 
Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff. 

Princess Royal — Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying 
the Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.). 

Tiger — Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O. 

Queen Mary — Captain Cecil I. Prowse. 

New Zealand — Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of Rear- 
Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.). 

Indefatigable — Captain Charles F. Sowerby. 

Southampton — Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C. 

Nottingham — Captain Charles B. Miller. 

Birmingham — Captain Arthur A. M. Duff. 

Dublin — Captain Albert C. Scott. 

Galatea — Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O, 

Inconstant — Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G. 

Phaeton — Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O. 

Cordelia — Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish. 

Falmouth — Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Ad- 
miral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.). 



APPENDIX 467 

Birkenhead — Captain Edward Reeves. 

Gloucester— Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O. 

Yarmouth — Captain Thomas D. Pratt. 

"Barham" — Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear- 

Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.). 
Warspite — Captain Edward M. Phillpotts. 
Valiant — Captain Maurice Woollcombe. 
Malaya — Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., 

M.V.O. 
Champion — Captain (D.) James U. Farie. 
Nestor — Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham. 
Nomad — Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield. 
Narhorough — Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett. 
Obdurate — Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams. 
Petard — Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson. 
Pelican — Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie. 
Nerissa — Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge. 
Onsloru — Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey. 
Moresby — Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison. 
Nicator — Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta. 
Fearless — Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper. 
Acheron — Commander Charles G. Ramsey. 
Ariel — Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet. 
Attach — Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James. 
Hydra — Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop. 
Badger — Commander G. A. Fremantle. 
Goshaivh — Commander Dashwood F. Moir. 
Defender — Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer. 
Lizard — Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke. 
Lapwing — Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye. 
Lydiard — Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith. 
Liberty — Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King. 
Landrail — Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart. 
Laurel — ^Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet. 
Moorsom — Commander John C. Hodgson. 
Morris — Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham. 
Turbulent — Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart. 
Termagent — Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake. 
Engadine — Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson. 



468 APPENDIX 

4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and 2nd 
Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons 
and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the 
5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting 
to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 
3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th 
Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th Flotillas. 

5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after 
the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course 
steered by the latter during the first hour of their action with the 
enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our 
battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets 
would never have been in contact. 

The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and 
admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under 
Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times, dis- 
advantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with the 
best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable advan- 
tage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the German 
Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and German battle 
cruisers in the matter of protection must not be forgotten. The Ger- 
man vessels are in this respect equal to powerful battleships, whereas 
our battle cruisers, particularly those of the 2nd and Srd Battle Cruiser 
Squadrons, are very lightly protected. The main difficulty with which 
our ships had to contend was the bad light. All reports mention the 
difficulty experienced in seeing the enemy vessels to the eastward, 
whilst remarking on the clearness of the western horizon. A photo- 
graph taken from Malaya during the action indicates this fact very 
clearly. 

During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged 
with the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the 
advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and 
the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting quali- 
ties of the personnel. 

6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir 
David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came 
upon the scene: 

"At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from Galatea indicating the 
presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately 



APPENDIX 469 

altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force 
between the enemy and his base. 

"At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the 
eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward 
and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the 
Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly 
altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 
3.31 P.M. They appeared to be live battle cruisers. 

"After the first report of the enemy the 1st and Srd Light Cruiser 
Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders 
spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the battle 
cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled 
up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at 
long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had 
come in at high speed and was able to take station ahead of the battle 
cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the course on which we first 
engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the light cruiser 
squadrons was excellent and of great value. 

"From a report from Galatea at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the 
enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit of light 
cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered Engadine to send up a seaplane and 
scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 
3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as 
Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as Observer, was well 
under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in Engadine 
about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, 
and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had 
to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light 
cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in 
no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight- 
Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be con- 
gratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under 
such circumstances are of distinct value. 

"At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of 
Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9tb Flo- 
tillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging 
on the enemj% who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed 
the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle 
Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing 



470 APPENDIX 

N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun 
behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, 
our situation was both tactically and strategically good. 

"At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a r.ange of 18,500 yards, 
both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered 
to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the 
enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards. 

"Shortly after 4 p.m. Indefatigable, after a violent explosion, fell 
out of the line, turned over and sank. 

"At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened 
fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to 
slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through a screen 
of enemy submarines. The destroyer Landrail of 9th Flotilla, who 
was on our port beam trying to take station ahead, sighted the 
periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing con- 
siderable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of Lydiard and 
Landrail undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers from closer sub- 
marine attack. Nottingham also reported a submarine on the star- 
board beam. 

"Eight destroyers of the ISth Flotilla, Nestor, Nomad, Nicator, 
Narborough, Pelican, Petard, Obdurate, Nerissa, with Moorsom and 
Morris of 10th Flotilla, Turbulent and Termagent of the 9th Flotilla, 
having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when oppor- 
tunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a simi- 
lar movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried 
out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before 
arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an 
enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce 
engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy 
were forced to retire on their battle cruisers, having lost two destroyers 
sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sus- 
tained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle 
cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers 
having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was there- 
fore unfavourable for torpedo attack. 

"Nestor, Nomad and Nicator, gallantly led by Commander the 
Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of Nestor, pressed home their attack on 
the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them at a range of 6,000 
and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's 
secondary armament. Nomad was badly hit and apparently remained 



APPENDIX 471 

stopped between the lines. Subsequently Nestor and Nicator altered 
course to the S.E., and in a short time the opposing battle cruisers 
liaving turned I6 points, found themselves within close range of 
a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a. 
terrific iire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for 
torpedo attack, fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at 
a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, 
Nestor was badly hit and swung to starboard, Nicator altering course 
inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the 
last torpedo. Nicator made good her escape and subsequently rejoined 
the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. Nestor remained stopped, but was 
afloat when last seen. Moorsom also carried out an attack on the 
enemy's battle fleet. 

"Petard, Nerissa, Turbulent and Termagent also pressed home 
their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after the 
engagement with enemy destroyers. Petard reports that all her tor- 
pedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while Nerissa states that 
one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks 
were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were 
worthy of its highest traditions. 

"From 4.15 to ^.^S p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle 
cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle 
Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very 
long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that 
of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third 
enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-east- 
ward had become considerably reduced and the outline of the ships very 
indistinct. 

"At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in Queen Mary; she was 
enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of her 
officers and men were subsequently picked up by Laurel. 

"At 4.38 P.M. Southampton reported the enemy's Battle Fleet 
ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's 
Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in suc- 
cession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead 
them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers altered 
course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. Southampton 
with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the southward to ob- 
serve. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy battle fleet and 
came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. Southampton's reports 



472 APPENDIX 

were most valuable. The 5 th Battle Squadron were now closing on an 
opposite course and engaging the enemy battle cruisers with all guns. 
The position of the enemy battle fleet was communicated to them, and 
I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh 
Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in Barham, this squadron supported us bril- 
liantly and effectively. 

"At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and 
came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet. 
Fearless with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle cruisers, 
and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. Champion with 13th 
Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 
3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the 
southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light 
Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter. 

"The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships 
being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the 
enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly 
at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van 
at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a 
northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this 
time the enemy received very severe punishment, and undoubtedly one 
of their battle cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged con- 
dition. This came under my personal observation and was corrobo- 
rated by Princess Royal and Tiger. Other enemy ships also showed 
signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. Onslow and Moresby, who had 
been detached to assist Engadine with the seaplane, rejoined the battle 
cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of 
Lion. At 5.10 p.m. Moresby, being 2 points before the beam of the 
leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight 
minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to 
be the 6th ship in the line. Moresby then passed between the lines 
to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined Champon. In corroboration 
of this. Fearless reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on 
fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke 
and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of Queen 
Mary and Indefatigable. 

"At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position of 
the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north- 
eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was 
gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the 



APPENDIX 473 

head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his 
light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third 
Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide Indomitahle's report). Possibly Zep- 
pelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted 
on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Grand 
Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east and 
proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy 
down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the Commander-in-Chief 
that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three 
of the enemy battle cruisers were visible, closely followed by battle- 
ships of the "Konig" class. 

At about 6.5 P.M. Onslow, being on the engaged bow of Lion, 
sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, ap- 
parently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. Onslow at once 
closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 
to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. Onslow then closed the 
enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be 
fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, 
with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his 
torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at 
slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he 
closed the light cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The 
enemy's battle fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes 
were fired at them; having started correctly, they must have crossed 
the enemy's track. Damage then caused Onslow to stop. 

"At 7.15 P.M. Defender, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, 
while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell which 
damaged her foremost boiler, closed Onslow and took her in tow. Shell 
were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, 
was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the en- 
suing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two strug- 
gled on together until 1. p.m. 1st June, when Onslow was transferred to 
tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be 
gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander 
J. C. Tovey of Onslow, and Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of De- 
fender, for special recognition. Onslow was possibly the destroyer 
referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Srd Light Cruiser 
Squadron, as follows; 

" 'Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a de- 
stroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition 



474 APPENDIX 

soon after G p.m. She ajiparentl}' was able to struggle ahead again, 
and made straight for the Derfflinger to attack her. The incident ap- 
peared so courageous that it seems desirable to investigate it further.' " 

Proceedings of Battle Fleet 

7. On receipt of the information that tlie enemy had been sighted, 
the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and Destroyer 
Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close 
the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before 
the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the 
older battleships were severely tested. Great credit is due to the 
engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, 
responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess 
of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels. 

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral 
the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet, 
was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in reckon- 
ing between Lion and the Iron Duke, which was inevitable under the 
circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third Battle Cruiser 
Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward, and it was not until 
6.30 P.M. that this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the 
sound of guns to the south-westward. Rear-Admiral Hood sent the 
Chester (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship en- 
gaged three or four enemy light cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The 
engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period 
Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy 
odds, and although the ship suifered considerably in casualties her 
fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. 
she rejoined the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron. 

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-west- 
ward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking 
station ahead of the Lion at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of 
the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He reports as 
follows : 

"I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out 
magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action 
ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. 
At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from 



APPENDIX 475 

the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her, and 
caused lier to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made 
a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of the bearing and distance 
of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 p.m. Invincible blew up. 

"After the loss of Invincible, the squadron was led by Inflexible 
until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were clear of our 
leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I 
ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern 
and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indiffer- 
ent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily 
lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the 
visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us 
than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, en- 
abling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite 
superiority over them. The damage received by our ships during this 
period, excepting the destruction of Invincible, was slight. From the 
reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the 
enemj' suffered severely, battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head 
of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the 
majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle 
Squadron were also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral 
Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be 
safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution. 

"From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the 
Third Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on 
our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with 
the torpedo. Falmouth and Yarmouth both fired torpedoes at the 
leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, 
as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light 
Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gun- 
fire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fight- 
ing efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral 
Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. 
Indomitable reports that about this time one of the Derfjlinger class 
fell out of the enemy's line. 

8. Meanwhile, at 6 p.m., Canterbury (Captain Percy M. R. Royds) 
had engaged enemy light cruisers which were firing heavily on the tor- 
pedo-boat destroyer Shark (Commander Loftus W. Jones), Acasta 
(Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and Christopher (Lieu- 



476 APPENDIX 

tenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr) ; as a result of this engagement 
the Shark was sunk. 

9- At 5.45 P.M. the report of guns had become audible to me, and 
at 5.55 P.M. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard 
beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished and the 
position of the enemy's battle fleet could not be determined. The 
difference in reckoning between Iron Duke and Lion mentioned in 
paragraph 6 added to the uncertainty of the general situation. 

10. Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under 
Hear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, were 
seen to be in action, and reports received show that Defence, Flagship 
(Captain Stanley V. Ellis), and Warrior (Captain Vincent B. Mol- 
teno), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light cruiser 
at this time, which subsequently sank. 

11. At 6 P.M. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle cruisers, 
were sighted by Marlborough bearing before the starboard beam of the 
battle fleet. 

At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser 
Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle cruisers, and at 
6.14 P.M. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet. 

At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle cruisers 
and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that 
our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels. 

12. I formed the battle fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir 
David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became en- 
gaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle cruisers 
ahead of the battle fleet. 

The divisions of the battle fleet were led by: 

The Commander-in-Chief, 
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, 
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, 
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, 
Rear-Adnniral Alexander L. Duff, 
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson. 
Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt. 

13. At 6.16 P.M. D -fence and Warrior were observed passing down 
between the British and German Battle Fleets under a very heavy 
fire. Defence was seen to blow up and Warrior passed to the rear 



APPENDIX 477" 

disabled. It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his en- 
gagement with the enemy's light cruisers and in his desire to complete 
their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy 
ships, owing to tlie mist, until he found himself in close proximity to 
the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were 
caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when Black 
Prince (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, 
but as a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m. 
reporting the position of a submarine, it is possible that her loss was 
the result of a torpedo attack. There is much strong evidence of the 
presence of a large number of enemy submarines in the vicinity of the 
scene of the action. 

14. The First Battle Squadron, which was iij the rear on deploy- 
ment, became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening 
fire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the "Kaiser" class. The centre 
squadron, which had previously been firing at an enemy light cruiser, 
opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the "Konig" class, and the 
van squadron commenced immediately afterwards. 

At 6.6 P.M. the Rear-Admiral Commanding, Fifth Battle Squadron, 
then in company with the battle cruisers, had sighted the starboard 
wing division of the battle fleet on the port bow of Barham, and the 
first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the 
remainder of the battle fleet, but on realising the direction of deploy- 
ment he was compelled to form astern, a manoeuvre which was well 
executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle fleet. 
An accident to TVarspite's steering gear caused her helm to become 
jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy's 
line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling 
enabled Captain Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat 
awkward situation. 

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was pos- 
sible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. To- 
wards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. 
More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight 
to twelve. 

The action between the battle fleets lasted intermittently from 
6.17 P.M. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, dur- 
ing which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E. 
by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned 
away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and 



478 APPENDIX 

smoke screens as the effect of the Britisli fire was felt, and the altera- 
tions, of course, had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which 
commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the 
enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the 
same time placed us between the enemy and his bases. 

At 6.55 P.M. Iron Duke passed the wreck of Invincible with Badger 
standing by. I was not aware of the loss of Queen Mary and Inde- 
fatigable until the following day- 

15. During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High 
Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire 
kept up by the battleships and battle cruisers of the Grand Fleet 
caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be 
constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line, and at 
least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not ef- 
fective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant. 

The Battle Cruisers in the Van 

16. Sir David Beatty reports: 

"Between 7 and 7-12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. 
to regain touch with the enem}^ and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them 
at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were 
two battle cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the 'Konig' 
class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that 
was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved consider- 
ably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. 
and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7-32 p.m. my course was S.W., 
speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. 
Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment, 
one ship being on fire while another appeared to drop right astern. 
The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of 
grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of 
which they undoubtedly turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight 
of them. 

"At 7.58 P.M. I ordered the First and Third Light Cruiser Squad- 
rons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's 
line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon 
located two battle cruisers and battleships, and more heavily engaged 
at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit 
repeatedly by Lion and turned away 8 points, emitting very high 



APPENDIX 479 

flames and with a heavy list to port. Princess Royal set fire to a three- 
funnelled battleship; New Zealand and Indomitable report that the 
third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling 
over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, 
and Falmouth reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to 
the westward. 

"At 8.40 P.M. all our battle cruisers felt a heavy shock, as if struck 
by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, 
examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it 
is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel. This 
seems a very probable explanation in view of the condition in which the 
enemy was last seen." 

17. As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very 
mtich on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility 
and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a "following" 
or "chasing" fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently .fired, 
but only one took effect (on Marlborough), and even in this case the 
ship was able to remain in the line and to continue «the action. The 
menace of effective torpedo attack on a long line, however, 'in weather 
conditions which were ideal for the purpose, contributed to the dif- 
ficulty of keeping within effective gun range of the enemy. Two 
separate destroj'er attacks were made by the enemy. 

Details of Battle Fleet Action 

18. The First Battle Squadron, under Vice- Admiral Sir Cecil 
Burney, came into action at 6.15 p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle 
Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe 
punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle cruisers and light 
cruisers which were also engaged. The fire of Marlborough (Captain 
George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship com- 
menced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the "Kaiser" 
class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she 
was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, 
but re-opened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen 
rapid salvoes at a ship of the "Konig" class, hitting her frequently 
until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective 
fire was kept up, in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused 
by the torpedo, was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example 
to the squadron. 



480 APPENDIX 

The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 
yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's 
return fire than the remainder of tlie battle fleet, with the exception of 
the Fifth Battle Squadron. Colossus was hit but not seriously damaged, 
and other.ships were straddled with fair frequency. 

In the Fourth Battle Squadron — in which squadron my Flagship 
Iron Duke was placed — Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, leading 
one of the divisions, the enemy engaged was the Third Squadron and 
some of .the battle cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light 
cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the 
fire of the squadron was effective. Iron Duke, having previously fired 
at a light cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battle- 
ship of the "Konig" class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was 
very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo, and 
only ceased when the target ship turned away. The rapidity with 
which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent 
gunnery organisation of the flagship so ably commanded by my Flag 
Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer. 

The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed 
at enemy battle cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. 
Hits were observed to take effect on several ships. 

The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir 
Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the "Kaiser" or "Konig" 
classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle 
cruiser which had apparently dropped back severely damaged. 

19. During the action between the battle fleets, the Second Cruiser 
Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, with 
the addition of Duke of Edinburgh of the First Cruiser Squadron, 
occupied a position at the van of the battle fleet and acted as a con- 
necting link between the battle fleet and the battle cruiser fleet. This 
squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an oppor- 
tunity of coming into action. 

The attached cruisers Boadicea, Active, Blanche, and Bellona car- 
ried out their duties as repeating ships with remarkable rapidity and 
accuracy under difficult conditions. 

The Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles 
E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack 
enemy destroyers at 7-20 p.m. and again at 8.18 p.m. when they sup- 
ported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore 
James R. P. Hawkesley to attack. On each occasion the Fourth 



APPENDIX 481 

Light Cruiser Squadron was very ■well handled by Commodore Le 
Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object 
was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the 
ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 
6,500 and 8,000 yards. The Calliope was hit several times but did not 
sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several 
casualties. The light cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with 
torpedoes at this time, but were not able to observe the result; an ex- 
plosion on board a ship of the "Kaiser" class was seen, however^ at 
8.38 P.M. 

During these destroyer attacks, four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers 
were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light cruisers and destroyers. 

Night Dispositions 

20. At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat 
of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching 
darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night 
with a view to its safety from such attacks whilst providing for a 
renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manceuvred to remain 
between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position 
in which they would aiFord protection to the fleet from destroyer attack 
and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's 
heavy ships. 

Night Attacks by Flotillas 

21. During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, 
but the Fourth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore 
Hawkesley and Captains Wintour and Stirling, delivered a series of 
very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy 
losses. 

22. It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth 
Flotilla occurred, including that of Tipperary with the gallant leader 
of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high 
pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the 
enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken and many gallant 
actions were performed by the flotilla. 

Two torpedoes were seen at least to take effect on enemy vessels 
as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from 
Spitfire (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the 



482 APPENDIX 

other from either Ardent (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), 
Ambuscade (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles), or Garland 
(Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff). 

23. The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Ause- 
lan J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, 
which consisted of six large vessels besides light cruisers, comprised 
vessels of the "Kaiser" class, and were almost completely surjDrised. A 
large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and 
third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she 
■was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later 
by Mcenad (Commander John T. Champion) on the five vessels still 
remaining resulted in the second ship in the line being also hit and 
blown up. 

The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light cruisers on 
reaching the rear of the line, but Onslaught was the only vessel which 
received any material injuries. In Onslaught Sub-lieutenant Harry 
W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the 
only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out 
of action and reached Rosyth. 

24. During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, Castor 
(Commodore John R. P. Hawkesley) leading, the flotilla engaged and 
sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point blank range. 

The 1 3th Flotilla under the command of Captain James U. Farie in 
Champion took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At 
0.30 A.M. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the 
flotilla at high speed. She passed close to the Petard and Turbulent, 
switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire which severely dam- 
aged Petard and disabled Turbulent. At 3.30 a.m. Champion was 
engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. Moresby re- 
ports four ships of "Deutschland" class sighted at 2.35 a.m. at whom 
she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by 
Moresby and Obdurate. 

Abdiel, ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out 
her duties with the success which has always characterised her work. 

There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas ; 
they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of 
them. 

Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light 
Cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for 
about fifteen minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one. 



APPENDIX 483 

enemy cruiser and four light cruisers, during which period Southampton 
and Dublin suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming 
and fighting qmalities were not impaired. It is reasonable to suppose 
that they inflicted considerable damage on their opponents. 

Proceedings on 1st June 

25. At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet being then to the south- 
ward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in 
search of enemy vessels, and for the purpose of collecting our own 
cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir 
Cecil Burney transferred his flag from Marlborough to Revenge, as the 
former ship had some difiiculty in keeping up the speed of the squad- 
ron. Marlborough was detached by my direction to a base, being un- 
successfully attacked en route by enemy submarines. The visibility 
early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and 
difficulty was experienced in meeting all ships, the torpedo-boat de- 
stroyers not rejoining until 9 a.m. The waters from the latitude 
of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched,. 
and some survivors from the destroyers Ardent, Fortune, and Tipper- 
ary were picked up, and the Sparrowharvk, which had been in collision 
and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken 
off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and 
at 1.15 P.M., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded 
in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were 
reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser 
squadron was detached to search for Warrior, which vessel had been 
abandoned whilst in tow of Engadine on her way to the base owing to 
bad weather setting in, and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no 
trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light 
cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she 
foundered. 

26. The fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9-30 
P.M. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action. 

Losses 

27. The conditions of low visibility under which the day action 
took place, the approach of darkness and the tactics adopted by the 
enemy of retiring under cover of torpedo attacks, enhance the diffi- 



484 APPENDIX 

culty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted, or the 
names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful exam- 
ination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy 
vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of 
these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure 
gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not 
entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, particularly 
those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the 
vessels sunk it is unquestionable that many other ships were very 
seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack. 

28. The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of 
him, and showed humanity in rescuing officers and men from the 
water. I particularly admired the conduct of those on board a dis- 
abled German light cruiser which passed down the British line shortly 
after deployment, under a heavy fire which was returned by the only 
gun left in action. But after the arrival of the British Battle Fleet, 
there appeared to be no desire on the part of the High Sea Fleet to 
continue the engagement. The battleships turned away on each occa- 
sion of being sighted soon after fire was opened, and although the 
British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near 
the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in 
spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the 
danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines 
and torpedo craft, the enemy made no sign, and I was reluctantly com- 
pelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. 
Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our 
position must have been known to the enemy, as at 2.50 a.m. the fleet 
engaged a Zeppelin for quite five minutes, during which time she had 
ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and 
course of the British Fleet. 

29- I deeply regret to report the loss of H. M. Ships mentioned 
in this despatch, and still more do I regret the resultant heavj' 
loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as 
Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. 
Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, 
Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles 
J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished 
with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led 
officers and men who were equally gallant and whose death is 



APPENDIX 485 

mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their 
duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire. 



The Personnel of the Fleet 

30. The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night 
actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them 
justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of 
the past were most worthily upheld — whether in heavy ships, cruisers, 
light cruisers, or destroyers — the same admirable spirit prevailed. 
Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that 
would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the 
wounded was the admiration of all. 

I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the 
Fleet filled me. 

31. I have now given details of the work of the various ships 
during action. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude 
to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during 
action the officers and men of that department perform their most 
important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course 
of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and 
endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and they 
were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations 
under review. Many ships attained speeds that had never before been 
reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming ef- 
ficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and 
many instances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the 
engine-room departments of injured ships. 

32. The work of the medical officers of the Fleet, carried out very 
largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and 
invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing 
critical operations and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, 
they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we 
owe a deep debt of gratitude. 

33. It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the 
Battle Cruiser Fleet, the Fifth Battle Squadron, and the flotillas. This 
was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas 
mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were 
handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd, and 4th 
Squadrons of the battle fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. 



486 APPENDIX 

34. In paragraph 3 of this despatch I have named the Command- 
ing Officers of all the ships mentioned above, and I desire to place on 
record my high appreciation of the manner in which all vessels were 
handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and 
ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous 
throughout the day. 

I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by 
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand 
Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton 
Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander 
L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, and Rear-Admiral Ernest 
F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the battle fleet. 
They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney's 
squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy battle 
fleet than the squadrons ahead, and under a leader who has rendered 
me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did 
excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear- 
Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David 
Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear 
of the battle fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening. 

Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant 
leadership, firm determination, and correct strategic insight. He ap- 
preciated the situation at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter 
forces, then his battle cruisers and finally his battle fleet. I can fully 
sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light 
robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred 
and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. 
The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous 
occasions, have been of the very greatest value. 

Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded 
him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner 
in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron 
into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. 
Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work 
performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respec- 
tively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore William 
E. Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He 
states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and 
used their forces to the best possible effect. I most fully endorse all 



APPENDIX 487 

his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report 
regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff: 

"I desire to bring to your notice the great assistance that I re- 
ceived on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the 
Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the 
greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, 
The Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the 
effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the 
enemy's discomfiture; my secretarj', Frank T. Spickernell, who made 
accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost 
value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant- 
Commander Ralph F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communica- 
tions under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that his 
signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these ofiicers 
carried out their duties with great coolness on the manoeuvring plat- 
form, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire." 

35. I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant, 
work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, 
K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of twenty-one months of war 
his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his 
long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity 
for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and 
have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct 
of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet 
action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, 
and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say. 

My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, 
C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also renders me much assistance 
in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is 
largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished 
with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance 
to me during the action. 

Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Com- 
mander Roger M. Bellairs of my staff, plotted the movements of the 
two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Com- 
mander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my staff, acted as ob- 
server aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. 
These officers carried out their duties efficiently during the action. 

The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Com- 
mander Alexander R. W. Wood, assisted hj the other signal officers. 



488 APPENDIX 

and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. 
My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert Fitzherbert, was 
also of much service to me throughout the action. 

The high state of efficiency of the W.T. arrangements of the Fleet 
and the facility with which they were worked before, during, and after 
the action is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out 
by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been in- 
valuable throughout the war. 

A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all 
ships. 

My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and 
Victor H. T. Weekes, recorded with accuracy salient features of the 
action. Their records have been of much assistance. 

To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am in- 
debted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout 
the operations. 

86. In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the ^lotice of 
their Lordships the names of other officers and men who did not come 
under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of 
specially distinguishing themselves. 

I am. Sir, 

Your obedient Servant, 

(Signed) J. R. Jellicoe, 
Admiral, Commander-in-Chief. 



Enclosure in Home Fleets Letter No. 1395, H.F. 0022, dated 
18th June, 1916. 

LIST OF ENEMY VESSELS CONSIDERED TO BE SUNK, 
31st May— 1st June, 1916. 

Battleships or Battle Cruisers. 

2 Battleships, "Dreadnought" type . , 

1 Battleship, "Deutschland" type . {"Certain. 

1 Battleship or Battle Cruiser . . . 

1 Battleship, "Dreadnought" type . jProbable. 

Light Cruisers. 



4 Light Cruisers 

1 Heavy ship or Light Cruiser 



rCertain. 



Torpedo-boat Destroyers. 



6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers 
3 Tornedo-boat Destroyers 



Certain. 
Probable. 



Submarines. 



1 Submarine . 
S Submarines 



Certain. 
Possible. 



Appendix II 



ACTION IN THE NORTH SEA, ON SUNDAY, 
24th JANUARY, 1915 

Admihalty, 

Srd March, 1915. 
The following despatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir 
David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., commanding the First Battle 
Cruiser Squadron, reporting the action in the North Sea on Sunday, 
the 24th of January, 1915: — 

H.M.S. Princess Royal, 

2nd February, 1915. 

Sir, — I have the honour to report that at daybreak on 24th Janu- 
ary, 1915, the following vessels were patrolling in company: 

The Battle Cruisers Lion, Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O., 
flying my flag; Princess Royal, Captain Osmond de B. Brock, Aide- 
de-Camp; Tiger, Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O. ; New Zealand, 
Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp, flying the flag of Rear- 
Admiral Sir Archibald Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O. ; and Indomitable, Cap- 
tain Francis W. Kennedy. 

The Light Cruisers Southampton, flying the broad pendant of 
Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O. ; Nottingham, Captain 
Charles B. Miller; Birmingham, Captain Arthur A. M. Duff; and 
Lowestoft, Captain Theobald W. B. Kennedy, were disposed on my 
port beam. 

Commodore (T) Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., in Arethusa, Aurora, 
Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, Undaunted, Captain Francis G. St. 
John, M.V.O., Arethusa, and the Destroyer Flotillas were ahead. 

At 7.25 A.M. the flash of guns was observed S.S.E. Shortly after- 
wards a report reached me from Aurora that she was engaged with 
490 



APPENDIX 491 

enemy's ships. I immediately altered course to S.S.E., increased to 
22 knots, and ordered the Light Cruisers and Flotillas to chase S.S.E. 
to get in touch and report movements of enemy. 

This order was acted upon with great promptitude; indeed, my 
wishes had already been forestalled by the respective Senior Officers, 
and reports almost immediately followed from Southampton, Arethusa, 
and Aurora as to the position and composition of the enemy, which 
consisted of 3 Battle Cruisers and Bliicher, 6 Light Cruisers, and a 
number of Destroyers, steering N.W. The enemy had altered course 
to S.E. From now onwards the Light Cruisers maintained touch with 
the enemy, and kept me fully informed as to their movements. 

The Battle Cruisers worked up to full speed, steering to the 
southward. The wind at the time was N.E., light, with extreme 
visibility. At 7-30 a.m. the enemy were sighted on the port bow steam- 
ing fast, steering approximately S.E. distant 14 miles. 

Owing to the prompt reports received we had attained our position 
on the quarter of the enemy, and so altered course to S.E. parallel to 
them, and settled down to a long stern chase, gradually increasing our 
speed until we reached 28.5 knots. Great credit is due to the Engi- 
neer Staffs of New Zealand and Indomitable — ^these ships greatly 
exceeded their normal speed. 

At 8.52 A.M., as we had closed to within 20,000 yards of the rear 
ship, the Battle Cruisers manoeuvred to keep on a line of bearing so 
that guns would bear, and Lion fired a single shot, which fell short. 
The enemy at this time were in single line ahead, with Light Cruisers 
ahead and a large number of Destroyers on their starboard beam. 

Single shots were fired at intervals to test the range, and at 9-9 
A.M. Lion made her first hit on the Bliicher, No. 4 in the line. The 
Tiger opened fire at 9.20 a.m. on the rear ship, the Lion shifted to 
No. 3 in the line, at 1 8,000 yards, this ship being hit by several salvoes. 
The enemy returned our fire at 9-14 a.m. Princess Royal, on coming 
into range, opened fire on Bliicher, the range of the leading ship being 
17,500 yards at 9.S5 a.m. New Zealand was within range of Bliicher, 
which had dropped somewhat astern, and opened fire on her. Princess 
Royal shifted to the third ship in the line, inflicting considerable 
damage on her. 

Our flotilla cruisers and destroyers had gradually dropped from a 
position broad on our beam to our port quarter, so as not to foul our 
range with their smoke; but the enemy's destroyers threatening attack, 



492 APPENDIX 

the Meteor and "M" Division passed ahead of us. Captain the Hon. 
H. Meade, D.S.O., handling this Division with conspicuous ability. 

About 9-45 A.M. the situation was as follows : Blucher, the fourth in 
their line, already showed signs of having suffered severely from gun- 
fire; their leading ship and No. S were also on fire. Lion was engag- 
ing No. 1, Princess Royal No. 3, New Zealand No. 4, while the Tiger, 
who was second in our line, fired first at their No. 1, and when inter- 
fered with by smoke, at their No. 4. 

The enemy's destroyers emitted vast columns of smoke to screen 
their battle cruisers, and under cover of this the latter now appeared 
to have altered course to the northward to increase their distance, and 
certainly the rear ships hauled out on the port quarter of their leader, 
thereby increasing their distance from our line. The battle cruisers, 
therefore, were ordered to form a line of bearing N.N.W., and pro- 
ceed at their utmost speed. 

Their destroyers then showed evident signs of an attempt to attack. 
Lion and Tiger opened fire on them, and caused them to retire and re- 
sume their original course. 

The Light Cruisers maintained an excellent position on the port 
quarter of the enemy's line, enabling them to observe, and keep touch, 
or attack any vessel that might fall out of the line. 

At" 10.48 A.M. the Blucher, which had dropped considerably astern 
of enemy's line, hauled out to port, steering north with a heavy list, 
on fire, and apparently in a defeated condition. I consequently 
ordered Indomitable to attack enemy breaking northward. 

At 10.54 A.M. submarines were reported on the starboard bow, and I 
personally observed the wash of a periscope, two points on our star- 
board bow. Immediately turned to port. 

At 11.3 A.M. an injury to the Lion being reported as incapable of 
immediate repair, I directed Lion to shape course N.W. At 11.20 a.m. 
I called the Attack alongside, shifting my flag to her at about 11.35 
A.M. I proceeded at utmost speed to rejoin the Squadron, and met 
them at noon retiring N.N.W. 

I boarded and hoisted my flag in Princess Royal at about 12.20 
P.M., when Captain Brock acquainted me of what had occurred since the 
Lion fell out of the line, namely, that BlUcher had been sunk and that 
the enemy Battle Cruisers had continued their course to the eastward 
in a considerably damaged condition. He also informed me that a 
Zeppelin and a seaplane had endeavoured to drop bombs on the vessels 
which went to the rescue of the survivors of BlUcher. 



APPENDIX 493 

The good seamanship of Lieut.'-Commander Cyril Callaghan, 
H.M.S. Attack, in placing his vessel alongside the Lion and subse- 
quently the Princess Royal, enabled the transfer of flag to be made in 
the shortest possible time. 

At 2 P.M. I closed Lion and received a report that her starboard 
engine was giving trouble owing to priming, and at 3.38 p.m. I ordered 
Indomitable to take her in tow, which was accomplished by 5 p.m. 

The greatest credit is due to the Captains of Indomitable and Lion 
for the seamanlike manner in which the Lion was taken in tow under 
difficult circumstances. 

The excellent steaming of the ships engaged in the operation 
was a conspicuous feature. 

I attach an appendix giving the names of various officers and men 
who specially distinguished themselves. 

Wliere all did well it is difficult to single out Officers and Men for 
special mention, and as Lion and Tiger were the only ships hit by the 
enemy, the majority of these I mentioned belong to those ships. 
I have the honour to be. Sir, 

Your obedient Servant, 

(^Signed) David Beatty, 

Vice- Admiral. 



INDEX 



Abdiel, 289, 373, 433, 466, 484 
Aberdeenshire coast, a U-boat rammed 

and sunk off, 209 
Aboukir, loss of, 15, 37, lOS, 132 
Acacia, 233 
Acasta, 9, 176, 464 

in Jutland battle, 332, 333, 366, 387, 
476 
Achates, 9, 464 
Acheron, 466 
Achilles, 8, 88, 212, 419 
accident on, 163 
sinks a German raider, 276 
Acorn, 9 
Active, 9, 134, 144, 145, 318, 380, 381, 439, 

464, 482 
Admiralty, adopt Scapa Flow as main 
Fleet Base, 15 
Intelligence Division of, 187 
naval policy of, 34, 302 
vigorous mine-laying policy adopted 
by, 249 
Adriatic, battleships withdrawn from, 

303 
Aeroplane attacks 2nd Cruiser Squad- 
ron, 165 
Aeroplanes over the Orkneys, 95 

substituted for seaplanes, 222, 283 
Africa, 8, 266 
Agadir crisis, 91 
Agamemnon, 10 

Agincourt, 108, 162, 241, 308, 318, 463 
in Jutland battle, 367, 360 
joins 4th Battle Squadron, 121 
Aircraft carriers, development of, 72 

in warfare, 70, 153 
Airships as scouts, 37, 450 
Ajax, 8, 93, 98, 107, 135, 152, 241. 290, 

318, 463 
Alarm, 9, 142 

Albemarle, 10, 93, 98, 212, 237, 249, 266 
Alcantara, 272, 273 

sinking of, 273 
Alderson, Captain, 207 
Alexander-Sinclair, Commodore E. S., 

203, 320, 466, 489 
Alison, Lieut.-Commander Roger V., 

466 
Allen, Commander Walter L., 464 
AUsup, Commander Claude P., 464 
Alsatian, 73, 105, 107, 109, 127, 131, 136, 
169 
captures concealed Germans, 138 



Ambuscade, 9, 176, 286, 464 

in Jutland battle, 376, 483 
America enters the War, 303 
American battleships join Grand Fleet, 

303 
Amethyst, 10 
Ammunition, for Army use, 114 

ships, 84 
Amphion, 10 
Amsterdam, 217 
Andes, 272, 273 

rescues German survivors, 274 
Andromache, 11 
Anglia, 104 
Anti-submarine defences, German, 30 

obstructions, 144, 146 

obstructions damaged by gales, 
247, 267 

operations, British, 146, 218 ei seq., 
282 
Antrim, 8, 89, 138, 169, 211, 419, 424 
Apollo, 11 

Arabis, sinking of, 269 
Arbuthnot, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert, 
8, 191, 334, 342, 410, 463. 477 

death of, 336, 410, 487 
Ardent, 9, 483 

in colUsion, 250, 286 

loss of, 376, 386, 485 
Arethusa, 111 

in action, 493, 494 
Argyll, 8, 89, 223 

aground off Scottish coast, 252 
Ariel, 209, 466 

sinks a submarine, 214 
Arlanza, 253, 431 
Arley, 233 

Armour piercing shells, a new type of, 
69, 417 

Committees' investigations on, 69 

limitations of British, 306 
Armour protection, improved, 417 

question of, 394 ei seq., 468 
Arnot, Midshipman R. G., 484 
Asquith, Right Hon. H. H., visits the 

Fleet, 237, 241 
Assistance, 8, 80, 83, 105, 114, 116, 138, 

143, 186, 197 
Atkins, Acting-Lieut. P. S., 239, 240 
Atlantic, Von Spee's squadron in, 24, 157, 

161 
Attack, 466, 496 
Attila, capture of, 108 



495 



496 



INDEX 



Audacious, 8, 135, 149, 150, 151 

loss of, 148 et seq. 
Aurora, 194, 493, 494 
Australia, 24, 203, 204, 210, 290, 
418. 

in collision, 285 
Austrian steamer captured, 108 

Back, Captain Eric, 260 
Backhouse, Captain Oliver, 463 
Backhouse, Commander Roger, 7 
Bacon, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald, 154 
Badger, 467 

rescues survivors, 338, 356, 479 
Baird, Captain George H., 463 
Balfour, Right Hon. A. J., becomes 
First Lord, 453 
offers Admiral Jellicoe post of First 
Sea Lord, 458 
Baltic, the, British submarines in, 434 

proposed operations in, 129 
Barham, 249, 320, 325, 328, 345, 348, 352, 
360, 463, 472, 478 
in collision, 258 
Barron, Commander J. O., 333, 356, 464, 

476 
Bashmakoff, M., 275 
Bate, Lieut.-Commander C. L., 465 
Battle Cruiser Fleet, aircraft attached to, 
71 
Instructions to, 53 
organisation of, 203 
title altered, 204 
Battle Cruiser Fleet's action, 316 et seq. 
Battle Cruiser Squadron, reorganisation 

of, 418 
Battle cruisers, function of, 304 

question of armour, protection of, 
305, 306 
Battle Fleet, composition of, 7 

aircraft provided for, 71 
Battleships, "all-big-gun" type of, 34 
and Battle Cruisers, British and Ger- 
man, 307 et seq. 
Battleships, British and German, 31 

dummy, 171 
Bayano sunk by submarine, 210 
Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis, com- 
mands 1st Battle Squadron, 7, 
85, 149 
discusses question of blocking Zee- 

brugge, 154 
exchange of command, 180, 182 
Beamish, Captain Tufton P. H., 466 
Bear Island, reported enemy base and 

wireless station at, 233 
Beattie, Lieut.-Commander Kenneth A., 

466 
Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, 8, 111, 
177, 178, 203, 285, 322, 466, 477, 494 



Beatty, Vice-Admiral Sir David, and 
Jutland battle, 320, 321, 325, 341, 
345, 369, 440, 442, 468, 480 
despatch on North Sea battle, 493 

ct seq. 
tribute to, 411, 489 
Belgian coast, sweeping the, 170 
Bellairs, Lieut.-Commander R. M., 7, 

359, 490 
BeUerophon, 8, 110, 318, 463 
Bellona, 7, 88, 94, 97, 98, 173, 202, 318, 
442, 463, 482 
in collision, 180 
Benbow, 169, 173, 186, 318, 352, 355, 463 
Bentinck, Captain Rudolf W., 2, 7, 41, 
465 
tribute to, 489 
Beresford, Lord, 35 

Berliner Tageblati, Captain Fersius' ad- 
missions in, 408 
Bernard, Captain V. H. G., 463 
Best, Commander the Hon. Matthew R., 

7, 490 
Betty, Captain, 185 
Biarritz, 292 

Bingham, Commander the Hon. E. B. S., 
324, 463, 470 
awarded V. C, 325 
Bircham, Lieutenant, 77 
Birkenhead, 246, 251, 255, 319, 466 
Birmingham, 8, 88, 178, 182, 203, 223, 
319, 466, 493 
sinks a submarine, 93, 119 
Black Prince, 171, 187, 244, 290, 318, 336, 
380, 463 
uncertainty of her end, 336, 337, 478 
Blackett, Captain Henry, 463 
Blake, Lieut.-Commander C. P., 467 
Blanche, 8, 88, 175, 202, 207, 272, 273, 

318, 463, 482 
Blockade, Ministry of, 76 

work of the Fleet, 73 et seq., 96, 97, 

189 
[see, also. Cruiser Squadron (10th)] 
Block-ships sunk in Scapa Flow en- 
trances, 167 
Blonde, 8, 88, 202, 290 

goes ashore, 433 
BlUcher, 152, 494, 495 a 

sinking of, 195, 197, 496 
Blunt, Captain W. F., 10, 466 
Boadicea, 4, 8, 88, 202, 318, 438, 463, 482 

damaged by hea\y seas, 175 
Boarding steamers, increased force of, 

171 
Bonham, Captain Thomas P., 463, 478 

death of, 487 
Borrett, Captain George H., 463 
Botha, 225, 267, 457 
Boxer campaign, 62, 63 



INDEX 



497 



Boxer, Lieut.-Commander Henry P., 465 
Boyle, Captain the Hon. Algernon D. E. 

H., 406 
Bradford, Viee-Admiral E. E., 8, 48, 108, 
170, 179, 208 
and Dogger Bank action, 196 
Brandenburg, 132 

interned by Norwegian Government, 
133 
Brisk, 9 
Britannia, 8, 199 

aground in Firth of Forth, 198 
British Expeditionary Force, transport 

of, 22, 23, 37 
British Fleet, anxiety for safety of, 28, 

31 
British Navy (see Navy) 
"Broad Fourteens," patrolling the, 37, 

127 132 
Brock, Rear-Admiral O. de B., 203, 319, 

465, 489, 493, 496 
Broke, 180, 293, 375, 387, 464 
Brooke, Lieut.-Commander Edward, 467 
Browning, Rear-Admiral M. E., 8 
Bruen, Captain Edward F., 463 
Bryce, Lord, 2 

BuUen, Lieut.-Commander, 278 
Bulwark, 10 
Burney, Lieutenant Dennis, 60 

clever device by, 61 
Burney, Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil, 10, 16, 
36, 207, 358, 459, 462, 477, 480 
and Heligoland, 129 
and Jutland battle, 319, 342, 343, 362, 

381 
exchange of command, 180, 181 
flagship damaged, 355, 485 
illness of, 182 
joins Grand Fleet, 36 
resumes command of 1st Battle 

Squadron, 185 
tribute to, 410, 488 

Caldaff, mining of, 150 
Callaghan, Admiral Sir George, 55 

gives up the command, 5 

his Ser\ace record, 1 

improvises defences at Scapa, 27 

strikes his flag, 6 
Callaghan, Lieut.-Commander Cyril, 496 
Calliope, 227, 272, 277, 365, 464, 482 
Cambria, 104, 114, 148 
Cameleon, 9 

Cameron. Captain John E., 466 
Campania, 71, 221, 222, 229, 230, 231, 

238, 282, 283, 428, 446 
Campbell, Commander G. W. McC, 465 
Canada, 308, 318, 463 

joins Grand Fleet, 250 
Canadian troops, a convoy for, 134, 136 



Canterbury, 317, 318, 330, 332, 339, 464, 

476 
Cantlie, Lieutenant, 232 
Caribbean, 211, 246 

sinking of, 246 
Carnarvon, 10 
Caroline, 203, 464 
Carpenter, Lieut.-Commander (N.) A. P, 

B., 2 
Carter, Lieut.-Commander Eric Q., 465 
Casement, Captain John M., 463 
Castor, 374, 464 
Cavendish, Lieut.-Commander J. R. C, 

464 
Cay, Captain Arthur L., 337, 338, 463 

death of, 487 
Centurion, 2, 8, 95, 140, 198, 318, 463 
Champion, 319, 329, 378, 463, 472, 484 
Champion, Commander J. P., 377, 465, 

484 
Channel Fleet, 15, 16, 36 

change in command of, 182 
squadrons manned with nucleus crews, 

36 
strengthened, 155 
Chatfield, Captain A. E. M., 465, 493 
Chatham, 443 
Cheerful, 135 

Chester, 317, 318, 330, 339, 415, 441, 464, 
475 
her boy hero. Jack Cornwell, 332, 410 
in action, 330 et seq. 
China, conference of Allied naval oflicers 

in, 63 
Christian, Rear-Admiral, 101, 105 

his command, 105 
Christopher, 9, 236, 245, 331, 332, 464, 476 
Chukovsky, M., 275 
Churchill, Right Hon. Wuiston, 3, 35 
and Heligoland, 128 
and position of Commander-in-Chief, 

3 
attends conference at Loch Ewe, 127 
interview with Sir J. Jellicoe, 3 

City 'of Oxford, 171 
Clan McNaughton, loss of, 205 
Cleopatra, 279, 433 
Clinton-Baker, Captain Lewis, 462 
Coaling the Fleet, 83, 92, 104, 108, 109 
Coal strike, a Welsh, 229, 230, 235 
Coast hghts, extinction of, 121, 136 
Coast to^s, enemy bombardment of, 25, 

287, 456 
Cobbe, Captain M. H., 11 
Cochrane, 8, 88, 318, 419, 463 
Cockatrice, 9, 173 

Cole, Commander John P. H., 242 
Coles, Lieut.-Commander G. A„ 376, 464, 



498 



INDEX 



Colliers at the Fleet Base, 83 

insufficient number of, 84, 92, 98 
CoUingwood, 7, 319, 3U1, 402 
Colossus, 7, 38 (nolc), CO, 318 319 

and battle of Jutland, 351, 353, 357, 
360, 381, 462, 481 
Columbclla, 233, 272 
Colville, Commander Hugh D., 464 
Colvillc, Vice-Admiral Sir Stanley, 81, 
82, 122, 143, 159, 1G6, 231, 234, 243 
assumes temporary command of 1st 
Battle Squadron, 182 
Comet, 9, 107, 217 
Commonwealth, 8, 186, 199 
Comus, 272, 273, 277, 278, 342, 426, 464 
Conqueror, 8, 31 {note), 152, 184, 193, 199, 

318, 463 
Conqueror II. torpedoed, 446 
Constance, 426, 432, 464 
Contest, 9, 464 
Cordelia, 203, 319, 320, 466 
Corlett, Lieut.-Commander GeofTrey, 466 
Comwallis, 10 
Comwell, Jack, of Chester, heroism of, 

332, 410 
Cowan, Captain Walter H., 465 
Crabbe, Commander L. G. E., 464 
Craig, Captain Arthur W., 466 
Crescent, 11, 205, 255, 277 
Cressy, loss of, 15, 37, 105 
Cromarty, a fleet practice base at, 64, 65 
a floating dock transferred to, 79, 80, 

106, 122 
and submarine menace, 64 
Naval Base at, 28 
Rear-Admiral Pears in charge of Base 

at, 97 
rendered secure from submarine at- 
tacks, 77, 146 
Crooke, Captain H. Ralph, 464 
Cruiser Squadron (3rd), disbandment of, 

245 
Cruiser Squadron (6th), broken up, 210 
Cruiser Squadron (lOth) augmented, 
181 
blockade work of, 73, 158, 193, 201, 
205, 214, 220, 228, 233, 243, 247, 
253, 257, 261, 268, 275, 281, 288, 
294, 427, 431, 444, 448, 452, 458 
paid off, 163 

patrol areas of, 96, 98, 103, 137, 145, 
181, 192, 206, 213, 272, 283 
Cruiser Squadrons, reorganisation of, 

418, 419 
Culme-Seymour, Captain Michael, 463 
Cumherland, 198 

Currey, Rear-Admiral Bernard, 10 
Curtis, Commander Berwick, 373,465,484 
Cuxhaven, enemy battleships at, 97 
Cycloys. 7, 80, 83, 98, 117, 143 



D'Aeth, Captain An-rnun C. S. H., 463 
Dahlia strikes a mine, 245 
Dampier, Captain, 149 
Danchcnko, M., 275 
Dannreuther, Commander, 337 
Dardanelles operations, kite balloons 

in, 71 
"Dark night" patrols, 261, 264, 432 
Dartmouth, 185 
Day, Commander Selwyn, 276 
De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley, 11, 73, 

90, 169 
Decoy ships (Q-ships), 262 
Defence, 191, 318, 334, 335, 337, 339, 340, 
463 
loss of, 306, 336, 477 
Defender, 340, 387, 467, 474 
Derfflinyer, 197, 357, 437, 474 
Destroyer Flotilla (15th), formation of, 

447 
Destroyer flotillas, 9, 118 
detailed orders for, 52 
fine work in Jutland battle, 378 
Destroyers, Battle Orders for, 52, 54 
German, 29, 50, 62 
German superiority in number of, 

396-7 
German p. British, 29 
importance attached by Germany to 

attack by, 393 
in action, 176, 323-5, 339, 340 
inadequate number of British, 17, 18, 

29, 175, 179, 200, 201, 397 
m collision, 245, 246, 280, 286 
used for mine-sweeping, 244 
welcome additions to force of, 204 
work of, 215 
Devonshire, 8, 90, 135, 180, 282, 419, 424 
Dick, Captain James D., 463 
Digby, 233 

Director-firing, system of, 66 
Displacement, question of, 307 
Dobson, Lieut.-Commander, 232 
Dock accommodation, absence of, 315, 
316 
the Kaiser's comments on, 315 
Dockyard men, fine work by, 129, 417 
Dogger Bank action, 187 et seq. 

Admiral Beatty's despatch on, 493 

et seq. 
battle cruiser fleet, composition of, 

203 
battle fleet engaged in, 199 
(See also North Sea Battle) 
Dominion, 8, 108, 119, 217 
Donaldson. Sir F., 421 
Donegal, 198, 255, 256, 290, 292, 419, 

424, 458 
Doughty, Captain Henry M., 463 
Dover, Straits of, mining the, 249 



INDEX 



499 



Drake, 10, 96, 97, 98, 103, 106, 108, 116, 

131, VM, 159, 104. 198 
Dreadnought, 8, 3i, 93, 207, 208, 290, 308 

ruins a submarine, 207 
Dreadnought Squadron, captains of, in 

eonferonce, 114 
Drcycr, Captain, 7 (note), 342, 416, 417, 

402, 481 
tribute to, 416, 481 
Dryad, 160 
Dublin, 319, 362, 375, 384, 436, 442, 466, 

485 
Duff, Captain A. A. M., 93, 466, 493 
Duff, Rcar-Admiral A. L., 60, 61, 62, 169, 

318, 4C3, 477, 488 
tribute to, 488 
Dnkc of Albany, 223, 433 
Duke of Clarence, 270, 433 
Duh-e of Cornwall, 430 
Duke of Edinburgh, 171, 318, 336, 368, 

419, 463, 482 
Dumarcsq, Captain John S., 463 
Duncan, 10 
Duncombe, 262 

Dundas, Commander Harold V., 464 
Dundee, 270, 276, 432, 433 
Dunnet Bay, a German mine ashore 

at, 266 
Dutton, Captain Arthur B. S., 463 

East Coast, bombardment of un- 
defended towns on, 25 

raids on, 156 
Ebro, 267 
Edgar, 11, 141 

Edinburgh, Zeppelin attack on, 282 
Edwards, Captain John D., 466 
Elbing, 374 

Ellershaw, Brigadier-General, 421 
Ellis, Captain Stanley V., 463, 477 

death of, 487 
Emperor of India, 169, 173, 186 
Ems sunk by submarine, 426 
Endymion, 11 
Engadine, 71, 289, 320, 321, 386, 467, 469, 

472, 485 
England, possibility of invasion of, 23, 
456 

raids on south-east coast of, 287 
English Channel, destroyers in, 455 
Erin, 129, 152, 308, 318, 463 
Erne, wreck of, 205 
Esbjerg, enemy sighted from, 131 
Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral H., 7, 320, 
460 

and Jutland battle, 326, 345, 349, 363, 
369, 410, 467, 472, 476, 478 

new command for, 243 

tribute to, 488, 489 
Everett, Commodore A. F., 7, 219 



Exmouth, 10, 93, 135, 148, 150 

Eyre, Lieut.-Commander Ralph V., 465 

Falkland Islands battle, 24, 157, 161, 

204, 205 

Falmouth, 10, 16, 88, 94, 95, 97, 98, 104, 

115, 134, 185,319,338,466 

and Jutland battle, 306, 441, 476, 479 

sinliing of, 441 [484 

Farie, Captain (D.) James U., 378, 466, 

Faroe Islands, a search for enemy bases 

in, 90, 97 
Farrington, Captain, 262 
Faulknor, 208, 377, 457, 465 
Faviell, Lieut.-Commander Douglas, 465 
Fawckner, Rcar-Admiral W. B., 228 
Fearless, 10, 111, 132, 204, 245, 319, 449, 
460 
and Jutland battle, 328, 378, 381, 472, 
473 
Fergusson, Captain James A., 463 
Field, Captain Frederick L., 463 
Filleul, C, awarded D. S. M., 334 
Fire control instruments, 68 
Fire correction methods, improved, 417 
Firedrake, 112 

Fisher, Captain William W., 463 
Fisher, Lieut.-Commander Leslie, 242 
Fisher, Lord, becomes First Sea Lord, 
34, 155 
destroyer programme of, 408 
energy as First Sea Lord, 187 
improvements in Fleet organisation 

by, 35 
Mr. Schwab's visit to, 151 
naval policy of, 34 
supports Director System, 67 
Fishermen's bladders as "floating mines," 

126 
Fishing areas, question of restriction 

of, 121, 136 
Fishing vessels attacked by submarines, 

228 
FitzGerald, Colonel, 421 
Fitzherbert, Lieut.-Commander Herbert, 

2,490 
Flamborough Head, enemy mines off, 110 
Fleet, the, a vital factor to existence of 
the Empire, 308 
concentration of, at outbreak of 'War, 

38 
disposition of, 15 
(See also Grand Fleet, Navy) 
Fletcher, Lieut.-Commander H. U., 465 
Floating storage, advantages of, 84 
Flotta, Island of, 81 
Flying Condor, 148 
Food question, the, 453 
Forbes, Commander Charles M., 7 (note), 
490 



500 



INDEX 



Formidable, 10 

Forth, Firth of, obstructions against 
submarines in, 78 

submarine activity in, 186 
Fortune, 9, 267, 464, 485 

in collision, i50 

loss of, 376 
Forward, 9 
Poula Islands, 105 
Fox, Captain C. H., 10 
Frauenlob, loss of, 375 
Fremantle, Commander G. A., 467 
Fremantle, Rear-Admiral S., 254 
Fury, 9, 150, 233 

Galatea, 203, 290, 319, 430, 466 

and Jutland battle, 319, 436, 443, 468, 
469 
Gamble, Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas, 8, 

205 
Garland, 9, 286, 376, 464, 483 
Garry engages a submarine, 169 
Gaunt, Rear-Admiral E. F. A., 61, 319, 
462, 477, 488 
relieves Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, 

243 
tribute to, 488 
General Cruiser Instructions, the, 53 
Gentian, 293 

George V., King, messages to the Fleet, 
89, 234, 288 
visits the Fleet, 204, 234, 426 
German account of Jutland battle, 363 
bombardment of East Coast, 25 
breach of international law, 18 
disguised raiders, 273, 274 
fleet {see High Sea Fleet) 
gunnery, efficiency of, 348 
merchant steamer intercepted and 

sunk, 291 
mines and submarines, 221 et seq. 

(and passim) 
submarine menace, 13, 16, 28, 37, 100, 
113, 115 et seq. 
German Bight, British submarine lays 

mines in, 426 
Germans fire on British rescuers, 112 
proclaim British waters unsafe for 

shipping, 201 
rescue British crews, 325, 486 
thoroughness of defences of their 
naval bases, 30 
Germany, destroyer force of, 392, 396, 
397 
mutinies in Navy of, 39 
naval strength of, in early days of 
War, 32, 33 
Ghourko, 86 
Gibraltar, 11 
Glen Isla, 262 



Glossop, Lieutenant Francis G., 467 

Glomedcr, 185, 203, 290, 320, 466 

GofI, Lieut.-Commander R. S., 376, 464, 

483 
Goldfinch, 9 

loss of, 205 
Goldsmith, Commander Malcolm L., 

467 
Goodenough, Commodore W. E., 8, 95, 
112, 194, 203, 320, 326, 341, 344. 
466, 489, 493 
and Dogger Bank battle, 195 
engages the enemy, 178 
Good Hope, 10 
loss of, 307 
Gorleston, hostile battle cruisers sighted 

at, 157 
Goshawk, 467 
Gossamer, 9 
Gough-Calthorpe, Rear-Admiral the Hon. 

S., 8 
Grafton, 11 

Graham, Lieut.-Commander E. S., 467 
Grand Fleet, a series of misfortunes, 152 
a watching policy decided upon, 14 
all-round improvement in fighting 

efficiency of, 70 
and its bases, 26, 28, 34 et seq., 76 

et seq., 144 
arrival of additional seamen ratings 

for, 109 
at end of November, 1914, 168 
at end of 1914, 185 
attempts to entice enemy to action, 

264 et seq. 
bases: conditions for leaving and re- 
turning to, 295 et seq. 
battle exercises, 258 
Battle Orders, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408 
battle tactics exercises, 47 
blockade work [see Blockade, Cruiser 

Squadron (10th)] 
compared with High Sea Fleet, 31 
composition of, 7 et seq. 
condenser and boiler troubles of, 103, 
108, 121, 129, 139, 152, 156, 159, 
167, 172, 174, 185, 187, 190 
constitution of, in May, 1916, and a 

parallel, 300 et seq. 
countering retiring battle tactics, 50 
cruising formation and deployment, 

47, 271 
destroj'er force of, 396 
development of, 36 
disposition and movements of, after 

declaration of war, 90 et seq. 
efiSciency of engine-room departments 

of, 140, 387 
Fleet movements: a month's work, 
216 



INDEX 



501 



Grand Fleet, gunnery practice of, 64 et 
seq. 

inception of, 34 

kite balloons provided for, 71, 72 

lectures, system of, 86 

measures against invasion and raids, 
23, 24 

messages frona the King to, 89, 234, 
388 

naval instruction and education prob- 
lem, 188 

new Submarine Flotilla, 447 

peace and war conditions compared, 
65 

personnel and welfare of, 85 et seq., 
410, 487 

pre-Dreadnought Squadron of, 47, 48 

Sroblem of tactics in Fleet actions, 391 
Loyal visits to, 204, 233, 426 
Russian gentlemen's visit to, 275 
sea-plane reconnaissances of, 221 
ships fitted with Director-firing sys- 
tem, 67 
signalling by, and why reduced, 66 

et seq. 
spirit of comradeship in, 87 
sports, 86 

submarines attached to, 303 
tables showing armament, protection 
and displacement of capital ships 
in, 308-310 
the Staff Organisation, 39 et seq. 
training of, 55 et seq. 
work of medical officers, 488 
Grant, Captain E. P. F. G., 462 
Grant, Rear-Admiral W. L., 10, 96, 97 
in command of 3rd Cruiser Squadron, 
210 
Great War, declaration of, 88 

first reports of enemy movements, 90 
naval strategy in home waters, 12 

et seq. 
opening of, 1 et seq. 
Green, Captain J. F. E., 466 
Greene, W. Graham, 414 
Grief, 274 

Griffin, W. C. R., a D. S. M. for, 334 
Grubb, Lieut.-Commander Reginald W., 

465 
Gun power, question of, 306 
Gun, range of, 38 (and note) 
Gunfire, correction of, 68 
Gunnery efficiency : a new departure, 235 
work of German High Sea Fleet, 62, 64 
Gye, Lieut.-Commander Alex. H., 467 

Haddock, Commodore, 149, 171, 172 
Haldane, Lord, 2 

Halsey, Commodore Lionel, 7 (note), 
219, 411 



Uambvrg, 374 

Hamilton, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick, 

becomes Second Sea Lord, 3 
Hamond, Commander Robert G., 464 
Hampshire, 198, 230, 257, 259, 420, 463 

Kitchener and staff sail for Archangel 
in, 421 

strikes a mine and sinks, 422 

survivors of, 422 
Hannibal, 93, 95, 205 
Hardman-Jones, Lieut.-Commander E., 2 
Hardy, 9, 176, 464 

Harris, Licut.-Colonel Gerald N. A., 82 
Harrison, Lieut.-Commander G. C. 465 
Harrison, Lieut.-Commander Julian, 464 
Hartford, Lieut.-Commander G. B., 465 
Harwich, mined areas near, 110 
Harwich Force, 9, 385 

provided with aircraft, 71 
Hawk sinks a submarine, 225 
Hawke, 11 

loss of, 21, 141 
Hawkslcy, Commodore J. R. P., 9, 374, 

384 463 477 482 
Heath, Rear-Admiral H. L., 334, 367, 368, 

463, 477, 482 
Heaton-Ellis, Captain E. H. F., 464 
Heligoland, a comprehensive mining; 
policy urged, 248 

fortifications of, 128 

proposals for bombardment and cap- 
ture of, 128 
HeHgoland Bight, British submarines fol- 
lowed by German trawlers, 105 

dispositions for sweeping, 123 

enemy light forces in action. 111 

mining policy in, 248, 249, 264 

projected operations in, 109 
Hercules, 7, 281, 318, 360, 462 
Hibernia, 8, 127, 264 
High Sea Fleet, a comparison with Grand 
Fleet, 31, 302 

changes in commands of, 200 

defensive role of, 39 

destroyer force of, 396 

efficiency of, ix, 62, 63 

position of, in Jutland battle, 341 

probable tactics of, correctly antic- 
ipated, 401 

superiority of protection in, 307 

surrender of, ix, 39, 70 

tables showing armament, protection 
and displacement of, 308-310 

under repair, 428 
Hindustan, 8 
Hobart, Lieut.-Commander F. E. H. 

G., 467 
Hodgson, Commander John C, 467 
Hague, sinking of, 15, 37, 105, 132 
Hollyhock, 236, 242 



502 



INDEX 



Holtzendorff, Admiral von, C3 

Homan. Lieut.-Commandcr Edwin A., 

465 
Hood, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace, 

219, 327, 330, 332, 337, 410, 4G3, 

474, 475, 489 
goes down with Invincible, 338, 487 
Hope, 9, 184 

Hope, C. C, awarded D. S. M., 334 
Hopkins, Lieut.-Commander Sydney, 464 
Hotham, Captain Alan G., 273, 342, 464 
Howell, T. O. G., awarded D. S. M., 334 
Hudson, Lieut.-Commander H. V., 465 
Hutchinson, Commander Reginald B. C, 

464 
Hydra, 467 

Illustrious, 114, 146, 157 
litis and her commander, 63 
ImpSrievse, 83 
Implacable, 10 
Inconstant, 203, 319, 466 
Indefatigable, 203, 204, 466 

loss of, 306, 323, 326, 370 
India torpedoed and sunk, 241 
Indomitable, 24, 191, 199, 203, 330, 332, 
338, 418, 464, 476, 480, 493, 494, 
495, 496 
and Jutland battle, 330, 332, 338 
joins Grand Fleet, 183 
takes Lion in tow, 196 
Inflexible, 24, 119, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 
136, 157, 203, 228, 330, 418, 442, 464 
and Jutland battle, 332, 338, 339, 475 
joins the Fleet, 228 
mined in Dardanelles, 314 
loss of, 306 
Ingenohl, Admiral von, 63, 200 
International law, German disregard of, 

18 
Intrepid, 11 

Invergordon as repairing base, 80 
exercise and recreation at, 200 
floating docks at, 79, 80, 448 
Invincible, 24, 105, 125, 126, 127, 134, 135, 
136, 157, 191, 203, 204, 213, 219, 
290, 330, 332, 463 
loss of, 306, 337-338, 475 
survivors rescued by Badger, 356 
Iphigenia. 11 
Irish mail packets as armed boarding 

steamers, 171 
Irish Sea, submarine activity in, 198, 209 
Iron Duke, 5, 6, 7, 88, 94, 96, 98, 100, 
101, 106, 108, 122, 132, 143, 144, 
146, 152, 164, 168, 174, 187, 194, 
197, 212, 219, 220, 267, 317, 318, 
345, 357, 373, 462, 479 
• Confirmation by Archbishop of York 
on, 228 



Iron Duke, disconcerting discovery on, 139 
in action, 349, 352, 353, 357, 481 
refitting at Invergordon, 200, 252 
Staff of, 39 et seq. 
the King's speech to Fleet, 426, 427 

Irresistible, 10 

Irvin, Commander (Acting) W. D., 465 

Italy enters Great War, 219 

Jackson, Admiral Sir Henrt, 78, 460 
and the submarine menace, 454 
becomes First Sea Lord, 219, 249 
James, Lieut.-Commander C. H. N., 466 
Jason, 9 
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir J. R. (Viscount 

Jcllicoe of Scapa), 318, 462 
accepts command of Home Fleets, 1 
and Kaiser's criticism of dock ac- 
commodation, 315 
and raids on unfortified towns, 287, 

288 
and the value of aircraft in war, 450 
appointed Commander-in-Chief of 

Grand Fleet, 5 
as First Sea Lord, 417, 459 
Battle Orders of, 49, 88, 401, 406, 408 
bids farewell to Fleet, 460 
Birthday message to the King, 388 
confers with Admiral Sir Henry 

Jackson, 219 
confers with Premier and Chancellor 

of Exchequer, 241 
despatches on Jutland battle, 304, 

388, 462 
embarrassing interview with Sir G. 

Callaghan, 4 
entertains Lord Kitchener, 419 
extensive mining policy of, 249 
memorandum to Fleet from, 412, 460 
objections to change of Command, 3, 4 
proposals for handling Fleet in action 

approved by Admiralty, 302 
proposes blocking of Zeebrugge, 154 
reorganises his Staff, 39 et seq. 
selects his Staff, 2 

suggested scheme of submarine ob- 
structions by, 78 
tribute to personnel of Fleet, 410, 411, 

487 
visits the Admiraltj', 453 
wounded in China, 63 
Jerram, Vice- Admiral Sir Thomas H. 

Martyn, 316, 318, 367, 410, 463, 

477, 482 
relieves Admiral Warrender, 261 
tribute to, 488 
Jones, Commander Loftus W., 464, 476 
gallantry of, 333 
posthumous award of V. C. to, 332, 

333 



INDEX 



503 



Jutlund, Battle of, 304 et seg. 

Admiral Jcllicoe's memorandum to 
Fleet, 412 

area covered by different engage- 
ments, 381 

battle cruiser fleet's action, 310 et 
seq., 479 

battle fleet in action, 341 et seq., 474, 
480 

battle opens, 322 

despatches on, 304, 388, 462 

Director System in use at, 67 

disposition of Fleet, 318 et seq. 

enemy losses, 486, 492 

enemy sighted, 320, 342, 374 

German version of, 363, 408, 409 

Grand Fleet congratulated by Ad- 
miralty, 414 

inferiority of British armour-piercing 
shell in, 69 

night attacks by flotillas, 483 

night dispositions, 483 

proceedings on 1st June, 485 

reflections on, 390 et seq. 

repairing and altering ships damaged 
in, 415 

results of, 409 

retiring tactics of enemy, 362, 407, 408 

the night action, 370 et seq. 

Kaiser, 310 

Kemmis, Sub-Lieutenant H. W. A., 484 

Kempeiijdl, 265, 266, 464 

Kennedy, Captain Francis W., 464, 493 

Kennedy, Captain Theobald W. B., 493 

Kerr, Lieut.-Commander Fairfax M., 

464, 476 
Keyes, Commodore, 105, 196 
rescues enemy crews, 112 
Kiddle, Captain E. B., 462 
Kiel, 2nd Battle Squadron's visit to, 91 
Kiel Bay, gunnery exercises in, 64 
Kildonan Castle, 452 
King, Lieut.-Commander Philip W. S., 

467 
Ki7ig Alfred, 10, 106, 109, 159 
King Edward VII., 8, 107, 108, 119 

mined and sunk, 264, 205 
King George I'., 8, 167, 168, 173, 185, 190, 

318, 463 
and battle of Jutland, 345, 354, 357, 

368 
King Orry, 246, 432 

King Stephen sights sinking Zeppelin, 269 
Kitchener, F.-M. Lord, 2, 3 
at Scapa, 419 
death of, 422 
sails on Hampshire, 421 
Kite Balloon Section, Roehampton, 72 
Kite balloons, 71, 283 



Knorr, Korvetten-Kapitan von, 240 

Koningen Luiic, 99 

Krislianiafiord intercepted by Teutonic, 

255 
Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 90 
Kullen, the, a German merchant-steamer 

sunk ofl', 291 

Lamlash, as pre-War practice base, 147 

Lrncaster, 210 

Landrail, 467, 470 

Lans, Vice-Admiral von, 63 

Lapwing, 467 

Lame, 9 

Lassoo, 278 

sinking of, 433 
Latona, 11 
Laurel, 467, 471 
Laverock, 27 

Lawrence, Commander, 457 
Lawrie, Lieut.-Commander E. McC. W., 

464 
Lawson, Captain R. N., 7, 331, 464, 475 
Leake, Captain F. M., 276 
Leatham, Captain Eustace La T., 463 
Lecky, Lieut.-Commander A. M., 464 
Leda, 9, 143 
Legge, Lieut.-Commander Montague C. 

B., 466 
Leggett, Captain Oliver E., 491 
Leith, Zeppelin attack on, 282 
Le Mesurier, Commodore, 227, 268, 361, 

365, 464, 482 
Lerwick, coaling base at, 105 
Leveson, Rear-Admiral A. C, 60, 61, 62, 
191, 318, 463, 477, 488 
tribute to, 488 
Leviathan, 10, 159, 169, 171, 191, 198, 210 
Ley, Captain J. C, 462 
Liberty, 467 

Light Cruiser Squadrons, new, 184, 226 

Light Cruisers, British deficiency of, 396 

Lilac strikes a mine, 242 

Lion, 8, 24, 195, 196, 197, 199, 203, 204, 

213, 242, 245, 250, 254, 319, 320, 

321, 322, 323, 327, 329, 418, 442, 

443, 446, 465, 472, 474, 475, 480. 

493 494 495 496 

and Jutland battle, 322, 323, 329, 480, 

495 
taken in tow by Indomitable, 496 
Liverpool, 10, 16, 88, 94, 97, 98, 104, 
113, 138, 148, 150, 165, 168, 174, 
200, 203, 228, 251, 255 
Lizard, 467 

Loch Ewe, a conference at, 128 
as coaling base, 96 
submarine activity at, 138 
Loch-na-Keal, base at, 144 
base abandoned, 57 



504 



INDEX 



Loch-na-Keal, improvised obstructions 

at, 77 
London, 10 

"Long Forties," the, 275 
Long Hope, anchorage at, 81 
Lord Nelson, 10 

Lough Swilly, anti-submarine obstruc- 
tions at, 146 

base at, 144 

Battle Squadrons at, 146 

diversion at, 147 

improvised obstructions at, 77, 146 
Louise (Danish steamer), 263 
Lowestoft, 8, 90, 203, 493 
Lowestoft, enemy bombardment of, 286 
Lowry, Admiral Sir Robert, 77, 208, 219 
Lucia, 447 
Lutzow, 310 (note), 357 

loss of, 314, 408 
Lyddite shell, suspected, 163 
Lydiard, 467, 470 
Lynx, 9, 176 

sunk by a mine, 238 
Lyon, Lieut.-Commander H. I. N., 465 
Lyra, 9 

Maclachlan, Captain, 265, 266, 463 

Madden, Rear-Admiral Charles E., 7, 
40, 128, 411, 459, 490 

Mwnad, 376, 377, 465, 484 

Maf eking, 232 

Magic, 274, 353, 374, 464 

Magnificent, 93, 95, 205 

Mahan, Admiral, vii, 12, 302 

Mainz disabled in action. 111 
her survivors rescued, 112 

Majestic, 136 

Makin, Lieut.-Commander Robert, 464 

Malaya, 270, 328, 362, 380, 466, 468 

Manchester Commerce, sinking of, 150 

Mandate, 250, 464 

Manners, 465 

Mantua, 73, 109, 127, 131, 135 

Marksman, 383, 465 

Mark-Wardlaw, Lieutenant W. P., 263 

Marlborough, 7, 180, 181, 207, 318, 319, 

343, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 351, 

354, 358, 376, 381, 382, 386, 415, 

434, 462, 477, 480, 481, 485 

in action at Jutland battle, 351, 354, 

358 
torpedoed, 316, 355 

Marne, 266, 353, 374, 466 

Marsden, Lieut.-Commander, 376, 464, 
483 

Martial, 464 

Martin, 9 

Marvel, 362, 465 

Mary Rose, 465 

Master, Lieut.-Commander E. G. H., 464 



Matchless strikes a mine, 255 
McKcnna, Mr., as First Lord, 35 

visits the Fleet, 237, 241 
McPherson, 2nd-Lieutenant, 421 
Meade, Captain the Hon. Herbert, 464, 

495 
Mediterranean, ships in the, 300 
Medusa rammed and sunk, 278 
Melita, 265 
Menace, 405 

Menelaus (kite balloon ship), 71 
Merchant-ships attacked by submarines, 
237, 241 

camouflaged, 171 

commissioned for blockade work, 73 

convoying, 46, 433 

instructions for safety of, 47 

serious loss of, 201, 210 

squadron disbanded, 172 

submarine peril to, 446 et seq. 
Meteor, 495 

damaged in Dogger Bank battle, 197 
Meteor (German mine-layer) abandoned 
and sunk, 239 

number of mines laid by, 247 
Michael, 280, 265 
Michigan, 171 
Midge, 9, 237, 464 
Milford Haven, Marquis of, 3, 391 

succeeded by Lord Fisher, 155 
Millbrook, 465 

Miller, Captain Charles B., 436, 466, 493 
Miller, Rear-Admiral Francis S., 80, 81, 

95, 117, 122 
Minches, the, submarines reported in, 145 
Mindful, 362, 465 

"Mine Bumping Squadron," the, 100 
Minelayer Squadron, 11 
Mine-layers, increased activity of British, 
248 

Instructions to, 54 
Mines, British, defective pattern of, 248 

experiments to counter, 60 

German, 18, 38, 96, 99, 113, 120, 150, 
192, 214, 221 et seq. 

success of new type of, 249 

the Northern Barrage, 249 
Minesweepers, 9, 19, 60, 118, 202, 223, 266 

chase submarine, 161 

in collision, 218 

inadequacy of force of, 19, 170 

maximum speed of, 19 

withdrawn for service abroad, 209, 434 
Mine-sweeping force strengthened, 434 
Mine-sweeping trawler rams submarine, 

165 
Minion, 464 

Ministry of Blockade, establishment of, 76 
Minotaur, 198, 257, 272, 318, 334, 367, 
419, 438, 463 



INDEX 



505 



Minstrel, 9 

Mischief, 406 

Mocatla, Lieutenant Jack E. A., 466 

Moewe lays extensive minefield off 

Scottish coast, 265 
Moir, Commander Dashwood F., 467 
Molteno, Captain, 335, 463, 477 
Moltke, 310 
Monarch, 8, 31 (note), 93, 148, 184, 193, 

310, 318, 463 
Monitors, work of, on Belgian coast, 128 
Monmouth, loss of, 306 
Mons, 464 
Moon, 405 

Moore, Rear-Admiral Sir Gordon, 169, 
171, 191, 493 

and Dogger Bank battle, 193 

succeeded by Rear-Admiral Paken- 
ham, 210 
Moorsom, 324, 325, 467, 470 
Moray Firth, a submarine hunt in, 209 

gunnery practice in, 65 
Moresby, 329, 379, 466, 472, 474 
Morley, Lord, dinner party at United 

Services Club, 2 
Morning Star, 259, 353, 465 
Morris, 324, 467, 470 
Morton, Lieutenant, 232 
Movnsey, 465 

Muckle Skerry, surrender of U 18 at, 166 
Munro, Captain Donald S., 127 

devises system of submarine ob- 
struction, 77, 146 
Munster, 465 

rescues crew of Alcantara, 273 
Musketeer, 266, 431 
Mystic, 464 

Nabakofp, Vladimik, 276 
Naiad, 11 

Napier, Rear-Admiral Trevylyan, 186, 
203, 338, 383, 466, 476, 489 

engages a Zeppelin, 382 
Napoleonic wars, work of the Navy in, 13 
Narborough, 324, 366, 370 
Narvik, iron ore trade of, 276, 292 
Narwhal, 465 
Natal, 8, 88, 199 

blown up in Cromarty harbour, 260 

court-martial on loss of, 260 
Naval instructors, reduced number of, 189 
Naval manoeuvres of 1912, 392 
Naval policy, in peace conditions, ix. 
Naval situation in May, 1916, 300 et seq. 
Navigation lights, extinction of, 121, 136 
Navy Acts, German, 35 
Navy League, the, formation of, 12 
Navy, the, a lesson for the future, 33 

composition of, at opening of Great 
War, 7 et seq. 



Navy, the, disposition of, in early days 
of Great War, 19 et seq. 
grief of, at Kitchener's fate, 424 
partition of, 36 
use and purpose of, 12 
Naylor, Lieutenant Charles G., 465 
Negro, 441 
Nemesis, 9, 206, 217 
Neptune, 7, 108, 207, 211, 318. 360, 462 

in collision, 286 
Ncrissa, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471 
Nessus, 266, 465 
Nestor, 323, 324, 466, 470, 471 
Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, 

75 
New Zealand, 8, 24, 101, 105, 126, 152, 
169, 191, 203, 285, 290, 319, 339, 
418, 466, 493, 494 
and Jutland battle, 480 
and North Sea action, 495 
Nicator, 324, 325, 466, 470, 471 
Nicholson, Captain William C. M., 463 
Nicholson, Captain Wilmot S., 493 
Nicholson, Lieut.-Commander R. L., 2, 
491 
organises wireless school, 188 
signalling system of, 58 
tribute to, 59, 491 
Nicholson, Rear-Admiral Stuart, 10 
Noble, 465 

Nomad, 323, 324, 466, 470 
Nonsuch, 356, 387, 465 
North American Squadron joined by 

Princess Royal, 161 
North east coast, Zeppelins on, 290 
North Rona Island, a reported enemy 

base on, 107 
North Sea, area of, 14 

controlling the, 249 ei seq. 

cruiser patrol areas in, 20 

drifting German mines in, 199 

Fleet in, 15 

northern and central areas of, 102, 

103 
proclaimed a dangerous area, 157 
reported mooring of oil drums in, 208 
submarine and mine menace in, 17, 

96, 116 et seq., 209 et passim 
sweeps, 15, 88-9, 99, 116 et seq., 127, 
158, 163, 171, 175, 194, 201 et seq., 
211, 217, 219, 221, 223, 241, 246, 
249 et seq., 264, 267 et seq., 435, 445 
et seq., 462 et seq. 
the Northern Barrage mine-field, 
249 
North Sea battle, 187 et seq. 

Admiral Beatty's despatch on, 493 
(c/. Dogger Bank) 
Norway, German Fleet's peace-time 
visits to, 91 



506 



INDEX 



Norwegian coast, British patrol of, 193 

British submarines' operations against 
enemy on, 258 

reported German bases on, 91, 95, 107 

steamers sunk, 449 

sweeping, 277, 429, 432 
Nottingliam, 8, 88, 134, 203, 223, 224, 319, 
435, 4G6, 470, 493 

torpedoed and sunk, 437 
Nugent, Captain R. A., 254 
Nymphe, 9 

in collision, 206 

rams a submarine, 142 

Oak, 7, 90, 113, 233, 355, 419, 465 

King George V. on, 426 
Obdurate, 325, 466, 470, 485 
Obedient, 361, 465 
O'Beirne, Mr., 421 
Observation mine-fields, 228 
Oceanic, 110 

loss of, 73, 127 
Older, German crew on, 458 
Oliver, Rear-Admiral Henry F., 186 
Olympic, 149, 151 
Onslaught, 362, 436, 464, 484 
Onslow, 340, 387, 472 

heroism of captain and crew of, 340, 
473, 474 
Onslow, Lieut.-Commander A. G., 465 
Opal, 465 

Ophelia, 330, 332, 364 
Oracle, 336 
Orcoma, 253, 256 
Orion, 8, 93, 103, 106, 119, 121, 152, 191, 

318, 357, 463 

Orkneys and Shetlands, defences of, 81, 
82, 122 

submarine activity in, 166 

wireless stations in, 110 
Oropesa in collision, 244 
Orotava, 206 
Orvieto, 217 
Oscar II., loss of, 233 
Ossory, 464 
Otway, 458 
Owl, 9, 464 

Pakenham, Rear-Admiral W. C, 8, 203, 

319, 466, 489 

succeeds Sir Gordon Moore, 210 
Palmer, Lieut.-Commander, 340, 467, 474 



Parker, Captain Edmond Hyde, 463 

Parker, Captain Henry Wise, 463 

Parsons, Lieutenant G., 245 

Pasley, 441 

Patey, Vice-Admiral, proceeds to West 

Indies, 210 
Patia, 245, 271 



Patrol engaged by battle cruisers, 177 
I'aluca, 233 

Peace manoeuvres, unreality of, 37 
Pears, Rear-Admiral Edmund R., 80, 97, 

127 
Peking Legations, relief Expedition for, 63 
Pelican, 324, 441, 460, 470 
Pelly, Captain Henry B., 466, 493 
Penn, 430 
Penshurst, 262 

Pentland Firth, approaches patrolled, 
110, 252 

gunnery practice in, 65, 281 
Persius, Captain, an admission by, 409 
Petard, 324, 325, 378, 470, 471, 484 
Peterhead, good work of patrol at, 225 

patrol sinks a submarine, 293 

trawlers sunk by enemy, 430 
Phaeton, 217, 320, 442. 466 

attacks a Zeppelin, 290 
Phillpotts, Captain Edward M., 350, 466, 

478 
Phipps, Lieutenant W. D., 7 
Piercy, Lieut.-Commander, 207 
Pitt, Captain Stanley Dean, 82 
Plover, 147 

Plowden, Commander Richard A. A., 464 
Plunkett, Flag-Commander the Hon. 

Reginald A. R., 489 
Pohl, Admiral von, 63, 200 
Poignand, Lieut.-Commander C. A., 465 
Pollard, Fleet-Paymaster C. F., 7 
Pommern, loss of, 314, 376, 379 
Porpoise, 9, 259, 464 

rams a submarine, 442 
Portrush, German wreckage ashore at, 

191 
Pound, Captain A. D. P. R., 462 
Pratt, Captain Thomas D., 466 
Preston, Commander L. G., 9, 242, 261 
Prince Charles, 262, 263 

sinks a U-boat, 263 
Prince of Wales, 10 
Princess Louise, 232 

attacked by submarine, 232 
Princess Margaret, 255, 289 
Princess Royal, 8, 135, 186, 190, 196, 198, 
418, 473 

convoys Canadian troops, 134, 136, 
137 

in Dogger Bank battle, 203, 493, 494, 
495, 496 

in Jutland battle, 320, 322, 466, 480 

joins North American Squadron, 161, 
168 
Prim Friedrich Wilhelm, 134 
Prisoners of war, German courtesy to, 240 
Prowse, Captain Cecil I., 465 

death of, 487 
Prudentia, loss of, 267 



INDEX 



507 



Purefoy, Rear-Admiral Richard P. F., 96 
"P. Z. Exercises," 391 

"Q" SHIPS (see Decoy ships) 
Queen, 10 

Queen Elizabeth, 219, 442 
Queen Mary, 8, 24, 194, 198, 203, 310, 466 
loss of, 306, 326, 471 

Ramage, Commander G. N., 434 

Ramexo, 437, 443 

Ramsey, Commander Charles G., 466 

Ramsey sunk by disguised mine-layer, 239 

Uiingc of gim and torpedo, 38 

Uaiigc-Knders, improved, 418 

llangc-finding experiments, 68 

Rattler, 185 

Kawlings, Lieut.-Commander H. C, 464 

Rcdpole, 9, 184 

Reeves, Captain Edward, 466 

Rcna. 273 

Renown, her deck protection improved, 
448 

Repulse, her deck protection improved, 
448 
joins the Fleet, 447 

Retiring tactics, advantages of, 401 

Revenge, 318, 354, 357, 360, 363, 381, 462, 
486 

Ridley, Lieut.-Commander John J. C, 
465 

Rifleman, 9, 107, 218 

Rivett-Carne, Lieut. J. W., 68 

Robertson, Mr., 421 

Robinson, Lieut.-Commander Charles 
G., 385, 467 

Rokilla, wreck of, 153 

Roper, Captain (D.) Charles D.. 466 

Rosehearty, a submarine attack on a 
merchant-ship at, 237 

Rosemary torpedoed, 430 

Ross, Captain George P., 355, 462, 481 

Rostock, 379, 409 

Rosyth, a conference at, 78 
base at, 28 
conditions for leaving and returning 

to base at, 299 
development of base at, 79 
German prisoners landed at, 113 
inter\'iew with Mr. Balfour at, 459 
submarine obstructions for, 77 
the coal diiEculty at, 84 
3rd Battle Squadron at, 24, 156 

Roxburgh, 8, 88, 199, 223, 277, 282, 420, 
425 
hit by torpedo, 224 

Royal Arthur, 11, 205 

Royal Naval Service, anti-aircraft work 
of, 72 

Royal Oak, 318, 358, 463 



Royal Sovereign, 442 

Royalist, 217, 435, 464 

Royds, Captain Percy M. R., 464, 476 

Ruby, 9, 184 

Russell, 10, 93, 237 

Russell, Lieut.-Commander Spencer F., 

465 
Russian steamer sunk, 449 
Russians relay their mine-fields, 284 

visit Grand Fleet, 275 
Russo-Japanese War, advances in tech- 
nique in, viii 
Rutland, Flight-Lieutenant F. S., 321, 469 

St. Clair, 110 

St. John, Captain F. G., 493 

St. Vincent, 7, 318, 357, 362, 463 

Salmond, Lieut.-Commander J. S., 7 

Sams, Lieut.-Commander Cecil H.H., 466 

Sapphire, 105 

Sappho, 7, 107, 122, 136, 137, 171, 181, 

193, 217, 218, 251, 258 
Sarah Alice torpedoed, 446 
Savill, Captain, 422, 463 
Scapa Flow, a floating dock placed at, 80 

a wireless school established at, 59, 188 

adopted as main Fleet Base, 15, 26 

arrival of Campania at, 71 

arrival of air- and sea-planes at, 100 

blocking the channels, 77, 167 

defenceless nature of base at, 92, 114, 
143 

entrances to, 26, 28, 159, 298 

gunnery and torpedo practice at, 65, 
70, 160 

recreation and occupation at, 85-7 

reinforcing gun defences of, 82 

situation of, 27 

submarine menace, 139 

submarine obstruction pierced, 181 

submarine obstructions at, 144, 170 
Scarborough, bombardment of, 176 
Schwab, Mr., interviews Sir J. Jellicoe, 

151 
Schwann, Captain O., 283 
Scott, Captain Albert C, 466 
Scott, Sir Percy, and Director-firing 

system, 66, 67 
Scottish coast, Moewe lays minefield on, 
265 

submarines on, 153 
Seagull, 9 
Sea-plane carriers, orders to, 54 

sheds wrecked by gale, 160 
Seaplanes as scouts, 469 

diflSculties of, 71, 221, 222, 282-3, 
290 

first reconnaissance work with Fleet, 
321 

replaced by aeroplanes, 222, 283 



508 



INDEX 



Sea Ranger, 443 
Searchlights, 1G2 

excellence of German, 379 

signalling by, 57 
Second Fleet, 10 
Selbome, Earl of, 34 
Seven Years' War, 39 
Seydlilz, 197, 310, 409 
Seymour, Admiral Sir Edward, 1, 63 
Seymour, Lieut.-Commander Ralph W., 

489 
Shamrock, 241 

Shan-hai-Kwan forts, capture of, 63 
Shannon, 8, 88, 168, 318, 368, 419, 463 
Share, Fleet Paymaster Hamnet H., 2, 

491 
Shark, 9, 176, 330, 368, 419, 463 

heroism of captain and crew, 333 

loss of, 332, 476 

survivors awarded D. S. M., 334 
Sheldrake, 9 

Shetland Patrol Force, 9 
Signalling by searchlight, 57 
Skipjack, 9, 166 

Smith, C. H., awarded D. S. M., 334 
Smoke screens, 69, 325, 357, 359, 362, 

363, 366, 408, 479 
Soudan, 148 
South Atlantic, von Spec's Squadron in, 

24, 157, 161, 204 
Southampton, 8, 88, 95, 178, 182, 203, 290, 
319, 320, 326, 442, 466, 493, 494 

and Jutland battle, 362, 375, 471, 472, 
485 
South-east coast, raids on, 287 
Sowerby, Captain Charles F., 466 

death of, 487 
Sparrowhawk, 9, 205, 464 

rammed, 376 

sinking of, 383, 485 
"Special Service Squadron," the, 171 
Spee, Admiral von, 24, 157, 161, 204, 205 
Speedwell, 9 
Speedy, loss of, 120 
Spickemell, Frank T., 489 
Spitfire, 9, 176, 375, 464, 483 
Spithead, Naval Review at, 3 
Spitzbergen, reported German submarine 

base and wireless station at, 233 
Stadlandet, patrols off, 276, 292 
Stag, 135 

Stanistreet, Lieutenant Henry D. C, 467 
Stanley, Captain the Hon. Victor A., 463 
Star shells, 378, 379 
Staunch, 9, 233 

Stavanger, Zeppelin destroyed at, 290 
Stileman, Rear-Admiral H. H., 73 
Stirling, Captain A. J. B., 377, 378, 465, 

483 
Stoddart, Rear-Admiral A. P., 10 



Stuart, Lieut.-Commandcr Dudley, 467 
Sturdee, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton, 207, 
318, 410, 463, 477, 488 
destroys von Spee's squadron, 204 
in Jutland battle, 482 
kite balloon experiments of, 71 
succeeds Sir D. Gamble, 205 
tribute to, 488 
Submarine acti\'ity in 'RTiite Sea, 449 
attack under difficulties, 457 
C 27 sinks a German U-boat, 232 
flotilla, organised as a unit of Grand 

Fleet, 294 
flotillas. Instructions to, 54 
menace, 76, 115, 434. 445, 453 et 

passim 
obstructions (system of), 28, 77, 159, 

170, 220, 225 
patrols, 225, 426 

peril to merchant shipping, 445 et seq. 
screens, question of, 45 
sinks German steamship, 426 
surrender of a German, 166 
Submarine Flotilla (10th), formation of, 

447 
Submarines, attached to Grand Fleet, 
54, 425 
comparative strength of British and 

German, 11, 17 
defences against, at Scapa Flow, 27 
German, 17 
in colUsion, 289 (note) 
reason for suppressing news of en- 
gagements with, 387 
sunk by Navy, 93, 165, 166, 207, 214, 
225, 226, 246, 263 
Sule Skerry, a suspicious steamer at, 152 
Sulis-Ker Rock, target practice at, 182 
SuUvan, Commander Harold E., 464 
Sulivan, Commander Norton A., 465 
Sumner, Lieut.-Commander Charles G. 

C, 150, 465 
Superb, 7, 192, 199, 244, 318, 463 
Swan, T. W., awarded D. S. M., 334 
Swarbachs Minn, as coaling base, 73, 162, 
220 
defences of, 232 
evacuation of, 162 
Swift, 9, 141, 142 

Symonds, Captain Loder, rams enemy 
destroyer, 280 

Taku forts, capture of, 63 

Talisman, 267, 294, 446 

Taranaki, 232 

Tarbet Ness, a submarine reported at, 291 

Tay, River, submarines off entrance to, 

187 
Taylor, Engineer Captain, killed in 

action, 197 



INDEX 



509 



Telephonic communications, establish- 
ment of, 214 
Tcmeraire, 8. 318, 463 
Termagant, 324, 325, 467, 470, 471 
Terry, Lieut.-Commander F. G., 375, 464 
Teutonic, 131, 137 

intercepts a Norwegian-American 
liner, 255 
Theseus, 11, 21, 135, 141, 277 
Thesiger, Captain Bertram S., 466 
Thetis. 11, 120 
Third Fleet, 11 
Thomson, Lieut.-Commander E. C. O., 

466 
Thomhill, 148, 149 

Thunderer, 8, 172, 175, 318, 352, 354, 463 

Tiger, 24, 174, 199, 203, 204, 308, 420, 467 

in Dogger Bank battle, 196, 493, 494, 

495 
in Jutland action, 322, 325, 472 
joins 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, 158 
Tipperary, 376, 463, 485 

loss of, 483 
Tippet, Lieut.-Commander Arthur G., 

466 
Tirpitz, Grand-Admiral von, 63 
Titania, 294 

Tolstoy, Count Ale.xis, 275 
Tondern, Zeppelin sheds at, 278, 289 
Torpedo attacks: caution required in, 
399 
practices at Scapa Flow, 70 
range of, 38 

warfare: element of chance in, 393, 
395 
importance attached by Germany to, 

393 
measures for combating, 359, 399 
work of German Navy, 62 
Torpedoes, influence of, on tactics, 51 

reports on, at battle of Jutland, 360 
Tothill, Captain Hugh H. D., 463 
Tottenham, Rear-Admiral, succeeds 

Rear-Admiral Waymouth, 213 
Tovey, Lieut.-Commander J. C, 340, 
467, 475 
heroism of and tribute to, 340, 374-5 
Townsend, Captain Cyril S., 464 
Trafalgar, Battle of, 302 
Trawlers, German, engaged and de- 
stroyed, 278 
support marine obstructions at Scapa 

Flow, 82 
suspicious, 106, 124, 224 
Trelawny, Lieut.-Commander C. W. E., 

375, 465, 483 
Trewin, Assistant-Pajinaster G. S., 321, 

469 
Trident, 294 
Trondhjem, Brandenburg at, 132 



Turbulent, 325, 326, 379, 467, 470, 471, 
484 
rammed and sunk, 378-80 
Turkish battleships, purchase of, 108, 

129 
Tynemouth, mineBelds off, 110 
Tyrwhitt, Commodore R. Y., 10, 191, 
198, 229. 239, 249, 251, 259, 271, 
278, 279, 286, 385, 386, 436, 440, 
442, 493 
a successful haul of German trawlers, 

249 
chases a destroyer. 111 
orders sinking of Medusa, 278 

U-BOAT losses, 93, 164, 166, 207, 214, 225, 

226, 246, 262 
Undaunted, 157, 279, 280, 493 
Underbill, Captain Edwin V., 463 
United Services Club, dinner party at, 2 
United States enters the War, 303 
Unity, 9, 176, 464 

Usbome, Commander Cecil V., 60, 61 
Usedom, Admiral von, 63 
Utvoer Lighthouse, 133, 270 

Vala, 262 

Valiant, 275, 328, 362, 466 

in collision, 434 
Vanguard, 7, 115, 318, 463 
Venerable, 10 
Vengeance, 10 
Victor, 9 

Victoria Cross awards, 326, 332 
Victorious, 83, 417 
Viknor, 192 

loss of, 193 
Vindex, 71, 289 
Visual signalling, 57 
Von der Tann, 310 

Wales, Prince of, visits Scapa, 243 
Walney Island, submarine attack on, 198 
Ward, Lieut.-Commander the Hon. C. A., 

465 
Wardle, Captain T. E., 272 
Warrender, Vice-Admiral Sir George, in 
command of 2nd Battle Squadron, 
7, 41, 91, 94, 148, 177, 178, 179 
terminates his command, 261 
Warrior, 171, 290, 318, 334, 335, 336, 463 
abandoned and sunk, 306, 386, 387, 

485 
in Jutland battle, 385, 477 
Warspite, 213, 256, 336, 466 
in collision, 258, 434 
in Jutland battle, 328, 349, 350, 478 
Waymouth, Rear-Admiral Arthur W., 
198 
breakdown in health, 213 



510 



INDEX 



Weekes, Fleet-Paymaster V. H. T., 7 

{note), 491 
Welsh coal-fields, strike in, 229, 235 
White Sea, enemy submarines in, 448, 

449 
protecting the trade route, 256, 257 
Whitfield, Lieut.-Commander Paul, 466 
Wiesbaden badly crippled, 335, 340 
William II., Emperor, criticises British 

dock accommodation, 315 
Wilson, Commander W. W., 169 
Wintour, Captain Charles J., 9, 376, 464 
death of, 380. 483, 487 
unpleasant experience of, 142 
Wireless school at Scapa, 59, 188 
Wireless signalling, and why restricted, 

56,57 
Wireless telegraphy, 38, 56 et seq., 110 

improved system of, 58, 59, 188 
Withers, Captain Percy, 464 
Wolf intercepted and sunk, 276 
Woods, Commander A. E., 188 
Woods, Commander Alexander R. W., 7, 

490 
WooUcombe, Captain Louis C. S., 463 
WooUcombe, Captain Maurice, 466 



Wynter, Lieut.-Commander Gerald C, 
464 

Yarmouth, 185, 203, 320, 430, 466 

in Jutland battle, 338, 476 
Yegoroff, M., 275 
YoTck, sinking of, 157 
York, Archbishop of, visits the Fleet, 228 
Yorkshire coast mined by enemy, 180 
Young, Captain G. B., 272 
Young, Captain, of Liverpool Salvage 
Association, 187 

Zaza, 231 

Zealandia, 8, 254, 255 

Zeebrugge, blocking of, discussed and 

considered impracticable, 154 
Zeppelin activity. 436, 437, 442, 443 

bombs rescuers, 496 

engaged by Fleet in Jutland battle, 
486 

shed, Tondem, attack on, 278, 289 
Zeppelins as scouts, 32, 451 

destruction of, 169, 290 

raids by, 282 
Zigzagging, procedure of, 46 



.0 0^ 












"^/-'♦'/no'' ,# 






-C.,,^'' 

.S^ 



J ., . , *"" .r,^ 









Sso 






,0c 






^^ ,V\V 



aV (/^„ "^ 






,0C> • 






<=0 









■•<f^ 






; ■^:^■^ A 






v" :m 






"^y v^^' 



.^ '^.-^/C.'^^^/' 



.0 



^■r^"^^cP 






v'*' - 



V- 







■^^-.^ „V 






L 









.•^ -^^ 




"^,^ v^' 






-V\ 






rO „^ ° ' *, <i5 



Oeacidified using the Bookkeeper process. ' 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: )l[f^ onni 



'''^ * » ' > o> s ^ ' ' . -'t. ^ X \ PreservationTechnologies 



'- -■^^■>''' 



A WOnLO LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 



fe%* .^.'i' 



.x^^^' 



^ ^"^^^'^ '^ >^ 



s^" "^^ 



'' %.,^'- : 


111 Thomson Park OfivQ 
Cranberry Township. PA 16066 


* *> "" 


(724) 779-2111 


;^' ^■/.^P^.r,,- ■\^^::-: 


'^■:% '" v<.^::^^''°- 




^•' ^<jM^ ^^""^«^ : "°o' 


• ""^ '.^^^i \^ '' 


^ ' ' . , V - ,;, 





-ns? 



357/ 



^-^^,^ ,^j.^^ ^_^^ 



y^'"' :^\^^, -A *.^o> ,r 



WW,. 



DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE SITUATION THAT MIGHT 
HAVE ARISEN HAD THE BATTLE FLEET DEPLOYED ON 



DictgroTTL U . 



THE STARBOARD WING COLUMN. 



JG^ Gearoe V. 



Ma-rihorotigli 




SignxJy to deploy 6-16 
{"jC'otcs not bearing) 



it should be borne in mind that no information as to 
the position of the Enemy Battle Fleet was received until 
6. 14. P. M., and that the only reports received had been 
one at 6. 6. P. M, giving a bearing of the Enemy Battle 
Cruisers from the "Lion", and a report at 5. 50. P. M. 
from the "Southampton" to the effect that the Enemy 
Battle Fleet bore north-east from his Battle Cruisers 
(and were therefore presumably ahead of them und ri^ht 
ahead of our Battle Fleet.) 

There had therefore been no sufficient information on 
which to re-dispose the guides of columns; deployment 
on the starboard wing column to meet an enemy before 
the starboard beam would necessarily be an awkward 
manoeuvre as it would involve a considerable alteration 
of the starboard wing column to port and a very large 
alteration of course of the remaining columns when 
coming into line astern of it. 

A torpedo attack during deployment would under these 
conditions throw the British Battle Fleet into great 
confusion and a concentration of gunfire on the turning 
point would be very effective; our own gunfire, owing to 
the large alterations of course and the consequent 
difficulty of obtaining correct fire control data would be 
correspondingly ineffective: our own destroyers had been 
spread ahead of the Battle Fleet as a submarine screen 
until 6. 8 P. M. and were moving across the front in an 
unformed condition to the two flanks. 

The movements that would probably have resulted and 
the number of ships on each side in action are shown in 
the diagram for each 3-minute interval from 6.16 to 
6. 28 P.M, 

The three ships of the 5th. Battle Squadron would 
eventually have come into line ahead of the 6th. division, 
bnt would possibly have masked the fire of that division 
during the movement. 



(*!'■& skip Hri7ifi)6 -19 

(^"i ships firing) 6^2 



18 (*U% ships firing) 
'6-Z5(*8^ ships firing) 



■* In some, of the rear sTvips only half the. hroaiside 
is hearinj/ hence the frcuction/. 



Destroyers attack on 
Battle Fleet 



(ISshzps firing) 
'6ZZ (9 ships firing) 




SZ8 (17 ships firing) 



619 (A'arcs bearing)^ 
(4 ships firing) 



German Destroyers 
■sstcrned hervabouis 



iVin of Battlf Fltet 6 14 



Ditigram- III 



. 


\ 


Kuig Co,-:,,. V Q^ 
ffcn/joyv Q. \ ^,. ^^ 

\ \^ ^^^ PlllJpm 


MufUittrotiglL.^ 


;p«i 




-» 


i 




\ 

\ 




''ourse SoutJi' \ Q.,A,fi, * 

\ '^'".7 Oenrqv V 
\ ' ' Qlioii.yilSp.j,i. 




V 




\ 

\ 




hz\... J 




1 






all! 


'i^rs"l-\ ^ -■■■ 




r.* 






^^;, / ^^^ 


57o'A 




DIAGRAM SHOWING 
ORDER OF THE BATTLEFLEET 


Coursn lietwecJL. South, «rt^\\ \^j 






BAI-^ILIE m JU^ILAM® 




/ M 






31=^^ MAY 1916 


L 


Z:lji%K'l6 'va 








k of t/i4:"Jioii, /Juice" 

„ fleet in. single lirue dheail. 

.. leaders of Mvtsions.wJmviwt in, 'iuitjle li/ie a}ipad: //' 
^•y" trtu-Jc //'-' 


/ )^W-1tp.,^- 
/ Vtl.WT,m f Course S.f>:</hrmiftti..!in<jlcime) 
/ p ™ "f" /u„},a,vm-5Spm. 

/,——",'" /Mavlbo,;.„pli. yyrSH p.m. 












Xion 






Wmisopinr— 

Bat'haitu/*' y " ^/ 


Wesv/^ — ■ / 
■apinJ f/*'- 










^farlhoroi^luA--'"' y^ 


m-46 p.„i. 










(Moaans/,' y^ y 


y^ 










Bejihow /f y/^ ,^ 










«,■- 


LioiuMl-lSpmnng'^riiA 

mt-20pm,cr7fr\ 1 

/ /,' \ \ 
/ ^JBiu).<;eorgeV 

Mon,Vm-25p.^c/ £j^.ooA. \ 




"^finotanr's' track' chart/ I'evorHs thai, at 8 p.iiu 
'iGiig George Vbure NIOE (Wue) from h^r. 
tlistunJt/ aboul 5 miles 

Jb aisorecords tJinO'Lion' hcfre WljyS.(true} 
fhanf Jter, distant' (djout/ 5 miles. 
If Ih&se records are rfUabie "Lions'Sp.m/. 
posiUorv would' be. ai/X , ond/ Iter tfcick, be- 
tween- 7'W and/ S p.nu, presumably as 




- 






'Minotaur's 'records 1iowevei\ do not/ profess 
to give cKftct dislnnees. 




/ \ % 










\ 


/ ' I 






I 






Hiagram, IV 




PLAN OF 

JUTLAND BATTLE 

BEFORE AND AFTER DEPLOYMENT 



The position of our Battle Cruisers at 6 0. P. M. is fixed 
by a report from the Marlborough and confirmed at 
6. 4. P. M. by a report from the Rear-Admiral 1st Battle 
Squadron in the Colossus. 

The position of the 5th Battle Squadron is fixed by 
a report from the Marlborough at 6. 5. P. M. taken 
in conjunction with the reports of the Rear-Admiral 
5th Battle Squadron. 

The courses of our Battle Cruisers are taken from 
the report of the Vice-Admiral Battle Cruiser Fleet 
and from the lion and Indomitable. 

The position of the Enemy Battle Cruisers at 6. 7. P. M. 
is fixed by a report from the Lion received at 6. 6. P. M.; 
this gave the bearing; the distance is obtained by a 
consideration of the ranges at which the Lion was firing. 



The position of.the Enemy Battle Fleet is fixed at 6. 14. 
P. M. from the Lion and at 6. 15. P. M. from the Barham; 
the latter being signailed by wireless, an interval of four 
minutes being allowed between transmission and 
receipt 

Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Cruisers 
are fixed by the bearings on which our Battle Cruisers 
were firing and the ranges given, and by a consideration 
of the German reports which show a 32 point' turn 
between 6.6. and 6. 15. P.M. 

Subsequent movements of the Enemy Battle Fleet are 
fixed by bearings and ranges given by the Marlborough 
at 617. P. M.,lron Duke at 6. 31. P. M. and Monarch 
at 6.33. P. M. 

The movements of the Defence, Warrior and Warspite are 
fixed by reports and diagrams from the Warrior, Duke of 
Edinburgh and the Rear-Admiral 5th Battle Squadron. 



Note. . In studyingthis diagram it should be borne in mind that 
only a few of the German ships were visible at a time due 
to the smoke and mist. 




Diagram, J. 



InvinaJ,U(5-5Z)\ 



Vim, of German, Battle Fleet 
(6I4-) 



